RECORDS
OF THE
EMIRATES
1820-1958

1

1820–1835

EDITOR
PENELOPE
TUSON

FX 2728

RECORDS
OF THE
EMIRATES
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS
1820–1958

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PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 1820–1958

Edited by
Penelope Tuson

VOLUME 1
1820–1835

ARCHIVE EDITIONS
1990

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Summary of contents of the complete work

Summary of contents v
Editor's preface xv
Select bibliography xvii
Political office holders in the Persian Gulf, India and Britain, 1820–1958 xix

Volume 1: 1820–1835

THE GENERAL TREATY OF 1820 AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH IMPERIAL INTERESTS

1.01 Agreement between Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr and the East India Company, 6 February 1806

1.02 The Preliminary and General Treaties, January 1820

1.03 The formulation of British policy: notes prepared by Francis Warden for the Government of Bombay, August 1819

1.04 Government of Bombay's instructions to Major-General Sir William Grant Keir on the expedition to the 'Pirate ports', 27 October and 27 November 1819

1.05 Gulf policy: the Government of Bombay's views, December 1819

1.06 Sir William Grant Keir's reports on the conclusion of the treaties and the operations in the Arabian Gulf, January–February 1820

1.07 British policy on the conclusion of the 1820 treaties, January–June 1820

1.08 The search for a British base: Qishm, February–April 1821

1.09 A marine patrol in the Gulf, November–December 1821

1.10 The removal of the troops from Qishm and maritime control, November 1822–January 1823

1.11 The British Resident, 1822

1.12 The appointment of a British Agent at Sharjah, 1825

THE SHAIKHDOMS OF THE COAST

1.13 Chronological table of events, 1730–1843

1.14 Captain Robert Taylor's description of the 'Pirate Ports' and the pearl industry, 1818

1.15 Historical sketches of the Arab Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1747–1854

1.16 The Arabian Coast Surveys, 1821–1829

1.17 The character and status of Sultan b. Saqr, October 1819–February 1820

1.18 An account of Sharjah, August 1820

1.19 The British Resident's report on his tour of the coast, February 1823

1.20 General report on the state of affairs in the Gulf, 1825

1.21 Joint attack on Bahrain by Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat and Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi, August–December 1828

1.22 Hostilities between Sultan b. Saqr and Bani Yas: agreement defining boundaries negotiated by Shaikh of Lingah, February–June 1829

1.23 Assassination of Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi by his brothers Khalifah and Sultan, April 1833

1.24 Emigration of Al Bu Falasah to Dubai, 1833

1.25 Bani Yas/Qasimi war, 1833–1834

THE ORIGINS OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

1.26 Historical sketch of the Wahhabis, 1795–1853

1.27 Wahhabi surrender of Buraimi, May 1819

1.28 Uprising of Na'im at Buraimi against Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat; mediation of Sultan b. Saqr, 1820

1.29 The Buraimi forts, December 1824–April 1825

1.30 Hostilities at Buraimi and arbitration by Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut, November 1828–May 1829

1.31 The second Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi, 1833

Volume 2: 1835–1853

THE TRUCIAL SYSTEM

2.01 British policy towards the Arab tribes of the Gulf, 1820–1844

2.02 British action against maritime warfare and the Bani Yas, 1835

2.03 The modification of the restrictive line, January 1836

2.04 Renewals of the Maritime Truce, 1836–1843

2.05 The Maritime Truce, June 1843

2.06 Lieutenant A. B. Kemball's tour of the Trucial shaikhdoms, May 1844

2.07 The Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, May 1853

HISTORICAL SUMMARIES AND TRAVELLERS' ACCOUNTS

2.08 Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, 1856

2.09 F. Whitelock's and J. R. Wellsted's travels into the interior of Oman, November 1835–March 1836

2.10 H. H. Whitelock's account of the Arabs of the Coast, 1836

REGIONAL RELATIONS

2.11 Destruction of Qubaisat settlement at 'Udaid by Shaikh Khalifah b. Shakhbut, May 1837

2.12 Departure of Al bin 'Ali Shaikh 'Isa b. Tarif from Abu Dhabi, December 1839

2.13 The Egyptian invasion of eastern Arabia, 1838–1839

2.14 An Egyptian Agent at Sharjah, June–July 1839

2.15 Disturbances at Buraimi, July–August 1839

2.16 Captain Atkins Hamerton's journey to Buraimi, January 1840

2.17 Relations between Shaikh Khalifah b. Shakhbut, Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr and the Na'im, 1841–1844

2.18 The third Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi, 1845–1848

2.19 The re-establishment of Wahhabi naib Sa'ad b. Mutlaq at Buraimi and the proposal to rebuild 'Udaid, 1849–1850

2.20 Relations of Shaikh Sa'id b. Tahnun of Abu Dhabi with Muscat, 1850–1852

THE SLAVE TRADE

2.21 Measures adopted for the suppression of the slave trade in the Gulf, 1820–1844

2.22 The case of the Somali slave girls, 1837–1838

2.23 Agreements on slave trade concluded with Shaikhs Sultan b. Saqr, Khalifah b. Shakhbut, Maktum b. Buti, Rashid b. Hamad and Abdullah b. Rashid, 1838–1839

2.24 Memorandum on the slave trade in the Gulf, 1835–1840

2.25 Agreement on the abolition of the African slave trade, 1847

Volume 3: 1853–1871

THE RULING SHAIKHS

3.01 The Chiefs of the Maritime Arab States, 1854

3.02 Deposition and death of Shaikh Sa'id b. Tahnun of Abu Dhabi, 1855–1856

3.03 Muscat succession: the death of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan Al Bu Sa'id, 1856

3.04 The British Resident's report on his annual tour of the Gulf, 1859

3.05 Historical sketches of events in the Gulf, June 1859–May 1861

3.06 The death of Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, 1866

3.07 Sharjah succession, the death of Khalid b. Sultan, April 1868

THE TRUCIAL SHAIKHDOMS, MUSCAT AND THE WAHHABI OCCUPATION OF BURAIMI

3.08 Occupation of Buraimi by 'Abdullah b. Faisal Al Sa'ud, 1853

3.09 Shaikh Sa'id b. Tahnun's involvement in the Omani/Persian dispute over the Bandar 'Abbas lease, 1854–1856

3.10 Hamriyyah, 1855

3.11 The Canning Award and its effects on regional politics: Sayyid Thuwaini b. Sa'id's appeal to the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai for help against Sayyid Qais b. Azzan, 1861

3.12 The Wahhabi invasion of Oman, 1865–1866

3.13 Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini in opposition, 1868–1869

3.14 The occupation of Buraimi by Sayyid Azzan b. Qais, 1869–1870

3.15 The rebellion against Azzan b. Qais and the accession of Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id: involvement of the Trucial Shaikhs, 1870–1871

BRITISH INTERESTS: MARITIME PEACE AND THE SLAVE TRADE

3.16 Engagement relating to the slave trade, 1856

3.17 Additional article for the protection of the telegraph line and stations, 1864

3.18 Joint attack on Qatar by Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifah of Bahrain and Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah of Abu Dhabi; breaches of the maritime truce, 1867–1868

SURVEYORS AND EXPLORERS

3.19 The hydrography of the Gulf, 1856

3.20 The Persian Gulf Pilot, 1864

3.21 Description of the maritime shaikhdoms, 1863

3.22 Lewis Pelly's journey to Riyadh, 1865

Volume 4: 1871–1892

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY: TURKISH EXPANSION AND THE BRITISH RESPONSE

4.01 The Turkish occupation of Al Hasa, 1871

4.02 British policy and the question of Turkish jurisdiction on the Arabian coast, 1879–88

4.03 The Exclusive Treaty of 1892

KHAUR AL-'UDAID: RELATIONS BETWEEN ABU DHABI AND QATAR

4.04 Migration of the Qubaisat to Khaur al-'Udaid, 1869

4.05 Turkish activities in the Qatar peninsula, 1873

4.06 'Udaid affairs, 1876–1880

4.07 Relations between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, 1881–1886: Government of India Foreign Department Proceedings

4.08 Relations between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, 1887–1890

EASTERN ARABIAN FRONTIERS: THE ASCENDANCY OF SHAIKH ZAID BIN KHALIFAH OF ABU DHABI

4.09 Muscat affairs: involvement of Shaikh Rashid b. Maktum and Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah, 1871

4.10 Visits to Muscat by Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah and Shaikh Tahnun b. Zaid, 1875–1884

4.11 Buraimi: Turkish interests and the balance of power, 1873–1875

4.12 Relations between Abu Dhabi and Muscat, 1886

4.13 Consolidation of Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah's power, 1887–1892

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

4.14 Slave trade agreements, 1873

4.15 The economy of the coastal shaikhdoms, 1873–1892

4.16 Summary of inter-tribal hostilities, 1873–1892

4.17 Relations between Sharjah and Fujairah, 1876–1888

4.18 The ruling shaikhs, 1883–1887

Volume 5: 1892–1909

BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY: THE CURZON ERA

5.01 British hegemony on the Trucial Coast: the Exclusive Treaty, 1892

5.02 The evolution of British policy, 1898–1905

5.03 Curzon's tour of the Gulf, 1903

5.04 Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 1903–1908

5.05 Naval defences and British flagstaffs, 1903–1908

5.06 British policy in the Gulf, 1905–1909

INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTER-STATE RELATIONS

5.07 Rulers of Dubai, 1894–1906: Shaikh Maktum b. Hashr and Shaikh Buti b. Suhail

5.08 Abu Dhabi: bedouin settlement at Zura, 1895–1905

5.09 Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Buraimi, 1902–1909

5.10 Umm al-Qaiwain: relations with Abu Dhabi, 1904–1907

5.11 The Qawasim empire: Fujairah's independence, 1902–1904

5.12 The Qawasim empire: the re-annexation of Ras al-Khaimah, 1900

5.13 Rulers of Ajman, 1891–1908: Shaikh Humaid b. Rashid and Shaikh 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Humaid

Volume 6: 1909–1921

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: WORLD WAR I

6.01 The Ottoman Empire, Persia and Arabia, 1907–1919

6.02 The British diplomatic and strategic position on the Trucial Coast, 1911–1914

6.03 Britain's post-war role in Arabia, 1919–1921

INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS

6.04 Rulers of Abu Dhabi, 1909–1913

6.05 The Dubai incident, 1910

6.06 Rulers of Dubai, 1912

6.07 Rulers of Ajman, 1910

6.08 Ajman affairs, 1911–1914

6.09 Ajman affairs, 1920–1921

6.10 Rulers of Ras al-Khaimah, 1910–1921

6.11 Fujairah affairs, 1912–1919

6.12 Umm al-Qaiwain affairs, 1912–1916

6.13 Rulers of Umm al-Qaiwain, 1912–1917

THE GULF WATERS AND ISLANDS

6.14 Shipping in the Gulf, 1909–1912

6.15 Abu Musa Island, 1883–1921

6.16 Halul Island, 1913–1919

THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMY

6.17 Pearl fishing, 1904–1914

Volume 7: 1921–1935

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

7.01 Political control in the Persian Gulf, 1921–1935

7.02 The protectorate idea, 1927–1928

7.03 Communications and air routes, 1928–1932

INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND INTER-STATE RELATIONS

7.04 Rulers of Abu Dhabi, 1922–1928

7.05 Rulers of Umm al-Qaiwain, 1922–1929

7.06 Dubai: the rule of Shaikh Sa'id b. Maktum – the middle years, 1929–1935

7.07 Reporting from the Trucial Coast, 1927–1934

7.08 Relations between Abu Dhabi, Dubai and the tribes of the interior, 1924–1931

7.09 Rulers of Sharjah, 1924–1928

7.10 Ajman affairs, 1921–1928

7.11 Fujairah and Kalba affairs, 1925–1927

7.12 Hamriyyah, 1922–1932

REGIONAL RELATIONS

7.13 Eastern Arabian frontiers: India Office memoranda, 1934

7.14 Eastern Arabian frontiers: Ibn Saud and Buraimi, 1925

7.15 Eastern Arabian frontiers: Anglo-Saudi negotiations, 1934

7.16 The Gulf islands, 1928–1935

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY

7.17 Trade in the Gulf, 1928

7.18 Oil exploration, 1921–1928

Volume 8: 1935–1947

BRITISH POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

8.01 The development of British policy and the transfer of power

8.02 The Arabian Gulf air route, 1935–1946

8.03 British jurisdiction, 1938–1947

INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTER-STATE RELATIONS

8.04 Dibba, 1933–1938

8.05 Kalba, 1937–1940

8.06 Fujairah, 1939

8.07 Dibba, 1941–1944

8.08 Hamriyyah, 1937

8.09 Ras al-Khaimah, 1939–1947

8.10 The reform movement in Dubai

8.11 War between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 1946–1947

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY

8.12 Trade in the Gulf

8.13 Oil concession agreements, 1937–1946

8.14 Oil concession negotiations: miscellaneous geographical reports, 1938–1945

8.15 Banking, 1945–1946

REGIONAL RELATIONS

8.16 Eastern Arabian frontiers: Anglo-Saudi frontier negotiations, 1935–1940

8.17 The Gulf islands, 1935–1936

Volume 9: 1947–1958

BRITISH POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION:
THE MOVE TOWARDS FEDERATION AND INDEPENDENCE

9.01 British post-war policy in the Trucial States, 1948–1953

9.02 Question of appointing a Political Officer or Adviser at Abu Dhabi, 1954–1955

9.03 UK policy and responsibility towards the Trucial States, 1955

9.04 The Trucial Oman Levies, 1951

9.05 The protection of British interests, 1954

9.06 The Trucial States Council, 1952

INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND INTER-STATE RELATIONS

9.07 Hamriyyah, 1948

9.08 Abu Dhabi-Dubai war, 1947–1948

9.09 Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary, 1949–1952

9.10 Ras al-Khaimah affairs, 1948–1950

9.11 The Rams affair, 1952

9.12 Kalba affairs, 1948–1952

9.13 Sharjah succession, 1951

9.14 Fujairah affairs, 1950–1954

9.15 Abu Dhabi internal affairs, 1954

9.16 Dubai internal affairs, 1955

9.17 Inter-state boundaries, 1956–1958

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY

9.18 Oil concession agreements, 1947–1954

9.19 The economy of Dubai and Sharjah, 1950

9.20 Dubai finances, 1950

9.21 Dubai hospital, 1952–1953

9.22 Banking, 1953

9.23 Water supply, 1953–1954

9.24 Development projects, 1954–1955

Volume 10: Maps and tables

01 Chart of part of the coast of Arabia in the Persian Gulf. Surveyed by J. M. Guy and G. B. Brucks, 1822–25, and published by J. Horsburgh, 1826

02 Chart of the Gulf of Persia constructed from the trigonometrical surveys of G. B. Brucks, 1830. Published by J. Horsburgh, 1832

03 Sketch of route from Sharjah to Buraimi showing the relative positions of the Naim tribes of Buraimi and Hafit. Captain Atkins Hamerton, January 1840

04 Map of Maritime Arabia with the opposite coasts of Africa and Persia reduced in the Quarter Master General's Office from an original map by Colonel T. Dickinson, Chief Engineer, 4 April 1843

05 General outline map of the Persian Gulf showing submarine cables and the principal places, Admiralty 1903

06 Map of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, compiled in the Foreign Office, Simla by Lieutenant F. F. Hunter for J. G. Lorimer's *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, 1905–1908*

07 Chart showing the pearl banks along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf between Ras Tanura and Dubai, 1908

08 Sketch map of disputed areas between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, showing Dubai claim of 1949. Political Agency, Sharjah, January 1949

09 Sketch map of various proposals for solution of Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary dispute. Political Agency, Sharjah, April 1949

10 Sketch map showing territorial limits of various Trucial Coast shaikhdoms as recognised by Britain. After 1955 report by J. F. Walker, Political Agency, Dubai, 1956

11 Genealogical tables of ruling families

Abu Dhabi
Dubai
Sharjah
Ras al-Khaimah
Ajman
Umm al-Qaiwain
Fujairah

Editor's preface

Records of the Emirates consists of archival and documentary material drawn mainly from the India Office Records and the Public Record Office in London, edited and arranged to provide a comprehensive introduction to the history of the United Arab Emirates from 1820 up to 1958.

As far as possible the selection of material has been focussed on the internal affairs of the emirates and on their relations with each other, although the wider issues of regional and foreign relations have been included to provide the broader international context. British policy and administration inevitably form an essential part of Gulf history. The vast majority of the documents included in these volumes were written, read, acted on and preserved by British civilian or military officials stationed in London, India and other parts of Asia and whose primary concern was the maintenance of British power and influence. The overall picture presented is of 140 years of developing colonial administration. Nevertheless, the picture is not completely one-sided. For varying reasons, the British were always concerned to know how their presence was viewed by local people and consequently took the trouble to gather as much information as they could and to record it. Many individuals, particularly in the nineteenth century, stepped beyond the narrow confines of their administrative or military duties and became genuinely sympathetic reporters of local affairs. The archives, moreover, contain a vast quantity of 'factual' information – geographical surveys, economic data, for example – which enables researchers to look beyond the obvious limitations imposed by their provenance. The inherent bias of the material must always be in the mind of the reader. However, in the absence of any other detailed continuous written historical source, it must still be accepted that the India Office Records, complemented by Public Record Office archives, constitute the basis of all modern historical research on the Gulf area from 1600 until the 1950s.

There is some duplication with other Archive Editions publications, for example on the subjects of boundaries and oil concessions. This is unavoidable where documents are central to a particular issue. On the other hand

I have tried to avoid reproducing a large quantity of material which is already available, and to concentrate instead on issues not dealt with elsewhere. Related publications are listed in the bibliography.

The physical condition of many of the documents imposed some limitations on the selection, particularly for the early nineteenth century period. Much of the original material is very fragile, faded and now almost illegible. As a general rule the archives which were preserved in London have survived in a better condition than those which were kept in the Gulf (i.e. the Residency and Agency files) and where correspondence is duplicated in several archive series it has been possible to select clearer copies. However, many of the detailed reports of the first British Agents at Sharjah (1825 onwards) only exist in full in the agency archives. Wherever possible, for the sake of authenticity, manuscript originals have been reproduced but in the case of key documents such as the early material on Buraimi, alternative printed versions (for example from *The Buraimi Memorials*) have been used rather than omit an essential document. A number of barely legible reports from the Residency Agents at Sharjah have nevertheless been included because they give the reader a taste of the original. Sometimes originals have been reproduced together with printed versions in order to give an authenticity to the text. The provenance of the archival materials has been described at length in *The Records of the British Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf* (see bibliography).

I would like to thank Anita Burdett for her research at the Public Record Office on material relating to the period 1947–1958.

Penelope Tuson
February 1990

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The Persian Gulf Gazette and Supplements, 1953–1972.
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Treaties and engagements relating to Arabia and the Persian Gulf (C. U. Aitchison, 1933).

Political office holders in the Persian Gulf, India and Britain, 1820–1958

Residents and Agents in the Gulf: British (Political) Residents, 1820–1958

Lt William Bruce	Sep 1808–Jul 1822 (acting until 1812)
Surgeon Andrew Jukes	Dec 1808–May 1809 (in charge)
Stephen Babington	April 1810 (i/c)
Nicholas Hankey Smith	Sep 1810
Lt Robert Taylor	Apr 1812–Nov 1812 (i/c)
Asst-Surgeon James Orton	Aug 1813–Apr 1814 (i/c)
James Dow	Nov 1819–Jan 1820 (i/c)
	May 1820–Jan 1822 (i/c)
Asst-Surgeon John Tod	Jan 1822–Mar 1822 (i/c)
	Jul–Dec 1822 Broker and Linguist in charge
Cpt John MacLeod	Dec 1822–Sep 1823[1]
Cpt Henry Hardy	Oct 1823–Dec 1823
Col Ephraim Gerrish Stannus	Dec 1823–Jan 1827
Cpt David Wilson	Jan 1827–Mar 1831
Dr John MacNeil	Dec 1830–Dec 1831
Lt Samuel Hennell	Mar 1831–Jan 1832 (i/c)
David Anderson Blane	Jan 1832–Jun 1834
Lt Samuel Hennell	Jun 1834–*c.*Jul 1835 (acting)
Surgeon Thomas Mackenzie	*c.*Jul 1835–
Major James Morison	Oct 1835–Oct 1837
Surgeon Thomas Mackenzie	Oct 1837–Apr 1838 (i/c)
Lt Samuel Hennell	[May] 1838–Mar 1852
Col Henry Dundas Robertson	Jan 1842–Apr 1843 (officiating)
Lt Arnold Burrowes Kemball	Apr 1843–Dec 1843 (offg)
Cpt Arnold Burrowes Kemball	Mar 1852–Jul 1855

[1] Appointment not taken up and subsequently cancelled.

Cpt James Felix Jones	Oct 1855–Apr 1862 (offg to Jul 1856)
Cpt Herbert Frederick Disbrowe	Apr 1862–Nov 1862 (offg)
Lt-Col Lewis Pelly	Nov 1862–Oct 1872 (acting to Mar 1863; offg to Apr 1864)
Lt-Col Edward Charles Ross	Oct 1872–Mar 1891 (acting until 1877)
Lt-Col William Francis Prideaux	May 1876–1877 (acting)
Lt-Col Samuel Barrett Miles	1885–Oct 1886 (acting)
Lt-Col Adelbert Cecil Talbot	1891–May 1893 (offg to Sep 1891)
Cpt Stuart Hill Godfrey	May 1893–Jun 1893 (i/c)
Maj James Hayes Sadler	Jun 1893–Jul 1893 (acting)
James Adair Crawford	Jul 1893–Dec 1893 (i/c)
Maj James Hayes Sadler	Dec 1893–Jan 1894 (acting)
Col Frederick Alexander Wilson	Jan 1894–Jun 1897
Lt-Col Malcolm John Meade	Jun 1897–Apr 1900 (offg to Mar 1898)
Lt-Col Charles Arnold Kemball	Apr 1900–Apr 1904 (acting)
Maj Percy Zachariah Cox	Apr 1904–Dec 1913 (offg to Oct 1905; substantive, temp to May 1909)
Maj Arthur Prescott Trevor	Aug 1909–Mar 1910 (i/c)
John Gordon Lorimer	Dec 1913–Feb 1914
Cpt Richard Lockington Birdwood	Feb 1914–Mar 1914 (i/c)
Maj Stuart George Knox	Mar 1914–Nov 1914 (i/c)
Maj Percy Zachariah Cox	Nov 1914–Oct 1920[2]
Maj Stuart George Knox	Jan 1915–Apr 1915 (officer on special duty)
Maj Arthur Prescott Trevor	Apr 1915–Nov 1917 (Deputy PR)
John Hugo Hepburn Bill	Dec 1917–Sep 1919 (Deputy PR)
Maj Cecil Hamilton Gabriel	Sep 1919–Nov 1919 (Deputy PR)
Lt-Col Arthur Prescott Trevor	Nov 1919–Oct 1920 (Deputy PR)
Lt-Col Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson	Oct 1920–Nov 1920 (offg)
Lt-Col Arthur Prescott Trevor	Nov 1920–Apr 1924
Lt-Col Stuart George Knox	Apr 1923–Oct 1923 (acting)
Lt-Col Francis Beville Prideaux	Apr 1924–Jan 1927
Lt-Col Charles Gilbert Crosthwaite	Jun 1925–Oct 1925 (acting)
Lt-Col Sir Lionel Berkeley Haworth	Jan 1927–Nov 1928
Sir Frederick William Johnston	Nov 1928–Apr 1929
Lt-Col Cyril Charles Johnson Barrett	Apr 1929–Nov 1929
Lt-Col Hugh Vincent Biscoe	Nov 1929–Jul 1932
Lt-Col Trenchard Craven Fowle	May 1931–Oct 1931 (acting)
Lt Col Trenchard Craven Fowle	Jul 1932–Aug 1939 (acting to Sep 1932)
Lt-Col Percy Gordon Loch	Apr 1933–May 1933
	Jul 1933–Oct 1933
	Jul 1934–Oct 1934
	Jul 1935–Oct 1935
	Jul 1936–Oct 1936 (acting)
Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe	Aug 1937–Nov 1937 (acting)
Hugh Weightman	Aug 1938–Sep 1938 (acting)
Lt-Col Charles Geoffrey Prior	Sep 1939–May 1946
Lt-Col William Rupert Hay	Oct 1941–Sep 1942 (offg)
Lt-Col Arnold Crawshaw Galloway	May 1945–Nov 1945
Lt-Col William Rupert Hay	May 1946–1953

[2] Cox was titular PR until October 1920 although absent in Baghdad. His duties were performed in his absence by an 'Officer on Special Duty' whose title was later changed to 'Deputy PR'. On Cox's appointment as Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran in March 1918, A. T. Wilson took over as absentee Resident in Baghdad until October 1920.

Lt-Col Arnold Crawshaw Galloway	Jun 1947–Oct 1947 (offg)
Bernard A. B. Burrows	Jul 1953–1958

Residency Agents Trucial Coast (Sharjah), c.1825–1949

Ruzza 'Ali Khan	*c.*1825
Mullah Husain	*c.*1825–1849
Muhammad b. Mullah	1849–1850
Ahmad b. Mullah Husain	*c.*1850
Haji Ya'qub	*c.*1850–1866
Haji Muhammad	1866
Haji 'Abd al-Rahman	May 1866–Jun 1880
Haji 'Abd al-Qasim	Jun 1880–Aug 1890
Khan Bahadur 'Abd al-Latif b. 'Abdal-Rahman	1890–Aug 1919
Khan Bahadur 'Isa b. 'Abd al-Latif	Aug 1919–Sep 1935
Khan Sahib Husain b. Hasan 'Amad	Sep 1935–May 1936 (offg)
Khan Sahib Saiyid 'Abd al-Razzaq	May 1936–Feb 1945
Jasim b. Muhammad Kadmari	Mar 1945–1949

Political Agents and Officers Trucial Coast, 1939–1958

Sharjah:	
Cpt John Baron Howes	Oct 1939–Oct 1940
Cpt Roy Douglas Metcalfe	Oct 1940–Mar 1941
Cornelius James Pelly	Mar 1941–Apr 1942
Post vacant	Apr 1942–Mar 1943
Cpt Maurice O'Connor Tandy	Mar 1943–Aug 1943
Post vacant	Aug 1943–Oct 1943
Cpt Maurice O'Connor Tandy	Oct 1943–Apr 1944
Reginald Michael Hadow	May 1944–Oct 1944
Cpt Richard Ernest Bird	Oct 1944–Apr 1945
Cpt Raymond Clive Murphy	Apr 1945–Apr 1946
Cpt Hugh Dunstan Rance	May 1946–Jan 1947
Gordon Noel Jackson	Jan 1947–May 1947
Maj Hugh Dunstan Rance	May 1947–Jun 1947
Cornelius James Pelly	Jun 1947–Jul 1947
Gordon Noel Jackson	Jul 1947–Feb 1949
Patrick Desmond Stobart	1949–1951
Arthur John Wilton	Mar 1951–1952
Michael Scott Weir	Aug 1952–1953
Dubai:	
Christopher Martin Pirie-Gordon	Mar 1954–1955
John Peter Tripp	May 1955–1958
Abu Dhabi:	
The Hon. Martin Stanley Buckmaster	1955–1958

Governors-General and Viceroys of India, 1820–1947

(showing years of appointment)

Governors-General:

Lord Moira	1814	Lord Amherst	1823

Lord Wm Bentinck	1828	Sir Henry Hardinge (later Lord Hardinge)	1844
Sir Charles Metcalfe	1835 (acting)	Lord Dalhousie	1848
Lord Auckland	1835	Lord Canning	1856
Lord Ellenborough	1843		
Viceroys:			
Lord Canning	1858	Lord Curzon	January–November 1905
Lord Elgin	1862	Lord Minto	1905
Sir John Lawrence	1863	Sir Charles Hardinge (later Lord Hardinge of Penshurst)	1910
Lord Mayo	1869	Lord Chelmsford	1916
Lord Northbrook	1872	Lord Reading	1921
Lord Lytton	1876	Lord Irwin (later Lord Halifax)	1926
Lord Ripon	1880	Lord Willingdon	1931
Lord Dufferin	1884	Lord Linlithgow	1936
Lord Lansdowne	1888	Lord Wavell	1943
Lord Elgin	1894	Lord Mountbatten	1947
Lord Curzon	1899		
Lord Amptill	April–December 1904		

16th August 1947: Independence of India and Pakistan

Governors of Bombay, 1820–1873

The Hon Mountstuart Elphinstone	1819	Sir George Arthur	1842
Major-General Sir John Malcolm	1827	Lestock Robert Reid	1846
Lt-General Sir Thomas Sidney Beckwith	1830	George Russell Clerk	1847
John Romer	1831 (officiating)	Viscount Falkland	1848
The Earl of Clare	1831	Lord Elphinstone	1853
Sir Robert Grant	1835	Sir George Russell Clerk (2nd time)	1860
James Farish	1838 (officiating)	Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere	1862
Sir J. Rivett-Carnac	1839	The Right Hon William Robert Seymour Vesey Fitzgerald	1867
Sir William Hay Macnaghten			
George William Anderson	1841 (officiating)	Sir Philip Edmond Wodehouse	1872

Secretaries of State for India, 1858–1947

Edward Stanley Lord Stanley (later 15th Earl of Derby)	1858
Sir Charles Wood (later 1st Viscount Halifax)	1859
George Robinson, 3rd Earl de Grey and 2nd Earl of Ripon (later 1st Marquess of Ripon)	February 1866
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Viscount Cranborne (later 3rd Marquess of Salisbury)	July 1866
Sir Stafford Northcote (later 1st Earl of Iddesleigh)	1867
George Douglas Campbell, 8th Duke of Argyll	1868
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury	1874
Gathorne Hardy (later 1st Earl of Cranbrook)	1878
Spencer Cavendish, Marquis of Hartington (later 8th Duke of Devonshire)	1880

John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley	1882
Lord Randolph Churchill	1885
John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley	February 1886
Sir Richard Cross, (later 1st Viscount Cross)	August 1886
John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley	1892
H. H. Fowler (later 1st Viscount Wolverhampton)	1894
Lord George Hamilton	1895
St. John Broderick (later 1st Earl of Midleton)	1903
John Morley (later 1st Viscount Morley)	1905
Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1st Earl of Crewe	1910
John Morley, 1st Viscount Morley	March 1911
Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1st Earl of Crewe (later 1st Marquess of Crewe)	May 1911
Austen Chamberlain (later Sir Austen Chamberlain)	1915
E. S. Montagu	1917
William Wellesley, 2nd Viscount Peel	1923
Sir Sydney Olivier (later 1st Baron Olivier)	January 1924
Frederick Smith, 1st Earl of Birkenhead	November 1924
William Wellesley, 2nd Viscount Peel (later 1st Earl Peel)	1928
W. Wedgwood Benn (later 1st Viscount Stansgate)	1929
Sir Samuel Hoare (later 1st Viscount Templewood)	1931
Lawrence Dundas, 2nd Marquess of Zetland	1935
L. S. Amery	1940
F. W. Pethick-Lawrence (later 1st Baron Pethick-Lawrence)	1945
William Hare, 5th Earl of Listowel	April 1947

Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 1820–1958

Robert Stewart Viscount Castlereagh (afterwards 2nd Marquess of Londonderry)	1812
George Canning	1822
John William Ward, 4th Viscount Dudley and Ward (afterwards Earl of Dudley)	1827
George Hamilton Gordon, 4th Earl of Aberdeen	1828
Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston	1830
Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington	1834
Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston	1835
George Hamilton Gordon, 4th Earl of Aberdeen	1841
Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston	1846
Granville George Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl Granville	1851
James Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury	1852
Lord John Russell (afterwards 1st Earl Russell)	1852
George Wm Frederick Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon	1853
James Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury	1858
Lord John Russell (afterwards 1st Earl Russell)	1859
George Wm Frederick Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon	1865
Edward Henry Stanley, Lord Stanley (afterwards 15th Earl of Derby)	1866
George Wm Frederick Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon	1868
Granville George Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl Granville	1870
Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby	1874
Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury	1878
Granville George Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl Granville	1880
Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury	1885

Archibald Philip Primrose, 5th Earl of Rosebery	1886
Stafford Henry Northcote, 1st Earl of Iddesleigh	1886
Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury	1887
Archibald Philip Primrose, 5th Earl of Rosebery	1892
John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley	1894
Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury	1895
Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne	1900
Sir Edward Grey (afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon)	1905
Arthur James Balfour (afterwards the Earl of Balfour)	1916
Lord Robert Cecil, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood (Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs till January 1919)	1918
Earl (afterwards Marquess) Curzon of Kedleston	1919
James Ramsay MacDonald	1924
Austen Chamberlain (afterwards Sir Austen Chamberlain)	1924
Arthur Henderson	1929
The Marquess of Reading	1931
Sir John Simon	1931
Sir Samuel Hoare (afterwards Viscount Templewood)	1935
Anthony Eden	1935
Viscount (afterwards Earl) Halifax	1938
Anthony Eden (later Sir Anthony Eden)	1940
Ernest Bevin	1945
Herbert Morrison	1951
Anthony Eden	1951
(Maurice) Harold Macmillan	1955
(John) Selwyn Brooke Lloyd	1955

Contents

Volume 1

Introduction xxxi

THE GENERAL TREATY OF 1820 AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH IMPERIAL INTERESTS

1.01 Agreement between Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr and the East India Company, 6 February 1806 3

Coulnamah or Agreement between Sheikh Abdulla bin Croosh on the part of Sheikh-ul Mus, Sheikh Ameer Sultan bin Suggur bin Kashid, Joasmee, and Captain David Seton, on the part of the Honourable East India Company. Bandar 'Abbas, 6 February 1806 *[from: A collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries compiled by C. U. Aitchison, 5th edn, revised to 1930, Delhi, 1933, vol xi, pp. 239–40]*

1.02 The Preliminary and General Treaties, January 1820 7

Translation of the Preliminary Treaties signed January 1820
with Hasan bin Rahmah, 8 January 1820
with Shaikh Shakhbut bin Diyab of Abu Dhabi, 11 January 1820
with Sultan bin Saqr, 6 January 1820
with the Shaikh of Dubai, 9 January 1820
with Husain bin 'Ali, 9 January 1820
[from: A collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries compiled by C. U. Aitchison, 5th edn, revised to 1930, Delhi, 1933, vol xi, pp. 240–44]

General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf, 1820 *[from: Treaties and engagements in force on 1st January 1906 between the British Government and the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab Coast, IOR: R/15/1/735, pp. 5–8]*

1.03 The formulation of British policy: notes prepared by Francis Warden for the Government of Bombay, August 1819 21

Extracts from brief notes relative to the rise and progress of the Arab tribes of the Persian Gulf. Prepared in August 1819 by Mr Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 56–60]*
Brief notes relative to the Province of Oman. Prepared in August 1819 by Mr Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 41–44]*

1.04 Government of Bombay's instructions to Major-General Sir William Grant Keir on the expedition to the 'Pirate ports', 27 October and 27 November 1819 33

Extract from J. A. Saldanha's Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801–1853 (Calcutta, 1906) *[IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 94–97]*

1.05 Gulf policy: the Government of Bombay's views, December 1819 39

Mountstuart Elphinstone to the Governor-General in Council, 15 December 1819 *[Saldanha, Persian Gulf Précis, IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 97–99]*

1.06 Sir William Grant Keir's reports on the conclusion of the treaties and the operations in the Arabian Gulf, January–February 1820 45

Keir to the Government of Bombay, 16 January 1820, with enclosures *[IOR: P/SEC/BOM/45, Consultation of 16 February]*
The Preliminary and the General treaties, January 1820
Reports on Shaikh Shakhbut b. Diyab of Abu Dhabi by the Governor of Qishm and Agha Husain 'Ali of Bandar 'Abbas, 11 January 1820
Keir to the Government of Bombay, 7 February 1820, with enclosures *[IOR: P/SEC/BOM/45, Consultation of 1 March]*
Keir to Major H. Willock, 30 January 1830
Captain Gray, Commanding at Ras al-Khaimah, to Major E. Stannus, Deputy Adjutant General, 28 January 1820
Government of Bombay to Keir, 28 February 1820 *[IOR: P/SEC/BOM/45, Consultation of 1 March]*

1.07 British policy on the conclusion of the 1820 treaties, January–June 1820 119

Extract from J. A. Saldanha's Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801–1853 (Calcutta, 1906) *[IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 111–17]*
Government of Bombay to Sir William Grant Keir, 16 February 1820
Keir to the Government of Bombay, 11 April 1820
Government of Bombay to Keir, 7 June 1820

1.08 The search for a British base: Qishm, February–April 1821 129

Sir William Grant Keir to the Government of Bombay, 21 February 1820, with enclosure *[IOR: P/SEC/BOM/45, Consultation of 8 March 1820]*
Captain F. A. Collier to Keir, 21 February 1820
Extract from J. A. Saldanha's Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801–1853 (Calcutta, 1906) *[IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 119–21]*
Sir William Grant Keir to the Government of Bombay, 1 April 1820

Major-General Sir Lionel Smith to the Government of Bombay, 23 April 1821 *[from: The Buraimi Memorials, 1955, vol II, pp. 33–37]*

1.09 A marine patrol in the Gulf, November–December 1821 151

Henry Meriton, Superintendent of Marine, to the Government of Bombay, 26 November 1821 *[Saldanha, Persian Gulf Précis, IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 128–29]*

1.10 The removal of the troops from Qishm and maritime control, November 1822–January 1823 155

Extract from J. A. Saldanha's Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801–1853 (Calcutta, 1906) *[IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 151–54]*
Instructions issued by Government of Bombay to the Senior Officer, Bombay Marine, in the Persian Gulf, 20 November 1822
Letter from F. Faithfull, Senior Marine Officer Persian Gulf to Henry Meriton, Superintendent of Marine, Bombay, 13 February 1823
Lieutenant J. MacLeod, Resident in the Persian Gulf to Senior Naval Officer, 10 January 1823
Instructions to the commanders of cruisers stationed off the piratical ports, 19 January 1823

1.11 The British Resident, 1822 161

Instructions issued by the Government of Bombay to Lieutenant John MacLeod on his appointment as British Resident at Bushire, 12 November 1822 *[Saldanha, Persian Gulf Précis, IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 148–50]*

1.12 The appointment of a British Agent at Sharjah, 1825 167

Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, 2 July 1825 *[IOR: L/P&S/6/177]*

THE SHAIKHDOMS OF THE COAST

1.13 Chronological table of events, 1730–1843 179

Chronological table of events connected with the Government of Muskat from the year 1730 to 1843; with the Joasmee tribe of Arabs from the year 1765 to 1843; with the Uttoobee tribe of Arabs (Bahrein), from the year 1716 to 1844; with the Wahabee tribe of Arabs, from the year 1795 to 1844; with the Beniyas tribe of Arabs from the year 1793 to 1843; and with the Debaye (Boo Felasa) tribe of Arabs from the year 1834 to 1843. The whole prepared in the year 1844 by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball, Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 121–165]*

1.14 Captain Robert Taylor's description of the 'Pirate Ports' and the pearl industry, 1818 227

Extracts from brief notes containing historical and other information connected with the province of Oman; Muskat and the adjoining country; the islands of Bahrein, Ormus, Kishm

and Karrack; and other ports and places in the Persian Gulf; prepared in the year 1818 by Captain Robert Taylor, 3rd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, Assistant Political Agent in Turkish Arabia *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 14–17, 38–42]*

1.15 Historical sketches of the Arab Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1747–1854 237

Historical sketch of the Joasmee tribe of Arabs; from the year 1747 to the year 1819. Prepared by Mr Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay. With continuations of the same, from the year 1819 to the close of the year 1831, by Lieutenant S. Hennell; from 1832 to July 1844, by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball; and from the latter period to the close of the year 1853, by Lieutenant H. F. Disbrowe; successive Assistants to the Resident in the Persian Gulf *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 299–359]*

Historical sketch of the Beniyas tribe of Arabs; from the year 1761 to the close of the year 1831. Prepared by Lieutenant S. Hennell; with continuations of the same, from 1832 to September 1843, by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball; and from the latter period to May 1853, by Lieutenant H. F. Disbrowe; successive Assistants to the Resident in the Persian Gulf *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 461–496]*

1.16 The Arabian Coast Surveys, 1821–1829 337

Ras al-Khaimah to Dubai *[from: Memoir of the survey of the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf undertaken by Lieutenant J. N. Guy and compiled by Lieutenant M. Houghton, draughtsman to the survey, IOR: Maps X/10309]*

Extracts from Memoir descriptive of the navigation of the Gulf of Persia; with brief notices of the manners, customs, religion, commerce and resources of the people inhabiting its shores and islands. Prepared by the late Captain George Barnes Brucks, Indian Navy, (1829–1835) *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 530–59, 578–615]*

1.17 The character and status of Sultan b. Saqr, October 1819–February 1820 429

Government of Bombay to William Bruce, Resident at Bushire, 4 December 1819 *[IOR: R/15/1/21]*

Bruce to the Government of Bombay, 14 February 1820 *[IOR: P/SEC/BOM/45, Consultation of 8 March 1820]*

1.18 An account of Sharjah, August 1820 457

Report by Lieutenant Thomas Tanner on board HCC *Antelope*, 23 August 1820 *[IOR: R/15/1/21]*

1.19 The British Resident's report on his tour of the coast, February 1823 469

Lieutenant John MacLeod to the Government of Bombay, 27 February 1823 *[Saldanha, Persian Gulf Précis, IOR: L/P&S/20/C248c, pp. 155–63]*

MacLeod to the Government of Bombay, 27 February 1823

Government of Bombay to MacLeod, 20 March 1823

1.20 General report on the state of affairs in the Gulf, 1825 481

Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, 2 July 1825 *[IOR: L/P&S/6/177]*

1.21 Joint attack on Bahrain by Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat and Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi, August–December 1828 501

Agent at Bahrain to Captain David Wilson, British Resident Bushire, 16 November *[IOR: R/15/1/48]*

Mulla Husain, Agent at Sharjah, to Wilson, 28 November and 4 December 1828 *[IOR: R/15/1/48]*

1.22 Hostilities between Sultan b. Saqr and Bani Yas: agreement defining boundaries negotiated by Shaikh of Lingah, February–June 1829 517

Sultan b. Saqr to Major Wilson, British Resident Bushire, 19 February 1829 *[IOR: R/15/1/48]*

Mulla Husain to Wilson, 17 June 1829 *[from: The Buraimi Memorials, 1955, vol II, pp. 39–41]*

Postscript, 20 June 1829 *[IOR: R/15/1/48]*

1.23 Assassination of Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi by his brothers Khalifah and Sultan, April 1833 527

D. A. Blane, British Resident Bushire, to the Government of Bombay, 4 June 1833, with enclosure *[IOR: P/387/47, Consultation of 17 July 1833]*

Mulla Husain to Blane, 22 May 1833

1.24 Emigration of Al Bu Falasah to Dubai, 1833 537

Mulla Husain to Lieutenant Samuel Hennell, Acting British Resident Bushire, 5 September 1833 *[IOR: P/387/51, Consultation of 11 December 1833]*

1.25 Bani Yas/Qasimi war, 1833–1834 543

J. G. Lorimer's account *[from: Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Calcutta, 1908–15, vol i, pp. 689–693]*

Mulla Husain to Hennell, 15 September 1833 *[IOR: P/487/51, Consultation of 11 December 1833]*

Government of Bombay to Court of Directors, 24 December 1834 *[IOR: F/4/1516, Collection 59859]*

THE ORIGINS OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

1.26 Historical sketch of the Wahhabis, 1795–1853 565

Historical sketch of the Wahabee tribe of Arabs from the year 1795 to the year 1818. Prepared by Mr Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay. With continuations of the same, from the year 1819 to the close of the year 1831, by Lieutenant S. Hennell; from 1832 to August 1844, by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball; and from the latter period to the close of the year 1853, by Lieutenant H. F. Disbrowe; successive Assistants to the Resident in the Persian Gulf *[from: Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, 1856, pp. 427–460]*

1.27 Wahhabi surrender of Buraimi, May 1819 601

Captain G. Forster Sadlier, Muscat, to Sir E. Nepean, Governor of Bombay, 15 May 1819 *[from: Diary of a journey across Arabia from el Khatif in the Persian Gulf to Yambo in the Red sea, during the year 1819, Bombay 1866, pp. 138–150]*

1.28 Uprising of Na'im at Buraimi against Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat; mediation of Sultan b. Saqr, 1820 617

Lieutenant-Colonel Warren, Qishm, to the Government of Bombay, 4 January 1821 *[IOR: G/29/39]*
Captain Thompson, Bushire, to Sultan b. Saqr, 2 January 1821 *[IOR: G/29/39]*

1.29 The Buraimi forts, December 1824–April 1825 643

Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors, 2 July 1825 *[IOR: L/P&S/6/177]*
Colonel E. G. Stannus to the Government of Bombay, 31 December 1824, with enclosure *[IOR: R/15/1/33]*
Agreement between Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat, Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr relating the forts at Buraimi, 26 December 1824
Stannus to the Government of Bombay, 10 March and 24 April 1825, with enclosure *[IOR: R/15/1/33]*
Sultan b. Saqr to Stannus, 7 March 1825

1.30 Hostilities at Buraimi and arbitration by Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut, November 1828–May 1829 719

Mulla Husain, Agent at Sharjah, to Major David Wilson, British Resident Bushire, 16 November 1828 and 2 January 1829 *[IOR: R/15/1/48]*
Sultan b. Saqr to Wilson, 23 January 1829 *[IOR: R/15/1/48]*
Mulla Husain to Wilson, 22 April and 9 May 1829 *[IOR: R/15/1/48]*

1.31 The second Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi, 1833 739

D. A. Blane, British Resident Bushire, to the Government of Bombay, 22 April 1833, with enclosures *[IOR: P/387/45]*
Mulla Husain to Blane, 14 March 1833
Acting British Agent Muscat to Blane, 22 March 1833

Introduction

Volume 1 has been divided into three sections. The first, the General Treaty of 1820 and the development of British interests, concentrates on the formulation and implementation of British policy from the time of the expeditions against the Qawasim and the conclusion of the 1820 treaties. The second section, the Shaikhdoms of the Coast, concentrates on internal development in each of the shaikhdoms, on their rulers and on their relationships with each other. The third section, the origins of territorial dispute, deals with relations between the coastal shaikhs and both the Sultanate of Muscat and Wahhabi amirs of Najd, focussing in particular on the Buraimi oasis, where from 1800 to the present day some of the most vital regional interests have converged. It should be noted that there is, inevitably, some overlap between the sections: Buraimi is often an issue which arises in the context of relations between the shaikhdoms as well as in their dealings with other regional powers; British policy tends to intrude in all three sections.

The General Treaty of 1820 and the development of British imperial interests [1.01–1.12]

The evolution of British policy towards the area is illustrated by key documents relating to treaties and agreements, diplomatic representation and formal statements of British interests.

Official British relations with the Coast began in 1806 when Captain David Seton, the newly appointed Resident at Muscat, concluded a *qaulnamah* at Bandar 'Abbas with the representative of the Qasimi Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr [1.01]. In the early nineteenth century, the East India Company's trade and communication with its Indian administration had seemed to be under increasing threat, both economically and politically, from what the British regarded as 'piratical' activity in the Gulf. This, combined with growing Wahhabi influence in Eastern Arabia and French hostilities in Europe and the Mediterranean, provided a stimulus for action. The modest agreement concluded in 1806 restored maritime peace only temporarily and

in the years following both the Court of Directors of the East India Company and the British governments in Calcutta and Bombay became increasingly convinced of the need for more positive measures to secure the route to India.

In 1819 a naval and military expedition under Sir William Grant Keir was despatched with instructions to occupy Ras al-Khaimah and destroy the Qasimi fleet. The subsequent Preliminary and General Treaties of 1820 [1.02] outlawed maritime violence and secured the surrender of fortified towers, guns and vessels other than pearling and fishing boats. They laid down the first imperial obligations on any part of the Arabian Peninsula – that no piracy should be committed against British shipping – but the interests of the rulers were also upheld by their own undertakings that they would cease from maritime warfare against each other, and by articles 5–7 of the General Treaty which implied a British commitment to prevent further outbreaks of war at sea.

The General Treaty was signed at Ras al-Khaimah in January 1820 by Hasan b. Rahmah, ruler of Khatt and Falaiyah, Qadib b. Ahmad of Jazirah al-Hamra, Shakhbut b. Diyab of Abu Dhabi on behalf of his son Tahnun, and Husain b. 'Ali of Rams; the uncle of Muhammad b. Hazza' of Dubai signed at Sharjah as did Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr; the rulers of Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain, Rashid b. Hamad and Abdallah b. Rashid signed on board ship in March.

After the expedition of 1820 it was clear that from the British point of view more permanent measures were needed to prevent the Gulf from descending once again into maritime instability. Within the administration in Bombay there was disagreement over the political and military objectives of the campaign, and especially over how the peace agreement was to be enforced [1.03–1.07]. In the summer of 1819 the Governor of Bombay (Sir Evan Nepean) had proposed that the whole Coast should be placed under the rule of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat. His Council's negative response was drawn together by the Chief Secretary, Francis Warden, who presented Nepean with a series of historical sketches of the Gulf states which he compiled from Government records, arguing that more background material was needed before an informed decision could be taken on the matter [1.03 and also 1.15 and 1.26 below]. Warden's view was that the Government was making policy without enough background knowledge. His papers were added to by successive Bombay and Gulf administrators and in 1856 they were published by the Government of Bombay in the form of a reference book designed for officers serving in the area (*Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government*, No XXIV, New Series).

In particular, the policy discussions in Bombay and in the Governor-General's office in Calcutta centred on the issue of a future British military or naval presence in the Gulf. In July 1820 a base was established at Qishm under Captain T. Perronet Thompson who was designated 'Political Agent for the Lower Gulf' and entrusted with the conduct of relations with the shaikhs on matters arising out of the General Treaty [1.08]. However, difficulties over the Persian claim to Qishm and the unhealthy climate of the place made it unsuitable for permanent occupation and in January 1823 the troops were removed and replaced by a system of 'maritime control'

carried out by six cruisers based in the Gulf, four of which continually policed the Coast [1.09–1.10].

After the decision to withdraw the Qishm detachment the immediate supervision of the Coast devolved on the Resident at Bushire. In November 1822 Lieutenant John MacLeod was appointed and instructed to 'suggest a plan for securing authentic intelligence of the proceedings of the several Chiefs on the coast' and to return regular and detailed news reports [1.11]. In January of the following year MacLeod interviewed all the notable Shaikhs and submitted a very full and detailed report to the Bombay Government [see below 1.19]. Among many other recommendations, he suggested, in paragraph 68 of the report, the appointment of a local agent at Sharjah, a proposal which was put into effect in 1825 [1.12].

The Shaikhdoms of the coast [1.13–1.25]

In 1818, Captain Robert Taylor, the Assistant Political Agent at Basra and a distinguished scholar, prepared a description of the 'Pirate Ports', complete with a plan of Ras al-Khaimah, for the use of the officers on the 1819/20 expedition [1.14]. Francis Warden's initiative in 1819 resulted in a further series of historical sketches which made available detailed background materials on the Arabian Gulf shaikhdoms, on the Sultanate of Muscat and on the Wahhabis [1.15 and see below 1.26]. In 1844 the Assistant Resident at Bushire, Lieutenant A. B. Kemball, provided a chronological context for these sketches with his table of events from the early eighteenth century [1.13].

Official European knowledge of the Arabian shores of the Gulf was fairly minimal at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Recognition of this ignorance and of its effect on the ability of the British to protect their local interests stimulated the East India Company's administrations in India to initiate a comprehensive topographical survey of the Gulf to be added to the political background papers which were already being prepared in Bombay. Until the 1770s the Company had no official charts to guide its captains in eastern waters and relied on private publishers of charts whose products were often unreliable. Since the departure of the Portuguese, the main shipping line had run up the Persian coast of the Gulf, the Arabian side generally being avoided because of its uncharted currents, rocks, shoals, reefs and islands. Indeed, ignorance of the coastal areas was believed by the British to be one of the main reasons the Qawasim had eluded them for so long.

Survey work in the Gulf proper began in 1785 under Lieutenant John McCluer of the Bombay Marine. However, his work was only a prelude to the first serious survey undertaken by Lieutenants John Michael Guy and George Barnes Brucks between 1820 and 1829 [1.16]. The survey was begun at Ras Masandam by Captain Philip Maughan in the *Discovery* assisted by Lieutenant Guy in the *Psyche*. Maughan gave up the work because of ill-health in November 1821 and Guy succeeded to the direction of the project. He continued the work up to Qatar where his place, again vacated by ill-health, was taken by Lieutanant Brucks who completed the

survey of the Arabian coast, including Bahrain and Kuwait, in 1825. While working on the survey Guy reported to the Bombay Government on the help he had received from Shaikh Tahnun of Abu Dhabi: 'The Chieftans have invariably behaved in the most friendly manner, especially Shaik Tahnoon of Aboothabee'. Although there were some omissions and inaccuracies, this first Gulf survey was a remarkable achievement and resulted in a new set of charts and accompanying descriptive memoirs covering almost all of the coastline from Ras Masandam to the Shatt al-'Arab.

In the meantime, reporting on Gulf affairs had begun in earnest. From 1820 onwards the Government of Bombay received regular and increasingly detailed letters from the Resident at Bushire, the Agent at Sharjah and various naval and military officials on duty at the time [1.17–1.19]. These were then forwarded by the Bombay administrators to the Court of Directors in London in the form of very lengthy and wide-ranging general letters on Gulf affairs [1.20]. For almost a century and a half the affairs of the Gulf shaikhdoms were continuously chronicled on an almost daily basis, the accumulated reports providing a surprisingly comprehensive body of material on all the key developments and people in the region.

The Government of Bombay's general letter of July 1825 gives an example of the coverage [1.20]: it describes the state of Ras al-Khaimah town, the activities of Sultan b. Saqr and other shaikhs, the earlier overthrow of Muhammad b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and the plunder of a Dubai boat by Bani Yas supporters of the former ruler. It also gives an up-date of affairs at Buraimi [1.29 below]. Subsequent letters from the Gulf describe the joint attack on Bahrain by Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut and Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat in 1828 [1.21], the assassination of Shaikh Tahnun by his brothers Khalifah and Sultan in 1833 [1.23] and the subsequent emigration of the Al Bu Falasah to Dubai [1.24]. Documents 1.22 and 1.25 describe the intermittent hostilities between the Bani Yas and Qasimi shaikhs culminating in the war of 1833–34 and including the 1829 treaty negotiated by Shaikh of Lingah defining the limits of their respective territories.

The origins of territorial dispute [1.26–1.31]

From 1800 onwards the Buraimi oasis gradually emerged as the focal point of territorial dispute in south-eastern Arabia. Between 1800 and 1869 five successive Wahhabi invasions provoked resistance and conflict in which traditional local rivalries also asserted themselves. Francis Warden's historical sketch presented an overview (from the official British perspective) of developments between 1795 and 1818 which was then up-dated in subsequent years by Gulf officers Hennell, Kemball and Disbrowe [1.26]. In May 1819 George Forster Sadlier [1.27] reported from Muscat on the end of the first Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi which had been retaken by the joint forces of the Sultan of Muscat and the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Ajman. A year later, however, the Na'im at Buraimi besieged Sa'id b. Sultan's garrison [1.28]. Sultan b. Saqr, mediating in the dispute, concluded an agreement between the Sultan and the Na'im declaring the Buraimi forts neutral but almost immediately nullified it by his own

occupation of the forts. A further agreement, to which Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi was a party, was concluded in December 1824 [1.29]. Under its terms Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr agreed to demolish the forts at Buraimi while Tahnun b. Shakhbut undertook to demolish the fort he had constructed at Derah between Dubai and Sharjah. In spite of attempts at mediation by the British Resident, Colonel Stannus, who reported that there was no evidence of the forts having been destroyed, the dispute continued into 1825. Another truce was agreed in September of that year.

In 1828 fighting again broke out in the oasis, on this occasion between the Ajman and Abu Dhabi [1.30] and continued until 1829 when Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut, in a demonstration of his increasing power, travelled to Buraimi and settled the dispute.

The volume ends with the second Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi under 'Umar b. 'Ufaisan in 1833 and his attempts to exact declarations of submission and *zakat* payments from the Sultan of Muscat, the Qasimi shaikhs and the Bani Yas [1.31]

NOTE ON SOURCES

The selection of material for this first volume of *Records of the Emirates* has inevitably been heavily influenced by the physical condition of the original documents. The key sources are the India Office Records series of reports from the British Resident at Bushire and the Residency Agent at Sharjah (*IOR: R/15/1*). Many of these are barely legible and could not be reproduced successfully. Wherever possible alternative copies have been located, either in the manuscript India Office Records series of Political and Secret letters from India (*IOR: L/P&S*) or the Proceedings of the Bombay Government (*IOR: P*). In other cases printed versions have been selected instead of the original manuscripts because they can be more clearly reproduced. Particular use has been made of J. A. Saldanha's various *Précis*, Lorimer's *Gazetteer* and the *Buraimi Memorials*. Occasionally a printed version of a document has been reproduced together with the manuscript original in order to give an indication of authenticity as well as legibility [eg 1.22 and also 1.02 cf 1.06, printed and manuscript versions of the General Treaty]. Every effort has been made to include the key documents or at least some part of the material relating to key events.

The two *Historical Sketches* [1.15 and 1.26] reproduced from volume xxiv of Selections from Bombay Government Records were started by Francis Warden and brought up to date to 1853 by successive Gulf officials. They have been included in full in this first volume for reasons of convenience.

The general treaty of 1820 and the development of British imperial interests

1.01
Agreement between Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr and the East India Company, 6 February 1806

No. XVII.

COULNAMAH OR AGREEMENT between SHEIKH ABDULLA BIN CROOSH, on the part of SHEIKH-UL MUS SHEIKH AMEER SULTAN BIN SUGGUR BIN KASHID, JOASMEE, and CAPTAIN DAVID SETON, on the part of the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY. In BUNDER ABBAS, this sixth day of February 1806.

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be peace between the Honourable East India Company and Sultan bin Suggur, Joasmee, and the whole of his dependants and subjects on the shores of Arabia and Persia, and they shall respect the flag and property of the Honourable East India Company, and their subjects wherever and in whatever it may be, and the same the Honourable East India Company towards the Joasmee.

ARTICLE 2.

Should the Joasmee infringe the above, they shall be liable in the sum of dollars 30,000, and on this condition Captain David Seton agrees to receive from Amir Sultan bin Suggur the brig now laying at Muscat, and to drop the claims to the cargo, guns, etc., of the said vessel and the *Shannon*.

ARTICLE 3.

Whatever British property shall be found in the Soric fleet shall be restored.

ARTICLE 4.

Should any British vessel touch on the coasts of the Joasmee for wood or water, or be forced on shore by stress of weather, or any other cause, the Joasmee shall assist and protect the said vessel and property, and permit it to be disposed of or carried away, as their owners shall see fit, without claim or demand.

ARTICLE 5.

Should Johood compel the Joasmee to infringe this peace, they shall give three months' previous notice in all places.

ARTICLE 6.

When the above is confirmed and ratified by both parties the Joasmee shall frequent the English ports from Surat to Bengal as before.

DAVID SETON.

ABDULLAH BIN CROOSH.

Signed, sealed, and confirmed.

SULTAN BIN SUGGUR.

Approved and sanctioned by the Governor-General in Council on 29th April 1806.

1.02
The Preliminary and General Treaties, January 1820

No. XVIII.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with SULTAN BIN SUGGUR,—1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

Know all men that Sultan bin Suggur has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE 1.

Sultan bin Suggur shall surrender to the General towers, guns, and vessels which are in Shargah, Imam, Umm-ool-keiweyn, and their dependencies. The General will leave the boats which are for the pearl fishery and fishing boats, and the remainder of the vessels shall be at the disposal of the General.

ARTICLE 2.

Sultan bin Suggur shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE 3.

The General will not allow the troops to enter the towns to lay them waste.

ARTICLE 4.

After the execution of these engagements, Sultan bin Suggur shall be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly (" or pacificated ") Arabs.

On these conditions there is a cessation of hostilities between the General Sultan bin Suggur and his followers, with the exceptipn that their boats are not to go to sea.

Done at Ras-ool-Kheimah on the twentieth of Rabee-ul-Awul, in the year 1235, corresponding to the sixth of January one thousand eight hundred and twenty.

W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.

SULTAN BIN SUGGUR.

Copy of the Articles entered into with Sultan bin Suggur. Witness my hand and seal.

W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with HASSUN BIN RAHMAH,—1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

Know all men that Hassun bin Rahmah has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE 1.

The town of Ras-ool-Kheimah and Maharra, and the towers which are in the date groves near the town, shall remain in the hands of the British Government.

ARTICLE 2.

If any of the vessels of Hassun bin Rahmah are in Shargah or Umm-ool-keiweyn or Imam, or any other of the places to which the General shall go with the force, they shall be surrendered to the General, and the General will leave those which are for the pearl fishery and fishing boats.

ARTICLE 3.

Hassun bin Rahmah shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE 4.

After the execution of these engagements, Hassun bin Rahmah shall be admitted to the terms of the general Treaty with the friendly (literally the pacificated) Arabs. End of the Articles.

Issued at Ras-ool-Kheimah in the forenoon of Saturday, the twenty-second of the month of Rabee-ul-Awul in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eighth of January 1820.

W. GRANT KEIR,

Major-General.

HASSUN BIN RAHMAH.

Copy of the Articles between the General and Hassun bin Rahmah. Witness my hand and seal.

W. GRANT KEIR,

Major-General.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with the SHEIKH of DEBAY,—1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

Know all men that Mahomed bin Haza bin Zaal, a minor, accompanied by Ahmed bin Futeiss has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE 1.

The people of Debay shall surrender to the General the vessels which are in Debay and its dependencies and the guns which are in the town and in the towers. The General will leave the boats which are for the pearl fishery and fishing boats.

ARTICLE 2.

The people of Debay shall give up all the Indian prisoners if any such are in their possession.

ARTICLE 3.

The General will not allow the troops to enter the town to lay it waste, and further, as a mark of consideration towards His Highness the Imam Saeed bin Sultan on the part of the General, he will not demolish the fort and towers.

ARTICLE 4.

After the execution of these engagements Mahomed bin Haza bin Zaal and his followers shall be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly (literally the "pacificated") Arabs.

On these conditions there is a cessation of hostilities between the British and Mahomed bin Haza bin Zaal and his followers, with the exception that their boats are not to go to sea.

Done at Ras-ool-Kheimah on the 23rd of the month of Rabee-ul-Awul, in the year 1235, corresponding to the 9th of January 1820.

W. GRANT KEIR,

Major-General.

SEAL OF AHMED FUTEISS.

Witnessed by the signature of Sheikh Hamza bin Mahomed bin Zubu all Moyzzine, Shaikh of Kishm, with his own hand.

Copy of the Articles between the General and Mahomed bin Haza bin Zaal. Witness my hand and seal.

W. GRANT KEIR,

Major-General.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with SHEIKH SHAHBOUT of ABOO DHEBBEE,—1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

Know all men that Sheikh Shahbout bin Dhyab al Talahij has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE 1.

If in Aboo Dhebbee or any other of the places belonging to Sheikh Shahbout there are any of the vessels of the piratical powers which have been attached or may be hereafter attached by the General during the present war against the pirates, he shall deliver such vessels to the General.

ARTICLE 2.

Sheikh Shahbout shall be admitted to the terms of the General Treaty with the friendly Arabs.

Done at Ras-ool-Kheimah on the twenty-fifth of the Rabee-ul-Awul, in the year one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eleventh of January 1820.

W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.
SHAHBOUT.

Copies of the Articles between the General and Sheikh Shahbout.

Witness my hand and seal.

W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with HASSUN BIN ALI,—1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

Know all men that Hassun bin Ali has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE 1.

If any of the vessels of Hassun bin Ali are in Shargah, or Umm-ool-keiweyn or Imam, or Aboo Dhebbee or any other of the places to which the General shall go with the force, such vessels shall be surrendered to the General, and the General will leave those which are for the pearl fishery and fishing boats.

ARTICLE 2.

Hassun bin Ali shall give up all the Indian prisoners if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE 3.

After this Hassun bin Ali shall be admitted to the terms of the general Treaty with the friendly (literally the "pacificated") Arabs. End of the Articles.

Issued at Ras-ool-Kheimah in the forenoon of Saturday, the twenty-ninth of the month of Rabee-ul-Awul, in the year one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the 15th of January 1820.

W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.
HASSUN BIN ALI.

Copy of the Articles entered into between the General and Hassun bin Ali in the forenoon of Saturday, the twenty-ninth of Rabee-ul-Awul, in the year of Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the 15th of January 1820.

Witness my hand and seal.

W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.

[5]

Treaties and engagements in force on 1st January 1906 between the British Government and the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab Coast.

[NOTE.—In the event of doubt hereafter arising as to the precise interpretation of any portion of the English or Arabic text of one or other of the Treaty stipulations, the English text shall be considered decisive.]

General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf—1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Praise be to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to his creatures. There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab tribes, who are parties, to this contract, on the following conditions:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for ever.

ARTICLE 2.

If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that pass by land or sea of any nation, whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind, and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods. An acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by Government against Government; and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a Government is plunder and piracy.

ARTICLE 3.



The friendly (literally the pacificated) Arabs shall carry by land and sea a red flag, with or without letters in it, at their option, and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white in the border being equal to the breadth of the red, as represented in the margin (the whole forming the flag known in the British Navy by the title of white pierced red); this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it, and no other.

ARTICLE 4.

The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other, and the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further.

[6]

ARTICLE 5.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper (Register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many Karahs it holds. And they shall also have in their possession another writing (Port Clearance) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the Nacodah, the number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And if a British or other vessel meet them, they shall produce the Register and the Clearance.

ARTICLE 6.

The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an Envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an Envoy also to them in like manner; and the Envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (Register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the Envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such Envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

ARTICLE 7.

If any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

ARTICLE 8.

The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy, and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Muhammadans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act and of those who ordered it.

[7]

ARTICLE 9.

The carrying off of slaves, men, women, or children, from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

ARTICLE 10.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports and into the ports of the allies of the British so far as they shall be able to effect it; and they shall buy and sell therein, and if any shall attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it.

ARTICLE 11.

These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present. End of the Articles.

Issued at Ras-ool-Kheimah, in triplicate, at midday, on Saturday, the twenty-second of the month of Rabe-ul-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eighth of January one thousand eight hundred and twenty, and signed by the contracting parties at the places and times under written.

Signed at Ras-ool-Kheimah at the time of issue by

L. S. (Sd.) W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.

L. S. (Sd.) HASSUN BIN RAHMAH,
Sheikh of Hatt and Fahleia, formerly of Ras-ool-Kheimah.

L. S. (Sd.) KAZIB BIN AHMED,
Sheikh of Jourat al Kamra.

Signed at Ras-ool-Kheimah on Tuesday, the twenty-fifth of the month of Rabe-ul-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eleventh of January 1820.

L. S. (Sd.) SHAKBOUT,
Sheikh of Aboo Dhebbee.

Signed at Ras-ool-Kheimah at midday, on Saturday, the twenty-ninth of the month of Rabe-ul-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fifteenth of January 1820.

L. S. (Sd.) HASSUN BIN ALI,
Sheikh of Zyah.

The seal is Captain Thompson's, as Sheikh Hassun bin Ali had not a seal at the time of signature.

[8]

Signed for Mubammad bin Haza bin Zaal, Sheikh of Debay, a minor, at Shargah, on Friday, the twelfth of the month of Rube-oos-Sanee, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the twenty-eighth of January 1820.

L. S. (Sd.) ZAID BIN SYF,
Uncle of Sheikh Muhammad.

Signed at Shargah at midday, on Friday, the nineteenth of the month of Rube-oos-Sanee, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fourth of February 1820.

L. S. (Sd.) SULTAN BIN SUGGUR,
Chief of Shargah.

Signed at Shargah by the Vakeel on the part of the Sheikhs Suleman bin Ahmed and Abdoolla bin Ahmed, in his quality of Vakeel to the Sheikhs aforesaid, on Saturday, the twentieth of the month of Rube-oos-Sanee, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the 5th of February 1820.

L. S. (Sd.) SYUD ABDOOL JALIL BIN SYUD YAS,
Vakeel of Sheikh Suleman bin Ahmed and Sheikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of the family of Khalifa, Sheikhs of Bahrein.

Signed and accepted by Suleman bin Ahmed, of the house of Khalifa, at Bahrein, on the ninth of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the twenty-third of February 1820.

L. S.

Signed and accepted by Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of the house of Khalifa, at Bahrein, on the ninth of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the twenty-third of February 1820.

L. S.

Signed at Fahleia at noon, on Wednesday, the twenty-ninth of the month of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred an thirty-five, corresponding to the fifteenth of March 1820.

L. S. (Sd.) RASHED BIN HAMID,
Chief of Ejman.

Signed of Fahleia at noon, on Wednesday, the twenty-ninth of the month of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fifteenth of March 1820.

L. S. (Sd.) ABDOOLLA BIN RASHID,
Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn.

(٩)

معاهدات فيمابين دولت البهية البرطانية و مشايخ المتصالحين في عمان -

للملاحظة

اذا بعد هذا حصل الاشتباه في معنى بعينه اىّ جزء من نصّ الشرايط المعاهدات كان انكليسيا او عربياً فالنصّ الانكليسي موثوق به للتوضيح ذالك قطعياً

معاهدة العموميه مع الاقوام العرب في خليج فارس في سنه ١٨٢٠ ع

- بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم -

الحمدلله الذى جعل الصلح خيراً للانام وبعد قد صار الصلح لدائم بين دولة سركار الانگريز و بين الطوايف العربيه المشروطين على هذه الشروط -

الشرط الاول - ان يُزال النهب والغارات في البر والبحر من طرف العرب المشروطين في كل الا زمان -

الشرط الثاني - ان تعرض احد من قوم العرب المشروطين على المترددين في البر والبحر من كافة الناس بالنهب و الغارات لاى حرب معروف فهو عدو لكافة الناس فليس له الامان علي حاله ولا ماله والحرب المعروف هو الذى منادأ به مبيّنٌ مامور به من دولةٍ الي دولةٍ وقتل الناس و اخذالمال بغير منادية و تبيين و امر دولةٍ فهو النهب و الغارات -



الشرط الثالث - ان العرب المصالحين لهم في البروالبحر عَلَمٌ احمر فيه حروفٌ اوبلا حروفٍ على مطلوبهم وهو في كَفّةٍ ابيض عرض الا بيض الذي في الكفة يعادل عرض الاحمر كما هو مُصوّرٌ في الحاشية وان هذا هو علَم العرب المصالحين فيستعملون به ولا يستعملون بغيره -

الشرط الرابع - ان الطوايف المصالحين كلهم على حالة الاول الا انهم مارالصلح بينهم و بين دولة سركار الانگريز و ان لا يحرب بعضهم بعضاً و العلم هو الشاهد على ذالك فقط وليس هو شاهدٌ على غيره -

(٦)

الشرط الخامس ـ ان مركب العرب المصالحين كلهم بايديهم قرطاسُ مر شوم بخط اميرهم فيه اسم المركب وطوله و عرضه وكم يحمل من كاره و بايديهم ايضاً مكتوب آخر مرشوم بخط اميرهم فيه اسم صاحب المركب و اسم الناخذاة و عدد الرجال و عدد السلاح و من اين سار وفى اىّ وقتٍ و الى اىّ بندر بتوجه فان تعرض لهم مركبُ من الانگريز او غيرهم يعرضون عليه القرطاس و المكتوب ـ

الشرط السادس ـ إن العرب المصالحين ان كان مرادهم يرسلون رسولاً الى سركار الانگريز في بحر الفارس و معه الذي يحتاج اليه فيجلس مع السركار حتى يقضى غرضهم منه و سركار الانگريز ان كان مراده يرسل رسولاً ايضاً الى عندهم كذالک و الرسول يلحق خطه الى خط اميرهم فى قرطاس مراكبهم المذكور الذي فيه طول المركب و عرضه وكم يحمل من كاره و ينبغى خط الرسول يُجدد فى كل سنة و ايضاً كل من المرسولين خرجه على قومه ـ

الشرط السابع ـ ان كان طايفة او غيرهم لا يزالون من النهب و الغارات فالعرب المصالحون يقومون عليهم على قدر حالهم و يصير بين العرب المصالحين و بين الانگريز كلام فى ذالک فى وقت وقوع ذلک النهب والغارات ـ

الشرط الثامن ـ ان قتل الناس بعد تسليم السلاح فهو من الغارات ولامن الحرب المعروف و ان كان طائفة يقتل الناس مسلمين اوغيره بعد تسليم السلاح فهو قد اخلف الصلح فان العرب المصالحين مع الانكريز يقومون عليهم وان شاء الله تعالى فلا يزال عليهم الحرب الا بعد تسليم مَن فعل بذالک وحكم به ـ

(٧)

الشرط التاسع ـ ان نهب الرقيق الرجال و النسآء و الاولاد في سواحل السودان او غيره وحملهم فى المراكب فهو من النهب و الغارات فالعرب المصالحون لا يفعلون من ذالک شيئاً ـ

الشرط العاشر ـ ان مراكب العرب المصالحين الحاملة عَلَمَهُم المذكور يدخلون فى كل بنادر دولة سركار الانكريز و في بنادر رفيقهم على قدرهم يشترون و يبيعون فيها وان كان احدٌ تعرض لهم فذلک على سركار انگريز ـ

الشرط حادي عشر ـ ان هذ ا لشروط المذكورة فهى على جميع الطوايف و الناس يقبلونها فى المستقبل كما قبلوها فى الحين ـ تم الشروط و ان تحرير القول فى راس الخيمه بثلاثة نسخ في تاريخ ظهر يوم السبت اثنين وعشرين من شهر ربيع الاول فى سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجرية مايتين خمس و ثلاثين بعد الالف و رشموه المشر وطون فى الاماكن و التواريخ المكتوبة ذيلا فرشموه في راس الخيمة فى تاريخ تحرير القول ـ

خط السردار بيده و خاتمه

كتبه حسن بن رحمه بيده

الواثق بالله عبد حسن بن رحمه

كتبه قضيب بن احمد بيده

الواثق بالصمد عبده ابن قضيب احمد

Seal.

(Sd.) W. Grant-Keie,
Major General.

فرشمه فى راس الخيمة فى تاريخ يوم الثلثاء خمسة عشرين من شهر ربيع الاول فى سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجريه مايتين خمس وثلاثين بعد الالف ـ

كتبه شخبوط بيده

شخبوط عبد بن سعيد

فرشمه فى راس الخيمة فى تاريخ ظهر يوم السبت تسعة عشرين من شهر ربيع الاول في سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجريه مايتين خمس و ثلاثين بعد الالف ـ

كتبه حسن بن علي بيده

المهر مهر قبطان طامسين وليس عند شيخ حسن مهر فى وقت رشمة

(٨)

فرشمه من طرف محمد بن هزاع بن زعل شيخ دبي و هو صغير السن فى الشارقة فى يوم الجمعه ثاني عشر من شهر ربيع الثانى سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجريه مائين خمس و ثلاثين بعد الالف ـ

زايد بن سيف على محمد

ابن سيف
مبد زايد

فرشمه فى شارقه فى تاريخ ظهر يوم الجمعه تسعة عشر من شهر ربيع الثانى سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجريه مائين خمس و ثلاثين بعد الالف ـ

كتبه سلطان بن صقر بيده

بن صقر
الواثق بالله سلطان

فرشمه فى شارقه الوكيل من طرف الشيخين سليمان بن احمد و عبدالله بن احمد بحسب و كالته عن الشيخين فى تاريخ يوم السبت عشرين من شهر ربيع الثانى سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجريه مايتين خمس و ثلاثين بعد الالف ـ

ابن عبد الجليل
السيد يسن

بسم الله قد كتبه بيده السيد عبدالجليل بن السيد يسن الوكيل عن الشيخ سليمان بن احمد و الشيخ عبدالله بن احمد آل خليفه شيخي البحرين ـ

فرشمه عبدالله بن احمد آل خليفه فى ٩ جمادالاول سنه ١٢٣٥ فى البحرين و قبلوا ذالك فى ظهرية الاربعا

عبدالله بن احمد
آل خليفه

فرشمه سليمان بن احمد آل خليفه فى ٩ جمادالاول سنه ١٢٣٥ فى البحرين و قبلو ذالك فى ظهرية يوم الاربعا

سليمان بن احمد
آل خليفه

فرشمه فى القلية فى ظهر يوم الاربعا فى تاريخ تسع و عشرين من شهر جمادالاول سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجريه مايتين وخمس و ثلاثين بعد الالف كتبه راشد بن حميد بيده

بن سلطان
عبده راشد بن حميد

فرشمه فى القلية فى ظهر يوم الاربعا فى تاريخ تسع و عشرين من شهر جماد الاول سنه ١٢٣٥ الهجريه مايتين وخمس و ثلاثين بعد الالف كتبه عبدالله بن راشد بيده

بن راشد
عبده
عبدالله

1.03
The formulation of British policy: notes prepared by Francis Warden for the Government of Bombay, August 1819

EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF NOTES

RELATIVE TO

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF

THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

PREPARED, IN AUGUST 1819,

BY MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,

MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

OF THE MUSKAT ARABS, JOASMEES, UTTOOBEES, WAHABEES, AND OMAN.

In the following paragraphs I have endeavoured to supply the want under which this Government has hitherto laboured of an adequate knowledge of the complicated interests that prevail in the Persian Gulf, by affording a sketch of the history of each of the Powers which have contended for superiority, and of the various revolutions which have occurred in that quarter from the earliest period.

During the ascendancy of the Portuguese nation, which under Alphonso d'Albuquerque conquered all the islands in the Persian Gulf in A. D. 1507, its navigation was perfectly secure from piracy; it continued so during the reign of Shah Abbas, or until the rise of the Muskat Arabs, which may be dated from A. D. 1694-95.

On the death of Shah Abbas, the Arabs, who had from the earliest ages possessed a superiority at sea over the Persians, established an influence which they maintained until the year 1736. Their depredations during that period were carried on to a most alarming degree, extending to the Indian seas, and the ruler of Muskat became master of all the islands.

The power of the Muskat Arabs declined in the reign of Nadir Shah, who re-established the Persian influence; an ascendancy which was maintained during the subsequent reign of Kureem Khan. The tranquillity of the Gulf was, however, disturbed in some degree on the death of Nadir Shah, by the notorious freebooter Meer Mehana, and by the Chaub Shaikh, by whose refractory dispositions the trade was greatly impeded. The British Government was also involved in serious difficulties by the vacillating policy pursued by its Agents at Bussora, on that occasion, which reduced our reputation to the lowest ebb. We experienced a disastrous defeat in an attack of the Chaub, and failed also in an attempt to reduce Bunderik, belonging to Meer Mehana. In the course of a badly conducted negociation with Kureem Khan, for the purpose of retrieving our credit in the chastisement of

those petty rulers, we involved ourselves in hostilities with the Khan, who issued orders for the seizure of all English ships which his fleets might fall in with. A good understanding with the Persian Government was in some measure restored on the re-establishment of the Factory of Bushire in 1776.

The Muskat fleet, of which we hear nothing from 1736 to 1769 or 1774, made its appearance in the latter year, to co-operate in the defence of Bussora, the reduction of which Kureem Khan was contemplating, and effected; one of the pretexts for which was stated to be the aid which the Pacha of Bagdad had granted the Imaum of Muskat, which prevented the Persians from subduing the province of Oman.

Bussora was abandoned by the Persians on the death of Kureem Khan, in A. D. 1779, and re-occupied by the Turks. The troubles that ensued in the interior of Persia on that event left the Gulf uncontrolled. The decline of the Persian influence may be dated from that period; its maintenance depended exclusively on the attachment and fidelity of its tributaries. The contests for superiority which arose between the different petty States involved the whole Gulf in a state of hostility.

The fleet of the Shaikh of Julfar (Ras-ool-Khyma), who was at this period at war with the Imaum of Muskat, being continually on the cruise, roused every petty chief to equip armed boats, manned by a lawless crew, who received no pay, but depended solely on plunder, which they committed on each other. The Uttoobee Arabs, ambitious of sharing in the spoils, conquered Bahrein from the Persians, the possession of which, supported by their allies, they have since maintained, with unimportant intermissions, against repeated efforts on the part of the Persians, assisted by the Joasmees, and of the Imaum of Muskat, for its recovery and reduction.

We now come to an important era in the history of the Persian Gulf,—the rise of the Wahabee power, of which mention is first made in the Bombay Records in 1787. The Persian and Turkish Governments were at this period in an unsettled state, and but ill calculated to oppose the progressive ascendancy of that sect.

During the whole of this period, and even up to the year 1797, the molestation which the British trade experienced in the reign of Kureem Khan may be attributed to that interference which the Government exercised in the disputes between the petty States in the Gulf: whenever we preserved a strict neutrality, we derived every advantage from the observance of that policy. To piratical depredations it was not at all exposed, nor can piracy be said to have been systematically prosecuted by any of the powers up to 1797, except by the Muskat Arabs during the period of their ascendancy.

The enterprising character of Syud Sultan, the Imaum of Muskat,

ARAB TRIBES.

who had usurped the Government from his elder brother, led him into serious disputes with the Arabs, which brought on a war with many of them. The British flag was insulted in one or two instances, for which, however, satisfaction was rendered. The troubles that prevailed from this period to the death of Syud Sultan, in 1804, are wholly attributable to the conduct of that chieftain in the prosecution of his ambitious views of aggrandisement.

The disputes that followed the death of Syud Sultan, for the succession, threw the Government of Muskat completely under the control of the Wahabee: from that period, the influence which the former chief had established declined, and that of the latter rapidly advanced, to the establishment of its ascendancy over the Gulf,—an event which led to the systematic prosecution of piracy, under the countenance and protection of that power, even to the Indian Seas.

The history of the rise of the Muskat, the Joasmee, and the Uttoobee Arabs, respectively, satisfactorily shows that they resisted the growing power of the Wahabees to the utmost of their efforts, and that not one of the petty States in the Gulf has voluntarily engaged in piracy.

From the period of their establishment in Oman until the year 1796, I have been unable to trace a single act of aggression, even on the part of the Joasmees, against the British flag. The attack of the *Bassein*, *Snow*, and of the *Viper* cruiser, in 1797, was supposed to have been by Arabs in the interest of the deposed Prince of Oman, the elder brother of Syud Sultan. In 1802 the Wahabees had reduced to nominal submission the principality of Seer, or the Joasmee territory; nor was it until after 1804 that the Joasmees, or, what would be a more just designation, the Wahabee Joasmees, commenced their piratical depredations. On the conclusion of the treaty with them in 1806, Captain Seton represented "the whole bulk of the Joasmees desirous of returning to their former mercantile pursuits."

Whatever may have been their disposition in that respect, they had not the power of gratifying it. In 1808, when their depredations first extended to the Indian Seas, Shaikh Sultan, the Joasmee Chief, possessed only the port of Ras-ool-Khyma, and his power being shortly after completely superseded, by the appointment of Wahabee officers to the charge of districts throughout his territories, he was inveigled up to Deriah, and imprisoned by the Wahabee Shaikh. He made his escape, reached Muskat, and sought the protection of the Imaum. The Joasmees were rendered independent of their lawful Shaikh, whose territories were placed under the vicegerency of Hussan bin Ali, the Joasmee Chief of Ramse, who had acknowledged the supremacy of the Wahabee Shaikh, and carried on piracy under his express orders and

ARAB TRIBES.

protection, on the condition of assigning to him one-fifth of the value of all captures.

The Imaum made two different attempts to reinstate the Joasmee Chief in his hereditary possessions, but failed to accomplish that object; and Shaikh Sultan, with some of his tribe, has since resided at Shargah, and occasionally at Lingah. Hussan bin Rehma is now in charge of the Government of Ras-ool-Khyma, conjointly with his brother Ibrahim bin Rehma, and it is said that one or other of the brothers always commands in every fleet that goes out on a piratical cruise. They are first cousins to Sultan bin Suggur, the legitimate Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, but devoted to the Wahabee power.

Next to the Wahabee power, the State of Muskat appears to have contributed, by its injudicious policy, to the insecurity of the Gulf. Their history proves that the Muskat Arabs were the first power in that quarter that prosecuted piracy, but they have abandoned it since 1736. Whenever the Government, however, has been efficient since that period, it has engaged in petty wars, in the prosecution of views of ambition which it has never been able to accomplish. With the most powerful fleet in the Gulf, and the means of protecting Oman against internal invasion if properly applied, the Imaum has been unable to check the depredations of the Wahabee Joasmees;—the Joasmees have maintained their independence against every attempt on the part of the Imaum to reduce their country. Equally unable has he been to reduce Bahrein, or to retain it when reduced, the Arabs possessing that island feeling themselves fully competent, as they manfully assert, and determined to defend it against attack by the Imaum, or any other Native power in the Gulf. The prosecution of those views on the part of the Imaum, leading to combinations among the Arab States either to promote or counteract them, and the general warfare that invariably ensued, have led to attacks on British vessels, and to check the trade of the Gulf.

In respect to the Uttoobee Arabs, I am disposed to think that the account of their origin and establishment as a commercial tribe of Arabs at Zobara will place their character in a very favourable light. As long as their power enabled them to oppose the Wahabees, they abstained from acknowledging allegiance to them. Inevitable necessity drove them to seek that protection: they did not, however, resort to that alternative, until after their offer to retire from their possessions on the main to Bahrein, provided the British would protect them, was declined. They cannot be charged with having committed a single act of piracy; they did not admit and promote the disposal of pirated property, until they found a renewed engagement, which they were anxious to enter into with the British, entirely disregarded. Self-existence compelled them to acknowledge a power, whose preponderance

ARAB TRIBES.

in the Gulf they have employed every effort to check, and to which they have ever manifested a decided hostility. The Imaum of Muskat has no greater merit: with more powerful resources to maintain its independence, His Highness was equally compelled to preserve the existence of his Government by an abject submission to the authority of the Wahabee Chief. The Imaum acknowledged allegiance to the Wahabees, and his whole fleet would have engaged in piracy but for the timely interposition of the British Government in 1809.

The Records of the Bombay Government, and every other authority I have consulted, fully corroborate the fact, that previously to the establishment of the Wahabee power,—and I would except also the period from 1694-95 to 1736, during the ascendancy of the Muskat Arabs,—the tribes in the Gulf were engaged in commercial enterprise; in the cultivation of extensive groves of the date tree; and in the pursuit of a lucrative pearl fishery: their vessels resorting to the ports of India, Yemen, Africa, Sind, Kutch, and Bussora, which afforded profitable employment to the maritime portion of the population of the Gulf.

It is a very extraordinary fact,—at least I have not been able to trace anything to the contrary,—that during the whole period of the ascendancy of the Wahabee power in the Gulf, the Imaum of Muskat has not lost an inch of territory, nor a single port, that belonged to his ancestors, on the shores of Oman.

Neither has he any claim to the ports of the Joasmees. Oman has from the earliest ages been divided between two tribes, the Beni Yemen or Beni Hinavi, and the Beni Nasir or Beni Gafree. The Imaum is the head of the first, and his ancestors have possessed one of the two principalities into which the province is divided, namely Rastag, of which Muskat is the principal port.

The Chief of the Joasmees is the head of the other tribe, and has for ages possessed the other principality, called Seer or Julfar, of which Ras-ool-Khyma is the chief seaport. His ancestors settled in Oman before those of the Imaum of Muskat.

BRIEF NOTES

RELATIVE TO

THE PROVINCE OF OMAN.

PREPARED, IN AUGUST 1810, BY

MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,

MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

PROVINCE OF OMAN.

The Province of Oman comprehends the south-easterly region of Arabia, extending from Ras-ool-Hud on the south, to Zobara (or to the island of Shargah) on the north-eastern coast. It is divided into two Principalities; the capital of the first is Rastag, and of the latter Seer or Julfar. Muskat is the chief seaport of the former, and Ras-ool-Khyma of the latter. It has been divided, also, from the earliest ages, between two Arab tribes, one called Beni Yemen* or Beni Hinavi, and the other Beni Nasir† or Beni Gafree. The Imaum of Muskat is the head of the first, and possesses the line of coast from Cape Ras-ool-Geete to Cape Musseldom; and the Chief of the Joasmees of the other; his territory, extending from Musseldom to Shargah, constituting the Seer Principality.

The Hinavi tribe consists of the following families, the names of the Chiefs in 1809 being given, viz:—

I.—The Imaum of Muskat, Syud Saiad.
II.—Azzan, the son of Gheifs, fixed at Sohar.
III.—Nunneed, the son of Ahmed, at Rastag.
IV.—Nunneed, the brother of Ahmed, at Simoak.
V.—Nunneed bin Nasser, of Zaheera.
VI.—The Beni Gafree tribes, under Mahomed bin Nasser, excepting the Joasmees, which are independent of Muskat.

Oman was originally peopled from Persia, and subject to that Government. The first Arab tribe that settled in Oman was the Ool-Yesdee, who, under Malik bin Fukkeem-ool-Yesdee, emigrated from Nujd. On entering Oman with his followers, they halted at Jah, and preferred a request to Meerzeban, the Persian commander of the province, for a tract of country on which they might settle, which being refused, a contest ensued, in which Meerzeban was killed, the Persians were defeated, and driven out of Oman. Malik conquered the country, and being joined by other tribes from Nujd, peopled it with Arabs, and embraced Mahomedanism in the time of the Prophet.

Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, led a force into Oman from Yemen, and, having established an intercourse with the Nujd tribes, returned. This introduction of the Yemends into the province formed

* So named from being on the right hand side of the Caaba.

† Or inhabitants of Nujd, as being on the left.

a new sect, and in time a new religion, as they embraced that schism which is known under the name of Kharej, or Seceders, but who call themselves Beazoo, or the Pures; whilst the Ool-Yesdee and other tribes have remained strict Soonites.

The Joasmsees are descended from the inhabitants of Nujd, and called the Beni Nasir or Gafree; and the Muskat Arabs from those of Yemen, and called Beni Yemen, or Beni Hinavi. The enmity between the Muskat Arabs and the Joasmees is the remnant of the schism that arose in the time of Mahomed, and has continued to prevail in Oman to this day.

The face of the whole of Oman is rugged and hilly, but possesses many fertile valleys, occupied by different tribes, each of whom have their own castles to retire to in time of danger, or when discontented; when the chief calls in his relations and tribe, defends himself as long as he can, or, if he has the power, plunders his neighbours; hence civil wars are of frequent occurrence in the province.

Each tribe has its own Shaikh, who elects from the most powerful tribe one who rules the whole, and who adopts the name of his tribe as a nation. The succession to the Shaikhship continues hereditary in this tribe until some other becomes more powerful, or the successor shows a vicious disposition, or want of capacity, when he is deserted by all the tribes, and a new family chosen.

The whole coast of Oman was once in the possession of the Portuguese; they were expelled by the Arabs, and these were, again, partially conquered by the Persians under Taki Khan, in the reign of Nadir Shah. The Persians were again driven out by Ahmed bin Sueed, the Governor of Sohar, on which occasion he was elected Imaum. Syud Ahmed attempted to reduce Ras-ool-Khyma to subjection, and would have succeeded had he not been abandoned by some of his allies, on whom he most depended, and forced to make a precipitate retreat; since which period Seer has remained independent. Hostilities, however, have continued to be carried on between the chiefs of the two principalities.

The Wahabee Arabs conquered the whole of the principality of Seer, including Ras-ool-Khyma, reducing the inhabitants to the most abject submission to their orders. By the compact entered into with the Wahabee Shaikh on his invasion of Oman, Nunneed bin Nasser of Zaheera, Azzan of Sohar, and Mahomed bin Nasser, were constituted Ameers, or territorial lords in their own right, without any dependance on Muskat.

Nunneed assisted the Wahabee Shaikh in the attack of Sohar, and Mahomed bin Nasser having also assisted him, with troops and money, nd by stopping the access to reinforcements east of Semay, he deprived he Imaum of all support, but what he derived from Mukran and the

country westward of Muskat to Masseera, which reduced the Imaum to such distress, that he was compelled to make peace with the Wahabees on their own terms, which were that he and the whole of Oman should be subject to their authority, and aid their views on Bussora and India, which were, however, delayed until Sahood's return from a pilgrimage to Mecca.

It is of importance here to notice a new power, the Zahib tribe, which the Wahabee Shaikh established in the tract of country from Musseldom to Ramse, which he placed under the government of Hussain bin Ali, who was the Shaikh of Ramse, and of two strong forts, called Teguera and Bithney, which Sahood took from the Joasmees, and conciliated Hussain Ali to his support. The Imaum, anxious not to break with the Wahabees, refrained from acting against this tribe, which it would have been for his interest to have done.

Hussain bin Ali, a Joasmee Chief, was invested by the Wahabees with the fullest authority, which enabled him to compel the heads of the Joasmees residing at Lingah and Ras-ool-Khyma to cruise in conjunction with vessels from Ramse, in the service of the Wahabees, against all ships, without exception, appearing in the Gulf.

Mahomed bin Nasser Gafree, dissatisfied with the Wahabees, made advances to the Imaum, who, drawing him into a snare, seized and imprisoned him, in consequence of his having acknowledged the Wahabee power, but released him on his surrendering to His Highness Semayle, and another strong place he possessed in the mountains.

The Chief of Zaheera, having been plundered and insulted by the Wahabees, offered to join the Imaum, who, however, distrusted him; whilst the ruler of Sohar, having been deprived of half of his territory, declared his resolution rather to die than longer to submit to the Wahabees. The common danger had in fact reunited the Shaikhs of Oman, and they were determined on a vigorous resistance to Sahood, who had threatened them with a visit on his return from Mecca. They were, however, desirous of the assistance of the English, to recover Shinas, and the places on the coast near Cape Musseldom, that had been dismembered from Sohar, so as to reduce the defence of the country to one point, the passage across the isthmus.

It is probable that the Oman Chiefs of the Hinavi tribe will, on the annihilation of the Wahabee power, return to their former relations with the Imaum.

Overtures for a pacification were recently received from Ameer Hussan bin Rehma, of Ras-ool-Khyma, which have been of course peremptorily rejected. He is devoted to the interests of the Wahabees, and is not the legitimate Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma.

1.04
Government of Bombay's instructions to Major-General Sir William Grant Keir on the expedition to the 'Pirate ports', 27 October and 27 November 1819

204. The Bombay Government issued very careful instructions to Sir William Grant Keir on the various points connected with the expedition, which he was to command, in their letter, dated 27th October 1819, which may be read:—

Instructions to Sir William Grant Kier. Volume 52—49 of 1820-1821, page 1.

4. You will be pleased to understand that the Joassmee tribe who have been most actively engaged in the atrocities which have called for the operations now about to be undertaken, occupy the port of Ras-ul-Khima on the western shore of the Gulph of Persia, from whence the greatest part of the piratical cruisers have been equipped, and where they may probably be now assembled.

5. For some years past until within the last, they appear to have been under the influence of the Wahabee sect, but since the fall of Deriah (the seat of Government) and the rest of the territories of that State to the Turkish troops under the command of Ibrahim Pacha, they have been subjected to no control, and have continued their depredations without regard to the nation to which the vessels or craft might belong, which they have felt themselves competent to subdue.

6. Abdoolla-bin Saood, the late chieftain of the Wahabees, who was made a prisoner at Deriah, was, it appears, sent to Constantinople, and has since been put to death.

7. It would be difficult to recapitulate the means and descriptions of the vessels and craft which have fallen into the hands of the pirates; but among them the Honourable Company's Pattamar, the Deria Dowlat and another belonging to this place with a detachment of the Honourable Company's Native troops are to be included, the crews of which, as well as the troops on board the latter, were inhumanly murdered.

8. The inhabitants of Ras-ul-Khima appear to the Governor in Council to be deserving the *most exemplary punishment*, and it would therefore be desirable, should circumstances be favourable for effecting the objects in view, that your operations should, in the first instance, be directed against them; but though the property they have found on board the trading vessels they have captured is of great extent, it is to be feared that it has already been disposed of at Bahrein and other places, and that none of it will be likely to be recoverable.

9. The pain of Ras-ul-Khima which accompanies this, though perhaps not very accurately described, will afford a tolerably correct idea of its situation and defences; and, considering the extent of the force which has been placed at your disposal, it is to be hoped that at no distant period, after the commencement of your operations, it will fall into your hands, the first object of your attention should be directed to the *destruction of the piratical vessels and craft of every description with every article of naval or military store that may be found there, and you will not fail to bear in mind that excepting in cases of particular emergency neither the troops or the crews of the ships of war or the Honourable Company's cruisers are meant to be employed at any distance from thence, or from any other place, to which your operations may be directed, against any military forces of the piratical States, unless their being so employed should be found essentially requisite for the demolition of the piratical vessels and craft which may be in their ports.*

10. The despatch of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General to Ibrahim Pacha and the instructions which have been given to Captain Sadlier to whom the delivery of that despatch has been confided, will put you in possession of the measures proposed to be concerted with His Excellency, *for placing the port of Rasselkhima under the authority of the Turkish Government*; and it is to be regretted that, by the unexpected departure of His Excellency from that part of the coast before the arrival of Captain Sadlier, the arrangements consequent to such a measure could not be concluded.

11. The letters which have been received from that officer which are inclosed for your information will apprize you that he has followed His Excellency into the interior, and until some reply shall have been received from him to the overture thus made, it will be necessary the town of Ras-ul-Khima should be occupied by such a portion of the force under your orders as may be necessary for its security.

12. To prevent any delay in the communication of the decision of His Excellency Ibrahim Pacha that can be avoided, Captain Sadlier has been directed, in the event of his being enabled to do so, to join you on your arrival in the Gulph and deliver to you any despatches he may have received from His Excellency to the address of this Government, and also to communicate to you such information of His Excellency's designs as he may have obtained for the regulation of your conduct.

13. You will perceive that, under the views of the Supreme Government, the possession of any other places than Ras-ul-Khima by the Turkish force, has not been contemplated, nor are you, without further instructions, to facilitate the placing any other of the piratical ports under His Excellency's authority.

14. Until some decision be formed respecting the disposal of Ras-ul-Khima, it would not appear advisable to demolish the town, nor even its defences, beyond what may be the effect of your operations to reduce it.

15. In the communications which passed between Captain Sadlier and the *Imam of Muscat* you will perceive that His Highness expressed some degree of *reluctance in co-operating with the Turkish force* in the reduction of Rasselkhima; but whatever may be the wishes of the Turkish Government with respect to the ultimate possession of that place, or the motives by which the Imam was disposed to withhold his co-operation with those troops, there seems no probability that any portion of them will be brought into contact with those of His Highness, which consequently will remove all the objections to a hearty co-operation with you, which his inclination would, the Governor in Council is disposed to believe, otherwise most readily leads him to undertake.

16. Besides the principal port of Rassul-Khima, there are several ports contiguous to it from Rumys to Abbo Heyle as laid down in the chart, now transmitted to you, the maritime force of which, as appertaining to the same piratical state, or by acting in concert with it, may be considered equally objects for consideration. If therefore after securing the possession of Ras-ul-Khima you shall learn that any piratical vessels are at either of those places, you will proceed to each of them respectively, and exert your best endeavours to burn or otherwise destroy them.

17. It has not been distinctly ascertained whether either of those places have recently submitted to the authority of Ibrahim Pacha, but should any of them at the time of your arrival be in possession of the Turkish troops, any operations against them should of course be avoided, unless any of the piratical vessels may have taken shelter within them and are without the reach of such troops.

18. In addition to the ports above described on the Arabian Coast, it is understood that the inhabitants of the *port of Lingua and other places on the Persian shore* have in a certain degree identified themselves with the Joassmee and have committed depredations on the trade.

19. The instructions to Mr. Jukes, who, as you are already apprized, has proceeded to the Gulph, and the letters with which he has been charged, copies of which accompany this, will explain to you the proceedings which have been adopted in respect to those places, and though from the date they bear no reply can yet be expected from the *Prince of Sherans* to the invitation transmitted to His Highness, it is hoped that the explanations afforded to him of the real objects of our solicitude, even should His Highness hesitate in co-operating with the force under your commands in their destruction, will obviate any inclination he might otherwise feel to oppose your operations against the piratical force that may be found within them.

20. The reply of His Highness to the letter addressed to him on this subject will probably reach you before you shall be prepared to proceed to the Persian shore, and you will in a certain degree be regulated by it in your intended operations, *but in any case you must not hesitate in proceeding to the destruction of the pirates on that side of the Gulph wherever you may ascertain them to exist, taking care to proceed in all such cases with the utmost practicable respect towards the undisputed rights of His Persian Majesty, the ally of our august Sovereign, and to cause it to be fully explained to such of the officers of the Persian Government with whom, in the course of events, you may be brought in communication that the British Government has no other object than to protect the commercial intercourse with the coast of Persia and other* ports of the Gulph, and to free it from the obstructions and losses to which it has too long been exposed from the predatory acts of the piratical tribes, without the slightest intention of occupying any part of the territory, or to molest or annoy any one of His Persian Majesty's loyal subjects, who in consideration of the friendly relations existing between the two countries, it is our earnest desire to cherish and protect.

21. The ports to which the pirates resort in addition to Lingua are specified in the margin.

22. You will receive herewith a triplicate of a letter from the President to the Prince of Sherans, which it is left to you to forward, or to make such other use of, as circumstances may render expedient. A translation of that letter forms an enclosure to the instructions to Mr. Jukes and a Persian copy is enclosed, the possession of which will enable you to make such communication to the local authorities as may preclude the possibility of any misconstructions of the views entertained by the British Government in the course of your proceedings against the piratical force in question.

23. The Resident at Bagdad has been instructed to communicate to that Government the objects contemplated by the present expedition, so that no interference with your operations may be expected from His Highness, the Turkish possessions under that Pachalic being too remote from the scene of action to be likely to be brought into contact with you.

24. You will perceive by the instructions to Mr. Jukes and the letter therein referred to, the desire expressed to the Imam of Muscat of His Highness's co-operation in effecting the reduction of the piratical force, and the Governor in Council does not entertain a doubt that His Highness will most cordially afford his aid, not only by means of the naval and military force at his disposal, but in the supply of the armament with such provisions and refreshments as may be necessary to facilitate your operations.

25. By the communication made to this Government by the Hon'ble Company's broker at Muscat, you will perceive that His Highness has recently been engaged in negotiation with the people of Rassulkhima, with a view of endeavouring to extinguish the power of the present chieftain and of restoring *Sooltan-bin Saggar*, the legitimate chieftain, to his authority; but that deserted by this chieftain on his arrival off that place, and, with the exception of Rahmat-bin-Jauber, all the petty chieftains who had promised to aid him in his operations in the event of a failure in his negotiation he had been obliged to return to Muscat.

26. Whatever may have been the claims of Sooltan-bin Saggar, it is by no means desirable, after such conduct, that his cause should be espoused by the British Government, and in any arrangements which may appear to you to be necessary, in reference to the temporary occupation of Rassulkhima previously to your having the determination of His Excellency Ibrahim Pacha or receiving further instructions from hence, care should be taken to avoid his being placed in authority.

27. With respect to *Rahmat-bin Jauber*, formerly the chieftain of Khore Husson, it would appear from the late communications received from the Gulph that he has identified himself with the Imam, and will in all probability be ready to aid your operations, and, should that disposition be expressed, it will be desirable you should avail yourself of his services, under the impression, that, whatever may have been his predatory habit formerly, he is disposed to unite in destroying the power of the Joassmees, and those associated with them, who have been so actively employed in disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulph.

28. It is probable that Rahmat-bin Jauber will join you in company with the Imam, but whether he has any force of his own, or is employed in the Imam's service, appears to be somewhat doubtful.

29. Although it might be convenient with a view to the intended operations that the armament should call at Muscat previously to its entering the Gulph, for the purpose of being joined by such part of the force of the Imam as may be assigned to the purposes of the expedition, yet from the unhealthiness of the place and in the difficulty in obtaining some of the necessary supplies, particularly water, but more especially with the view of occupying a more convenient position for pursuing your future operations, it would appear to be far preferable that you should *proceed at once to the islands of Kishmee*, which Island is represented to be capable not only of affording a safe anchorage, but of furnishing a certain portion of water and other refreshments which cannot so readily be obtained at Muscat, and no doubt can be entertained of permission being granted for your occupying any part of that island that may be necessary for the temporary accommodation of the armament.

30. You will, therefore, after leaving this place proceed direct to Kishm, where you will probably find Captain Theriff of the Commissariat Department, who has been employed in collecting such supplies, and after obtaining what may be required for the refreshments of the troops and such information as you may conceive to be necessary regarding the proceedings of the piratical force, you will lose no time in carrying your instructions into execution.

31. It may probably happen that previously to your arrival in the Gulph, the chieftain of Rassulkhima under the dread of the effect of your intended operations may have ordered their maritime force to leave that place and proceed to sea, or to take some more secure position—this, and other local circumstances which may have occurred since the last advices were received, may render it necessary that you should change the proposed plan of operations, and understanding that their destruction is the primary object of consideration, much will be left to your discretion.

32. The Governor in Council has so much reliance in your zeal and ability, that whatever opinions he may have given as applicable to the immediate attack of Rassulkhima, he is willing to leave the course of proceeding entirely in your hands under a full persuasion that it will be regulated under the exercise of a sound judgment, and that any difficulties which may present themselves that can be effected by skill and gallantry will be surmounted.

33. *The objection contemplated is of no slight importance, and it is to be hoped that by your exertions the commerce of this part of India will be freed from the further ravages of those barbarians, who under circumstances that could not be prevented, have so long continued* to practise them with so much success.

34. Lieutenants Searight and Brucks have been appointed agents for the transport service and have been directed to place themselves under the orders of Captain Collier, who will be charged with the conduct of the maritime part of the expedition, and the Governor in Council relies with the fullest confidence that all your proceedings will be conducted with

that cordiality and good humour which are so essential to the public interests and the success of your operations.

35. The Governor in Council has authorized some articles to be supplied to you to be disposed of as presents to the Imam or such other persons, to whom it may be proper to pay these marks of attention, and leaves their distribution entirely to your discretion. The rank and station of His Highness will, he is persuaded, not to be lost sight of by you and that you will endeavour to cultivate the good opinion and confidence of His Highness, so essential in the present moment to the common interests.

36. As Government must be anxious to learn the actual state of the enemy's force in the different piratical ports and the prospect you have of destroying it, it will be very desirable that you should allow no opportunity to escape you of giving him the fullest information you may be able to collect on these subjects, and of the course you may mean to pursue under the circumstances that may present themselves after your arrival at your rendezvous, the better to enable him to decide on the nature of the further instructions which may hereafter be necessary to be transmitted to you for your guidance in the execution of the service confided to you.

37. Mr. Jukes has been directed to furnish you with a copy of his proceedings and to consider himself under your orders on your arrival in the Gulph.

205. In a letter, dated 27th November 1819, to the address of Major-General Keir, Bombay Government modified the instructions contained in the letter of the 27th October so as to vest him with a discretionary authority to make over Ras-ul-Khima, after its capture, to Sultan-bin-Saggar, if he should find that the Chief had sufficient weight with the tribe to render it probable that he would be able to retain it. But should Sultan-bin-Saggar be found not to have that degree of influence, the Government desired that the place should be transferred to any person whom the tribe may elect as their Chief, provided he was unconnected with the Wahabis and unlikely to resume the piratical habits which had led to the British interference.

1.05
Gulf policy: the Government of Bombay's views, December 1819

206. The Bombay Government now presided over by Sir Monstuart Elphinstone addressed the following important despatch to the Government of Marquis of Hastings at Fort William, dated 15th December 1819, indicating the line of policy which they proposed should be followed in Persian Gulf matters :—

We have postponed a reply to Your Lordship's despatch of the 28th of August last, on the subject of the intended expedition to the Gulf of Persia under an expectation that the information subsequently transmitted to Your Lordship would have led to our being furnished with specific instructions in respect to the line of policy which it might be deemed expedient to pursue for the suppression of piracy in that quarter, a review however of the documents which have been furnished to Your Lordship affording us reason to conclude that it may be considered to be our duty to submit a specific plan in respect to the extent of our interposition for the attainment of that object, we proceed under that impression to offer what appears to us to be an arrangement the best adapted to the attainment of our views, without pledging, in any serious responsibility, the guarantee of the British Government to its observance.

2. Referring in the first instance to the propositions contained in the despatch from the late Government of the 21st of July we are of opinion *that we should abstain from all interference in the pretensions which are advanced to the occupation of Bahrein, under a* distinct explanation to the Sheikh of that island, that so long as he restrains his tribe from the prosecution of acts of aggression on the high seas, and carries on those commercial pursuits in which they would appear to have been formerly engaged, the ports of India shall be open to his vessels, and that he may rely in experiencing from the British Government every degree of encouragement and of friendly intercourse, but that, on the contrary, if any indications of a piratical spirit should manifest themselves, we shall be compelled to adopt those measures of coercion which we are prosecuting against the Joassmese. An engagement similar to that negotiated by Mr. Bruce in the year 1816 would probably tend to convince the Uttoobi Arabs of the integrity of our intentions.

3. *The transference then of the island of Bahrein to the Imam of Muscat being abandoned, the proposition with which it was coupled, of His Highness's subsidizing a British force, should be relinquished, as under any circumstances impolitic and objectionable.*

4. With respect to the Joassmese, the reduction of the *Port of Rasul-khima and those contiguous to it from Kuiny to Abbo Heyle,* and the annihilition of that influence under which it would appear to have engaged, in so extensive a degree in piratical pursuits, will operate no doubt as an immediate check upon the habits of the tribe. Its subsequent disposal, however, is an important object of consideration.

See 16th paragraph of the instructions to Sir William Grant Keir.

5. Your Lordship will observe from our Chief Secretary's letter, dated the 4th of this month, that we have modified that part of the instructions to Major-General Sir William

Grant Keir, which imposed a positive prohibition against the restoration of Sultan-bin-Suggar to his hereditary possessions; leaving it optional with his tribe either to reinvest him in authority, or to elect another Chief as their ruler—our conquest of that port will enable us to demand conditions from the Chief under whose control it may be placed, which may restrain and reform the habits of the tribe.

6. Every vessel of a warlike character will no doubt be destroyed by the armament, and only those to be employed in commerce should in future be allowed to navigate from that port, and the port be dismantled. For the purpose of enforcing these conditions we should insist on a Native Agent residing at Rassul-khima to guard against any boats quitting the port offensively armed—our cruizers should be allowed free ingress into the port, and by stationing one or more armed Pattawars at its entrance, or in a secure harbour in its vicinity, with liberty to visit Rassul-khima, whenever we might deem it expedient, a salutary check would probably be imposed upon their future conduct. The ports of India should also be open to the Joassmees, our intercourse with which would not fail of civilizing the habits, and gradually reviving in them a spirit for commercial pursuits.

7. Should our anticipation in these respects not be realized, the project of placing the principality of Seer under the control and Government of the Imam of Muscat might be resorted to. The maritime resources which His Highness commands, if well directed, might, supported by our co-operation, effectually control every port in the province of Oman.

8. In regard to the *Imam of Muscat*, we should hope that little difficulty would be experienced in convincing him of the policy of consolidating and strengthening the possessions and resources which he commands, instead of weakening them by an extension of his territories. We might derive very material aid from the co-operation of His Highness's vessels and boats, in the future protection of the Gulph, and if for the purpose of rendering them more efficient, His Highness should still be desirous of the assistance of some European gunners, or even of a Marine officer, to exercise a general control in improving the efficiency of his marine, it would tend, in our opinion, to render the Imam's vessels fully competent to aid us in securing the future tranquillity of the navigation of the Gulph, acting in conjunction with our own cruizers.

See correspondence with the Supreme Government dated the 17th of July 1810.

9. The interest of Persia would as it appears to us be materially promoted, by our interposition in restoring the Gulph its former state of security. The *petty States on the Persian* side which were tributary to her, prior to the ascendancy of the Wahabees, might be restored to her allegiance, inclusive of such islands, the Chiefs of which may be disposed to acknowledge the supremacy of the Persian Government, either through our aid or through the influence of her own power, which would not be difficult of accomplishment, probably, if a Persian force were detached for that purpose whilst any part of our armament continued in the Gulph.

10. The suggestion of forming an *establishment in the Persian Gulf in a more central situation*, which would enable us to exercise a more immediate and commanding control over its navigation, than we can possibly do, either from Bushire, or Bussora, will engage our attention on the receipt of the reply to our Chief Secretary's letter of the 21st of October to Major-General Sir William Grant Keir; anticipate, however, some opposition on the part of the Persian Government to that measure, since it would be difficult we apprehend to satisfy that power that our views were limited to the professed object of our policy, the more especially as the Persian Government has manifested some degree of alarm at our contemplating the occupation of the Island of Babrein.

Sent to Bengal on the 31st of October.

11. With the view of allaying these alarms and of enabling the British Envoy at Tehran to afford to the Persian Government an explicit and candid exposition of the objects to which the expedition is exclusively directed, and of the ultimate plan which we contemplate for the permanent suppression of piracy, our President has addressed a letter to Mr. Willock of which the enclosed is a copy, which we trust will produce the effect of conciliating the Government of Persia to the arrangements which we have submitted to your consideration or to any other which Your Lordship may be pleased to prescribe, and in particular to our permanent occupation of Kishm. It would be premature in us to offer any opinion on the prospect of our being capable of maintaining an establishment on that island, without exposing the public to any additional expense, beyond what is at present incurred in the Gulf; whatever expense, however, may be incurred on the occasion will, we should hope, be more than compensated by the security which the valuable trade to that quarter will derive from the measure, and which will admit of reduction, as our influence becomes consolidated, and the piratical tribes abandon their predatory pursuits.

12. It is our intention to station as large a *marine force* in the Gulph as we can spare, with some armed boats for the purpose of visiting the different ports, and guarding against any vessels being equipped of a warlike character. The presence of this force, combined with the salutary effects, which cannot but be produced by the reduction of Rassul-khima, and the rigid observance of a prohibition, which should in our opinion be imposed on the export of timber, adapted to shipbuilding, to the Gulf of Persia and Arabia, from any of the ports of India, are the measures which appear the best calculated for the gradual suppression of piracy.

13. We have directed Major-General Sir William Grant Keir to reduce the force under his command and to return it to the Presidency at as early a period as practicable retaining, until further orders, a battalion of Native Infantry at Kishm, or at any other eligible island under a strict injunction not to admit of the troops occupying any position on the main.

14. The presence of this force will in our opinion produce a very salutary impression in overawing any disposition in the Joassmes or any other tribe, after the reduction of their port, to prosecute piracy, by manifesting to the different petty States that our views are not limited to the mere reduction of Rassul-khima and the destruction of the piratical boats; but extend to the prosecution of arrangements of a more permanent nature.

We have the honour to be, etc.,

M. ELPHINSTONE,

CHARLES COLVILLE,

ALEXANDER BELL,

G. L. PRENDERGAST.

BOMBAY CASTLE;
The 15th December 1819.

1.06
Sir William Grant Keir's reports on the conclusion of the treaties and the operations in the Arabian Gulf, January–February 1820

165

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

Read the following Despatch from Major General Sir Wm. Grant Keir to the Chief Secretary, dated the 16th of last Month

Pirates Persian Gulph. From Major General Sir Wm. Grant Keir &c. &c. &c. reports his Proceedings Subsequent to his Despatch of the 6th Instant. Submits a General Treaty with the Arab Chieftains together with Several preliminary Documents. Encloses Copy of a Letter from the Prince of Shiraz with reply. Arrangements with regard to the Khelat of Shoolabee. Has released the Chiefs of Zyah & the Fishermen taken at that place. Engagement entered into by the former. Submits Copies of Letters on the Subject of Commissariate and Medical Stores required.

Sir,

1 The thirty eighth Paragraph of my Despatch of the 6th Instant will have acquainted the Honble the Governor in Council that the Arab Chiefs in authority over the whole of the places on the Arabian Coast of this Gulf enumerated in your Letter of the 27th of October as belonging to Pirates, were in my Camp, and that they had evinced their readiness to enter for themselves and Tribes into any arrangements that might be prescribed for the effectual pacification of the Gulf of Persia.

2 I have now the honor to transmit the accompanying Copy of a general Treaty into which I have entered as it appears to be calculated

166

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

calculated to produce the suppression of Piracy, and the establishment of a free and secure Commercial intercourse between the different ports in the Gulf and those of India, and Persia, that the Honble the Governor in Council may think proper to recognise it accordingly—

3 All matters of a temporary or individual nature have been excluded in Preliminary Treaties with the several Chiefs, that the General Treaty might be reserved exclusively for arrangements of a permanent nature or such as are common to the whole of the contracting Tribes, and it will be observed that it has been awarded as to admit of the accession of future adherents.

4 Article first of the General Treaty provides for a cessation of all plunder and Piracy on the part of the contracting Arabs, this being the principle upon which those who have been guilty

167

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

guilty, are admitted to a reconciliation with the British Government.

5 Article Second points out the punishment that will be incurred by such individuals as may practice "plunder & piracy," and attempts to define what constitutes those Crimes, as contrasted with legitimate war.

6 Article Third describes the flag that is to be in use amongst the Tribes that are parties to the General Treaty. In discussing this point with different Arabs, I found that the proposed Flag would be the most agreeable to their inclinations, as connecting the sacred flag which they have hitherto borne with the white Ensign, the universally recognized Symbol of Peace. They are likewise aware that the Red Flag is usually considered by European Nations to belong to Pirates, and that their safety would consequently be greatly promoted

168

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

promoted by the adoption of that measure proposed.

7 Article Fourth declares that the relations now subsisting between the Tribes continue unaltered with the exception of being at peace with each other and also with the British Government. This article is intended to keep in mind the broad principles on which we have proceeded, and to prevent any idea arising that we wish to alter the existing relations either of Chiefs or States, as well as to demonstrate our determination not to interfere in the petty feuds of the subsisting powers, whilst they continue duly to observe the Stipulations of this Treaty.

8. The Fifth article provides for Vessels being furnished with certain papers similar to our "Registers" and "Port clearances". Considerable difficulties are likely to arise in obtaining the introduction of these papers with

167

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

with such attention to forms, as to secure them from being liable to legal objections on the part of the Commanders of Different Ships of War, exercising the right of Search, and I ought here to observe that it may be necessary to call for a considerable degree of forbearance on these points for some time on the part of all Vessels cruizing in these Seas.

9 I anticipate other important advantages from the introduction of these Papers, as well from the beneficial effects to all parts of the World, as from the tendency they will have to introduce order and more correct ideas of property than have hitherto existed in the Gulf.

It is to the observance of this article that I look principally as the means of preventing the equipment of any Vessels for warlike purposes, and I consider it better to introduce restrictions under such

170

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

Such forms, than to impose others that might not be so effectual, although more direct, interfering as they must, with the freedom necessary to commerce. An additional reason for adopting the line of Policy is, that it affords an opportunity for admitting to the General Treaty, a number of Tribes against whom no direct charge of piracy has been advanced, and on whom consequently there would be no plea for imposing more severe restrictions, the nature of which are superseded in effect by others that are conciliatory—

10. Article the sixth points out the means by which a ready and friendly intercourse may be maintained at the convenience of the contracting powers, and provides for the free admission of a functionary, whose establishment would go a considerable way towards the due introduction of the required papers— Article

171

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

11 Article the Seventh is designed to entitle us to call upon the different Tribes to join with us in putting down all who in defiance of the present compact may continue a System we have shewn ourselves determined to abolish; and it will make apparent that the falling off from their engagements of Tribes, or individuals, does not interfere with, or annul in any manner, the obligations of the General Treaty with respect to all others—

12. Article the Eight specifies in its due light the horrible custom of inflicting death on such as may become prisoners of War, and announces that a general coalition will take place against all who may persist in so inhuman a practice—

13 Article the Ninth abolishes the Slave trade of the subscribing powers, and must shew distinctly the abhorrence in which it is held

172

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

fied by the British Government. This even as a measure of Policy cannot failto be followed by beneficial effects, as a considerable portion of the Men lately opposed to us have consisted of Slaves, and I cannot withhold from observing, that no persuasion was necessary to induce the acceptance of this Stipulation.

14 Article the Tenth holds out to the Arabs the prospect of an equitable & secure Commercial intercourse, and it is to the due cultivation of this, that we must look for any permanent conquest over the lawless habits which have so long interrupted the friendly relations that naturally arise out of it, and which lead so immediately to the introduction of civilization with all its attendant blessings.

15 The Eleventh article makes the Treaty common to all Tribes and persons who may

173

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

may at any future time sign an adherence to it.

16 I shall now proceed to notice the preliminary treaties to which I have before adverted.

17 Article the first in the accompanying

2/ Treaty with Hajan bin Rachma the Chief of Ras ul Khyma Shahara, & their Dependencies, provides for the cession of Ras ul Khyma and Makara. In demanding this, it has been explained that the British Government is fully at liberty to dispose of these places in any manner that it may think fit on the three remaining articles I do not deem it necessary to offer any remarks.

18 Sultan bin Sugger the Chief of Shargah soon after the fall of Ras ul Khyma sent Vakeels with offers of submission how-ever terms might be dictated, he afterwards sent his brother with the same proposals, and next came himself into Camp where he signed the

3/ preliminary Treaty, of which the accompanying is

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

is a Copy — The enmity on the part of this Chief evidently arose from his desire to avoid the consequences of any actual hostilities on our part against him, and not the cause of the 3d article being inserted —

19 Mahomed bin Haza bin Jaal a minor Chief of Decboy noticed in the conclusion of the 38 Paragraph of my despatch of the 6th Instant, was sent to me by His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, who I am led to understand is desirous that some exceptions should be made in favor of him and the people of Decboy being of the same Tribe with His Highness, and not generally involved in the acts of Piracy committed in the Gulph, I have in consequence of my desire to meet the Imaums wishes, made the exception in the end of the third article of the accompanying preliminary Treaty —

20 It will be observed that the remaining

175

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

remaining articles are similar to what were entered into with Sultan bin Suggur and Mahomed bin Haza bin Jaal, will be admitted along with him to subscribe the General Treaty, when the whole of the Stipulations which are preliminary shall have been fulfilled —

21 Where a political State of Society exists similar to that which obtains in the Gulph of Persia, the basis of any approach to general pacification must have its rise in forgiveness for past offences, and it is well when that forgiveness can be bestowed without the exertion of great sacrifices from the guilty who, when the punishment inflicted is more severe than is absolutely necessary might prefer to indulge feelings of revenge rather than cultivate peaceful habits of industry which it is so desirable to introduce here reasoning thus I should have confined the compass into

176

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

into which they now stand, my demands upon the former practices of Piracy, but the tenor of my instructions being in perfect unison with this reasoning decided me not to require more from them in negociation, than I could have obtained by proceeding to the utmost acts of hostility contemplated in my orders; and it is gratifying to know that the full extent of what was desired, has been considered without exciting feelings that would have interfered greatly with our views for the suppression of Piracy, and the introduction of a secure Commercial intercourse.

22. It gives me great satisfaction to announce that a new class of Chiefs, and Tribes [illegible] whose conduct has not been tainted with fresh Crimes, are likely to come forward anxiously wishing to be admitted to the General Treaty; this will be a proof that it is efficient in their estimation

177

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

estimation, and that they are consequently desirous of meeting with us to interchange civilities by others who have subscribed to it.

5/ 23. Sheikh Booth the Chief of Boothabee arrived in my Camp, on the 11th Instant, and expressed a great desire to enter into friendly, and strict relations with the British Government. I have accordingly made with him the accompanying preliminary engagements, and admitted him to subscribe the General Treaty.

6/7 24. The enclosed Documents will shew the terms on which Sheikh Booth stands with His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, as well as the Character he bears in the estimation of those who should be well acquainted with the affairs of the Gulf.

25 It will be apparent to the Honble the Governor in Council, that I have eagerly seized what I considered a most favorable moment for

178

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

for the conclusion of these engagements but in the fluctuations of human affairs, and in the time required for previous sanction, it should have been lost for ever, — There were indeed opportunities not to be overlooked, for confirming & propelling the effects of our previous Military operations and for executing the spirit, and letter, of my instructions to suppress Piracy. — The state of affairs on this Coast called for some decided demonstration of what was likely to be our future conduct, since we had shown our power to accomplish them, and all who had been made sensible of this, await with much anxiety, a pledge that would set at rest all their apprehensions; and I humbly conceive that any delay in granting this, would not have been becoming, particularly as the annulment of all that has been executed conformable to these ideas, could not occasion greater perplexity than was before existed —

The

179

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

26 The distinct introduction into the General Treaty of any of our former allies has been avoided from the belief that their religious, and personal animosities, added to their habits of indecision and procrastination might prove a bar to the conclusion and afterwards the due observance, of any compact with which they might be directly connected with us, and the reasons for their omission, will probably appear stronger, when it is recollected how liable their interests are to fluctuation, and that a change in the views of any one power, would interfere with the operation of the whole System, and consequently, thwart the intentions of the British Government in entering into such arrangements — at the same time it is apparent that all the advantages which the allies could derive from the introduction of their names into the General Treaty might be secured to them,

66

180

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

by their entering through the mediation of the British Government into Special treaties, genera or individually, with the Arab Tribes, recogniz at the same time that which has now been concluded. This would leave the British Go=vernment perfectly unembarrassed in the pur=suits of future views, an object which must at all times be desirable.

27. Under this conviction I have trans=mitted to Muscat to His Highness the Imaum who had proceeded towards that place previous to the conclusion of the General Treaty, a com=munication intimating my belief, that the British Government would most readily recog=ly a Special treaty, that acts of piracy commit against His Highness, or his subjects, should be looked upon in the same light as committe against its own, and would guarantee free

Emigra

181

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

admission of His Highness's Subjects and Vessels into the Ports of the Arabs, understanding that a reciprocal admission shall be given to them into the Ports of His Highness.

28 I have likewise intimated that His Highness's formal recognition to Bombay of the Treaty now entered into, would probably be very acceptable to the British Government, provided an offer on his part to act against the Arabs, in the event of their committing any breach of it. To prevent mistakes or misrepresentations, I have transmitted for His Highness's information, Copies of all the engagements into which I have entered with the Arabs, from the convic=tion that such public proceedings which must be matters of notoriety, although not yet ratified by the Governor in Council would be

transmitted

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

transmitted with great advantage in a compleat form —

29 His Highness had been made acquainted previous to his leaving Ras ul Khyma, that these Treaties were in progress, and should have been finished in possession of the whole, had it been possible to compleat them before his Departure — the day previous to which, Captain Thompson my Interpreter visited upon His Highness, to communicate the substance of the foregoing proposals which seemed to be received with great satisfaction —

30 Shortly after the transmission of my Despatch of the 6th Instant, the Imaum intimated during an interview with me, his desire to return to Muscat, and directly avowed that his intention in proceeding there, was to make preparations for an independent attack on Bharein, as adverted to in the 31st Paragraph of my Despatch of the

1823

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

the 6th His Highness at the same time begged to know whether I have any objections to his doing so now as he considered the Service in which he had been engaged with us, to be at an end, and pressed me to inform him, whether his proceeding to Bharein, would be disagreeable to the British Government — I replied that His Highness being an independent Prince must at all times be at liberty to act in conformity to his ideas of what was right, with regard to his proceedings to Bahrein, it was impossible I could give him any opinion; and as my instructions did not relate to that point, I could not form any judgement of what the views of my Government might be, but if the Imaum would commit to writing any proposals he had to make, or questions he wished to ask, in the event of my not being able to give him

184

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

an immediate reply, I should forthwith forward his communication to Bombay. His Highness intimated that this should be done in the Evening and stated that he should proceed to Muscat next Day. In the evening I received a Message from His Highness, stating that he did not intend writing to me on the Subject that he had agitated, until he should reach Muscat, for he wished for time to consider, whether it would be necessary to trouble the Government with such a reference. His Highness proceeded to Muscat the next Day and has left me impressed with the belief, that he means to make an attack upon Bahrein without permitting the Government of Shiraz to share in the Success he anticipates, from the impression made by his having been admitted to a state of operation with a British Force still in the Gulph. That

185

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

That the Prince of Shiraz dreads a proceeding of this Kind on the part of the Imaum, and is likewise uneasy respecting the future movements of this Force, is apparent from the great desire he has shewn to possess himself of the Imaum's Ships and his having given the pledge required by His Highness, as well as the promise that his expences shall be reimbursed, this policy on the part of the Prince will probably embarrass the Imaum considerably.

31 The letter from the Prince of Shiraz of which the accompanying is a Translation reached me on the 9th Instant, and a Translation of my reply to it was now forwarded. It is hardly to be supposed the Prince could have expected, that his request to have four or five Ships for the purpose of conveying his Army to Bahrein, would be complied with, it was probably urged with the view

186

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

view of calling forth some reply from which he could form a judgement of what the views of the British Government were respecting that Island, or conjecture the future operations of this Force –

32. It will be observed that the Rescript abstains entirely from alluding in any manner to the Determination announced in Sir Evan Nepean's Letter, that the Expedition should visit certain places on the Persian Coast for the purpose of destroying the Piratical Vessels that might be in them, but the Envoy Meerza Mahomed Bauker made many enquiries respecting my intentions, when I should proceed there – To these enquiries I replied by a reference to Sir Evan Nepean's Letter above alluded to. –

33. – I take this opportunity of noticing that I have understood from Captain Bruce the

187

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

the Resident of Bushire that there is an article in the last Treaty between the Persian and the British Governments, which precludes the latter from holding possession of any of the Island in this Gulf – Captain Bruce spoke from recollection not having a Copy of the Treaty along with him –

34 Being anxious to reduce the expences of the armament as much as possible I have availed myself of the opportunity arising from the appointment of a Garrison to Ras-el-Khyma, to effect a new distribution of the Troops and Stores by which I have found myself enabled to dispense with fifteen hundred and four Tons of the most expensive Vessels, which are as follows. –

The Pascoa of 732 Tons that sailed on the 6th Inst. having on board the wounded of the Force on which account she was directed to touch at Muscat

The Angelica of 356 Tons that will be ready to sail about the 1st Instant, the Liberwie will touch at

188

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

at Muscat and the Orpheus of 416 Tons that conveys this Despatch direct to Bombay.

35. On the two last mentioned Ships will proceed all the Sick of the Force who are not likely to become effective during the remainder of the Service.

36. When these Ships shall have arrived at Bombay Government will be able to determine whether or not it will be expedient to discharge them, but even in the event of the Honble Board deciding to retain them, they are more serviceable under their present destination than if they had remained here where their Services can be dispensed with.

37. The general Re-establishment of confidence and tranquillity has afforded a favorable opportunity of liberating the Prisoners taken at Zayah and I feel considerable gratification in being at so early a period enabled to

189

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

to give effect to a measure which is called for by every consideration of Policy and humanity.

38. The important change which has taken place in our relations with the Arab Chiefs since the fall of Zayah, has entirely superseded the necessity of continuing these people any longer under restraint. Even their enmity can be productive of no bad consequences at the present period whilst the conciliation of the Chief which appears the most probable effect of placing him on a footing with the other Sheiks, who by a timely submission alone escaped the humiliation he has suffered will tend materially to consolidate the arrangements which have so happily been effected.

39. I am confident therefore in taking this step for which Government will be prepared by the 15th Paragraph of my last Despatch, I shall only anticipate its pleasure, and it is fortunate that

Bombay Castle . . 16th February 1820

that the policy and humanity of this measure coincide even with the convenience of the service a due regard to which, might have compelled me to adopt the expedient of releasing the prisoners, to prevent the risk of contagion to the Garrison, arising from sickness amongst them, which in the opinion of the Medical Gentlemen in charge was to be apprehended. — Hassan bin Ali and his followers, were accordingly liberated, and returned to their families at Shaumel yesterday the

10/ Chieftain came back and after signing the accompanying preliminary, was permitted to become a party to the General Treaty. —

The operation of this Document may therefore now be considered as extending to the whole of the Arabian Coast from Rumys to Bo-Shahr, which includes all that has of late been reckoned piratical —

The

19

Bombay Castle . . . 16th February 1820

40 The General Treaty has been executed in Triplicate, and so soon as the expected Signatures have been affixed, an original shall be transmitted to the Honble the Governor in Council

41 The important Services which have been rendered by my Interpreter Captain Thompson, I shall have occasion to bring forward hereafter, when the final arrangement consequent to my visit to the remaining ports are concluded on,

42. The assaults at Ras-ul-Khyma adverted to in the 35th Paragraph of my last Despatch, having been brought to the required state, and the embarkations being almost completed, I expect to be able to proceed this afternoon to accomplish the fulfilment of the preliminary Treaties, after which I purpose crossing over to the Persian Shore —

43 I expect in about three weeks to

return

Bombay Castle . . . 16th February 1820

return to Ras-ul-Khyma, where I hope to be fa-
-voured by the receipt of instructions from the Go-
-vernor in Council, that will enable me to form
a judgement respecting the time when the Expe-
-dition may return to Bombay.

4th I have entrusted this despatch to my
Aid de Camp Lieut. Marriott to whom I beg
leave to refer for any further information which
may be required respecting the subjects mentioned
in it —

I have &c
(Signed) Wm Grant Keir
(Major Genl

Transport Orient
at Ras-ul-Khymah
16th Jany 1820

P.S.

Some Commissariat and Medical Stores
being required I beg to enclose the accompanying
Copies of Letters addressed to the Heads of those De-
-partments —

(Signed) W. G. Keir

Translation

11/12/

193

Bombay Castle . . . 16th February 1820

No 1

Translation of the General Treaty with the
Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulph

In the Name of God the merciful, the
Compassionate —

Praise be to God who hath ordained peace to be
a Blessing to his creatures — There is established a
lasting peace between the British Government and
the Arab Tribes who are parties to this contract on
the following conditions —

Article I — There shall be a cessation of plunder and
piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs who
are parties to this contract for ever —

Article II. If any individual of the people of the
Arabs contracting shall attack any boat passing by
land or sea of any nation whatsoever, in the way
of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged War
he shall be accounted an enemy of all Mankind,
and shall be held to have forfeited both life and
goods. — and acknowledged War is that which is
proclaimed

194

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

proclaimed, avowed and ordered by Government against Government and the Killing of Men and taking of Goods without proclamation avowed and the order of a Government is plunder and piracy.

Article III. The Friendly ("literally the Pacificated") Arabs shall carry by land and see a Red Flag with or without Letters in it at their option, and this shall be in a Border of White the Breadth of the White in the Border being equal to the Breadth of the Red as represented in the margin, the whole forming the Flag known in the British Navy by the title of White pierced Red, and this shall be the Flag of the Friendly Arabs, and they shall use it and no other.



Article IV. The pacificated Tribes shall all of them continue in their former Relations with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government and shall not fight with

195

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

with each other, and the Flag shall be a Symbol of this only, and of probing further.

Article V. The Vessels of the Friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper ("Register") Signed with the Signature of their Chief; in which shall be the name of the Vessel, its Length, its Breadth, and how many Hands it bodes. And they shall also have in their possession another writing ("Port Clearance") Signed with the Signature of their Chief; in which shall be the name of the Owner, the Name of the Nackoah, the number of Men, the number of Arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what Port bound. And if a British or other Vessel meets them they shall produce the Register and the Clearance.

Article VI. The Friendly Arabs, if they chuse shall send an Envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulph with the necessary ac-

196

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency - and the British Government if it think shall send an Envoy also to them in like manner and the Envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief, in the paper ("Register") of their Vessels, which contains the length of the Vessel, its breadth, and Tonnage; the signature of the Envoy to be renewed every year - also all such Envoys shall be at the expense of their own party -

Article VII. If any Tribe, or others shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the Friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances - and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the Friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur -

Article VIII. The putting Men to death after they

197

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

they have given up their arms, is an act of Piracy and not of acknowledged War - and if any Tribe shall put to death any persons either Mohammedans or others, after they have given up their arms, such Tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the Friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and God willing, the War against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed that act and of those who ordered it -

Article IX. The carrying off of Slaves, Men, Women or Children from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in Vessels, is plunder and Piracy - and the Friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature -

Article X. The Vessels of the Friendly Arabs bearing their Flag above described shall enter into all the British Ports, and into the Ports of the allies of the British, as far as they shall be able

198

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

able to effect it, and they shall buy and sell them and if any shall attack them the British Government shall take notice of it.

Article XI. These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all the Tribes and persons who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as those who adhere to them at the time present.

End of the Articles.

Signed at Ras-ul-Khyma, in triplicate, at midday on Saturday the twenty second of the Month of Rebi al Awwal in the year of the Hijra one thousand, two hundred and thirty five (Corresponding to the eight of January One thousand eight hundred and twenty) and signed by the contracting parties at the places and times under written.

Signed at Ras-ul-Khyma at the time of Issue by

L.S. (Signed) Wm Grant Keir
Major General
Signed

199

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

L.S. (Signed) Hassan ben Ramah
with his own hand
("Sheik of Rattan and Jabin
formerly of Ras-ul-Khyma")

L.S. (Signed) Rageb ben Ahmed
with his own hand
("Sheik of Jezeirat al Hamra")

Signed at Ras-ul-Khyma on Tuesday the twenty fifth of the Month of Rebi al Awwal in the year of the Hijra one thousand two hundred and thirty five ("Corresponding to the eleventh of January 1820")

L.S. (Signed) Signature of Shabait
with his own hand
("Sheik of Tabou Dhabyee")

Signed at Ras-ul-Khyma, at midday on Saturday the twenty ninth of the Month of Rebi al Awwa in the year of the Hijra one thousand two hundred and thirty five ("Corresponding to the fifteenth of January 1820")

The seal of Captain Thompson as Sheik Hassan ben Ali had not a Seal at the time of signature

L.S. ("Signed")
Signature of Hassan ben Ali
with his own hand
("Sheik of Zyah &c &c")

200

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

Copy of the General Treaty, with the friendly (or literally the Pacificated) Arabs, with the Signatures attached to it up to the fifteenth day of January 1820 inclusive — Given under my hand and Seal —

(L.S.) (Signed) W.m Grant Keir
Maj.r Genl.

("An exact translation")
(Signed) J. P. Thompson
Capt.n 17th L.t Dragoons
& Interpreter

("Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with Hussan ben Ahmah".)

In the Name of God, the Merciful & the Compassionate —

Know all Men, that Hussan ben Ahma has been in the presence of General Sir Wm Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following Stipulations —

Article I. The Town of Ras-ul-Khyma and Mahurra

201

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

Mahurra, and the Towers as far as are in the Date Groves near the Town, shall remain in the hands of the British Government —

Article II. If any of the Vessels of Hussan ben Ahmah are in Khorgah, or Ummul Qiywyn or Jman, or any other of the places to which the General shall go with the Force, they shall be surrendered to the General and the General will leave those such as are for the Pearl Fishery and fishing-boats

Article III. Hussan ben Ahma shall give up all the Indian Prisoners, if any such are in his possessions

Article IV. After the execution of these engagements Hussan ben Ahmah shall be admitted to the terms of General Treaty with the friendly (or literally the Pacificated) Arabs — End of the Articles

Signed at Ras-ul-Khyma in the forenoon of Saturday the twenty-second of the Month of Rebi-ul-awwal in the year of the Hejra one Thousand

202

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

thousand two hundred and thirty-five (Corresponding to the eighth January 1820")

(L.S.) (Signed) Wm Grant Keir Major Genl

(L.S.) (Signed) The Signature of Hassan ben Ahmah with his own hand

Copy of these Articles between the General and Hassan ben Ahmah Written by my hand and Seal.

(L.S.) (Signed) Wm Grant Keir

("An exact Translation")

(Signed) J.F. Thompson Capt 17th Lt Dragoons & Interpreter

3/

("Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with Sultan ben Saggur")

In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate.

"Known all Men that Sultan ben Saggur has been in the presence of General Sir Wm Grant Keir

203

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

Keir, and there have passed between them the following Stipulations.—

Article I. Sultan ben Saggur shall surrender to the General, the Towers, Guns and Vessels which are in Sharjah, Umm al Qawain and their dependencies.—The General will leave the boats which are for the pearl-fishery, and fishing-boats; and the remainder of the Vessels shall be at the disposal of the General.—

Article II. Sultan ben Saggur shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

Article III. The General will not allow the Troops to enter the Towns to lay them waste.

Article IV. After the execution of these engagements Sultan ben Saggur shall be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly ("or Pacificated") Arabs.—

On these conditions there is a cessation of Hostilities between the General and Sultan ben

204

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

ben Seggur and his followers, with the exception that their boats are not to go to Sea.

Done at Rasul Khyma, on the twentieth of Rabi al Awwal, in the year 1235 "corresponding to the Sixth of January, one Thousand, Eight hundred and Twenty"]

(L.S.) ("Signed") Wm Grant Keir Major General

(L.S.) ("Signed") Sultan ben Seggur with his own hand

Copy of the Articles entered into with Sultan ben Seggur Witness my hand and Seal

(L.S.) ("Signed") Wm Grant Keir Major Genl

4]

("Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with the Sheik of Dubay")

In the name of God, the merciful, the Compassionate.

Know all Men, that Mohammed ben Haza

203

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

Haza ben Zaal a Minor, accompanied by Ahmed ben Futais, has been in the presence of General Sir Wm. Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following Stipulations.

Article I. The people of Dubay shall surrender to the General the Vessels which are in Dubay and its Dependencies, and the Guns which are in the Town and in the Towers. The General will leave the boats which are for the pearl-fishery and fishing-boats.

Article II. The People of Dubay shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in their possession.

Article III. The General will not allow the Troops to enter the Town to-day it's self. And further as a mark of consideration towards His Highness the Imam Saidben Sultan on the part of the General, he will not demolish the Fort and Towers.

Article IV. After the execution of these engagements, Mohammed ben Haza ben Zaal and his followers shall be admitted to the same terms

206

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

of Peace as the remainder of the friendly & Literally the Pacificated" Arabs.—

On these conditions there is a cessation of hostilities between the British and Mohammed Ben Hazaben Jaabi and his followers, with the exception that their boats are not to go to Sea.—

Done at Ras-el-Khyma on the twenty third of the Shawth of Kebi al awwal in the year 1235 (Corresponding to the ninth of January 1820)

("Signed")
(L.S.) Wm Grant Keir
Major Genl

("Signed")
Witnessed by the Signatures of Sheik Hamza ben Mohammed Ben Jaber, al Shoeyjy Sheik of Kishme with his own hand

Seal of a pointed Cutlass (L.S.)

Copy of the articles between the General and Mohammed Ben Hazaben Jaabi
Witness my hand and Seal ("Signed")

(L.S.) Wm Grant Keir
Majr Genl

("a true translation")
(Signed) J. P. Thompson
Capt. 17th Lt. Dragoons
& Interpreter.

Translation.

207

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

5

("Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with Sheik Shahbout of Abou Dabyee.")

In the name of God, the Merciful the compassionate.

Know all Men, that Sheik Shabbout, Ben Sheyb, al Falahy, has been in the presence of General Sir Wm Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following Stipulations.—

Article I. If in Abou Dabyee or any other of the places belonging to Sheik Shahbout there are any of the Vessels of the Piratical powers or such have been attached or may be hereafter attached by the General during the present War against the Pirates he shall deliver such Vessels to the General.—

Article II. Sheik Shahbout shall be admitted to the terms of the General Treaty with the Friendly Arabs.—

Done at Rasul Khyma on the [illegible]

208

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

Twenty fifth of Rubi ul Awwal in the year one thousand two hundred and thirty five" corresponding to the eleventh of January 1820").

("Signed")
(L.S.) Wm Grant Keir
Major Genl

("Signed")
The Signature of Shaikh with his own hand

(L.S.)
Copy of the Articles between the General and Head Shaikhs of Wungs in my hand Seal. ("Signed")
Wm Grant Keir
(L.S.) Major Genl

("Arrice Translation")
Signed J.P. Thompson
Capt. 17th Lt Dragoons
& Interpreter

9/

Report of Shaikh Humza the Governor of Kishm respecting Sheikhooth the Chief of Boothabee Rasul Khyma 11th January 1820.

Shaikh Humza states that Shaikh Sheikhooth the Chief of Boothabee has never been concerned

209

Bombay Castle ... 16th February 1820

concerned with the Joasmees or other Piratical Tribes in the Persian Gulf - that for his own security he has kept on amicable terms with them all - but without entering into any of their predatory Excursions - that during the Supremacy of the Wahabee Government in this part of Arabia he was obliged to acknowledge their authority but never adopted their faith - that he has always been on good terms with the Imaum of Muscat & in his late Attempt on Ras ul Khyma when he was deserted by his Mamm Sheen Suggur Sheikhooth was his staunch ally - that his tribe consists of between three & four thousand Men & are chiefly employed in the Pearl fishery -

Signed) Andw Jukes

7/

Report of Aga Hoosein alias Son of Khaja Abdul Guffoor Governor of Bunder Abbas, respecting Sheikhooth Chief of Boothabee -

Aga

210

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

Seyd Hasseim alee States that Sheik Sooltan has been on terms of cordiality with the Imaum of Muscat for many years, that he has also been on open terms of friendship with the Joasmees & Sultaun bin Suggur, but that he never joined the Joasmees or other Piratical tribes in Plunder & Piracy, that with the Ports of Bunder Abbass & Kishm a friendly intercourse has always been maintained & he is not aware that he ever joined any of the Piratical Tribes in any of their predatory excursions that he was upon good terms from necessity with the Wahabee Chief Sultaun without adopting his Religious tenets.

Ras-ul-Khyma 11th Jany 1820 } (Signed) And.r Jukes

216

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

10/

("Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with Hasan bin ali")

In the name of God the merciful the Compassionate

Know all Men, that Hasan bin ali has been in the presence of General Sir Wm.m Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following Stipulations

Article 1. If any of the Vessels of Hasan bin ali are in Shargah, or Umm al Qyuyn or Jman or Abau Dhabyee, or any other of the places to which the General shall go with the Force such Vessels shall be surrendered to the General and the General will leave those which are for the

217

Bombay Castle 16th February 1820

the Pearl fishery, and fishing boats.

Article II. Hasan ben Ali shall give up all the Indian Prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

Article III. After this, Hasan ben Ali shall be admitted to the terms of the General Treaty with the Friendly ("Literally, the Pacificated") Arabs.—

End of the articles.

Issued at Ras-ul-Khyma, in the forenoon of Saturday the twenty-ninth of the Month of Rabial awwal in the year one thousand two hundred and thirty five ("Corresponding to the fifteenth of January 1820")

L.S.

("Signed")
Wm Grant Keir
Major Genl

("Signed")
The Signature of Hasan ben Ali with his own hand

The seal is Capt. Thompson's & Sheik Hasan ben Ali had no seal at the time of signature.

Copy of the articles entered into between the General & Hasan ben Ali in the forenoon of Saturday the 29th of Rabial awwal in the year of the Hejra 1235 ("Corresponding to the 15th of January 1820")
Witness my hand and Seal

L.S.

("Signed")
Wm Grant Keir
Maj. Gen.
Lieutenant

L.S.

261

Bombay Castle March 1820

Consulter 8
Wednesday 1st

At a Council

Present

The Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone
Resident & Governor

His Excellency
Lieut. General The Hon'ble
Sir R. Blaville G.C.B.
Commander in Chief

Alexander Bell
&
Guy Lenox Henderson Esqrs
Members of Council

Read and Approved our Proceedings dated the 23d Ultimo.

Read the following Despatch from Major General Sir Wm Grant Keir to the Chief Secretary dated the 1st of February.—

Pirates Persian Gulph
Forwarding Major Genl Sir Wm. Grant Keir's Report that the operations on the Arabian Sea Coast of the Persian Gulph have been completely the fulfilment of the

262

Bombay Castle... 1st March 1820

The Preliminary Treaties. The Chiefs of Shargah and Dubay admitted to subscribe the General Treaty. Fifty one Captives of that Tribe subjects and 34 of the Imam of Muscat. Has appointed Capt. Thompson to act as Political Agent on the Arabian Coast. Also capturing the War Vessels of Ras-ma-kin Jaubee. Transmits communications on various subjects connected with the Objects of the Expedition & Correspondence with the British Envoy at the Persian Court.

completed by the fulfilment of the Preliminary Treaties, Copies of which are transmitted with my despatch of the 16th Ultimo.

2 "From Rumz to Abou Heley" Three hold of the Fortifications that were deemed of sufficient importance have been most effectually destroyed. The Guns that were mounted upon them have been surrendered, and are now destroyed or been put in possession of all the Boats larger than those which are used for the Pearl, or Common Fisheries that belonged to the Tribes in the portion of the Coast specified above, as well as those belonging to the Part of Dubay, which is beyond Abou Heley, the last mentioned Boats were brought out by the people themselves, under the superintendance of a Marine Officer, and delivered over in Shargah.

3 Sultan bin Sugger Chief of Shargah and its dependencies, and Mahomed bin Haza bin

263

Bombay Castle... 1st March 1820

bin Zaal Chief of Dubay, have accordingly been admitted to subscribe the General Treaty, they having as observed above, fulfilled the Stipulations in the preliminary engagements.

Imam of Muscat's Vessels
Shargah
Abou Heley
Vessels exclusive of fishing Boats destroyed — 82
Ras-ul-Khyma — 110
Boats of ditto — 10
Ras-ul-Khyma — 202
Vide Report of Commanding Engineer and Estimate annexed.

4 A Memorandum is noted in the margin of the Fortifications blown up or otherwise destroyed at the different places since the Fleet left Ras-ul-Khyma, as well as an estimated Statement of the whole of the Vessels destroyed or now in our possession. The Cutter Capt. Collier means to send to Ras-ul-Khyma, therefore remain until Government shall determine whether or not they are to be destroyed, as referred in the 16th to the 20th Paragraphs of my despatch of the 6th Ultimo.

British Subjects 17
Guests of the Imam of Muscat 34
Total 51

5 The Honble the Governor in Council will derive great pleasure from the clearance of the Indian and other Captives, whose emancipation

Univ.-Bibl. Bamberg

264

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

communication & return to their native Countries was one of the objects of the British Government in undertaking the present Expedition — The effects of this benevolent and enlightened consideration for British subjects and even for others (who have no claims for which we can be expected to make sacrifices, cannot fail to produce a deep impression upon the minds of all connected with those who have happily been released, and spread abroad the legitimate fame of a pure and disinterested exertion of power —

6 I trust that the arrangements which have thus been carried into effect will in their operation, fully secure the complete suppression of piracy, and by the introduction of new habits and ideas, will abolish for ever the lawless and inhuman practices that have maintained disorder and affliction where peaceful industry and consequent

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820.

consequent prosperity and happiness may now be expected to spring up —

7 In conducting the negotiations of my intercourse with the Arabs I have derived great advantage from the zealous & unwearied exertions of my Interpreter Captain Thompson, to whom I have already noticed in the 11th Paragraph of my Despatch of the 16th ultimo — as he has been eminently successful in gaining the confidence of the Arab Chiefs and their people, as he both understands and speaks the Arab language, and as I have the greatest reliance on his zeal and judgment, I have placed him as Political Agent for all matters connected with the Arab Tribes, in my absence from this Coast, until the pleasure of the Governor in Council shall be known —

8 It is obvious that much good may be accomplished by the efforts of even a single indi-

Individ

266

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

individual whose exertions will be directed to widen the Channels of communication now opened and to encrease the confidence established between us and the Arabs. Long confirmed habits of cruelty and depredations cannot be eradicated by a single effort of power, and Men Situated as the Arabs are, must be shewn the advantages of pursuing the right path before they can be expected to forsake it. The best instructions is experience, and time and attention should be employed in endeavouring to induce the Arabs to enter into Commercial pursuits, for until they have done so, they cannot be pronounced to be finally reclaimed from their former evil practices. All these considerations have influenced me in my selection of Capt.n Thompson, and consequently beg to recommend him to the favorable consideration of the Hon.ble the Governor in Council

267

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

Council as a person most peculiarly qualified to fulfil the Duties I have entrusted to him.

9 I avail myself of the honor to acknowledge the receipt on the 28th Ultimo of your Despatch of the 15th of Dec.r with its accompaniments conveyed by the Honble Company's Brizer Vestal. A prior dispatch alluded to, and which I understand was transmitted by the Honble Company's Brizer Syl.ph, has not yet reached me.

10 It has afforded me sincere gratification to remark that many of the leading features of the policy recommended to be pursued by the Governor in Council in the Despatch to the Governor General in Council, transmitted for my guidance, will be found to obtain in the general line of conduct which I have followed, and which is detailed in my Despatches of the 6th and 11th Ultimo.

296

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

[...]

20 I have much pleasure in forwarding the accompanying Extract of a Letter from Capt.n Gray of the 2d Regt of N.I. who is at present Senr Officer at Ras-ul-Khyma, as it evinces the confidence with which we are regarded by the Inhabitants of that Neighbourhood.

21 When I shall submit to the Hon.ble the Governor in Council the opinions I am called on by your Letter of the 28th October to give respecting the ulterior arrangements which may

297

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

may be necessary to make on the termination of the present Expedition, I shall do myself the honor of again adverting to the subjects discussed in the Despatch to the Governor General.

22 The Convoy has sailed to the Island of Kenn, for the purpose of completing it's water previous to proceeding on the further objects of the Expedition, and His Majesty's Ship Liverpool will follow immediately.

I have &c.—

(Signed) Wm Grant Keir
Major Senr

H.M.S. Ship Liverpool off Sharga 7th Feby 1820

1/

To Francis Jack Esqre
Capn of H.M. Ben
off Ras-ul-Khyma Persian Gulf
By Captain Fr. A. Collier
C.B. of His Majesty's Ship Liverpool and Senior Officer &c.

376

Bombay Castle... 1st March 1820

My despatches to you of the 14th of November 15th December, and the 16th January 1820 will have kept you fully acquainted with the operation of the Expedition on the Arabian Shore of the Gulph, and I have much pleasure in further informing you that the Service on this Coast will be completed to morrow or next day by the entire demolition of all the Fortification that were considered of sufficient importance from Rumy to Aboo Mayle by the surrender of the Guns that were mounted on them, and by our being put in possession of all the Boats larger than those used for the Pearl, and common fishing Boats, belonging to the Ports along the line of Coast specified above, as well as those of the Port of Dubaye. It was to these stipulations complied with one for the release of Indian Captives, that I have generally limited my demands upon the Tribes denounced by Government as the most frequent practisers of Piracy as these demands comprehended

377

Bombay Castle... 1st March 1820

comprehended all that could have been obtained by proceeding to the ultimate acts of hostility contemplated in my instructions, and the conceptions required in every instance have been fulfilled, without our having occasion to excite by violence many feelings that would have interfered greatly with the view for the permanent suppression of Piracy and the introduction of habits of Industry which lead to civilization, and the accomplishment of the enlightened intentions of Government.

I hope to be enabled to quit this Coast in two or three days at furthest, when the Fleet will proceed to Rendezvous at the Island of Henin for the purpose of watering, and with the hope of meeting a Squadron that sailed from Rasul Khyma under the Command of Captain Lock Resident on intelligence being received that some Piratical Boats had taken shelter in the Port

318

Bombay Castle 1st March 1820

Part of Bahrain. No certain information of the proceedings of this Squadron has yet been received, and I feel anxious to know the reception it met with from the Shaick of that place previous to making the communication directed by the second Paragraph of Mr. Chief Secretary Warden's Letter to me of the 15th December.

I am likewise in expectation that Capt. Bruce will join me at Kenn, as he proceeded in Capt. Lock's Ship, and it is to him I mentioned Gentleman that I must principally look for information to enable me to identify the Pirates on the Persian Coast, as he probably will be acquainted with the overt acts upon which a decided proceeding may be considered justifiable.

I hope to be enabled to communicate to you from Kenn my positive intentions respecting

319

Bombay Castle 1st March 1820

respecting the different Piratical Ports on the Persian Coast, and I shall endeavour to put you in possession of such information as will enable you to meet with effect remonstrances that may be urged against our proceedings by the Persian Government.

You will perceive from the 10th Paragraph of my original instructions, Dated 27th October, that the Supreme Government then contemplated placing the Port of Bas-el-Khima under the authority of the Turkish Government, arrangements were accordingly made for its occupation until an answer could be received from Ibrahim Pacha, and the Fortress was placed in such a State of defence as to render its Garrison composed of one Battalion of Native Infantry and a small detail of Artillery, secure against any sudden attack.

The

320

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

The 4th to the 7th Paragraphs inclusive of the Despatch, dated 15th December from the Bombay Government, to the Governor General in Council evince that other intentions now obtain respecting the ultimate disposal of that Port, and as its Garrison comprises nearly the number of Troops that will remain at the chosen station may be finally fixed upon to be occupied in the Gulph, I conceive that they may with advantage be permitted to remain there either till you decide upon the mode by which the possession of Kishm is to be accomplished, as pointed at in the 8th 9th & 10th Paragraphs of the Honble the Governor's Letter to you of the 15th ultimo, or until some other Island be fixed upon should Kishmee be considered objectionable

The 3rd Paragraph of my Instructions under date the 28th October set forth as a

321

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

measure the most conducive to the permanent suppression of Piracy in the Persian Gulf, that the occupation by the British Government of a central, and Commanding Situation appears to be indispensible, nor is the Governor in Council aware of a more eligible Situation than the Island of Kishmee for that purpose, upon which however your opinion is desired, but I have not deemed my Local information as yet sufficiently extensive to enable me to form a correct judgment on this important point, I have therefore withheld from giving any opinion with the prospect of opportunities occurring daily for acquiring further information respecting Kishmee, or other places that may appear eligible, this I have done on general grounds and not from conceiving as far as I am yet informed, that Kishmee could not be made to answer the required

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

required purpose.

No further intelligence has reached me respecting the movements of His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, or the Prince of Persia since the date of my last Despatch.

I have &c

Transport Orient off Sharja 30th Jany 1820

(Signed) Wm Grant Keir
Major Genl

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820.

171

Extract of a Letter from Captain Gray Commanding at Ras-ul-Khyma, to Major E. Ilanus, Deputy Adjutant General, dated Ras-ul-Khyma 28th January 1820.

"The Fishermen who have met with every encouragement have had their Boats re-
"to them many of which are now numbered, and
"carry the prescribed Flag. These people are now
"busily intent upon repairing their Boats and
"pursuing their former avocations in security
"and with encreasing confidence."

"Most of the Inhabitants of this Town
"and Adjacent Villages have returned to their
"homes, and Domestic occupations, and Women
"as well as Men, are now seen daily employed
"in cultivating and Watering the Date Trees."

"Of the Supplies from Bunderabaft,
"Kishm and other Ports as well as our High-

333

Bombay Castle 1st March 1820

"Neighbours have been somewhat irregular and
"not quite so abundant as to occasion any great fall
"in the price of them, yet they have proved fully
"adequate to meet the wants of the Garrison."

True Copy
(Signed) J. Wilson
Actg Secy

Ordered that the following reply
be returned to the preceding Despatch

Pirates Persian Gulph
To Major General Sir W.G. Keir, announcing the approbation of Government of his proceedings in the surrender of the Captives & giving the appointment of Captain Thompson to command Armed Vessels & also Hassima bin Jaber
Hopes entertained that the communications made to the Envoy at Teheran will alleviate the grounds of Jealousy

Major General
Sir William Grant Keir Kt & C.

&c &c &c

Sir,

I have had the honor of receiving and of laying before the Hon'ble the Governor in Council your Despatch dated the 7th of this Month, reporting that the operations of the Expedition on the Arabian side of the Gulph had been completed by the fulfilment of the Preliminary Treaties.

334

Bombay Castle 1st March 1820

Jealousy & alarm in the Persian Court
His endeavours to dissuade the Imaum of Muscat from the attack of Bahrein approved
That arrangements should be made to supercede the necessity for Garrison Castle Shyma with British Troops

2

In announcing to you the high approbation of the Governor in Council of the proceedings detailed in the 2d & 4 Paragraphs of your letter, of the effectual destruction of the whole of the fortifications that were deemed of sufficient importance from Ruins to Shaw Heleg, of your having obtained the surrender of all the Guns that were mounted upon them, & of your having destroyed or been put in possession of all the boats larger than those employed in the Pearl or common fisheries, that belonged to Ports in that line of Coast as well as those belonging to Dubay, situated Opposite Shaw Heleg, I am at the same time directed to express his conviction that those Stipulations of the Preliminary Treaties have not been fulfilled without a scrupulous observance on our part of the Article providing for the Troops not entering the towers by them

355

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

"Item read."

3 The surrender of seventeen Indian Captives subjects of the British Government & thirty-four of those belonging to the Imaum of Muscat, has afforded the Governor in Council a very peculiar degree of gratification

4 The Governor in Council entertains a full sense of the judicious & unremitting exertions which have been displayed by Captain Thompson officiating as your Interpreter on the present Service, but it is to be considered contrary to those principles of economy which have been prescribed for the guidance of this Government by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, & as the formation of any additional Establishment in the Gulph would be at variance with the views & intentions of the Governor in Council, he feels himself precluded from sanctioning

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

your Selection of Captain Thompson as Political Agent for all matters connected with the Arab Tribes as a permanent appointment, but to be as you may be absent from the immediate range of that Officers agency, & as Sir Bruce's services being otherwise engaged, the Governor in Council approves of Captain Thompson's being entrusted with the duties you have committed to him. In any permanent arrangement however for the Gulph the control of its political concerns is desirable to continue where it has so long been vested in the Resident at Bushire

5 The 9 & 17 Paragraphs of your letter seem to require no instructions, It may be necessary however to remark that the despatch of which you acknowledge the receipt in the 9th Paragraph is not dated the "15th ultimo" (January) but of the preceding Month of December and that

337

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

That the prior despatch alluded to was one dated the 27th of November, vesting upon with a discretionary authority of making over Ras-ul-Khyma to Sultan Bin Saggur or to any other Chief from its inhabitants might desire such was unconnected with the Wahabee of which a Copy is enclosed.

[...]

344

Bombay Castle ... 1st March 1820

[...]

11. The information afforded in the 20th Paragraph of your letter of the 20th instant with which we are regarded by the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of Ras-ul-Khyma is satisfactory to the Governor in Council who is however anxious that an arrangement may be made that shall supersede the necessity for garrisoning that place with British Troops.

I have &c

Bombay Castle
28th Febry 1820

(Signed) F. Warden
Chief Secy

1.07
British policy on the conclusion of the 1820 treaties, January–June 1820

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE PRELIMINARY TREATIES AND THE GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE, 1820.

232. The Bombay Government was not entirely satisfied with the terms of the treaty, and made the following criticisms and suggestions for future guidance in case alteration was possible or similar treaties had to be made with other Chiefs (letter No. 37, dated 16th February 1820) :—

Volume 53—49 of 1820-1821, page 260.

4. The Governor in Council would be disposed to introduce certain additions, which will be hereafter noticed, into the treaty, but sensible that with a people so rude as the natives of Arabia, any alteration made here in the ratified treaty, although offered again for their confirmation or rejection, might be considered as a breach of an engagement already concluded; he therefore directs me to request that in case there should still be any of the piratical ports not admitted into the general treaty, or if from your opportunities of observation you should conceive that those already admitted might be led to concur in any of these additions, you will be pleased to procure the consent of all the different Chiefs to them, but if you should conceive that any doubts of our faith will be excited by an attempt at such an alteration, it is by no means the wish of the Governor in Council that the subject should be mentioned.

5. The additions desirable will be best communicated by pointing out the objects which it was thought expedient to attain, the degree to which they have been compensated by other advantages acquired in the present treaty, and the alterations which should be necessary to improve such parts of that treaty as were not anticipated in the former instructions.

6. After destroying all vessels of war and dismantling all forts belonging to Piratical Chiefs which the Governor in Council concludes has actually been accomplished, it would have been desirable to remove all Chiefs concerned in piracy or likely to afford any countenance to the practice of that enormity; to detain in custody all such Chiefs as had rendered themselves particularly obnoxious by their practice or countenance of piracy, and had fallen into our hands in the course of our operations, together with all their piratical adherents and to set up in their stead such Chiefs as could be depended on for their discouraging piracy, or if no such could be found to make over the country to the Imam.

7. To prohibit the fitting out of armed vessels of every description at ports that have been accustomed to practice piracy, to limit the size of those allowed for commercial purposes, so as to render them easily resisted if applied to piracy, and to stipulate for the right of search and of capturing all such as should be found to transgress this prohibition.

8. To restrain the exportation from India of timber for building large ships.

9. In the event of the Imaum's refusal to accept of the piratical ports rendering it necessary to allow the same Chiefs to remain, the Governor in Council conceives that it would have been expedient to restrain their known disposition to piracy by additional restrictions such as prohibiting their rebuilding their forts and stipulating for the right of landing and destroying any works that they might attempt to raise and others of the same nature. The Governor in Council is aware that these engagements would have been occasionally evaded, but he conceives that they were better calculated than any others, attainable to answer the aid in view, and that aided by the executions of the Officer Commanding at our station in the Gulf they would scarcely have failed in suppressing piracy.

10. The principal advantages gained by the present treaty appear to be the promise of the Arab Chiefs to abandon piracy, and to renounce the slave trade, and the practice of murdering their prisoners. The two last stipulations appear to the Governor in Council to do honor to your humanity and have his highest approbation; while the first, if acted up to, comprehends all the objects of the expedition. The security, however, for the performance of those conditions appears to the Governor in Council to be unsatisfactory. The promise even of a civilised nation to abstain from practices recommended by their habits, their interests, and their religion could not of itself be relied on; and the only means of securing its performance provided by the treaty are the institution of registers and port clearances together with the adoption of a particular flag; to which may be added the promise of the Arab Chiefs to co-operate against any of their number who may renew the practice of piracy. With regard to the use of registers and port clearances the Governor in Council is compelled to avow his distrust of their efficacy.

If our cruizers were authorised to seize any vessels belonging to piratical ports which either in the size or in the number had arms of their own exceeded the extent necessary for commercial purposes, the register would then be useful to enable our cruizers to distinguish the vessels of

those ports from those of the other ports of Arabia, but if all are allowed to send out such vessels the advantage of ascertaining the port to which each belongs is not apparent. It was not from ignorance of the ports from whence piratical vessels issued that we have so long been subjected to their attacks. There appears ground to apprehend that any vessels disposed to renew the practice of piracy will sail with all their papers ready to show to any ship of superior strength, and under the colors of the friendly Arabs, those means will at first enable them more easily to deceive our vessels, and when they are detected and their Chief declared our enemy, his breach of the present treaty exposes him to no consequences which would not have resulted from his piracy had that agreement never been entered into, unless the other Arabs should adhere to their engagement to act against them, which cannot be generally expected except in cases where those chiefs have themselves a sufficient interest to induce them to afford their co-operation. To give efficacy to this stipulation for registers and port clearances, it is necessary that some penalty should be annexed to its non-fulfilment, as it is probable the Arab Chiefs do not conceive that by promising to furnish their vessels with such papers they have subjected them to capture or even detention if they should sail without being so provided.

11. It would also be expedient, particularly in the event of the consent of the piratical Chiefs being procured, to limit the size and crews of their vessels, to insert a stipulation that any Chiefs granting false papers should subject his own boats to seizure, the principal object of this stipulation is to prevent piratical ports from sending out armed vessels under the name of Chiefs not addicted to piracy. The possession of armed ships by Chiefs not so addicted is an advantage to the British Government from the means it affords for resisting predatory attacks.

12. I am now directed to communicate the Governor in Council's general approval of the preliminary treaty. The Governor in Council, however, directs me to remark on the stipulation for the surrender of all armed vessels at places to which the expedition might proceed, he conceives that the end would have been better answered by demanding the surrender of all such vessels whenever they might be, although the result will probably be the same, as the expedition will no doubt proceed to every port where there may be armed vessels belonging to tribes engaged in piracy.

13. The Governor in Council is desirous of further explanation of the prohibition in some cases against the Chiefs sending boats to sea which he observes is not applied to Hussun bin Rahma and Hussun Bin Allee, although the most likely to employ their boats in disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulph.

14. The exemption in favor of the Chief of Daebyi at the recommendation of the Imam of Maskat is entirely approved. The agreement with Sheik Boothe the Chief of Boothabee has the full approbation of the Governor in Council; it appears to be highly expedient to give every encouragement to Chiefs like him who have never been engaged in piracy.

15. The general stipulation against all piracy appears to the Governor in Council to be a sufficient *security to His Highness the Imaum and our other allies* from the future attacks of communications as are, however, been perfectly judicious.

16. Your communications to the Imaum and to the Prince at Sheorawz regarding their proposed attack on Bahrein were expressed with great prudence and are highly approved on this subject; I beg to refer you to my letter of the 26th of January.

17. In reference to the statement of Captain Bruce alluded to in paragraph 33 that the British Government is precluded by a treaty with Persia from holding possession of any island in the Gulph, I am directed to observe that no such article has been communicated to this Government. The arrangements for reducing the tonnage as reported in paragraph 34 are approved.

18-19. You will have anticipated from the preceding part of this letter as well as from my former despatches, that the Governor in Council is unable to concur in the justice of the opinion conveyed in paragraphs 37, 38 and 39 regarding the release of Hussein Bin Allee; I am, however, directed to observe that on this and all other points in which he is compelled to withhold his full concurrence in the policy you have adopted, he is well aware that from the necessity which in your judgment existed for you acting without instructions, you were placed in a situation of much difficulty and delicacy; and although his own sentiments are decided as to the course which could have been expedient, he is fully sensible that you have been guided in that which you pursued no less by a liberal view of the advantages of your own Government, than by a laudable regard to the interests of humanity.

20. I have now to add the instructions of the Governor in Council in the manner in which Ras-ool-Khyma is to be disposed of, and on the nature and extent of the force to be permanently stationed in the Persian Gulph.

21. The Governor in Council continues to be of opinion that Ras-ool-Khyma is by no means an eligible place for the establishment above alluded to, independently of the risk of such a possession involving us in the disputes of the continent, the number of troops required to guard it would frustrate the object of its institution, by preventing its sending out sufficient detachments either to attack piratical vessels at sea or to burn them in their ports. It may be absolutely necessary to retain possession of it, if it should clearly appear that we are precluded from holding any island in the Gulph, and unless you receive satisfactory proof of the existence of an agreement to that effect, you will be pleased to make over Ras-ool-Khyma to the Imaum of Mascat, if His Highness should consent to accept it, and if you

should be of opinion that he will be able to hold it. Should he refuse to receive or be in your judgment unable to defend it, the Governor in Council is pleased to authorize you to make it over to any of the local Chiefs making use of such a transfer to obtain the consent of as many as possible to the modifications in the general treaty which have been suggested in this letter including the prohibition against repairing the fortifications.

22. With regard to the establishment itself the Governor in Council is of opinion that it will perhaps be expedient in the actual state of affairs to frame it on a scale somewhat more extensive than was originally contemplated, so as to enable it to send out numerous armed vessels with strong parties of sepoys to act against piratical vessels as well to render it capable of making occasional descents on any parts of the coasts that may be disposed to recur to piracy; with this view the Governor in Council has called on the Superintendent of Marine to state the number and the nature of the vessels he conceives necessary for this purpose, on which subject also he could be gratified by a communication of your sentiments and those of Captain Collier.

23. He is also pleased to authorise you to leave such a force as you think necessary for the above purposes (even if it should exceed the strength originally prescribed of one battalion), and he directs me to suggest, for your consideration, whether the advantage that would result from attaching two or more companies of Europeans to the detachment to be left in the Gulph would be sufficient to compensate for the difficulty of supplying them and the expense they would occasion.

24. The arrangements now alluded to, with the impression left by the distinguished ability and success of your military operations, will, the Governor in Council is confident, afford the strongest ground for relying on the attainment of the objects contemplated by Government in the suppression of piracy and the restoration of the commerce and tranquillity of the Persian and Arabian shores.

233. The following reply of Major-General Sir W. G. Keir (dated the 11th April 1820) explains his view of the points at issue:—

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt in Bombay on the 4th instant of your despatches dated the 16th of February.

(2) The very liberal and gratifying manner which has been adopted in expressing the opinion of the Governor in Council on the subjects discussed in my despatch of the 16th January, renders me doubly anxious to offer every elucidation of the line of policy which I pursued when entering into engagements with the Arab tribes in the Gulf of Persia.

Volume 31-47 of 1820-1826.

(3) *The leading idea under which I acted in framing both the General and Preliminary Treaties, was found on the knowledge that our future relations with the Gulf of Persia were to be supported by the presence of an efficient military force, calculated to act in a prompt and vigorous manner on the first manifestation of any attempt to return to piratical practices.*

(4) *The next prominent feature in the policy I pursued rested on a distinct understanding that Government wished to abstain as much as possible, consistent with the attainment of the desired object, from interfering with the affairs of the Arabian Continent.*

(5) In these two ideas the policy I pursued had its origin, and I endeavoured to maintain it as consistently as possible. Whilst I shall ever regret that some of the details of its execution have not met with approbation of the Governor in Council, I feel highly gratified at his most handsome recognition of the motives which induced me to incur a responsibility that a sense of duty called upon me to encounter.

(6) I have already expressed belief that long confirmed habits of cruelty and depredation cannot be eradicated by a single effort of power nor have my expectations ever been so sanguine as to induce me to think that piracy in the Gulf of Persia could be permanently suppressed without a watchful care to destroy the first symptoms of any return to it. I contemplated that the *power* of doing this was to remain with the British authorities in the Gulf, the Governor in Council will therefore perceive that I was not influenced by any abstract or theoretical belief in the faith of treaties, or of promises to attain from practices, recommended by habit, interest, and religion, and that I was not by any means disposed to trust the Arabs beyond where there could be an efficient control over them. Whilst I conceived that *any measure calculated to secure their reform must have its foundation in power, I reckoned it legitimate and good policy to betray as little as possible to them this distrust in their faith, I therefore suppressed all outward signs of disbelief, nor did I think that our actual strength could be diminished, or that any substantial benefit could be lost by my doing so.*

(7) To maintain the suppression of plunder and piracy has been throughout our avowed determination, and this is perfectly understood in the Gulf, nor does there appear to me anything in the treaties which have been made that would subject Government to an allegation of breach of faith, or undue interference, were it to make use of its power, in saying to one Chief we shall not admit of any vessels equipped offensively for war, leaving your ports; or to another we forbid you to construct any fortification excepting such as may be absolutely necessary for your protection against your neighbours. In saying this, we should of course proceed to support our remonstrances if they were not attended to; nothing more could have been done, had articles to this effect been inserted in the treaties, nor would our intention of

acting in this manner been more deeply impressed upon the minds of all concerned than it is at this moment.

(8) I state with great deference that I still conceive the general omission of articles that would be occasionally evaded, whilst the means of maintaining our will remains, is likely to have a better effect than stipulating for what we were not to demand on all occasions; as the latter would in some measure impose obligation on ourselves, as well as line of conduct that might at times prove inconvenient and embarrassing.

(9) I shall now proceed to a consideration of the additions which the Governor in Council is disposed to introduce into the "General Treaty."

(10) The capture of the war vessels and dismantling of the forts of the piratical Chiefs has already been reported, but it will be observed that a considerable number of the former were given up, and some of the latter destroyed under the preliminary treaties; I take the liberty of recurring to these considerations as they are not mentioned as "principal" advantages gained by the present treaty, whilst the promise of the Arab Chiefs to abandon piracy is first pointed out as one of them. The latter stipulation it is true belongs to the "General Treaty", whilst the former is in those that were preliminary, but I have ever reckoned that a consideration of both together was necessary to the appreciation of the advantages other of the general or preliminary treaties.

(11) The Governor in Council conceives that it would have been desirable to remove all Chiefs concerned in piracy, or likely to afford any countenance to the practice of that enormity; to detain in custody all such Chiefs as have rendered themselves particularly obnoxious by their practice or countenance of piracy, and had fallen into our hands in the course of our operations together with their piratical adherents, and to set up in their stead such Chiefs as could be depended on for their discouraging piracy, if no such could be found, to make over the country to the Imaum, to prohibit the filling out of armed vessels of every description at ports that have been accustomed to practice piracy; to limit the size of those allowed for commercial purposes so as to render them easily resisted if applied to piracy; and to stipulate for the right of search and of capturing all such as should be found to transgress this prohibition. To restrain the exportation from India of timber for building large ships. Prohibiting their (the Arabs) rebuilding their forts and stipulating for the right of landing and destroying any works that they might attempt to raise and others of the same nature.

(12) To remove all Chiefs concerned in piracy or likely to afford any countenance to the practice of that enormity must have involved the contingency of my leaving the sea coast in the event of any chieftain moving into the country as Sultan-bin-Sugger actually did previous to his signing any treaty. I was restrained from pursuing the contingency mentioned by many considerations, the most immediate, of course, was the following paragraph in my instructions dated the 27th of October: "And you will not fail to bear in mind that excepting in cases of particular emergency neither the troops nor the crews of the ships of war, nor of the Hon'ble Company's cruizers, are meant to be employed at any distance from thence (Russulkhimah) or any other place to which your operations may be directed against any military forces of the piratical States unless their being so employed should be found essentially requisite for the demolition of the piratical vessels and craft which may be in their ports. Sharga Sultan-bin-Sugger's chief port, as well as other places, might have been destroyed without entering into any treaty whatever, but it is not to be supposed that this chieftain would have voluntarily placed himself in my power and consented to any treaty or stipulations confirming his own disposition whilst he was at the head of his people, and the desert of Arabia was open to him. I had not any other means to resort to under my positive instructions not to quit the coast, except in that of entering into recognitions, which I accordingly did with the view of obtaining what must have appeared to the world a strong manifestation of the effects of our previous military operations. I had resolved on the destruction of the fortifications as well as of the vessels, and I conceived that greater advantage would be derived from accomplishing this on the footing it is placed by the treaties than by cutting off all the friendly communication, and annulling thereby all hopes of future improvement, nor did I believe that any benefit could arise from the display of our military power in the capture and destruction of fortifications and vessels, whilst we should in all probability have re-embarked under the fire of the very enemy we had beaten, and who must have gathered confidence from our departure under such circumstances. By treating men and time were saved, and our military power was acknowledged by a peaceable surrender of the maritime force of the Joasmes, which my instructions pointed out to be the object of the expedition.

(13) With regard to retaining such Chiefs and their followers as might fall into our hands in the course of our operations, and setting other Chiefs up in their stead, I shall offer the following considerations. The Hon'ble the Governor in Council has pleased to express his approbation of the terms granted to Hassan-bin-Rahma whose case is viewed under peculiar circumstances. The only chieftain and people therefore who may be considered as having fallen into our hands in the course of our operations are Hassan-bin-Ali and his followers. Knowing the peculiar character of this Chieftain, I at first felt disposed to prevent his re-establishment at Zaya although it had been completely destroyed; that place and the territory belonging to it was accordingly offered to His Highness the Imaum, who declined to accept of it. Here then remained in my possession a single Chieftain and one hundred and seventy-seven followers. I am not aware of the existence of any Chief that could be depended on to set up in Hassan-bin-Ali's stead; the alternative suggested of offering the territory in question to the Imaum had been resorted to without

success; I consequently followed what appeared to me to be the best course, and released him and his followers. Had Hassan-bin-Ali been retained, and another person set up in his stead by the British authority, the Chief so created would naturally have looked to us for support and protection; we should have put him up for our own benefit; but as that advantage would have been immediately lost had any Chief in whom we had no trust been pleased to remove him, we should have felt it incumbent upon us to support the person who was in our own interests; any person set up in the room of Hassan-bin-Ali would have been a solitary instance of our interference in the internal affairs of the Arab tribes. If the influence of the person so situated had been powerful, he would still have looked to our countenance, if it had been weak he would have required our active support, he would have been our man, and our character would have been committed had we abandoned him, nor could we have had any further security from him than his promises, but that is of little consequence, as the security remains with ourselves. Hassan-bin-Ali had promised not to practice plunder and piracy, but he is aware that there is a British force in the Gulf for maintaining this promise in its fullest extent. Our own Chief would have promised the same things, but I submit that we could not on that account have diminished the force to retain one man. As affairs now stand when our garrison shall be withdrawn from Russulkhiyma, our political connection with Arabia may cease from that moment, and this I have ever considered to be very great advantage.

(14) Had I known any person, or had there been any person in Hassan-bin-Ali's tribe nearly equal in power to that Chieftain and who in the natural course of event had succeeded to the Government of the tribe, from Hassan-bin-Ali's confinement, advantage might have been desired from permitting the person who had thus succeeded without our interference, to remain in power, but as far as my information goes no such person appeared. I had one other political inducement to release Hassan-bin-Ali, which was that at the time this measure was carried into effect, he was the person most able as well as willing to maintain some balance in the authority on the coast against Sultan-bin-Sugger.

(15) Hassan bin Ali's followers were released as I have before observed, under the idea that even their enmity can be productive of no bad consequences at this period, they were suffering much from disease, and I verily believe that we should not have been long burthened with the care of many of them, their deaths whilst under confinement by us would not have created a favourable political impression, which I trust their release has. I did not look to their deserts, but I looked to placing the British character in the most advantageous point of view; this of course not to be done without some sacrifices, if not in reality, at least of opinion, I cannot regret any that I have incurred, excepting being deprived of the approbation of the Governor in Council to a measure which appeared to me one that could be pursued with the greatest advantage.

(16) I did not prohibit the fitting out of armed vessels of every description at ports that have been accustomed to the practice of piracy as we considered that we always maintain the power of doing so; which I did not conceive that it was the desire or policy of the British Government to prohibit the use, but only the abuse of such vessels. *In disarming a people or in preventing them from defending their persons and property whether by sea or land, we may fairly I think be said to charge ourselves with their protection against all who shall attack them unjustly.* We are not the sole power in the Gulf of Persia and our entire repugnance to involve ourselves in the politics of the Gulf is, I believe, maintained, and made still more apparent by our not interfering directly with the quarrels and wars that may arise in it; it was this idea that caused me to discourage the Imaum only by arguments and remonstrances against his attack on Bahrein. I did not mean to interfere actively in this or any other acknowledged war, which was defined in the General Treaty to be that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by Government against Government.

(17) I felt disinclined to limit the size of vessels allowed for commercial purposes as understood that the largest were not by any means the most frequently used piratically; and as the introduction of commercial habits and ideas much to be desired I was willing to impose as few impediments to their adoption as a sense of safety would permit whilst I have every confidence in the efficacy and practicability of a strict maritime superintendence. The Gulf of Persia is a very small and confined sea, through which information will circulate rapidly, and no act of piracy can in future be committed without early intelligence being received at the British settlement, of where, and by whom, it may have been perpetrated, when immediate steps may be taken to inflict the necessary punishment on such as may offend.

(18) The right of search I conceive to be recognized in the obligation to have particular papers.

(19) As any restraint on the exportation from India of timber for building large ships could not be imposed by me, I do not trouble the Government with any observations on that head.

(20) For the reasons given in the 7th paragraph of this letter I conceive that we have every right to prohibit the Arabs from rebuilding their forts, as well as of landing and destroying any works they may attempt to raise for the purpose of enabling them to carry on piracy.

(21) The Hon'ble the Governor in Council conceives that a breach of the present treaty exposes him (any Arab Chief) to no consequences which would not have resulted from his piracy had that agreement (the General Treaty) never been entered into. The commission of an act of piracy would place the persons committing it beyond the pale of any treaty,

it is probably therefore of little consequence in such a case, during what existing treaty such an act may be committed as the punishment of the loss of life and goods mentioned in the general treaty might with every justice be inflicted, and this appears to be the highest punishment that could be stipulated for in any treaty.

(22) The Governor in Council further conceives that it would also be expedient particularly in the event of the consent of the piratical Chiefs being procured to limit the size and crews of their vessels. As I have been led to believe that the mischief to be apprehended from these vessels is not to be estimated in proportion to their size, I am doubtful whether this stipulation would be productive of a good effect.

(23) The Governor-General in Council is desirous of further explanation of the prohibition in some cases, against the Chiefs sending boats to sea, which he observes is not applied to Hassan bin Rachma and Hassan bin Ali, although the most likely to employ their boats in disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulf. It will be observed that the preliminary treaties in which this article is inserted were all concluded at Rasulkhima, the object of this article being inserted was to secure to us any vessels that might sail from the piratical forts and take shelter elsewhere before we had visited them. This stipulation was not in force after we had visited the different places, and destroyed or taken away the vessels given up. It may be right to observe that I am not aware of any vessel having attempted to get away. It was not necessary to interdict the sailing of Hassan bin Rachma and Hassan bin Ali's vessels, as they had not at that time any in their possession; such as belonged to the former were captured in Rassulkhima, but there were not any found in Ramz belonging to the latter.

(24) The Honourable the Governor in Council's cordial approval of the insertion in the general treaty of the article respecting the renunciation of the slave trade by the Arab tribes induces me to mention an idea which prevails, that a traffic of this nature to a considerable extent is carried on by the subjects of His Highness the Imaum of Maskat.

234. The Bombay Government (995, dated 7th June 1820) made the following observations on Major Keir's reply :—

Page 227 of Volume 31-47 of 1820-1821.

(2) On the 2nd and 6th paragraphs of your letter, I am instructed to remark that our power to destroy the first symptoms of any return to piracy is limited by our treaty; since nothing short of an infraction of one of its articles would justify our using it, and the Governor in Council cannot but consider such a limitation as a diminution of our actual strength as applicable to the suppression of piracy.

(3) It may be inferred from the 7th paragraph of your letter that you conceive us still to retain the right of attacking any Chiefs who may be equipping vessels for war, or construct in fortifications beyond what may be absolutely necessary for their protection against their neighbours, but this opinion is not supported by the tenor of our engagements; beyond which we could not exercise any power without subjecting ourselves to the imputation of a breach of faith.

(4) On the 8th paragraph of your letter I am directed to remark that the Governor in Council cannot assent to the position that it is better an article should never be enforced than it should occasionally be evaded.

(5) The number of boats given up and the forts destroyed under the preliminary treaty to which you recur in the 10th paragraph as considerations that have not been mentioned, as principal advantages gained by the present treaty, have been acknowledged as advantages acquired by the expedition independent of all treaties.

(6) The arguments stated in the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th paragraphs against deposing or imprisoning the piratical leaders and making over their forts to other Chiefs drawn from your inability to seize the Chiefs and the impossibility of finding suitable persons willing to accept the forts, are admitted in all cases when they apply, but the Honourable the Governor in Council still retains his opinion as to the solidity of the principle by which that course of proceeding was recommended.

(7) I am directed to observe that as the original sources of the piratical habits of some of the Arabs arising from the civil and religious state of their tribes are far beyond our reach or control, there remain to the British Government no other means of removing the evil, but by punishing the perpetrators wheresoever it has an opportunity. We appear at first sight to possess another resource in encouraging commerce as an occupation for those formerly supported by piracy, but as we have no new source of trade to open, and as no restrictions that we can remove have ever existed to the commerce of the Gulf except what are occasioned by piracy itself, it follows that the punishment of pirates is the only means we possess of diminishing the prevalence of their crimes. In this point of view the Honourable Governor in Council cannot but consider every circumstance that diminished the force of the example afforded by the late expedition as so far unfortunate.

(8) The release of Hassan bin Ali's military followers under the very unexpected and peculiar circumstances detailed in paragraph 15 was indispensably required by humanity.

(9) On the power which you consider us to retain (paragraph 16) to prohibit the fitting out of armed vessels at the ports accustomed to practice piracy, I am directed to repeat the remark that no such right is stipulated for in the treaty and the conclusion of such an instrument shuts out all the undefined rights which might have been exercised previous to its conclusion.

(10) With regard to the duty enforced on us to protect those whom we disarm, the Governor in Council is neither disposed to admit the principle nor the consequences deduced from it. We have an undoubted right to disarm the freebooter whose arms are always used against us, and we are not bound to extend our protection to him even though it were required, which does not in this case appear necessary, the tribes against whom this prohibition was directed being the only ones who practised piracy in the Gulf of Persia.

(11) On the 17th paragraph I am directed to observe that though small vessels might be as frequently used for piracy as large ones, they could not be so formidable for our trade, or so able to resist our cruizers.

(12) On the 18th and 19th paragraphs the Governor in Council has directed me to remark that it is nowhere explained that the right of search is recognized in the obligation to have particular papers; and that no restraint can now be imposed on the import of timber consistently with the treaty.

1.08
The search for a British base: Qishm, February–April 1821

366

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

Pirates
Persian Gulph
From Major
General Sir W.m
Keir, his opinion
regarding the occu-
pation of a Central
& Commanding Situa-
tion in the Persian
Gulf—Encloses Letter
from Capt.n Collier
of H.M. Ship Li-
verpool describing
the Island of Kishmee
the Island of Ormu
or Gueshm the most de-
sirable for the purposed
Settlement, & recom-
mends that measures
be adopted for ob-
taining possession
of it—

Sir

1 I have the honor to acknowledge the re-
ceipt the day before yesterday of your Despatches
of the 23d and 27th of November, 4th of December, and
Despatch of that of the 15th of December—

2. As the immediate active Services of that
portion of the Force which was left in Garrison at
Ras ul Khyma, could happily be dispensed with in
the subsequent operations, from the very favorable
circumstances, which my several Despatches will
have brought to the notice of the Honble the Governor
in Council, I shall desist for the present entering
upon the question of the probable consequences that
would arise out of the re-establishment of Sultan
ben Sugger's authority at Ras ul Khyma, as suggested
in your Despatch of the 27th of November—

3 The 7th Paragraph of my Despatch of
the 12th Instant intimated that His Majesty's
Ship Liverpool was about to proceed to Kishmee
for

397

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

for the purpose of obtaining information respecting that Island. We accordingly sailed on the 13th inst. owing to light winds, & the intricacy of the approach to the Watering place, and Town of Kishmee, we did not arrive there until the 18th Instant, having been four days in working into the usual place of anchorage.

4. In conformity to your letter of the 28th October, I shall now proceed to offer my opinion regarding "the occupation by the British Government of a Central and Commanding Situation in the Persian Gulf," and of the Island of Kishmee in particular, as noticed in the 3rd Paragraph of the above mentioned despatch, as well as in communications of a subsequent date.

5. Respecting Kishmee in a Maritime point of view I beg leave to refer to the accompanying Copy of a Letter from Captain Collier and

398

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

and at the same time to state, that the Officers of the Cruizers which have occasionally visited that, have represented it to be very far from eligible for the purpose of either procuring supplies or of watering. The difficulty of approach and prevailing calms have been experienced on many occasions, and must ever be an important objection to it as a Commercial entrepôt. The productions of this Island have not appeared to be abundant, and there is every reason to believe that many supplies of Vegetables &c &c are brought from the Neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas on the Persian Coast. The general appearance of the Neighbourhood of the Town of Kishmee is extremely barren, and unfavorable to the Sail, excepting a few considerable patches in cultivation, is almost entirely sand, and in many places the bare rock protrudes. The experience of many Navigators has proved, that the Water is

399

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

is neither in abundance, or of a good quality, although much trouble has lately been taken in clearing out Wells, many of which were quickly drained by the Transports. — Kishmee is represented by some people to be fertile in the interior, but the general aspect from Seaward along the whole Southern Coast corresponds with the description given of the Neighbourhood of the anchorage, and the Coast on the North Side is represented by good authority to be equally barren. — There are other objections to Kishmee for the purposes now in contemplation, and I reckon amongst the most important, the great extent of this Island it being upwards of fifty Miles long, this would interfere much with its Space by rise as a Commercial Settlement, and render its defence difficult from the obvious necessity of scattering over so great a Space, the small number

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

of Troops that would be appropriated to that purpose. The circumstance of Kishmee being so near the entrance of the Gulph, will not be reckoned an advantage, when it is remembered that the prevailing Wind within the Gulf is the Northwester, that Island is consequently to Leeward of the whole Gulf for the greater part of the year, a very considerable objection where Military ascendency is necessary, and the speedy execution of an enterprize with the means at Command, is a great Security for its Success. —

6 An attentive consideration of the important results likely to arise out of the permanent occupation by the British Government, of a Settlement in this Gulf has impressed me with the propriety of profiting as well by diligent enquiry, as personal experience, previous to submitting to Government any

No 1

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

any opinion on this interesting Subject, and it is Satisfactory to believe that by having done so, I am now enabled to point out a Situation that appears in every way calculated for the desired purposes. The Island of Kenn or Queis is the place to which I allude, & which for the reasons I shall now proceed to give, I prefer to Kishmee or any other Situation in the Gulf.

7 The Island of Kenn or Queis is from Seven to eight Miles in length, and four to five in breadth. It is particularly well situated for Naval purposes. Good anchorage is close to the Shore all round the Island, and Ships can lie at any time to which ever may be the leward Side. For the convenience of landing & embarking in blowing weather, there is a small cove or basin into which the Boats of the Transports entered with great safety & facility during the prevalence of a severe North West wind. When however this is moderate the beach may be approached at any place

No 2

Bombay Castle .... 8th March 1820

place. This Island has the great advantage of being easy of access, and the Channel between it and the Coast of Persia is frequently chosen by Vessels proceeding up or down the Gulf. Kenn is directly opposite to a part of the Persian Coast which has been reputed to have been occasionally piratical and it is commonly for Nine Months in the year, to Windward of all the Ports on the Arabian Side of the Gulf that have been visited by the Expedition. It is also centrically situated for communicating with the other Ports of the Gulph of Persia.

8 The Water is good as well as very abundant at no great depth, and the Wells are numerous and conveniently situated for the Shipping as well as Cultivation. During the time the Troops have been on Shore at Kenn the usual refreshments of an excellent quality, have been more plentiful than they were at Kishmee.

The

403

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

9th The population of Kaun is reckoned at about 500, and it subsists by agriculture and fishing. The surface of the Island is every where Stony Bed. The Soil is said to be very fertile producing abundant returns from the Seed. The pasture though Scanty is of a good quality and the Wood being more abundant than on any other Island in the Gulf affords Sufficient fuel to the Inhabitants. The Climate is reputed to be good, and has every appearance of being so, as there are no Swamps, or Jungles. Only a small portion of the Island is in a State of Cultivation, and probably more than half of the land formerly tilled is now quite neglected, in consequence it is said, of frequent attacks having been made by people from the Coast of Arabia. The Establishment of a British Garrison would of course obviate the latter evil and the Security it would

404

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

would afford, would speedily induce the Inhabitants to cultivate every thing for the Troops in which could not be more conveniently obtained from a distance.

10 Experience has ever proved that a Small insular Situation which combines the advantages enumerated as belonging to Kaun is most favourable for a rapid rise in a Commercial Emporium and it might be observed that this Island was not overlooked by such acute Commercial observers as the ancient Portuguese who appear to have had a considerable Settlement upon it, as may be inferred from ruins which are still visible, and the tradition current amongst the Inhabitants of the Island.

11 The complete conviction which obtains in my own mind of Kaun being in every way eligible for the purposed Settlement, induces me most strongly to recommend that immediate measures may be taken to obtain permanent pos-

session

405

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

possession of it. It is at present occupied by Arabs, and is held by the Sheik of Charrack who is said to pay a nominal tribute to the Persian Government of Six Tumaun per annum, but the tenure is extremely loose, for the Sheik declared that in the event of the Prince of Shirazpersiling Charrack with his army, he should abandon that place, and take refuge with his people in this Island, as the Prince has not the means of following him.

12 H.M. Ship Barbam Royal already been detained a day to convey this despatch and an opportunity of writing will again occur immediately by the Transports which will proceed with the European Troops. I shall not at present enter upon any other subject.

H.M. Ship Liverpool at anchor off the Island of Hann 21st Feby 1820

I have &c
(Signed) Wm Grant Keir
Maj. Genl
Majr

406

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

Major General
Sir Wm Grant Keir K.C.B.
Commander in Chief of the Forces in the
Gulf of Persia

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 19th Instant respecting the Island of Kishmee as a Settlement.

In my opinion there are several Nautical objections to it.

That Island being nearly at the end of the Gulf and the prevailing Winds being N.W. it consequently must lie generally to Leeward.

The Currents being particularly strong and by no means regular. The anchorage very difficult of access being subject to frequent and long Calms. Water difficult to procure and by no means good, no Wood except what comes from the main. Refreshments of all kinds scarce as they are procured in general from Gombroon. With



Bombay Castle .... 8th March 1820

With the Winds from the N.E. the anchorage is dangerous, the landing bad, and in the event of a Vessel wishing to go to Sea in a N.E. Gale, it would be I think impossible.—

The Island of Kesm in my opinion possesses many advantages to Kishmee for a Settlement, the Situation being more central, anchorage good all round the Island, and a Vessel being able to move at any time and with all Winds.—

Water abundant and good, and easily procured, a fine sandy Beach all round the Island and the landing excellent and convenient.—

On the Northside where the Fleet are at present, there is a Cove where the Boats landed with ease during the late N.W. Gales which is the usual Wind for this anchorage. The anchoring ground is good being Sand and Clay and no want of refreshments.—

H.C.S. Ship Liverpool Island of Kesm 11th March 1820

I have &c
(Signd) F.M. Ellis

Part V—Chap. XXVIII. 139

The Governor in Council is also desirous of receiving your opinions upon the practicability of *increasing the requisite control in the Gulf of Persia by the establishment merely of a factory* in the Island of Kishm or any other more central station upon the same scale as exists at Bushire and under the participation of such privileges in the imports and exports of merchandize in British bottoms and of a share of the customs as may be necessary to compensate us in some degree for the expense we shall incur in the maintenance of a maritime force in the Gulf, in preference to the occupation of the whole of that or of any other island in full sovereignty.

The Governor in Council is also anxious to receive such suggestions as you may have to offer for the promulgation of *a code of maritime regulations* to be observed by the different tribes in the Gulf to enable the British cruizers to discriminate the one from the other, imposing restrictions in the equipment of their boats, and an obligation in them to admit our cruizers into their different ports and to search all vessels for the purpose of guarding against any of them being equipped for warlike purposes; and how far in your opinion the different petty States may be induced to acquiesce in such an arrangement under a clear understanding that our object is limited to the suppression of piracy and to re-establishment of a force and secure commercial intercourse between the different parts in the Gulf and those of India.

It is understood that the Island of Kishm, as well as Angar which is contiguous to it, belongs in full sovereignty to the Imam of Maskat and should the reports that may be received from you and the other persons to whom the consideration of this important subject has been confided be favourable to the measure now suggested, the necessary negotiation will be opened for obtaining possession of the spot that may be fixed upon for forming the establishment."

235A. The report of Sir William Grant Keir, dated 1st April 1820, on the points raised by the Bombay Government is a very interesting one and is quoted at length below:—

Volume 31—47 of 1820-1821, page 91.

The intention of removing the British factory from Bushire expected in your letter of the 28th of October last, induces me most respectfully to submit to the Honorable the Governor in Council a few considerations which have occurred to me after visiting that place.

2. It appears that on the removal of the British factory from Gomberoon to Bushire in the year 1762, the last mentioned place was an insignificant fishing village, and that it commenced to rise rapidly to its present state of prosperity from the period of that removal; it may, therefore, be fairly presumed that *the presence of the British Factory by affording protection, and inspiring confidence, is the sole occasion of the flourishing condition of Bushire;* for we may look in vain for any other adequate cause either in its internal Government, or in the Government of Persia to which it owns allegiance.

3. The British Government has, I understand, derived important advantages from the establishment of a considerable import and export trade to and from Bushire; in deriving these advantages it has induced many respectable merchants to settle at the place, and to remove to it property to a considerable amount, which occasioned the opening of an extensive trade with the interior of Persia by a new route. All this evinces a most gratifying faith in British protection, and a confidence has doubtless arisen that it will not be withdrawn without warning, and affording time for securing or removing without any considerable loss, valuable property that is risked under a pledge which may reasonably be implied, where benefits are reciprocal between a Government and individuals, who, by certain circumstances, controlled by that Government, have been induced to hazard their persons and effects in the territory of a State that is little aware of the advantages to be derived from affording protection to commerce, and security to property of all descriptions.

4. The Government are, I presume, possessed of the means of ascertaining readily whether the views now taken be correct; if they be, we may infer that much advantage would be derived, by affording time and opportunity for a trade established under British auspices, to take a new and natural course before removing the protection of a factory under which it grew up. The establishment of a British settlement in the Gulf of Persia will naturally attract this trade, whilst that of Bushire will in probability decline, from the removal of affluent individuals with their property to our more enlightened Government, which will be calculated to diffuse commercial benefits by many new sources.

5. These considerations induce me respectfully to *recommend that the factory at Bushire may not be removed before the general trade to that place shall have fallen naturally into the course it will in all probability take, soon after the establishment of a British settlement in the Gulf of Persia.*

6. Having received an intimation from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the Court of Persia that he conceived addresses from me "to the Shah, and Sudr Azam, would be productive of a good effect." I trust that the Governor in Council will approve of my having transmitted through Mr. Willock the communications of which the accompanying are drafts, I forward likewise a copy of my letter to Mr. Willock on this occasion.

7. Whilst at Bushire I received from His Royal Highness the Prince of Shiraz a communication of which I forward a translation as well as a draft of my reply. As connected with these letters I also transmit the translation of a communication from Rama bin Jauber: to this I have not made any reply as I have not been favoured by the receipt of any instructions since the reference made respecting that person in the 14th paragraph of my despatch of the 25th of February.

8. The accompanying is a translation of a letter from His Highness the Imam of Maskat; a translation of his proposed agreement with the Utubis of Bahrein alluded to in his letter is also transmitted, as well as a copy of my reply to His Highness.

9. I now beg to refer to the letter from the Imam which accompanied my despatch of the 24th of February as well as to the remarks in the 15th, 16th and 17th paragraphs of that despatch. The difference in the tone of His Highness's communication now forwarded, and the profession of his great desire "to act in strict conformity to my wishes" was probably occasioned by his distrusting, not without reason certainly, the professions of the Prince of Shiraz respecting His Royal Highness's army being about to aid in the Bahrein expedition. The preparations for this expedition have, for these last two or three years, been made use of by the Prince of Shiraz, as an excuse for levying exactions of a most oppressive nature from many of the Sheikhs and other inhabitants of the Persian coast of the Gulf, by which much distress has been occasioned and the minds of all kept in a most harassing state of alarm and doubt; this has interrupted all the industrious pursuits that under due encouragement would tend materially to maintain the peace of the Gulf. It is, therefore, much to be desired that some decided steps should be taken to set the conflicting claims against the Utubis of Bahrein permanently at rest.

10. By the latest accounts received the day before I left Bushire, the Prince of Shiraz had left the sea coast, and was on his return to Shiraz, having, I understood, intimated that he had abandoned all intention of proceeding this year against Bahrein. The Imam of Maskat, who had reached the Island of Kism with his ships and boats, in conformity to his agreement with the Prince, will thus again have been deceived by His Royal Highness, who appears to have a mean opinion of the Imam's penetration and judgment, and I understand that the Shiraz Government calculates upon deceiving the Imam at all times when it may be convenient for it to do so. The Imam will probably return to Maskat without being able to effect anything decisive against the Bahrein Government; this will, I trust, afford time for urging the mediation contemplated in the Honourable the Governor's letter of the 15th of December to Mr. Willock.

11. As connected with this subject I transmit a translation of a communication made to the Sheikhs of Bahrein according to the spirit of the despatch of the Governor in Council to the Governor-General, dated the 15th of December, and I beg leave to state that the ratification of these Sheikhs has been received to the preliminary treaty mentioned in the 14th paragraph of my despatch of the 7th of February, as having been entered into by their Vakil. Their ratification of the "General Treaty with the Arab tribes" extended to them at the same time has also been received.

12. I now transmit one of the original copies of the "General Treaty" having the autograph signatures of the different Chieftains. As the Chieftains of Imam and Am-ul-Gywyn appeared to enjoy a certain degree of independence of Sultan bin Sagger, I conceived that advantage might be derived from associating them by name in the General Treaty, and this was done accordingly.

13. His Majesty's ship *Liverpool* was at Ras-ul-khima for a few hours on the 25th ultimo, and I then received a report of which the accompanying is a copy from Captain Thompson. The Governor in Council will derive satisfaction from the favourable accounts it contains of the state of that garrison, although the difficulty of procuring good water may be reckoned a serious evil.

14. The very voluminous proceedings of a Committee assembled by Captain Thompson are before me, and from them the following inferences may be drawn. *No good water is procurable within the Fort of Ras-ul-khima*, and the nearest that is drinkable is at the distance of 2 miles, but even that water becomes putrid and unfit for use at the end of fifteen days. In the event of the country becoming hostile extreme inconvenience must naturally arise from this want of water, the only mode of remedying which is to have a considerable supply stored up in proper vessels. It will be observed from the accompanying copy of a letter that the Commandant is particularly urgent on this point, and is very anxious that a stock sufficient for three months should be laid in, as this is the period calculated in which relief might be obtained from Bombay in case of the wells being occupied by an enemy with an overpowering force, but I cannot consider so large a supply to be absolutely necessary, as it appears to me that water could, so long as our cruizers are maintained in the Gulf, be procured at any time of the year from Kishm, the Persian Coast, or Maskat, in a period not exceeding one month, and much sooner unless in cases of extreme bad or calm weather, yet as it must ever be advisable that a garrison should be prepared against emergencies, I most strongly recommend that immediate steps be taken for affording the garrison of Ras-ul-khima the means of keeping in store either in tanks or casks, a sufficiency of water for one month. The accompanying sketch of a calculation shews the quantity of water that the garrison have now vessels to contain, as well as the balance to complete one month's supply for which tanks or casks are required; with these vessels our establishment of the cruizers should be sent, and I conceive that great advantage in point of time, the saving of which is certainly a great object, would be derived by sending the tanks or casks from Bombay full of water, as considerable difficulty, as well as delay, would be experienced in filling so large a quantity of water in the Gulf of Persia.

15. With the view of placing the troops at Ras-ul-khima beyond all immediate chance of being distressed for water, Captain Thompson, it will be perceived, has requested Captain Bruce, the Resident at Bushire, to send from that place a supply of about three

hundred tons, but I do not think that this can be done, with advantage, or even that it can be done at all, from the want of means of containing so large a quantity.

16. I am aware of the great comfort and consolation that the sepoys at Ras-ul-khima would derive from the presence of their families, an indulgence which I am convinced the Government feel disposed to grant, but under the conceived possible want of water, I am induced, however unwilling, to recommend that the families may not yet be permitted to proceed, unless Government should be pleased to send a further supply of water for their eventual use.

17. The Government will perceive that these recommendations and remarks are offered under the idea that Ras-ul-khima will not immediately be given up, but it is right for me to state that I do not perceive any advantages sufficiently strong to induce me to wish that it should be retained longer than the period which Government may determine as fitting for the removal of our troops to some other place in the Gulf. I have already most strongly *recommended that the eventual removal should be to the Island of Kishm, all that I have learnt since offering that recommendation, has tended to confirm my opinion of that island being the most favourable situation in every respect, and if no other considerations existed than those of political expedency, I should be disposed to urge that the removal should take place immediately.*

18. Not the smallest doubt need be entertained respecting the result of my attack that the Arabs can make on Ras-ul-khima, yet the possibility of such an occurrence ought not altogether to be lost sight of. The chief consideration that would induce me to deprecate such an event is the necessity that would consequently be imposed upon us of retaining that place until the impression that would be made by any attack should be worn off, that we might avoid the imputation of being driven out which the Arabs would naturally conceive had been the case, did we retire before due time had elapsed.

19. Captain Thompson's report mentions particularly the growing ascendancy of Sultan-bin-Sagger; the result of this will probably be the establishment of that Chieftain's power over a considerable portion of the Arabian Coast. There is one direct inference to be drawn from this ascendancy which is that the *Chieftains on the portion of the coast alluded to have lost much of their religious feature, for Sultan has abjured Wahabism although many who willingly acknowledge his superiority still profess that faith, which appears to be generally on the decline, and is now hardly acknowledged on the Persian side of the Gulf.* On the Arabian Coast Hussen-bin-Ali of Zyak, is, I believe, the only Chieftain who still professes Wahabism; although old he preserves his enthusiasm, and may certainly be considered a man of penetration and even of some talent which occasioned him to be appointed by the Imam of the Wahabis to receive from the Joasmi tribe the tribute payable to the general treasury by the followers of Wahab. Until lately it appeared probable that Hussen-bin-Ali would have been able to maintain himself as a powerful rival to Sultan-bin-Sagger, but that expectation must now, I conceive, be abandoned, as none of the Chieftains seem to coalesce with Hussen-bin-Ali with the exception of Cuzuk-bin-Ahmed, a person of little political consideration. We may, therefore, I think calculate upon the ascendancy of Sultan-bin-Sagger, and it is with him that we shall in all probability have to negociate the transfer of Ras-ul-khima, for its former Chieftain Hussen-bin-Raukma appears to have rendered himself entirely subservient to Sultan.

20. The expression made throughout the Gulf by the complete success of the expedition is palpably very great, and must, whilst it is maintained, produce the most beneficial consequences; such decidedly favourable opportunities for manifesting our superiority are not likely to occur again; we should therefore be careful not to run the risk of weakening the ascendancy we have acquired; this consideration points particularly to the advisableness of abstaining generally from any active interference with the transactions on the Arabian Continent.

21. It has hitherto been usual for both cruisers and merchant ships proceeding up or down the Gulf to sail along the Persian Coast only; this practice may now be abandoned whenever it may be convenient to do so. But to enable our vessels to approach the Arabian Coast with safety, a circumstance absolutely necessary to secure the permanent suppression of piracy, a *minute and accurate survey of that coast* should be immediately undertaken. Our knowledge of many parts of the Gulf is extremely imperfect, and even the number of the islands adjacent to the Arabian Coast is unknown.

22. It is extremely advisable at this particular crisis whilst the minds of many in the Gulf still remain unsettled, that as *many of our cruisers as can be spared, should be seen frequently both on the Arabian and Persian shores*, we should approach them in as friendly and conciliatory a manner as possible, prepared of course at all times to put down the very first manifestations of any return to piratical pursuits, but as treaties now exist with all the independent tribes on the coast, and there is a British settlement at an inconsiderable distance from every part of the Gulf, it is particularly desirable that all vessels captured in the actual commission, under an allegation, or detained from suspicion of piracy, should, unless in cases of extreme necessity, be sent into a British port to be condemned, previous to being destroyed.

33

ANNEX B, No. 1

Major-General Sir Lionel Smith to the Government of Bombay, April 23, 1821

[Bahrain Archives, Book 23, pp. 238-58]

To, [p. 238].

Francis Wardin Esq^re^

Chief Secretary to Government;

Sir,

1st My letter to you under date the 15th ultimo, will have shown my proceedings up to that period, and informed you of my intention of embarking on that day from zoor and the Pirate Forts, on the further objects of my instruction.—

2nd I arrived at Kishme on the evening of the 26th ultimo. It may first be desirable I should state my opinion on the advantage and disadvantages of our Post on the North Eastern extremely of that Island and near the principal Town, or capital, after which I shall offer my observations on other situations upon or near the same Island.—

3 The position of Kishme may be considered good for about 500. Men. It stands on a high flat of rocks, of very different access from the Beach of landing place, which it commands—There is an old Battery and Tower towards the left [p. 239]. shape, of the Sea front which also commands the watering place below. The right rear, and extreme left of the Position, are alike protected by deep ravines of a brupt rock.—

4th Thus the position would easily be held, without the exception of artificial works common attention being kept up against surprize.—

5th I have the honour to transmit a plan of the Position, and its vicinity, you will observe it is defective insufficient[*sic*] space to give protection to my numerous population wishing to settle under our flag hereafter. Such persons would have to reside in the Town of Kishme, and under the Government of His Highness the Imam.—

6th The locality is also objectionable as too remote and too[1] from the Pirate Coast, in Account of the North West Winds, which may be considered to prevail for nearly nine months in the year. It is also out of the Track of the ordinary [p. 240]. destination of vessels, either to or from the Gulph, so that it would not be visited in passing without considerable detention It has no Harbour but the anchorage is considered safe—The fresh water is tolerably good and I directed the number of walls to be increased—The last season is reported as one of abundant Rain, in less favorable years, I should feel doubtful if sufficient water would be procurable.—

7th The natives represent the place to be unhealthy, but I do not understand why—The situation is high and open to sea, without the least vigitation[*sic*]. The Sepoys have been much afflicted with scurvy from the quantity of Salt fish in which they indulge, without being able to procure vegetables, or karanah they are accustomed to in India—The European Troops have been too few in Kishm as yet to give much experience on the effects of the climate, but there has been no unfavorable appearance whatever.

8th There probably are no two coasts in the world so little calculated to answer [p. 241]. the requisite qualities of a Military and naval position as these of Arabian[*sic*] and Persia in this sea; Fresh Water, salubrious air, defencible ground without incurring expences[*sic*], exceeding the objects of our occupation a good Harbour or at least a safe anchorage with a ready command of the Pirates coast, in all objects equally essential to the purposes of our ultimate Establishment, and can be hardly one of them be obtained in any one place.

9th I should most inclure to the locality of Kenn, the Island already recommended by Sir William Keir. I have no information of it,—in other respects but in the present temper of the Court of Persia on this subject, we could only obtain it by Force or money; its position with regard to all the Pirate ports is excellent.—

10th Next to that situation I should prefer the Island of Anjar but it could not be occupied without some expence in defences and Tanks—Its great disadvantage [p. 242]. is the want of a natural supply of water agreater[*sic*] part of the Island standing

[1] word omitted?

34

on a Base of salt—yet it was extensively occupied by the Portuguese—Its proximity to the Private Ports and its ready to command of the general channel of the Gulph, which is here very narrow, combined with the sound or safe Roadstead, framed by this Island and Kishme, are advantages which render it unequalled, as a naval position in the whole Gulph—The sound requires to be well surveyed and both Channels into it to be laid down.—

11th I took an opportunity of examining Basadore on the South Western extremely[*sic*] of the Island of Kishm—as being still near to the Pirate Coast, but this point of the Island is surrounded by an extensive sand Bank which renders the Channel to the Anchorage off the Town too circuitous and entrecate[*sic*] to enable vessels to get promptly to sea and is thus useless to one principal object— [p. 243]. Among the ruins of large Town, are some excellent Tanks of Water, and the place could be easily made defensible.—

12th I next inspected a place called Zeellah about 25 miles East of Bassadore, which had been represented to me as eligible—It has the near advantage in this part of the world of a natural supply of good fresh water but it has no other requisite.—

13th From Zeellah I proceeded to Deristan opposite the Island of Anjar when the troops cantoned after leaving Rasulkhyma its appearance gave little promise of its being healthy, and it could not be more a convenient, or secure Post, without great expence.—

14th Under all these circumstances I am of opinion we should continue for the present to occupy the Position near the Town of Kishm The inconvenience of its locality, in not possessing a more speedy command of the Pirate Coast may be partly obviated by Vigilance. It requires no expence for works of defence against any local enemy, and its disadvantages the want of space and the possible [p. 244]. scarcity of fresh water, may only be seriously felt in proportion to the increase of Population which has not been repaid as yet.

15th I have always felt persuaded that nothing but the Establishment of a military and naval Post in Gulph could keep down the Piratical Tribes.—

16th Whatever may result therefore from the pretensions of the Court of Persia to the Sovereignty of the Island and to Kishme, in particular I shall still anxiously hope that important object will be obliged to establish ourselves, on the Arabian shore.—

17th His Highness the Imam of Muscat would not readily give us up any Port or Town we wished, so satisfied is he with the benefits of our presence in the Gulph —His Highness has not studied the least concealment of his contempt at the Threats of his Persian mission.—

[p. 245]. 18th There can be no doubt that the policy of our Establishment in the Gulph has been already proved, in securing the advantages gained by Sir William Keir's force, but the present year should be considered one of great importance as likely to future habits of the Piratical Tribes in rendering their means of subsistence dependent in industrious pursuits instead of on those of fraud and violence.—

19th To express them into such a desirable Course, and to keep down the attempts and hopes of renewed Piratical Powers they should be constantly watched on their own shores, and while discussed [*sic*][1] as they are at present, the Honorable Companys' Cruizers (though some of them certainly appear modelled on mysterious capacities for war) may be considered fully equal to that service.—

20th It is by the conduct of this branch of the service therefore that Government will chiefly have to depend for preserving what has been effected by so much labour, and expenditure of Men and money, and every scrutiny which can improve [p. 246]. the condition of the cruizers and every incouragement which can stimulate the exertions of the affairs of that services would seem particularly called for, at the present juncture.—

21st I do myself the honor to enclose copies of the instructions which I have issued to the acting Political Agent and senior marine Officer at Kishme, on this subject, it regulates a system of Cruize and watch, as now suggested providing also for Cruizers occasionally visiting Bussora and Bushire.—

22nd Among the enquiries which could be usefully setforth, to improve the efficiency and extend the active services of the Cruizers, in this quarter it seems

[1] *disused*(?).

35

important that positive injuctions should be given to the Political Agents at the above mentioned places, not to detain these vessels but upon most positive necessity reported at the time. The service has been to much waste of time by this and as far as I had means of inquiry, I was not satisfied if the practice was not [p. 247].
founded in official ostentation, or in useful objects.—

23rd The system of provisioning Cruizers at these Forts by Agents, on shore may possibly give a pretence for delays, out of the Commanders controul[*sic*] and if as I had stand there is a perCentage[*sic*], on Pursurage allowed on Marine supplies, the responsibility and the advantage, would seem best united in the hands of the Commanders, because they are the best likely to yield to unnecessary interruptions, against those important duties they will be now charged with and have to account for (though[*sic*] the Political Officer) direct to Government.—

24th On the other hand there is a species of private temptation to the Commander of the Cruizers to visit the Ports of Bussorah and Bushire, oftener than public duties may require and which it would seem most desirable to set at rest— I allude to Treasure freight—It has I believe constituted one of the most valuable [p. 248].
sources of emolument, let to this service, and on every seasoning of justice and Policy should only be removed by a fair equivalent—supposing therefore that Six Cruizers are to be constantly attached to the Gulph station, I should be glad to see an allowance granted to each Commander while so employed, of 200 Rupees per mensem clear of any other Pay. or advantage, he may enjoy— The Commander then instead of seeking freight voyages, and a quick return to the/Residency, would be glad to remain on the most active, and best paid employment—Instead of that lamentable ignorance of the Arabian Coast, now existing, it would thus be constantly visited, and shortly as well known, as the gilded channel to Bussorah, and the Pirates could not launch a Dow or erect a shed, lest it would be immediately observed and reported Cruizers could still take up the Merchants Treasure when required but the per Centage instead of going to individuals Commanders should be paid over to Government and probably [p. 249].
would fully meet the amount of the proposed remuneration.—

25th The whole of the Cruizers should be placed under the controul and inspection of an intelligent Officer as Commadore stationed with the Political Agent of the lower Gulph. He should well observe their reports and Log Books, and keep all the Commanders strictly in their duties, of incessantly Cruizing— The latter to meet the expences of such a necessary appointment, the almost useless situation of master attendant at Kishme could be done away with.—

26th I earnestly beg to recommend that the Ports in the Gulph, should be kept provided with two Bunder Gun Boats—One of those furnished for Sir Willian Keir's expedition, has been already destroyed—They require to be armed with 24Pr Cannonades, instead of 18's for the advantage of throwing 5½ inch shells—

27th If the Post could be furnished also with two additional Decked Gun [p. 250].
Boats drawing little water it would be a most judicious equipment. Some of the Cruizers are exceedingly small, and could neither tow or carry the present open Gun Boats which could not always work across the Gulph—I have gone largely into this branch of the service, as I attach the greatest consequence to its efficient equipment, and to just sentiments on their constant exertions.—

28th I should next recommend a strict examination into the composition and use of the proposed establishment of Troops in the Gulph for the same object of keeping down piracy.—

29th This I think should be a small but very efficient Force constantly ready for offensive operations, afloat, or on shore encumbered as much as possible with followers and unshakled from all useless establishment an in appropriate[*sic*] Indian customs.

30th At Kishme there is now a Bombay native Marine Battalion of about 500 [p. 251].
Ranks and file—the Battalion is complete in all its establishment as if in the field in India and as is frequently the case with this description of Troops, it has numerous followers, who it would require a large portion of the Battalion to protect in the event of active service. In India followers are of no inconvenience in the Gulph, the Government has to feed from India, every Indian Native.—

31st But if the view I have taken on the best means of keeping down the Pirates by the Honorable Company's Cruizers be deemed correct, it must be obvious that any species of troops who cannot be actively useful, on board those vessels / and

36

the Government have no others to depend upon from prompt transport / or on board Boats, both to work, and fight, are wholly ill adapted for the duties of this station.—

32. Though the sepoys are excellent Troops in India, no one will suppose them calculated for Service—I have described.—

[p. 252]. 33rd The Arabs seem to respect European Troops most among themselves they place most confidence in africans for Bravery and fidelity and the well deserved character—They do not certainly much respect asiatic soldiers, not even British Sepoys.

34th The best adapted Troops therefore against Arabs, would seem to me to be European and coffrees, not only as carrying most weight of Character, but as the Cheapest and hardiest in this particular climate because most easily fed, and readiest moved.—

35th I should rate the amount of the detachment desirable to be ultimately stationed for the service in the Gulph at about 40 Artillery men, and I would recommend consideration to the propriety and means, of raising men an african marine "Battalion" proposely for this service / but liable to serve any where / to the extent of about 300 effective rank and file as the remainder of the Force— When drilled one hundred of these, or as many as necessary should always be kept [p. 253]. employed on board the Gulph, Squadron, instead of the useless marine sepoys now on Board these vessels.—

36th Watermen, Washermen, Cooks, or any other sort or personal helpers, which encumber Troops so much in India would be quite unnecessary and should be strictly prohibited in the Affrican[*sic*] Battalion.—

37th A Detachment thus composed, and simplified, in its wants, would I am persuaded prove best adapted for the climate and by far the least expensive— I have no prejudices whatever to gratify, in the recommendation of any particular Troops. No man can have a higher respect for sepoys in India, than I have but always regret seeing their willing services stretched to conjugal climates, and Scenes of difficulties, which destroy their Energies, and confidences, and render them only helpless men, when you require them as effective soldiers.—

[p. 254]. 38th In reference to the 25th and 26th paragraphs of my instructions, I regret exceedingly that I was unable to land at the Principal Pirate Ports, and to see Sultan Ben Suggur—although I embarked on the Mercury Cruizer for this purpose and was several days off the coast the strong north West winds, which prevail at this season, prevented by landing It was of little consequence in respect to my desired interview with Bin Suggur as he was absent at the time from Sharga avowedly to interpose his influence with the Shaik of Agmaun, who had marched to attack Bramey belonging to His Highness the Imam.—

39th I have great pleasure however in reporting that the whole of the Pirate Ports are quite[*sic*][1] as yet, and the Chiefs have preserved the conditions of the Treaty—That they will have their Broils without each other both in the Interior and at sea, must be expected—one of the results of their depression at sea, will be fight for authority, and better subsistance among each other.—

[p. 255]. 40th With regard to allowing Ben Suggur to build a Fort at Rasulkhyma, as Captain Faithful when acting Political agent, had decidedly disencouraged his application, I meant to have informed Ben Suggur that Government would be best pleased if he abstained from it for the present, as furnishing pretentions to other Chieftains to erect Forts in whose good faith we had less confidence.—

41. My real reason for avoiding his request would have been that the People of Rasulkhyma have been for a considerable time past removing to, and settling in other places which seems very desirable and the notion of a Fort at Rasulkhyma might in some degree have given hopes of revived Piracy.—

42nd In reference to your remark in my Instructions that the Government comparatively speaking had no serious grounds of complaint against Sultan Ben Suggar permit me to remind you that this man was Chief at Rasulkhyma when it was [p. 256]. taken in 1809,—a little before which his people had captured the ship Minerva of Bombay and wantingly murdered all the crew.—

43. The same barbarity was committed under his power in every minor Capture long before.—

44. Sent prisoner to Duriah and disgraced by saood for losing Rasulkhyma, he afterwards escaped to a fort in the red sea, and reaching Muscat threw himself on

[1] *quiet* (?).

37

the generosity of the Imaum His Highness procured him the Shaik ship of Linga from whence he sent shaik to Sharga.—

45th There under pretence of influence with the people of Rasulkhyma's he persuaded the Imam to undertake an expedition against it, in which he was to assist, but hung back when called upon and in return of all the Imam's kindness it appears he had medicated his destruction.—

46 The Character is no doubt very infamous, but as the Chief of most influence, among a people, of equally bad or worse dispositions,—he was the person best able to assist, our endeavours in reforming their habits—But in our intercourse with him we must defend more on our means coercive, than on his faith and principles. [p. 257].

47 I have unavoidably entended this letter in the necessary reply to several points of my Instructions and as a duty I fell, to offer a detached opinion upon our future Interests and policy in this quarter.

48th Inclosing my reports I must request you to acquaint Government, how much we have been endebted on the late service to His Highness the Imam of Muscat for his most friendly and cordial assistance on all occasions nothing could exceed the strict honor and good faith of his whole conduct, and he may unvariably confide to in alliance only guarding ourselves against the least interference with his religions verimilies and avoid confounding those disputed with any possible Interests of our own.— [p. 258].

I have &ca

(signed) L. Smith

Major General—

At Sea Ship
Byramgore
23d April 1821.

[*Explanatory Note.*—This letter demonstrates that, in 1821, Buraimi (Bramey) belonged to the Sultan (Imām) of Muscat.]

1.09
A marine patrol in the Gulf, November–December 1821

(v) QUESTION OF CONTROLLING PIRATICAL PORTS EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH A MARINE FORCE.

258. The Bombay Government being desirous of ascertaining the practicability of controlling the piratical ports in the Gulf of Persia exclusively through the medium of a marine force, which might render the maintenance of a military one in that quarter for that purpose unnecessary, requested Henry Meriton, Superintendent of Marine, to submit his opinion on the subject with a plan for maintaining a watch and cruize during the period which is favourable to the prosecution of piracies. Mr. Meriton submitted in his letter No. 336, dated 26th November 1821, the following observations and suggestions :—

Volume 26—51 of 1821, page 480.

I beg to state that after a careful examination of the charts of the Gulf of Persia, and repeated conferences with Lieutenants Hardy, Grubb, and Robinson, officers who have a perfect knowledge of that navigation, and who have recently returned from that station, it appears that the principal ports from which piratical vessels are most likely to be fitted out, and from which they can most readily get to sea, are the following on the Arabian Coast, namely, Rump, Ras-ul-kima, Sharga and Deboy.

3. The above four ports extending from the 25th to 26th degrees of latitude and occupy a range of coast of about 70 miles, and as they are all easy of access, I think they might be guarded in the following manner. That there should be three cruisers (one of each class) constantly cruising in the face of these ports, and visiting them all from time to time, when it would be seen if any preparations were going on in the equipment of vessels, and, if so, that it should be unequivocally ascertained, on what service they were meant to be employed.

One of the three cruisers might as occasion require proceed to the Island of Khen for water and refreshment, leaving the other two on the watch and cruising as before stated. I say the Island of Khen as a station from which the cruiser could return immediately to her consorts if wanted on emergency, as the prevailing winds (north-westerly) would enable the cruisers to navigate to and from the Island of Khen to the piratical ports at all seasons of the year, and if a small depot of stores with the gun-boats under the care of a marine officer (present master attendant at Kishm) and a detail of sepoys (say 20) could be kept at Khen for the refit and supply of those cruisers, they would be able to keep their cruising ground during the whole of these months in which the pirates would put to sea, were they to fit out vessels for that purpose. I therefore conceive that the distribution of the Honourable Company's cruisers in the Persian Gulf might be as follows :—*Three (one of each class) to cruise, and watch, in face of the piratical ports before mentioned. Two, for the purpose of navigating and giving convoy if required between Maskat and Bushire and Bussorah, and with despatches or for other purposes. One, to run to Bombay with packets, etc., as occasion may require.*

4. It is understood that there are doubts as to the right (according to the late treaty) of demanding to know for what purposes Nepals are building in the ports before mentioned, as also the right to destroy them on the stocks in the event of it appearing they are meant to be piratically employed. In such case it will scarcely be practicable to prevent their escaping to sea in the night, when no remedy can be applied, but by capture when they may be found at sea without the authorized papers and wearing the proper flag, in which case there should be four cruisers in front of the ports before mentioned instead of three, and it might be advisable to make trial of this measure for one season before the garrison was withdrawn.

5. As connected with this subject, I beg to state that it has been brought to my notice by Officers Commanding the E. I. Co.'s cruisers in the Gulf, that several instances have occurred of Nepals belonging to the ports before stated, having been found navigating without either the flag or documents as provided for in the 3rd and 5th articles of the Treaty concluded by Sir William Grant Keir, and that on said Nepals having been taken to Kishm, the Commanding officer did not feel himself authorized to detain them. I therefore respectfully suggest that the Chiefs of the aforesaid ports be cautioned not to suffer vessels to depart therefrom without the proper flag and documents before mentioned or otherwise vessels may be at sea whose aim may be piracy when opportunity offers.

258A. In Bombay Government letter No. 1706, dated 10th December 1821, Mr. Meriton was directed to issue the necessary orders to give effect to the arrangements suggested in his letter above quoted, and as regards the troops he was told the necessary orders would be passed on receipt of Dr. Juke's final reports.

1.10
The removal of the troops from Qishm and maritime control, November 1822–January 1823

CHAPTER XXXV.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE DETACHMENT FROM THE KISHM ISLAND.

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MARITIME CONTROL OVER THE PIRATE COAST.

RENDEZVOUS OF THE NAVY AT MOGOO BAY SHIFTED TO BASSIDORE–1822-1823.

292. The following instructions were issued on 20th November 1822 to the Senior Officer, Honourable Company's Marine in the Persian Gulph, for the arrangement and distribution of the force under his orders for guarding against piracies and being watchful of the vessels navigating those seas :—

Vol. 91 of 1822, p. 321.

It being intended *to bring down the garrison, and the whole of the British Establishment from the Island of Kishm to Bombay, as also to withdraw the Honourable Company's cruisers from that station, it has been deemed expedient to make the port of Muscat the general rendezvous for the Honourable Company's cruizers accordingly.*

As when the military force shall have left Kishm it will become doubly incumbent on the Honourable Company's marine not only to be watchful of those ports from which piratical vessels were formerly fitted but to be vigilantly alert in keeping down piracies in every part of the Persian Gulph, and in order more effectually to obtain this desirable end, it will be necessary to make *such a division of the cruisers as may be best calculated for the purpose.*

I therefore recommend the following arrangement as the most efficacious manner of employing the force under your orders.

Contemplating that you will have *six of the Honourable Company's cruisers for the service of the Persian Gulph (exclusive of the two surveying vessels).*

I conceive there should be three of the cruisers (one of each class) constantly cruizing off the Ports of Rumps, Rasselkyma, Shagra and Dubay, and that a fourth should be frequently out and in the Port of Muscat during those months that the pirates (if any) would put to sea.

That a fifth cruiser be passing from Muscat to Bushire and Bussorah in order to give convoy or convey despatches from the one port to the other.

And that the sixth vessel be sent to Bombay with despatches or other emergent occasion or for refit as might be required.

As the successfully guarding the Gulph and preventing piracies in that navigation will greatly depend and watchful observation of the movements of the inhabitants in the ports on the Arabian shore.

The Commanders of Cruisers should frequently repair to the ports of the Arabs who are parties to the Treaty negotiated by Sir William Keir, and land for the purpose of ascertaining how they conform to its stipulations and be careful to conduct themselves with the utmost degree of cordiality and conciliation towards the Chiefs. If any appearance of the renewal of piracy should manifest itself, he should in the first instance remonstrate with the Chief and require its discontinuance, failing in which, measures must be adopted for destroying any armed boats that may be found at the port, but no operation is under any circumstances to be carried on shore.

Should the Commander in his visits to the ports beforementioned observe any vessels building, or equipping which he may conceive of a suspicious description, he will report the circumstances to you and it must be your care to have a watchful eye over such port and prevent such vessel making her escape to sea maintaining a constant communication on all subjects of importance with the Political Agent in the Gulph.

On all occasions of examining vessels at sea to avoid delay or unnecessary interruption to the fair and licensed trader, and in cases where suspicion attaches, the crews should be treated with mildness and moderation unless by violence on their part they induce severity in part of the cruizers.

Should any vessel be detained on the grounds of her being piratically employed, immediate notice of the case with all its attendant circumstances should be communicated to the Political Agent in the Gulph and his sentiments obtained as to the disposal of such vessel, and you are yourself and all the Commanders of the Honourable Company's cruisers in the Gulph to attend to all instructions from the Resident in the Persian Gulph.

As it is most desirable that the marine force should be kept at all times as efficient as practicable, it is recommended that not more than one cruiser be sent to Bombay at the same time (unless on a case of emergency) and at the return to the Gulph of such cruiser the next in order of refit be sent when occasion may require.

You will be careful to keep me informed of your proceedings and those of the Honourable Company's cruizers under your orders from time as occasions may offer.

293. The correspondence printed below shows the measures taken in furtherance of the instructions of Government given above in their letter to the Resident, No. 1584, dated 12th November 1822, and the Instructions of 20th November 1822:—

Dated Bushire, the 13th February 1823.

From—Mr. F. Faithfull, Commander, Senior Marine Officer, Persian Gulph,

To—Henry Meriton, Esq., Superintendent of Marine.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of a letter received from the Resident in the Gulph, which, with the instructions received from you, have been my guide in framing the orders to the cruizers stationed off the piratical ports, copy of which orders I also inclose.

The Resident in the Gulph being ready to embark from Bassadore on the 12th of January he was received on board the *Ternate* and sailed for the piratical ports accompanied by the *Aurora* and *Antelope*.

On leaving Sharga the Resident wished to proceed between the Islands to Bidda and to communicate with the surveying vessels and then proceed to Bahrain, as this passage was quite unknown. I deemed it expedient to take a pilot at Sharga and discharge him at Bahrain.

It having become necessary *to fix on some port where the senior officer might be found not only to carry on the detail, but also to communicate readily with the Resident in the Gulph, I have chosen Mogoo Bay, as affording good anchorage, being near the piratical ports and directly in the track for ships passing up and down the Gulph*: should this arrangement be approved it will enable me to conduct with some certainty the movements of the cruisers on the Gulph station. At present I am subject to some inconveniences from not knowing where I may meet vessels coming from Bombay.

The cruisers are at present disposed of in the following manner: *Aurora* on cruise off Rump Rasalkhima, Zezerett Ul Humra and Amulgaween; *Antelope* on cruise off Aymaun Sharga, and Debai; *Mercury* I hope before this off Boothabee and adjacent Islands. *Teignmouth* disposed of by Captain French of His Majesty's sloop *Sophis* in Bussora River.

I shall remain at Bushire to water and refresh the crew of the *Ternate* until the 18th instant when I shall proceed first to Mogoo to establish a native agent there for the Resident in the Gulph and then join the vessels off the piratical coast and look particulary after Suadin Bin Zal. When these services shall have been performed I intend proceeding to Muscat to give the vessels and water casks a repair and to refit the rigging.

I have the pleasure to submit such observations as I have made on my late visit to the piratical ports accompanied by Lieutenant Macleod, Resident in the Gulph.

Dated Bassadore, the 10th January 1823.

From—I. Macleod, Resident, Persian Gulph,

To—The Senior Officer Commanding the Honourable Company's vessels in the Gulph of Persia.

As you are now about to carry into effect the instructions of Government for cruizing on the pirate coast, it becomes necessary that measures should be immediately adopted for *revising and renewing the registers* to be carried by the vessels of the Maritime Arabs who are parties to the treaty negotiated by Sir W. G. Keir.

2. You will in the first instance have the goodness to specify what size and description of vessels you consider it necessary and practicable to register, and it will be intimated to the different Chiefs that the registers of all such vessels must be immediately renewed, but that smaller boats are not required to be registered.

3. I would recommend that the officers stationed to cruise off the pirate ports should each be intrusted with the particular charge of a certain number of adjoining ports, so that the three cruisers should together embrace the whole of the pirate coast.

4. A list will be furnished by each Chief describing all his boats which require registry, whether he may wish for a register to enable them to go to sea at that time or not, I would then suggest that the registers should be granted in the following manner.

5. The Commander of the cruiser in charge of the particular port should either land himself or send an intelligent officer on shore to inspect the boats in person, and compare them with the Shaik's list, writing a description of each in English according to the usual form of the Register which he will keep for future information and forward a copy to you, the Chief will then furnish separate registers in Arabic, under his own seal, for such vessels as he may wish to send to sea during the year which will be compared and filed up below, and signed by the Commander of the cruiser, but the register shall not be valid until they shall have been countersigned either by you or by me, and must therefore be retained until your next visit, or returned to the Chief to be forwarded, as the case may be, for countersignature.

6. You are authorized to grant or refuse at your discretion all registers which may be applied for, in communication with the officer in charge of the particular port to which the boat may belong; and you will send a list or copy of all Registers which you may issue for my information in the event of any urgent case, in which a Chief may desire a register for a boat, which he wishes to despatch immediately for purposes evidently pacific and where delay would be seriously inconvenient, the officers on the cruising stations may be

authorized at their discretion to grant a temporary pass for the present voyage, until a regular register can be procured from you or me.

7. When circumstances require that any of the cruising vessels should leave her station the Commander will take an early opportunity on his return, of landing at each of the ports, or sending on shore to ascertain, what vessels may have sailed or arrived during his absence, and in the event of any having arrived without registers, he will warn the Shaik of the danger of his infraction of the treaty and report the occurrence to you or me, after making particular enquiry as to the circumstance of the case of each vessel.

8. The present registers to be held good until the new registers shall have been issued but no longer, excepting in the case of any vessels returning from trading voyages, on which they had previously sailed under their former passes, the registers will be valid for one year only, and will be renewed annually when the old register must be given up.

9. It is hoped that when the registers shall once have been issued as here recommended, no difficulties will occur in renewing them, and that the occasional inspection of the ports will enable every officer to give a pretty correct account at any time of all the boats belonging to each of the ports under his particular charge.

10. I am not yet prepared to furnish you with any more particular instructions on other points, than those which have been issued to you in the Marine Department, but I am particularly directed by Government to warn you against making any attack on Chiefs not piratical under the operation of the 9th paragraph of the Superintendent's last instructions, and you will therefore be careful to avoid committing hostilities in any case short of piracy.

11. Arrangements will, if possible, be made for providing a native agent at some of the principal ports, who will give you every information, assist in procuring occasional supplies, and also act as interpreter when required, in the meantime the officer may be authorized to employ for the time such persons as they may require to enable them to make out the necessary list of boats, the expense of which will be defrayed on their preferring a contingent bill through you.

Instructions to the Commanders of Cruisers stationed off the Piratical Ports.

You will in the cruiser under your command take under your inspection and watch the ports named in the margin.

You will apprise the Shaiks of these ports that it is necessary they should renew the registers of all boats excepting those employed for the purpose of fishing; and you should either land yourself or send an officer on shore, and require of the Shaik to furnish you with a list of all boats belonging to his ports, a copy of which should be kept on board and one sent to me.

The Shaiks having furnished their list and an English description of each boat from actual inspection written on it he (the Shaik) should then furnish separate registers in Arabic under his own seal for such vessels as he may require to send to sea for the year which you will compare and fill up and sign; but these registers are not to be valid until countersigned either by the Resident in the Gulph, or the Senior Marine officer, and must therefore be retained until my next visit to the coast; or until you are apprised that I am to be found in Magoo Bay; in the latter case the Shaik must send a boat over with the registers for countersignature.

In the event of any urgent case in which a chief may desire to send a boat to sea for purposes evidently pacific, and where delay would be seriously inconvenient, you are authorized to grant a register or pass for the particular voyage, which must be expressly stated in the register, and you are also at liberty to refuse a register to any boat that may appear to you suspicious, or likely to be improperly employed and to take the earliest opportunity of informing me of it.

When circumstances require that you quit your station either by stress of weather or for supplies, you are to take the earliest opportunity of ascertaining what boats have put to sea during your absence and require from the Shaik an account of all such, and should it appear to you that any boats have left the port for improper purposes, you are to warn the Shaik of the danger of his infraction of the treaty, and to report the occurrence to me or to the Resident in the Gulph should the opportunity be more convenient.

The present registers to be held good until the new register shall have been issued but no longer excepting in the case of any vessels returning from a trading voyage, on which they had previously sailed under their former passes.

The registers will be valid for one year only and will be renewed annually when the old registers must be given up.

On all occasions of examining vessels at sea delay should be avoided, and where suspicion attaches the crews should be treated with mildness and moderation unless by violence on their part they induce severity on yours, and should you detain any boat on the grounds of her being piratically employed, immediate notice of the case with all its attendant circumstances should be communicated to me for the information of the Resident in the Gulph, and you are required to attend to any instructions you may receive from him.

On your visits to the Chiefs parties to the treaty made by Sir William Grant Keir you are to preserve the present friendly footing and to treat them with the greatest degree of

cordiality and conciliation, and if any appearance of a renewal of piracy should manifest itself, you should remonstrate with the Chief and require its discontinuance, failing in which you are to report the circumstances fully, that measures may be adopted for destroying any armed boats; but no operations under any circumstances are to be carried on on shore.

The cruisers employed on this station are to be entirely separate in the control of the several ports entrusted to their charge, and to make their reports direct to the senior officer, and it is hoped that in a short time the Commanders will be well acquainted with the number of boats, men, etc., of the ports under their inspection possess and that they will be able to furnish the senior officer with the best information, as well as suggesting any measures that may appear to them as likely to prevent the occurrence of piracy.

When a cruiser shall be relieved on her station, she is to deliver over all papers, etc., connected with it, and to furnish the relieving officer with every information, as well as with a copy of these instructions.

An arrangement will, if possible, be made by the Resident in the Gulph for providing a native Agent at some of the principal ports who will give you every information, and assist in procuring you occasional supplies, and also act as interpreter when required; in the meantime you are authorised to employ such persons as you may require to enable you to make out the list of boats, and also to have such boats as may be absolutely necessary in visiting the back waters, the expense of which will be defrayed on your preferring a contingent bill on the Resident in the Gulph, through the senior officer.

When the *Mercury* arrives on the station she is to relieve the vessel most in want of provisions (either *Antelope* or *Teignmouth*) or in the event of joining the station before the *Teignmouth* she is to take charge of the ports named in the *margin* and to be furnished with a copy of these instructions.

In the event of a cruiser being obliged to leave her station and go to Muscat for supplies, it is expected there will be as little delay as possible but when regularly relieved greater extent of time will be permitted.

The senior officer intends to go to Mogoo immediately after landing the Resident at Bushire, but does not anticipate being there before the end of February, he will not make any stay at Mogoo but revisit this coast without delay.

F. FAITHFULL, *Commander,*
S. M. Officer, Persian Gulph.

H. C. C. TERNATE,
Off SHARGA;
The 19th January 1823.

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294. The above correspondence having been submitted by Mr. Meriton to the Government of Bombay, they entirely approved of the disposition of the cruisers made by Captain Faithfull, as well as the instructions issued to their Commanders. The selection of the *Mogoo Bay for establishing a native Agent on the part of the Resident in the Persian Gulf and as the place of rendezvous for the cruisers,* in their joining the senior officer, seemed to the Governor in Council under all circumstances to be judicious, and the Superintendent of the Marine was asked to direct the Commanders of all the cruizers bound to the Gulf from Bombay to proceed thither in the first instance (Bombay letter No. 351, dated 18th March 1823).

295. In forwarding to the Bombay Government certain despatches received from Sir Henry Willock, the Resident pointed out that Sir Henry had expressed his opinion *that our rendezvous in Mogoo Bay was likely to be received with great jealousy by the Persian Government, which was anxious to construe the 11th article of the Definitive Treaty into a stipulation that none of our ships of war could anchor in any Persian port without the express permission of that Government.*

Volume 37—132 of 1823.

A house had been engaged at Mogoo for a Public Store Depôt, but in their letter No. 1104, dated 10th September 1823, the Bombay Government directed the Resident to give it up if the Persian Government objected, and to make *Bassidore the rendezvous of the cruisers and obtain there a house for reception of marine stores.*

Ibid, page 476.

296. In October 1823, in view of the Persian objection to our making Mogoo Bay a rendezvous for our cruisers, the Bombay Government instructed Lieutenant McLeod not to establish the rendezvous of the cruisers again in the Persian territory without previously consulting His Majesty's representative at Teheran (letter No. 1126, dated 3rd October 1823).

Ibid, page 475.

1.11
The British Resident, 1822

CHAPTER XXXIV.

REMOVAL OF Mr. BRUCE AND APPOINTMENT OF LIEUTENANT MacLEOD AS RESIDENT AT BUSHIRE. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW RESIDENT AS TO THE BRITISH POLICY IN THE GULF—NOVEMBER 1822.

291. After the recent unathorized proceedings of Mr. Bruce, especially in connection with the treaty concluded by him with the Shiraz Government, Government had, as we have seen, to remove him from the Residency and appointed in his place *Lieutenant John McLeod*, who had been employed in various capacities in the recent expeditions on the Gulf. The instructions issued to him by the Bombay Government as to the line of policy to be followed by him on their letter No. 1584, dated 12th November 1822, is an important document and printed therefore at length below :—

Volume 91 of 1822, page 358.

The Honourable the Governor in Council having been under the necessity of removing Captain Bruce from the situation of Resident at Bushire, for the reasons stated in the enclosed copy of a correspondence with that officer, has been pleased to select you to succeed Captain Bruce under the designation of Resident in the Gulf of Persia.

2. In furnishing you with the necessary instructions for the regulation of your conduct, it is necessary to premise that they embrace two objects; one, immediate, arising out of the effect to be apprehended from Captain Bruce's unauthorized proceedings, and the other of a permanent nature connected with your office of Resident and the maintenance of the policy which it has been determined to pursue with the view of keeping down piracy in the Persian Gulf.

3. The powers whose reliance on our good faith are likely to be shaken and their alarms excited, by the agreement entered into by Captain Bruce, are the Imam of Maskat and the Uttubi tribe of Arabs in general, and especially the Shaik of Bahrein, an island which it has been an object equally with Persia and the State of Maskat to reduce and annex to its sovereignty, whilst a considerable degree of jealousy in establishing an ascendency over the Persian Gulf has long subsisted between those two Powers.

4. The effect of Captain Bruce's proceedings is calculated to impress the Imam of Maskat and the Shaik of Bahrein with an apprehension that, instead of observing *a perfect neutrality in the Gulf, and limiting our interference to a control of all measures likely to lead to a renewal of piracy* founded on Major-General Sir William Kier's treaties, we have thrown our whole influence in the scale in favor of Persia in support of its general views of supremacy over every island and possession in the Gulf of Persia.

5. The enclosed letters from the Honourable the Governor to the Imam of Maskat and the Shaikh of Bahrein are intended to remove any doubts or apprehensions which the conduct of Captain Bruce may have excited in that respect, it will be your duty to enforce on the conviction of those Chiefs the assurances contained in those letters; and of the determination of the British Government strictly to adhere to the line of policy it has observed in its relations towards the different powers in the Gulf, unaffected, in the slighest degree, by Captain Bruce's agreement which having been unauthorized and disavowed has of course no existence.

6. You will also explain *to them that our views are not at all changed by withdrawing our troops from Kishm which is to be restored to the Imam of Maskat as the power with whose permission we occupied it.*

7. The Governor in Council anticipates your experiencing a greater degree of difficulty in removing the dissatisfaction of the Prince of Sepiraz in the disavowal of an agreement so decidedly favourable to Persia than you will meet with in reconciling the Imam of Maskat and the Shaik of Bahrein to the integrity of our views.

8. Should you find His Royal Highness at all disappointed at our disavowal of Captain Bruce's agency on this occasion, you will express your regret that His Royal Highness did not demand from that officer his authority for proposing an agreement so much at variance with our policy before he directed his minister to enter into the negotiation. You will refer to the whole tenor of our communications to the Persian Government and of our conduct since the occupation of Kishm and our negotiations with the Arab States for proof that *the permanent suppression of piracy, and the conservation of the peace of the Gulf by the friendly interposition of our power and influence, has been alone the ruling principle of that*

policy. You will explain that it is our determination to persevere in that policy notwithstanding the removal of our troops from Kishm, which has been restored to the Imam of Maskat under whose sanction we occupied it; and that the pretensions to its sovereignty remain precisely in the same state as at the period when that sanction was granted.

9. The enclosed copy of a Minute by the Honourable the Governor and of the letters addressed to His Majesty's Envoy at Tehran and to Captain Bruce will make you fully acquainted with the circumstances connected with the claim to the value of some boats belonging to the Persian ports of Linga and Charrack which were captured by His Majesty's Navy in the last expedition on the ground of their being connected with the Joassmee pirates.

10. You will perceive the determination of the Governor in Council long since formed to compensate the owners; you will proceed to give effect to that determination in the mode already prescribed without any reference to the stipulation contained in Captain Bruce's agreement for that purpose, and in direct communication with the sufferers: should you experience any difficulty on the subject which a reference to the Envoy at Tehran may not remove, you will apply for further instructions to the Governor in Council.

11. With respect to the nature of your permanent *local functions at Bushire they are exclusively of a commercial character to protect the British trade against the exaction of higher rates of duty than have been fixed by the Government of Persia, and all merchant ships belonging to subjects of the British Government trading to the port of Bushire and all British subjects residing or trading under the protection of the British flag in the lawful prosecution of their commercial dealings.*

12. *Our relations with the Imam of Maskat*, where we have a native Agent, are best explained by the enclosed copy of an agreement negotiated with that State in 1798 by the late Mahomed Ali Khan and subsequently confirmed with Sir John Malcolm in 1800. It is also necessary to put you in possession of the correspondence between the Imam of Maskat and the Bombay Government and recently between His Highness and Captain Morseby of His Majesty's Ship Mendi respecting the abolition of the slave trade carried on by foreign European Powers.

13. I also enclose the copy of a correspondence with the Imam regarding the terms on which the Chiefs of the Beni Boo Ali Arabs have been permitted to return to Arabia, as the British Government is in some respect answerable for their personal safety.

14. There is nothing in our relations with Maskat that requires any special instruction, except the renewal on your part of an assurance that His Highness will continue to observe that friendly connection with the British Government which has hitherto proved reciprocally advantageous to the two States. It will, however, be essential that you should advise the Imam of Maskat, in whatever countenance or protection he may afford to Ramah bin Jauber, who was formerly Chief of Khore Hussen and notorious for his former depredations, if not on the British at least on other traders, to guard against his renewing his former courses or disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulf.

Hussan bin Rahmah, Chief of Hatt and Faleiz, late of Russul-Khyma, Razib bin Ahmed, Chief of Jezirat at Hannah.
Shakbout, Chief of Abou Dhabyu, Hussan bin Ali, Chief of Zyah, Mahomed bin Haza bin Jaal, Sheik of Dubey-Zaud bin Seyf, uncle of Sheik Mahomed Sultan bin Saggur, Chief of Shargah.
Seid Abdul Jalil bin Seid Yas-vakeel of Sheik Solymann bin Ahmed and Sheik Abdullah bin Ahmed, of the family of Khalifa Sheiks of Bahrein Rashid bin Hamid, Chief of Ejmar.
Abdullah bin Rashid, Chief of Uman-ul-Kowyn.

15. With the *Petty Arab States* enumerated in the margin Major General Sir William Keir entered into Treaties for the abandonment of piracy in the last expedition, to which they have hitherto satisfactorily adhered. You will receive from Lieutenant-Colonel Kennet the records of our proceedings with those States, from which, with the result of a personal communication with that officer, you will ascertain the nature of our intercourse with those principalities and the prospect there is of effecting a complete reformation in the piratical habits of the Chiefs.

16. It is necessary that you should have a personal interview with those Chiefs with the view of conciliating and confirming them in the disposition they have hitherto manifested to conform to their engagements: you will explain to them that a confidence in the continuance of that disposition has led us to withdraw our troops from Kishm which was from the first a temporary arrangement, that a squadron of cruizers will still be maintained in the Gulf to preserve its tranquillity, which will occasionally visit their posts to uphold the friendly intercourse that has been carried on since the conclusion of those treaties, and that you will yourself occasionally visit them with similar views.

17. You will hereafter be furnished with copy of the *instructions* under which the *maritime control* over the piratical ports is to be conducted on the removal of the force from Kishm. They will be sufficiently full and explicit and supersede the necessity for any further orders on this branch of your duty; you will, however, concert with Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett the best means of furnishing the Arab vessels with the *flags and papers prescribed by the general treaty*, and communicate the result to the Arab Chiefs concerned in their observance. They should be granted or renewed either by yourself or under your authority by the Officer Commanding the squadron whichever may prove the most convenient to the Arab traders: you will in fact consider and suggest the most effectual mode for enforcing the provisions of those treaties now that the control has been transferred from Kishm to Bushire. Should it be necessary to carry on offensive operations against any Chief who may show a

disposition to recur to piracy, they must be confined to the destruction of the boats and on no account be carried on on shore.

18. Those treaties you will observe are limited to the petty States in the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf. As the *Government of Persia has pledged itself to be answerable for the conduct of the Chiefs on the Persian side*, your vigilance and those of the Commanding Officers of cruizers must therefore be constantly exercised in observing their proceedings and should any piratical acts be committed by any boats or vessels belonging or resorting to those ports or should they adopt any measures directly tending to the revival of piracy, you will, on the fact, being fully established, represent the circumstance to the Government of Fars (to which all the possessions of Persia, including Bushire in the Persian Gulf, are immediately subordinate) and demand reparation, and should your representation lead to no satisfactory result, you will forward your proceedings to the British Envoy at Tehran and to the Governor in Council.

19. It is desirable that you should suggest a plan for securing authentic intelligence of the proceedings of the several Chiefs on the coast and a ready communication with them should they appear of a questionable character. You will adopt the plan at once if not attended with much expense. The mode in which the piratical Chiefs purchase their boats or materials for constructing them and the sources whence they are supplied with arms and ammunition for their equipment, it is also desirable to ascertain.

20. *With the political affairs of Persia, with its disputes with the Imam of Maskat or the different Powers in the Gulf, or the hostilities of these with each other unconnected with piracy, the Resident has no concern whatever, you will therefore maintain on the occurrence of any such disputes or national warfare the strictest neutrality.*

21. The Governor in Council is desirous that you should make yourself fully acquainted with the constitution of the different petty States into which both sides of the Persian Gulf are divided, the nature of their relation to each other or their subordination to any higher authority, either as tributaries or dependent branches of the sovereign State including the several islands in the Gulf, ascertaining and reporting any changes that may occur in the Chiefs either by death or otherwise, and the characters of their successors or any principality affecting its original relation with or dependence on another State; affording in fact a succinct history of each as events may arise.

22. Your personal salary has been fixed at rupees twelve hundred per mensem. ₹600 per mensem for a table and ₹600 for office establishment and house-rent including boats, crews and ₹150 contingencies exclusive of presents, the average amount of which for the last four or five years you will ascertain and limit your expenditure on that account accordingly. On your quitting your station to visit the different ports in the Gulf or proceeding on duty to Shiraz which may be necessary with the view of executing those instructions, you will draw rupees five hundred (₹500) per mensem as additional salary until your return. Your expenses by land or to the Commander of cruizers on which you may embark, being a separate charge. Should you have occasion to proceed to Shiraz in the execution of these instructions, you will report the circumstance to the Envoy at Tehran and be guided by any suggestions he may offer on the occasion.

23. The Superintendent of the Marine has been directed to furnish you with a suitable accommodation in my vessel under orders for the Gulf. You should proceed direct to Kishm or to Maskat in the first instance and regulate your measures according as you may ascertain to be the effect of Captain Bruce's negotiations, should they not have been promulgated nor any alarm been excited in the Gulf by a knowledge of the terms, it would be advisable that you should repair to Bushire and receive charge of the Residency and after entering into the prescribed explanation with the Prince of Shiraz in disavowing the agreement, carry into effect the other part of these instructions having relation to Maskat, Bahrein, and the Arab States which are parties to Sir William Keir's treaty.

1.12
The appointment of a British Agent at Sharjah, 1825

4 of 3

No 6 of 1825

Political Department
2 July 1825

To

The Hon^ble the Court of Directors
of Affairs of the Hon^ble United Com-
-pany of Merchants of England
trading to the East Indies.

London.

Hon^ble Sirs

Our last letter in
this Department was dated the 22^d of
June.

Persian Gulph 2

The Triennial reports
received from the Resident in the Persian
Gulph since our last General report
on the state of affairs in that quarter
(Letter to the Court 11^th January 1824)
will be found to afford a very satis-
-factory

Pol[l] Consul: 1823
24th December Vol: 7152
" " 1824.
17. to March. Folio 1138
12. to May " 2345
2d June " 2725
8. September " 3980
20. October " 4570

satisfactory view of its general tran-
=quillity and the increase of com-
=mercial intercourse among the
different Tribes inhabiting its Coast
particularly in the Southern part
of the Gulph, where nothing has
tended to disturb its repose, unlike
the late disputes which have arisen
between the Imaum of Muscat
& Sultan Bin Saggar regarding the
Towers of Rhymee which will be
hereafter noticed.—

[...]

543

[...]

Political Agents to be appointed

The President has
succeeded in placing his Agents at
almost all the Ports where they
appeared to be required, and they
must at all times prove useful
auxiliaries in observing and contrau-
=ling the seeds of dissension in the
Gulph.—

4th The station of
Sharjah, the Chief residence of Sultan
Bin Saggar, seemed to demand the
presence of a person of more than
ordinary talents and respectability
and Mirza Ali Khan was accord-
=ingly

Pol[l] Consul: 1824
23 June Vol 3263

accordingly selected by Colonel Hannas for this duty with a superior Salary of Rupees 150 per Mensem - The appointment of an Agent at Sharjah was by no means palatable to the ambitious and intriguing character of Sheikh Sultan, and it was not long before the Agent represented that his motions were strictly watched, his friends prohibited from visiting him and that he himself, although exempt from
Fol: 401 2 actual ill usage, was not treated with the slightest respect or attention - A remonstrance from the Resident to Sheikh Sultan obtained however a different treatment - Lieutenant Colonel Hannas

545

Hannas has since found it necessary to remove Reeza Ali and place at Sharjah another person more capable of contending with the caprices of the Sheikh -

47 Lieutenant Colonel Hannas in his letter of the 24th March reported the particulars of an act of piracy, said to have been committed by two Boats belonging to Sharjah - These Boats had left the Gulph & were stated to have captured a Bagla near Soohra belonging to the Imaum of Muscat, put to death every person on board & then proceeded towards Zanzebar -

[...]

Transcription of previous document

Political Department
2 July 1825

To

The Honble the Court of Directors
For Affairs of the Honble United Company of Merchants of England
Trading to the East Indies
London

Honble Sirs

Our last letter in this Department was dated the 22nd of June.

The several reports received from the Resident in the Persian Gulph since our last general report on the state of affairs in that quarter (Letter to the Court 14th January 1824) will be found to afford a very satisfactory view of its general tranquillity and the increase of commercial intercourse among the different tribes inhabiting its coast, particularly in the southern part of the Gulph, where nothing has tended to disturb its repose, until the late disputes which have arisen between the Imaum of Muscat & Sultan Bin Suggur regarding the Towers of Brymee which will be hereafter noticed.

(...) The Resident has succeeded in placing his Agents at almost all the Ports where they appeared to be required, and they must at all times prove useful auxiliaries in observing and controling the seeds of dissension in the Gulph.

The station of Sharga, the chief residence of Sultan Bin Suggur, seemed to demand the presence of a person of more than ordinary talents and respectability and Ruzza Ali Khan was accordingly selected by Colonel Stannus for this duty with a superior salary of Rupees 150 per mensem. The appointment of an Agent at Sharga was by no means palatable to the ambitious and intriguing character of Sheikh Sultan, and it was not long before the Agent represented that his motions were strictly watched, his friends prohibited from visiting him and that he himself, although exempt from actual ill usage, was not

treated with the slightest respect or attention. A remonstrance from the Resident to Sheikh Sultan obtained however a different treatment. Lieutenant Colonel Stannus has since found it necessary to remove Ruzza Ali and place at Sharga another person more capable of contending with the caprices of the Sheikh.

Lieutenant Colonel Stannus in his letter of the 24th March reported the particulars of an act of piracy, said to have been committed by two boats belonging to Sharga. These boats had left the Gulph and were stated to have captured a Bugla near Socotra belonging to the Mehra Tribe, put to death every person on board and then proceeded towards Zanzeebar.

The shaikhdoms of the coast

1.13
Chronological table of events, 1730–1843

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

CONNECTED WITH

THE GOVERNMENT OF MUSKAT,

FROM THE YEAR 1730 TO 1843;

WITH

THE JOASMEE TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1765 TO 1843;

WITH

THE UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS (BAHREIN),

FROM THE YEAR 1716 TO 1844;

WITH

THE WAHABEE TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1795 TO 1844;

WITH

THE BENIYAS TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1793 TO 1843;

AND WITH

THE DEBAYE (BOO FELASA) TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1834 TO 1843.

THE WHOLE PREPARED, IN THE YEAR 1844, BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,

ASSISTANT RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1730-35	The Persians are driven out of Oman by Ahmed bin Saeed, the Governor of Sohar, who is elected Imaum.
1769	The Muskatees boldly and peremptorily refuse the demand of Persia for tribute.
1770	A large fleet, with troops, sails against Bushire, but the ships, dispersing, return to Muskat.
1774	Efforts to negotiate a peace between the Imaum and Persia fail, the former considering the conditions proposed disgraceful.
1775	A Muskat fleet proceeds to relieve Bussora, besieged by the Persians. It defeats the Bushire boats, and becomes master of the river, but the town being compelled ultimately to surrender, returns to port.
1797	Syud Sultan, the second son of Syud Ahmed, succeeds to the Imaumship, usurping the authority of his elder brother, the rightful heir, and confining him to the city of Bombae, and its immediate vicinity, the usual residence of the Imaum.
12th Oct. 1798	An engagement is entered into by the Imaum with the British Government, to exclude the French and Dutch from having any factory within his territories, or at Gombroon; to prevent the ships of the former nation entering the cove; and to dismiss the French, who were at the time, and had been for many years, in his service.
28th Nov.	The Imaum, with a view the more effectually to prosecute his hostile intentions against Bussora, on account of some ancient claims on the Pasha of Bagdad, negotiates a peace with his formidable enemy the Joasmee Chief. Through

MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
	the mediation of the British Resident, the usual friendly intercourse between the Pasha and the Imaum is however restored.
A. D. 1799	The Imaum, sailing with a large fleet to attack the Uttoobees, and reduce Bahrein, seizes the only three vessels belonging to them. The Uttoobees apply for aid to Shaikh Nassir of Bushire, who proceeds to Bahrein, and receives the tribute for 1798. The Imaum, in return, by means of intrigues, obtains possession of the island of Karrack. He amicably adjusts matters with the Uttoobees, and the Shaikh of Bushire, and returns to Muskat.
1800	Colonel Malcolm, touching at Muskat on his embassy to Persia, enters into an agreement, in confirmation of that of 1798, with the Imaum, who was supposed to have favoured the intrigues of the French.
	The Imaum proceeds towards Ras-ool-Khyma, where he joins Shaikh Suggur, with a view to oppose the threatened invasion of Oman by the Wahabees, which is, however, averted by the conclusion of a peace.
1801	The Imaum accomplishes his favourite object of reducing Bahrein. The Uttoobees, however, retake it in a few months.
1803	The Wahabee influence and power having greatly increased, the Imaum, unable to check its progress, accedes to a truce of three years with them. The Wahabee ruler, returning from his victorious career on the western frontier of Arabia (to allow of his prosecuting which the truce had been formed), now, in violation of the same, prepares to attack Oman by land and sea. The conquest of the province was arrested by the murder of the Wahabee Shaikh, Abdool Azeez, early in the month of November.
14th Nov. 1804	Syud Sultan is killed in an engagement with the Uttoobees, joined by the Joasmees, off the bar of Bussora river. Another account has it that he was killed by some Aza Arabs (a branch of the Joasmee Tribe), while going on shore at Kishm.
	The administration of affairs devolves upon his two sons, who being young and unprotected, their pretensions are disputed by their uncle, Shaikh Ghes, of Sohar, who aims at the usurpation of the government.

MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1804	The management of affairs is entrusted by the two sons to Syud Beder, their cousin, who, with the Wahabee Chief's assistance, defeats Ghes.
1805	Syud Beder recovers Bunder Abbas and Ormus, of which places the Shaikh of Kishm, availing himself of the troubles that had ensued on the death of the late Imaum, had possessed himself.
1807	Syud Saeed, the second son of the late Imaum, who had now succeeded Syud Beder, defeats an expedition against Mukran by the Joasmee pirates.
1808	An attack by the Imaum against Khore Fukaun fails, in consequence of the treacherous desertion of an auxiliary Chief of the Fajarah Tribe. The Imaum narrowly escapes to his ship, and Syud Ghes loses his life in the affray, and is succeeded by his son Azan.
	The Wahabees establish their influence at Muskat, and commence to propagate by violence the tenets of their particular sect. Some instances of oppression on their part, indeed the common danger, reunited the Shaikhs of Oman, who determine on a vigorous resistance to Saood.
1809	An expedition was despatched by the British Government, for the protection of Muskat against the Wahabees, in order that a well disposed ally might not be converted into a dangerous enemy, through their influence and compulsion; and for the suppression of the Joasmee pirates. (Vide Joasmees.)
1811	The Imaum's brother sails on an expedition against Bahrein and Zobara. The latter is taken, plundered, and levelled with the ground. The troops and battering train are landed on the former, where the brother of the governor, and the Duryah Begee of the Wahabee fleet, with fifteen of their principal officers, are made prisoners.
1813	An expedition by the Imaum against Ras-ool-Khyma, for the purpose of reinstating Sultan bin Suggur, fails.
1814	A second expedition had started, when the chiefs and inhabitants send a mediator to him, to solicit peace, which the Imaum grants, and returns to the island of Ormus.
1815	The Imaum's fleet is beaten off by the Joasmee fleet, and his frigate, the *Caroline*, nearly taken. He returns to Muskat,

MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
	and, having refitted, again puts to sea after the Joasmees, whom he chases into Ras-ool-Khyma.
A. D. 1815	The Imaum, accompanied by boats from the coast of Persia, attacks Bahrein, but is signally defeated. He proceeds to Congoon for a Persian reinforcement, for the purpose of renewing the attack. Discovering the treachery of the Persian Government, who contemplate the seizure of himself and the different Arab Chiefs, he quits the coast, and the expedition is abandoned.
1816	The Imaum blockades Ras-ool-Khyma for four months, but is unable to effect anything against it.
1819	The Imaum co-operates with the British expedition, under Sir W. Grant Keir, against the piratical ports.
Nov. 1820	The Imaum, in concert with a British detachment from Kishm, under the political and military control of Captain Thompson, attacks the Beni Boo Ali Tribe of Jaalan. The combined force is defeated. The whole proceedings entirely disapproved by Government.
Mar. 1821	A large detachment is despatched from Bombay against the Beni Boo Ali Tribe, defeats them, killing five hundred of their number, and taking the rest prisoners, and blows up the works and defences of their town.
1823-24	The Beni Boo Ali prisoners (who were taken to Bombay) restored to their former seats and residences, and 25,000 German crowns advanced by Government, to enable them to repair and rebuild their dwellings.
1826	The Imaum intercepts the Shaikh of Bushire on his return from Mecca, and captures his two vessels, having previously captured the *Noosrut Shah*, also belonging to the Shaikh.
	The Imaum blockades Bussora, but shortly withdraws his fleet, on his claims being adjusted.
May 1827	Shaikh Abdool Russool, Governor of Bushire, restored to liberty, and his two vessels also given up to him, on his giving a bond for 80,000 German crowns.
July.	The Imaum marries the daughter of the Prince of Shiraz.
Nov. 1828	The Imaum, accompanied by Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, and a body of the Beniyas Tribe, attacks Bahrein, and is defeated, with considerable loss, being himself slightly wounded. The failure was attributable to the imprudence or treachery of the Beniyas' allies.

MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1829	A small vessel, belonging to Mr. Shipton, a British subject, is attacked and plundered on her way from the Red Sea by some dependents of the Imaum. His Highness obtains satisfaction from the pirates, and affords redress to the Government.
	The British merchant ship *Oscar*, having run ashore off the Coast of Jaalan, is plundered of her cargo by the Beni Boo Ali and Beni Boo Hussain Tribes, to the amount of eight lakhs of rupees. Five vessels proceed to that quarter, and partial redress is obtained.
Dec.	The Imaum invites Syud Hullal, the Governor of Soweik, to Muskat, and treacherously seizes and detains him a prisoner. He then sails for his African possessions.
1830	Syud Hullal's sister harasses the Imaum's territories, and Syud Humood bin Azan bin Ghes recovers from the Imaum his patrimony of Sohar. The safety of Muskat is compromised, and that town is saved by the intervention of the British Government.
	The Imaum returns to Muskat, and attacks Sohar, but fails to reduce it; is compelled to come to terms with Syud Humood, who agrees to pay tribute, retaining the districts of Khizza, Khaloora, Markies, and Sohar. Shinas and Ghillal are restored to His Highness, who liberates Syud Hullal, and permits him to return to Soweik.
1831	The Imaum, accompanied by the Shaikh, and a force from Ejman, attacks Sohar: having rejected the alliance of the Beniyas, they join his opponents; and his allies, the Beni Naeem of Ejman, treacherously turning against him, he is defeated, and compelled to patch up a peace with the Sohar Chief, upon nearly the same terms as the former.
1832	The Imaum, having collected a force of Beloochees, quits Muskat for his African possessions, leaving his son, Syud Hullal bin Saeed, and nephew, Mahomed bin Salim, as his representatives at Muskat.
	Shortly after his departure, the persons left in charge of the Government, proceeding to Burka, are confined as prisoners there by its Chief, Saood bin Ali, who proceeds immediately against Musnaah, held by the mother of Mahomed bin Salim, but fails to reduce it. Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, and Hullal bin Imaum, of Soweik, taking advantage

MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
	of the disturbed state of affairs, prepare to attack Rastag, and other inland places in the Imaum's territory. Sultan bin Suggur seizes Khore Fukaun, Khulla, and Dibbah, ports on the Batinah Coast. The British Government, determined upon upholding the Imaum's Government, and preserving the integrity of his dominions, despatch a naval force to Muskat, to support the local Government, and check the designs of their enemies, and the Resident addresses letters of remonstrance to the several invading chiefs.
A. D. 1832	The Imaum returns to restore order. The British Government declines to interfere to compel the Joasmee Chief to give up the towns of which he had taken possession during his absence.
1833	The Imaum, with the cognisance of the British authorities, enters into closer connection with the Wahabees; agrees to pay 5,000 German crowns as Zukat. A further engagement is formed, fixing the limits of the territories of each according as they then existed, and binding the parties reciprocally to assist in putting down any rebellions which might arise in their respective dominions. The execution of the last act the Imaum declared to the British Government should depend upon its views and wishes.
	A cruel piracy, committed on a Kutch Nowry off Zanzibar, is traced by His Highness to some Beni Hajir of Soor. He seizes and places the offenders at the disposal of the Resident, as also an individual who had been one of the chief actors in the piracy on a Dutch brig in 1829, who had hitherto evaded detection. The latter is sent to Bombay, but escapes punishment, from the absence of evidence to convict him.
1834-35	A further exertion of British influence becomes necessary, to check the designs of aggrandisement on the part of Humood bin Azan, who had taken possession of Rastag, and threatened other places. He is informed, that by committing further aggressions against the territories of the Imaum he would incur the penalty of being considered an enemy of the British Government. This has not the full effect. He attacks Soweik, and partially gains possession of the town, but is shortly driven out, with some loss. The

MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
	Muskat authorities imprudently invite the Piratical Arab Tribes to their assistance.
A. D. 1836	The Imaum enters into engagements with Syud bin Mootluk, the Wahabee Agent, with a view to the expulsion of Humood bin Azan from the places of which he had illegally and forcibly obtained possession. The combined forces invest Sohar by land and sea, but the Imaum learning that, in the event of the place falling, the Wahabee Agent meditated retaining and garrisoning it in the name of his master, separates from his ally, and relinquishes the expedition. He shortly after proceeds to his African possessions.
1837	The Imaum, principally through the assistance and gallant behaviour of Esai bin Tarif, and his dependents, succeeds in reducing Mombassa, which had revolted from his authority.
1839	The Imaum returns from Africa in September, and is guided by the advice and views of the British Government in his intercourse and relations with the Egyptians. The letters of their Agents receive no attention. He exhorts and encourages the Brymee Shaikhs to unite and maintain their independence against the invaders.
	The Imaum threatens to send a force to attack Bushire, in consequence of the murder of his Agent, a Persian subject, in that town, on his return from Teheran, where he had been with a view to negotiate a marriage between His Highness and one of the Persian Princesses.
	A reconciliation is effected between the Imaum and Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, through the mediation of the British Resident.
1840	Captain Hamerton appointed British Agent at Muskat; is subsequently created a Consul by the Home Government, and directed to establish himself at Zanzibar.
	The blockade of the ports held by the Egyptians being contemplated, the Imaum places his vessels at the disposal of the British Government, whenever required.
	His Highness returns to Zanzibar.
	Humood bin Azan visits Bombay, and is received with all suitable respect and attention by the British Government.
1841	Shortly after his return from Bombay, Humood bin Azan furnishes proof of the sincerity of his friendship with the

MUSKAT—JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	Imaum, by preparing cordially to aid the authorities of Muskat against a rebellious chief, who is in consequence induced to return to his allegiance.
A. D. 1842	A piracy, attended with murder, is committed by six Nujdees of Muskat, who had been lately dismissed from the service of the Imaum, upon a Kishm boat, in which they had taken passage. The pirates are discovered at Cheeroo, and handed over to the British authorities, who subsequently send them, agreeably to instructions from Government, to Muskat, with a desire that they might be made to suffer adequate punishment.
1843	The authorities of Muskat supply Esai bin Tarif and his colleagues with ammunition and military stores, but decline taking any active interference in their contest with Bahrein, without the sanction of His Highness, who refers them for the sentiments of the British Government on the subject. These were opposed to his taking part in the civil war.
	A force, sent by the Imaum against his rebellious subjects of Sevee, is defeated, with great slaughter.

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1765	The Joasmees, called in to aid the Governor of Ormus, Gombroon, and Minao, in resisting the unjust levy of tribute on the part of the Persian Government, take possession of the towns of Kishm, Luft, Lingah, and Shinas (on the Persian Coast). Kishm and Luft are subsequently recovered by the Persian Government.
1777	Shaikh Rashid, of Ras-ool-Khyma, resigns the Shaikhdom in favour of his son, Suggur.
1780	Shaikh Suggur, failing to negotiate a peace between the Persians and Uttoobees, who had taken and plundered Bahrein, joins Shaikh Nassir of Bushire in an expedition for the recovery of the island. These attempts for reducing Bahrein are repeatedly made, and not abandoned until 1785.

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1797	The Joasmees seize the *Bassein Snow*, a British vessel, charged with public despatches, but release her two days after.
October.	The Joasmees, after having by professions of friendship, &c. procured ammunition from the *Viper* cruiser, treacherously attack that vessel in Bushire Roads, but are beaten off.
1803	Shaikh Suggur dying, is succeeded by his son, Sultan.
1805	Wahabee influence and authority lead to the vigorous renewal of piracy. The Joasmees capture two British vessels, the *Shannon* and *Trimmer*, and a fleet of forty sail surround and fire into the *Mornington* cruiser, but are compelled to sheer off.
	A Joasmee fleet is blockaded at Kishm by a combined British and Muskat force, and is reduced to such distress as to solicit a peace. The *Trimmer* was restored, the *Shannon* having been previously given up, completely stripped.
1806	An agreement is entered into between the British Government and the Joasmees, dated 6th February. It does not appear to have been negotiated with the consent, or even the knowledge, of the Wahabee Shaikh.
1807	The Joasmees join Syud Beder, the Imaum, against Syud Ghes, of Sohar.
1808	Precluded by the Treaty of 1806 to carry on their cruises in the Gulf, the Joasmees, urged and instigated by the Wahabees, extend them to India; and, rendered independent of their lawful Shaikh, Sultan, by the Wahabee ruler, send out their boats without his permission, and capture twenty country craft on the coast to the northward of Bombay.
20th Oct.	They commit a breach of the Treaty of 1806, and attack and capture the *Sylph* cruiser in the Gulf. She is immediately retaken by His Majesty's frigate *Nereid;* which heaves in sight.
1809	The Persians from Lar attack Lingah and Charrak, and compel the Joasmees to retire to Bassadore.
	The Joasmees defeat a fleet of Bushire boats, destined for the attack of Khor Hassan.
	The Wahabee Chief appoints Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, and Shaikh of Ramse, his vicegerent in the Seer principality, vesting him with authority over Ras-ool-Khyma, and nominates Wahabee officers throughout the Joasmee country. Invites Shaikh Sultan to Deriah, and detains and imprisons him. Shaikh Sultan contrives to escape from prison, and, finding his way to Yemen, embarks at Mocha, and proceeds to Muskat. The Imaum takes him to Shargah, and places him over the Joasmee Tribe at that place, Shaikh Sultan occasionally living at Lingah.
A. D. 1809	The British Government, determining to relieve the Imaum from the power of the Wahabees, and to suppress their piracies, despatch an expedition to the Gulf.
13th Nov.	Ras-ool-Khyma, vigorously attacked by sea and land, is taken, after a bloody resistance. The town, with the vessels in port, amounting to upwards of fifty, with the English prize ship *Minerva*, burnt.
	The expedition then proceeds to Lingah, and destroys twenty Dows; thence, after passing Congoon, Bunder Mullim, and Homeram, to Luft. The town is soon occupied, but all attempts to carry the fort by storm fail. The bombardment continued.
	The fort is surrendered, together with property to the amount of two lakhs of rupees, belonging to the Imaum, which, with the fort, are handed over to His Highness.
1st Jan. 1810	Shinas attacked by the combined British and Imaum's forces. After an obstinate and sanguinary resistance, the fort surrenders, and is made over to His Highness; but now in so ruined a state that it cannot be occupied.
1812	The pirates reappear in the beginning of this year, and destroy several large Native craft, belonging to Bussora and Congoon. Boats carrying British colours do not escape, and others are detained at Porebunder, and prevented from prosecuting their mercantile pursuits.
1813	An expedition by the Imaum against Ras-ool-Khyma, with the view of reinstating Sultan bin Suggur, fails.
1814	A second expedition this year, for a similar purpose, terminates in a peace concluded between the Imaum of Muskat and the Joasmees, to which Shaikh Suggur is compelled to become a party.
1814-15	The Joasmees commit many depredations upon the Indian trade, and insult the British flag, by plundering and retaining a boat, despatched by the British Resident on the faith of an engagement entered into early in the year 1814.

JOASMEES.

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1815	The Joasmees engage and defeat the Imaum's fleet, and nearly take the *Caroline* frigate, of 32 guns (Imaum's). They capture also a British vessel from Bombay, put the greater portion of her crew to death, and exact ransom for the release of the remainder.
1816	The Joasmees attack the *Aurora* cruiser, and fire at the ship *Persia*, and *Cintra* schooner. They take three vessels belonging to Surat, and murder many of their crews: the loss of property by this capture estimated at ten lakhs of rupees. Many other captures made of British vessels, under circumstances of similar atrocity; and finally the British armed boat *Turrarow*.
1817	A small squadron of Joasmee boats proceeds to Busheab: the crew land, burn, and pillage the villages on the western part of the island, and carry off all the cattle, killing great numbers of the inhabitants.
1817-18	They enter the harbour of Aseeloo, and take five large laden Buggalows, valued at three lakhs of rupees, and murder their crews. They proceed to Congoon, but, finding the place prepared to receive them, weigh, and proceed to Daire, where they land, and destroy a number of date trees. They are repulsed, however, by the inhabitants, and compelled to take to their boats. The greatest consternation of the Joasmees inspired throughout the Gulf.
1819	Ras-ool-Khyma taken by the British troops, under Sir W. G. Keir, 9th December. Hussain bin Ramah and Guzeeb bin Ahmed, the chiefs, surrender at discretion. The other chiefs on the coast tender unqualified submission to the British General.
8th Jan. 1820	A general Treaty of peace concluded with the maritime chieftains, its object the suppression of piracy, and security to trade. A separate agreement is entered into with Hussain bin Ali, the former Wahabee vicegerent, for the surrender of all his vessels (excepting the fishing-boats), the release of all Indian captives, and the occupation of the towns of Ras-ool-Khyma and Moharra by the British troops. A similar agreement also with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, for the surrender of the towers, guns, and vessels of Shargah, Ejman, Amulgavine, and their dependencies, stipulating that British troops should not enter the towns or lay them waste.

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1820	Ras-ool-Khyma is garrisoned by a detachment of British troops, which is, however, removed to Kishm on 18th July, when the defences are dismantled, and destroyed.
1823	Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur claims general supremacy over all the Joasmee ports. The British Government recognise the assumption of this authority on his part in as far only as it is acknowledged and obeyed by the several chiefs. Ejman in the first instance refuses, but subsequently tenders allegiance to him.
	The Shaikh of Ramse is deposed by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and succeeded by Mahomed Abdool Rahman, the son of a former Shaikh, who had been removed by Hussain bin Ali (the Wahabee vicegerent).
	Shaikh Guzeeb bin Ahmed, of Jazirat-ool-Hamrah, dies, and is succeeded by Shaikh Mahzem bin Abdool Rahman; who, dying, is succeeded by his son, Mahomed; who, giving umbrage to the Joasmee Chief, is removed by him, and Ahmed bin Abdoolla established in his room.
1824	A piracy, attended with cruelty, is committed by two Shargah boats upon a Buggalow belonging to Socotra. A strict watch being kept, in order to seize them on their return, one is abandoned by its crew at Charrak, and the other takes refuge at Muttra, where, having remained unmolested for several months, no further steps are taken regarding it.
	The Joasmee Chief opens a communication with the Wahabees, who had lately obtained considerable successes over the Turks, assigning self-preservation as his motive.
1824-25	Owing to the intriguing and faithless conduct of the Joasmee Chief, hostilities arise between him and Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, and are the occasion of various irregularities. An amicable adjustment is effected in October, through the influence of the Imaum.
1827	Hostilities again break out between the Joasmees and Beniyas, the latter having seized Debaye; but a peace is soon concluded.
1828	A most atrocious and cruel piracy is committed by a Joasmee boat, under one Mooslim bin Rashid, upon a Sohar boat, which, after plundering, he scuttles. The Resident remonstrates, and Mooslim, with the greater part of his crew, are made prisoners, after a sharp action, by a boat

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	sent in pursuit by the Joasmee Chief, who subsequently puts Mooslim to death. The pirate vessel, with all the plundered cargo recovered, is given up to the Imaum.
A. D. 1829	The British ship *Sunbury* visiting Shargah, her Captain and crew are ill-treated, in consequence of her meditating to visit Aboothabee, with which place the Joasmees are at war; an insult is further offered, in pulling down the flag. Sultan bin Suggur affords satisfaction, by burning the first boat that boarded the *Sunbury*, and flogging the individual who hauled down the flag.
1831	The Joasmee Chief, receiving a subsidy from the Imaum, promises him his aid against Sohar; but, with his usual want of faith, fails in performance. The Shaikh of Ejman, similarly subsidised, joins His Highness, but, on the defeat of the troops of the latter, declaring in favour of the people of Sohar, treacherously turns his arms against his late allies. His town and date groves are plundered and injured, during his absence, by a party of Beniyas, sent by Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee.
	Hostilities are in consequence declared between the Joasmees and Beniyas, but through the mediation of Mahomed bin Guzeeb, of Lingah, a peace is again concluded.
	Sultan bin Suggur intimates his intention of declaring war against the Imaum of Muskat, and of immediately commencing hostilities. Previous to the receipt of an answer from the Resident, and to the arrival of the British naval force at Muskat, to the assistance of the existing Government, he, by surprise or treachery, obtains possession of the ports of Khore Fukaun, Khulla, and Dibbah, on the Coast of Batinah. Rashid bin Humeed, of Ejman, commits daring depredations upon the trade of Sohar and Muskat.
	Some Joasmee boats take advantage of the defenceless state of many of the places near Bushire, in consequence of the plague, plunder the towns of Bunder Dillum and Bunder Reigh, and likewise a boat returning from Congoon to Bushire.
1832	Called upon to afford redress for the outrages committed by the dependents of the Shaikh of Ejman, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur distinctly disavows any authority over that chief.

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	He had before by letter disclaimed the exercise of any control over the Shaikh of Amulgavine.
A. D. 1832	Shaikh Rashid, of Ejman, on a naval force appearing before his port, affords the required redress, on account of the plunder of Muskat and other vessels (not including those of Sohar, with which place he was at war).
Nov. Dec.	A large fleet of Joasmee vessels, under the command of Sultan bin Suggur in person, come to Bushire, with a view to assist Shaikh Nassir, the hereditary Governor of Bushire, who had been ejected by the Shiraz authorities, and had instituted a blockade of the port. According to previous agreement, the plunder of the place was to have been the reward of a successful attack.
	The Joasmees are prevented by the British authorities from carrying out their intention.
1833	A trifling act of piracy, but indicative of their disorderly and plundering spirit, is committed by a Joasmee boat, whose crew carries off from Corgoo some small portion of a tent belonging to the British Residency establishment, who had made that island the place of their sojourn during the plague. A vessel of war is despatched after the boat, and coming up with it at Mohumrah, demands and obtains the surrender of the delinquents, and plundered property, and brings them to Bushire, where, the object having been gained, they are immediately released.
1833-34	Sultan bin Suggur is defeated in his attack upon Aboothabee. He returns with his fleet, accompanied by the boats of Lingah, Ejman, and Debaye, and blockades the place, where parties of his dependents and allies cut off the supplies by land. Both sides, much distressed, and deprived of the benefits of the pearl fishery, are glad to conclude a peace, which is mediated by Syud bin Guzeeb, the Shaikh of Lingah.
	The influence of the Wahabees in favour of the Beniyas is insufficient to prevent these proceedings on the part of the Joasmees.
1835	Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur proceeds with a large fleet to his possessions on the Batinah Coast, ostensibly for the purpose of assisting the authorities of Muskat in their civil broils (agreeable to the desire of the Imaum, on his leaving for his

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	African possessions), but really to avail himself of the disturbed state of affairs to promote his own interests at the expense of either party. His fleet plunder not only the boats of Sohar and Muskat, but neutral vessels. For these last he is compelled by the British Government to make reparation; but the Muskat Government, fearing to incur his more decided enmity, and perhaps turn him over to the cause of their opponent, Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, overlook, and even sanction his proceedings.
A. D. 1835	The Shaikhs of Ras-ool-Khyma, Ejman, and Amulgavine, become parties to the Maritime Truce.
1837	Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur applies for permission to go to the aid of the Shaikh of Towarah, who was at feud with the Shaikh of Soweik, both places on the Persian Coast, which is, on the grounds of his engagements, and for other reasons, refused.
	The people of Heera, a Joasmee dependency, commit a piracy upon a Bunder Abbas boat. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur of his own accord compels full restitution of the property, and punishes the perpetrators.
1838	Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur supersedes his brother Saleh in the government of Shargah, and appoints his son, Suggur, in his room.
	Rashid bin Humeed, of Ejman, dies, and is succeeded by his son, Humeed.
	Two piracies are committed by two Joasmees, brothers, named Sultan and Mahomed bin Sohar; the one on a Karrack boat, having on board a Chaab subject, on his way to Mohumrah, with much property, the other on a Batinah boat. Sultan is discovered and seized at Lingah, and placed at the disposal of the Resident, who sends him to Shaikh Samur, the Chief of Chaab. Mahomed, and the Nakhoda of his boat, take refuge at Ejman, but are given up on demand. Having suffered much from confinement at Shargah, they are subsequently released, on furnishing a bond to pay 100 crowns.
	Alarmed at the threats of Shaikh Samur, in consequence of the piracy committed by Sultan bin Sohar, the boats of Lingah and Ras-ool-Khyma, annually visiting Bussora and Mohumrah for dates, sail in company, in order to repel

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	force by force. The Resident addresses the Shaikh of Chaab, and the misunderstanding is settled.
A. D. 1839	Shaikh Sultan, thwarted in his forcible endeavours by land, to reduce the Naeem Tribe of Kassaab, Koomza, and Ras Musseldom, who would not acknowledge his supremacy, resolves to send a naval force to blockade their ports; but, alarmed at the rapid successes of the Egyptians, and their tool Ameer Khalid, relinquishes his hostile intentions, and quickly makes peace.
March	Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur receives the Egypto-Wahabee Agent, Syud bin Mootluk, into his territories, and is by him induced to summon the Beni Naeem of Brymee to surrender their fort into his hands: they boldly refuse, and prepare for resistance.
	Two Debaye men being killed by a party of six, of whom two are subjects of Amulgavine, the satisfaction offered by that chief, in the shape of blood money, is refused. The Shaikh of Debaye proceeds to foray the neighbourhood of Amulgavine, but is defeated, with the loss of six men made prisoners. The Shaikh of Shargah requiring the liberation of these, is refused, and joins the Shaikh of Debaye. Their united forces march against Amulgavine, whose inhabitants are decoyed to some distance by a pretended flight, and, suddenly attacked and overwhelmed, are compelled to retreat, with the loss of twenty men killed, and many wounded. A peace is then concluded, the Amulgavine Shaikh consenting to liberate the six prisoners, and to pay his share of the blood money for the two Debaye men.
1840	Captain Hamerton is despatched to Brymee, with a view to collect all the information in his power relative to that place and its inhabitants. Owing to the intrigues of the Joasmee Chiefs, and the Shaikh of Debaye, who offers every obstacle to the prosecution of the Mission, it is not without great difficulty and delay, nor until the principal Brymee Shaikh voluntarily offers to accompany him, that he is enabled to start for his destination.
	Previous to his departure, with a view to combine the power and resources of the inland tribes, the Resident invites their chieftains to a conference at Ejman. Small sums of

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	money are distributed, and, with the exception of a slight misunderstanding between the Zowahir and Beni Kuttub, their differences reconciled.
A. D. 1840	The Shaikh of Heerah, Humeed bin Obed bin Subt, with a body of the Beni Naeem, surprises and takes Ejman. Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan declines in the first instance to interfere, but considering that he would thereby give umbrage to the British Government, subsequently sends his son Suggur, with Muktoom of Debaye, who eject the Shaikh of Heerah, and burn his town, in retaliation for the injuries he had inflicted upon the people of Ejman.
Apr. May	Immediately on the termination of the Maritime Truce, before steps could be taken for its renewal, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, engaging the assistance of his son Suggur, of Shargah, and Muktoom of Debaye, attacks Amulgavine, which is reduced to the last extremity, when the Resident arriving, mediates between the parties, and effects a peace, a treaty being concluded, one article of which binds the Shaikh of Amulgavine not to build any new defences, or add to the old.
	Suggur bin Sultan, the Shaikh of Shargah, at the instigation of Muktoom of Debaye, rebels against his father, and refuses to acknowledge his authority.
	The latter, avoiding measures of violence, dissimulates, and agrees that his son, instead of being Governor of Shargah, and receiving a salary as before, should hold it as a permanent possession, and pay annually a stipulated sum.
Dec.	Saleh bin Suggur, and the principal men of Shargah, invite Shaikh Sultan to attempt the recovery of his lost authority, and, introducing him clandestinely into the fort, put him in possession of the person of his son. The latter is despatched under escort to Ras-ool-Khyma, but contrives to escape from his guards, and takes refuge at Debaye, whose Shaikh refuses to give him up.
	Shaikh Sultan effects a reconciliation with the Chiefs of Amulgavine and Aboothabee, who now willingly consent to aid him against Debaye, which place, it was agreed, should, when taken, be entirely destroyed. Shaikh Muktoom, thereon greatly alarmed, makes professions of unlimited obedience and submission, and offers a bribe of 1,000

JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	crowns, which Shaikh Sultan being unable to resist, he coolly breaks with his new allies, reconciles himself with Shaikh Muktoom, and replaces his son Suggur in the government of Shargah.
A. D. 1840-41	A Joasmee boat of Ras-ool-Khyma is plundered by some lawless characters from Biddah, among whom is the old and notorious delinquent, Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee. Salmin bin Nassir, governor of that place, having screened and protected the latter for some years, is held responsible for his acts. Two vessels of the squadron, accompanied by a steam-frigate, visit his port, for the purpose of demanding redress ; but it is not until eleven shot have been fired into the place that he affords compliance with the requisition made upon him. (No lives are lost, nor injury done on shore.) Shaikh Abdool Azeez usurps authority over his brother, Humaid, and seizes the fort of Ejman.
1842-43	Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, of Amulgavine, persisting, contrary to treaty, in erecting and renewing the defences of his town, in opposition to the repeated remonstrances of the Resident, upon the representations of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and refusing positively to act up to his agreement, he is at length told, that unless he consents to destroy what has been built or added subsequent to the conclusion of the peace between him and the Joasmee Chief, he will be considered an enemy, and treated accordingly: this had the desired effect; but previous to the total demolition of the works, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur consenting to their remaining in existence, the demands of the British Government are foregone. Previous to this just exercise of power, both parties had been informed that on the Amulgavine Shaikh acting up to his engagement, he would be at liberty to raise what defences he pleased, and that the treaty would thenceforward be considered null and void.
1843	The Maritime Truce is established, for the extended period* of ten years.

* At the expiration of this Truce a Perpetual Treaty of Peace was entered into, on the 4th May 1853, by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, through the mediation of the Resident, Captain A. B. Kemball.—Vide pages 88 and 89 of this Selection.—*Editor.*

UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS.—BAHREIN.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1716	The Beni Subah, Al Yalahimah and Al Khaleefa, considerable tribes of Arabs, the first under Shaikh Soleyman bin Ahmed, the second under Jaubir bin Uttoobee, and the third under Khaleefa bin Mahomed, enter into a compact, and take possession of Koweit, belonging to the Persians.
1766-75	Khaleefa bin Mahomed, with a portion of his tribe, passes over and settles at Zobara, where, after gradually drawing over the rest of his own tribe, completely separating himself from the other two, he establishes his independence.
	The Yalahimah, shortly after expelled from the port and town of Koweit by the Beni Subah, seek and obtain the protection of their kinsmen at Zobara. Quarrelling in a few years, they quit Zobara, and take up their residence at Raveish, a barren spot, a short distance eastward of Zobara.
	A desperate feud arises between the tribes, which terminates in the almost total destruction of the Yalahimah.
1776	On the attack of Bussora by the Persians, some of the merchants of that place, and one of the Shaikhs of Koweit, with many of the principal people, retire to Zobara, and the power, wealth, and influence of the Beni Khaleefa rapidly increase.
1777	The fears and jealousy of Shaikh Nassir, the Persian Governor of Bushire and Bahrein, are thereby excited. His repeated attempts, however, to reduce Zobara, are ineffectual.
1782-83	On the death of Kureem Khan, and the warfare and confusion which ensue, the Zobara Arabs make a descent upon Bahrein, compel Shaikh Nassir to retire to the fort, and, having plundered and destroyed the town, return to Zobara.
	A military force, in a large fleet from the Persian Coast, blockade Zobara, and, after some fruitless and unsuccessful negotiations on the part of the Arabs, assisted by Shaikh Rashid, of Ras-ool-Khyma, land to storm the place; but, resolutely attacked by an unexpectedly large force, are

Date.	Occurrences.
	compelled to throw down their arms, and escape to their boats. Several of the principal men are killed. A Koweit fleet arrives the same day at Bahrein, sets fire to, and plunders the town.
A. D. 1783	The Zobara Arabs, assisted by their kinsmen from Koweit, capture Bahrein from the Persians on 28th July. The four sons of Jaubir bin Uttoobee, dissatisfied on this occasion with the rewards and rank assigned to them, quit the island in disgust; and, after wandering for a few years, establish themselves at Khor Hassan, and commence a system of piracy.
1800	The Imaum of Muskat reduces the island of Bahrein, and sends all the head men, consisting of twenty-five families, to Muskat. The Uttoobees return to Zobara, and solicit the protection of the Wahabees, which is readily extended.
1801	Early this year the Uttoobees, with the assistance of the Wahabees, retake Bahrein.
1809	The Uttoobees deprecate the wrath of the British Government, urge exemption from the general chastisement of the pirates by the British forces, and solicit the countenance of the British Government in throwing off the Wahabee yoke, and quitting the main; also some trifling support to enable them to remain undisturbed at Bahrein. The British Government abstain from all interference.
1810	The Wahabee ruler assumes the government of Bahrein and Zobara, and appoints Abdoolla bin Oofeysan Vukeel over those places, and the Kateef and Guttur districts, to convert the Uttoobees to the Wahabee faith. The Uttoobees continue in administration, but pay tribute to the Vukeel.
1810-11	The Imaum, taking advantage of the attention and resources of the Wahabee ruler being engaged in checking the invasion of the Turkish troops under Ibrahim Pasha, attacks Zobara and Bahrein, burns the former, and lands on the latter. The Wahabee Vukeel, Oofeysan, is made prisoner, and the Uttoobees recover the island.
May, 1811	A desperate action was fought between Ramah's fleet, accompanied by a fleet of boats belonging to the Joasmees of Ejman, and the Uttoobees of Bahrein, in which the latter are victorious.
1815-16	The Imaum attacks Bahrein. His troops land at Arad, and

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	are signally defeated, with great loss, two of his relations and principal Sirdars being killed.
A. D. Oct. 1816	The Wahabee Chief, incensed against Shaikh Ramah bin Jaubir, for having taken part with the Imaum of Muskat, directs his property and family to be seized and brought up to Deriah : he escapes with them, with great difficulty, to Bushire.
1818	Ramah bin Jaubir proceeds to, and lands with some guns at Kateef, which, in concert with Ibrahim Pasha, he batters, and commences to rebuild his old fort at Damaum, destroyed by the Wahabees in 1816.
1819	Seventeen Indian women, captured by the pirates of Ras-ool-Khyma, are restored to liberty, by the Bahrein Chiefs releasing a number of Joasmee prisoners in exchange, at the instance of Captain Lock, of His Majesty's vessel *Eden*, on that ship visiting the island, accompanied by five other vessels of war, for the purpose of inquiring into the report that several Indian women had been brought from Ras-ool-Khyma, and publicly sold in the bazar at Bahrein, which proved unfounded.
1819-20	Ramah bin Jaubir is informed by the British authority that his vessels would not be permitted to leave Kateef to cruise against the people of Bahrein, unless acting with an authorised State, in regular warfare.
Feb. 1820	He proceeds with his three vessels to Bushire, in order to co-operate in an expedition projected against Bahrein by the Prince of Shiraz. On his way down to Tauzee his large Buggalow is wrecked on the Berdistan Shoal, and he and his people escape with great difficulty with their lives.
April.	Ramah bin Jaubir refuses to become a member of the General Treaty, under the plea of his being the servant of the Persian Government. The Governor of Bushire engaging to be responsible for his future peaceable conduct, the excuse is admitted.
	After the capture of Ras-ool-Khyma by the British expedition, the Shaikh of Bahrein delivers up the vessels belonging to the piratical powers, which were in his harbour.
	The General Treaty is first signed at Ras-ool-Khyma by the Vukeel of the Uttoobee Shaikhs, and subsequently by themselves in Bahrein.

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1821-22	The Bahrein Chiefs agree to pay 30,000 German crowns tribute annually to the Imaum of Muskat, who, in return, engages to release some of the Uttoobee Shaikhs detained by him, and restore all the vessels and property belonging to Bahrein, which he had put under an embargo on their way up from India. Of the tribute, 12,000 crowns are subsequently remitted.
	Ramah bin Jaubir nevertheless (with reference to the security of the Bushire Shaikh for his future good conduct) continues his aggressions upon the trade of Bahrein. The Uttoobee Chief complains to the British authority. A remonstrance is made to the Shiraz Government, who order him to be called to account, and his son and family to be detained as hostages. Ramah in the mean time had quitted Bushire, and placed himself under the protection of the Imaum, but returns to Bushire in November ; the Imaum disavowing him, and declaring that no reliance was to be placed upon his word.
1823	Ramah bin Jaubir takes up his residence at Damaum, with a view, although old and blind, of prosecuting his inveterate feud against the Bahrein Chiefs.
1824	A peace is concluded between the Bahrein Chiefs and Shaikh Ramah bin Jaubir of Khor Hassan and Damaum, through the Resident's mediation.
	Ramah blockades Kateef, with the view of recovering the tribute formerly paid him by that place, and is successful.
1825	He continues his aggressions against the trade of Kateef, plundering its boats, and murdering their crews. Remonstrances of the British authorities fail, and two vessels of war are stationed near Damaum for the protection of peaceable traders. It was directed, however, that no interference should be made as long as his hostilities were confined to the people of Kateef, and the cruisers are again withdrawn.
1825-26	Hostilities again break out between Ramah bin Jaubir and the Uttoobees. The parties apply to the British Resident to proclaim a truce ; but Ramah, refusing to admit the people of Kateef to a participation of it, that functionary declines all interference, except such as would lead to a general pacification.
1826	Ramah proceeds to Bushire, and failing to induce the British

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	Resident to interfere in his behalf, receives on board a reinforcement of Beloochees, and returns to Damaum; on entering which place he fires a salute, as a mark of contempt. Ahmed bin Soleyman, a nephew of the reigning Shaikh, attacks him in his vessel. A desperate action takes place. Ramah sets fire to his own magazine, and blows himself and crew into the air.
A. D. 1826	Busheer, the son of Ramah, surrenders Damaum unconditionally. His life and liberty are granted him, and he proceeds to Muskat, where His Highness the Imaum presents him with a Buggalow, to enable him to gain a livelihood by trade.
	Through the influence of the Imaum, Busheer is permitted by the Wahabee Chief to build a fort at Dareen, a place on Tirhoot, an island opposite to Kateef, where he is joined by many of the Aboosemate tribe, bitter enemies of the Uttoobees.
	Suliman bin Ahmed, the colleague and elder brother of Shaikh Abdoolla, dies, and is succeeded in his property and political influence by his eldest son, Shaikh Khaleefa, who accordingly shares the net revenue of the island equally with his uncle, with whom the executive power and transaction of all public business still remain, the concurrence of the nephew being, however, considered necessary.
1827	A piracy is committed by Obed or Abdoolla bin Mohunnah, an inhabitant of Biddah, a Bahrein dependency, upon a Bushire boat, off Gonara.
1828	The Chief of Biddah, stabbing an individual of Bahrein, is placed in confinement by his feudal superior. The inhabitants thereon becoming refractory, are removed to Rowees and Fowarah, more immediately under his control, and their fort is destroyed by the same authority.
	Obed bin Mohunnah commits further piracies, but is himself, after a desperate resistance, taken prisoner on his landing at Zeerah, on the Persian Coast, to make inquiries regarding the destination of a Buggalow then at anchor. Being convicted by the British authorities, he is handed over to the Shaikh of Bushire, whose subjects had suffered from his late piracies, but contrives to escape. The crew of his

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	boat, on their way to Aboothabee, plunder four Aseeloo boats. Full redress is, however, afforded for this act, by Shaikh Tahnoon.
A. D. 1828 Nov.	The Bahrein Chiefs signally defeat the Imaum's expedition against the island.
Mar. 1829	A Bahrein fleet, under the command of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, in person, set out on a cruise to harass the Imaum's trade and coasts. His Highness sends out two frigates to meet it, which, after an ineffectual attempt to capture the Uttoobee Buggalow, the *Syar*, with which they fall in, return to Muskat without doing anything.
	The Bahrein fleet fail to capture an Aseeloo Buggalow, which fairly beats them off. They commit a piracy, in seizing a Morebat (neutral) vessel, evade two Muskat vessels of war which they meet, and return to Bahrein in safety. Redress to a certain extent was obtained for the piracy upon the Morebat vessel.
2nd Dec.	A peace most favourable to the Uttoobees is concluded between them and the Imaum; the tribute they formerly paid to cease, and no interference whatever to take place in each other's concerns.
1830-31	Shaikh Abdoolla is called upon by the Wahabee Chief to pay the annual Zukat or tribute, besides 40,000 German crowns, as the alleged value of a number of horses left under his charge by the Wahabees many years previous. A demand is at the same time made for the surrender of the fort of Damaum to Busheer, the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir. The Shaikhs despatching a near relation to wait upon the Wahabee ruler at Riaz, an arrangement is made, that the supremacy of Ameer Toorkey bin Saood should be acknowledged at Bahrein, and the Zukat paid by the Uttoobees, in return for which he promises them his protection.
1831	The sincerity of the Wahabee ruler considered doubtful, from his establishing Busheer the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir at Dareen, with whom they had necessarily a most inveterate feud.
Jan. 1832	Busheer quarrels with the inhabitants of Kateef, destroys the fort he was building, and leaves with his dependents for Muskat.

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1832	A piracy, committed on a Congoon boat in Hallilah Bay, is traced to Hussoom of Fowarah, a dependency of Bahrein, and the captured boat recovered.
1833	The Shaikh of Bahrein refuses allegiance to the Wahabees, and resolves to retaliate all attempts at aggression. The Imaum pledges himself to him not to interfere in the quarrel. He instigates the Amayir Tribe, who, leaving the neighbourhood of Kateef, take up a position at Damaum, and establish a very close blockade of the former port.
1834	The British Agent is ill-treated and grossly insulted by the sons of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, whom the father does not exert himself to check. The appearance of a considerable naval force in his port induces him to afford ample satisfaction. On the death of Toorkey, and in the absence of his son from Kateef, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed succeeds by bribery in obtaining possession of the fort of Tirhoot, on the island of that name.
31st May	Khaleefa bin Suliman, the nephew and colleague of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, dies, and is succeeded by his son Mahomed, to whom, however, the power and share in government possessed by his father are not immediately accorded.
	A party of the Amayir, under the command of one Mushrif, make an attempt to recover their possessions at Lahsa and Kateef, but are defeated by the Wahabee General, Omr bin Oofeysan, and compelled to take refuge under the guns of Tirhoot.
1835	The Wahabees fail in an attack upon Tirhoot. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed resumes the strict blockade of Kateef and Ageer. The internal dissensions of Bahrein begin to wear a serious aspect. The Chiefs of Huailah, dependents of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, conspire against his authority, and enter into treasonable communications with the Imaum and the Wahabee Chief. They are moreover joined by one of his sons, who, securing the services of a body of Wahabees, sets his authority at defiance, and commits depredations on the trade of Bahrein. Capturing, also, some neutral vessels, he is compelled to make reparation by the British Resident. He proceeds to Muskat to solicit aid.
	His Highness the Imaum not only refuses to take any part in these civil broils, but sends his son Hullal, in one of his

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	frigates, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation; but his efforts are rendered unavailing, by the irregular and hostile conduct of the subordinates, which leads to the secession of two influential inhabitants of Bahrein, and their dependents, who take refuge at Aboothabee.
A. D. 1835	Esai bin Tarif desires permission to carry on hostilities against the trade and territories of his late master, which is refused, he having established himself in a friendly, or at least neutral port.
May June 1836	Abdoolla bin Ahmed, alarmed at the threats of Persia, with whom the Imaum might co-operate, enters into terms with the Wahabees, he promising to pay the small annual tribute of 2,000 dollars, and the Wahabee Chief engaging to supply a contingent of troops to repel any invasion of Bahrein, and not to call for the vessels of that island in the event of his purposing to attack Muskat.
	The disturbances and confusion increase on the island, in consequence of the tyrannical and oppressive conduct of the subordinate members of the Chief's family.
1837	The Huwajir and Amayir, taking advantage of the disturbed state of affairs in Nujd, in consequence of the struggle for power between Ameer Fysul and the pretender Khalid, commence the systematic plunder of all boats belonging to Kateef, and occasionally those from Bahrein. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed punishes and brings them to order.
1838	Attempts are made to effect a reconciliation between the Chief of Bahrein and the Al Ali under Esai bin Tarif and Bin Salameh, but without effect. Hostilities are, however, postponed.
1839	On the fall of Ameer Fysul, his General, Omr bin Oofeysan, seeks and obtains asylum at Bahrein. Ameer Khalid demands his surrender, and that Damaum be given up to him. Tribute, and the surrender of Tirhoot, had been before demanded.
	The Bahrein Chief evades compliance, on the plea of connection with, and submission to, the Persian Government.
	Korshid Pasha, the Egyptian Commander, avows to the British authority his intention of attacking and reducing Bahrein. The latter remonstrates and protests, and

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	reminds him of the assurances of His Highness Mahomed Ali Pasha to Her Majesty's Government.
A. D. 1839	One Hajee Kasim, formerly supercargo of a trading vessel, is sent from Bushire as envoy from the Government of Shiraz to Bahrein, having an escort of ten Sirbaz, to reside on the island as Persian Agent, and be the medium of receiving and transmitting the annual tribute, which the Persian authorities vainly flattered themselves the Bahrein Chief was disposed to pay for their countenance and protection. Hostilities are carried on between the Al Ali at Aboothabee and the people of Bahrein, which entail much distress upon the merchants of the latter. The Assistant Resident is despatched, to bring about a reconciliation. As no terms would be entered into that had not the guarantee of the British Government, his mission is of no avail.
	The friendship between Esai bin Tarif and the Chief of Aboothabee is interrupted: the latter, who was under friendly communication with the Chief of Bahrein, requires him to leave his country, or settle there permanently as a peaceable subject. He is therefore obliged to relinquish the prosecution of further aggressions.
	Abdoolla bin Ahmed becomes tributary to the Egyptians, notwithstanding his having promised to communicate with the Resident previous to placing himself under the protection of any other foreign power; being aware of the light in which Korshid Pasha's proceedings are viewed by the British Government, and the encouragement he had received from them to assert his rights and maintain his independence. He declares, however, that it has been expressly stipulated by him that no Agent of the Pasha should reside in Bahrein. The quarrels and dissensions among the members of the Uttoobee Chief's family grow more serious. He brings over a body of mercenary Bedouins from the main land. His own weak and vacillating conduct greatly disgusts the inhabitants.
	Esai bin Tarif and his dependents remove from Aboothabee, on the termination of the pearl fishery, and settle on the island of Kenn, whence, he is forewarned, he will be precluded from carrying on aggressive warfare against any part of the Arabian Coast.

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1840	Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the young Chief of Bahrein, is invited to assume authority over Lahsa and Kateef, but is opposed in doing so by the elder chief. An open collision between the two is with difficulty averted; a hollow reconciliation takes place. Mahomed bin Khaleefa addresses a letter to the British authorities, offering his services, and soliciting assistance against his grand-uncle. He then proceeds to the Guttur Coast, and commences a system of annoyance and opposition to his superior.
1841	A piracy, committed in the previous year upon a Koweit boat, is traced to a follower of Shaikh Moobaruk, the son of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. The father is compelled to make reparation, by the payment of the value of the property plundered.
1842	An open rupture takes place between the parties,—the immediate, but only ostensible, cause of contention being a girl sought in marriage by a dependent on either side. Mahomed bin Khaleefa is driven out of Munama (which town is given up to plunder by Abdoolla bin Ahmed to his victorious followers, and property belonging to British merchants shares the common fate), and flies to the main land. He proceeds to Lahsa and Riaz, to solicit the aid of the Wahabee ruler, Abdoolla bin Soneyan.
	Abdoolla bin Ahmed, finding that the son and dependents of Humood bin Omeree, a person most obnoxious to him, had taken refuge in the British Agent's house, demands and obtains their surrender by means of threats of violence, when they are immediately cut to peices. The Agent's conduct throughout the affair is so irregular and condemnable, that he is dismissed. The Uttoobee Shaikh is not without blame however. Abdoolla bin Ahmed proceeds to Khor Hassan, which he also gives up to plunder.
	Abdoolla bin Ahmed, not coming to terms with the Wahabee ruler, in consequence of his refusing to release his staunch adherent, Shafee, the head of the Huwajir Tribe, the latter favours the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa.
	Esai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah solicit and obtain permission from the British Resident to espouse the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and due intimation is given of this coalition to Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed.

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1842	Mahomed bin Khaleefa establishes himself on the Guttur Coast, whose inhabitants are well inclined towards him, and keeps open the communication with his colleagues.
	The Wahabee ruler endeavours to mediate between the parties, but without effect. He releases Shafee, who promises to use his influence towards a reconciliation. The Uttoobee Chief unwisely uses threatening language to the Wahabee ruler, to induce his observance of perfect neutrality.
1843	Mahomed bin Khaleefa prosecutes his successful operations on the main land.
	A piracy is committed upon a boat carrying British colours, in the harbour of Munama, by the immediate dependents of Abdoolla bin Ahmed.
	Mahomed bin Khaleefa lands with a force on the island, and shortly obtains possession of Munama, which offers no resistance.
	A Charrak boat is plundered in the harbour of Munama by some of the Huwajir and Suloota Tribes.
April.	The forces of the colleagues join from Kenn. They attack Muharag, defeat the troops of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and compel him to take refuge in a small fort, close to the town. Abdoolla bin Ahmed surrenders at discretion, and is allowed to leave the island, with his personal property and followers. His sons are permitted to remain.
	Abdoolla bin Ahmed proceeds to Damaum, the only place now left acknowledging his authority, held by his eldest son, Moobaruk.
June.	Abdoolla bin Ahmed annoys the trade of Bahrein. The colleagues in consequence blockade Damaum.
	Both parties make overtures to the Wahabee ruler.
	Shaikh Jaubir, of Koweit, proceeds with his fleet to Bahrein, with a view to mediate a peace between the contending chieftains, but fails in his object.
	Mahomed and Ali, the sons of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and Hajee Bushab his Vizier, are made prisoners by the Governor of Kateef, who places them at the disposal of the Wahabee ruler.
	Abdoolla bin Ahmed endeavours to engage the assistance of the Chiefs of Ras-ool-Khyma, Shargah, and Debaye, who refer him to the Resident for his permission. The ex-chief

UTTOOBEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	comes in person to Bushire with this object. The colleagues had made overtures with a view to secure the aid of the Shaikhs of Aboothabee and Amulgavine. The British authority declines on this account, and for obvious reasons, to give his sanction.
A. D. 1843 Oct.	Proffers of military aid are unauthorisedly made to the ex-chief by an individual of Bushire, one Shaikh Sulman, on the part of the Persian Government, which the former affects to believe. The ex-chief leaves Bushire, and proceeds to Nabend, on the Persian Coast.
	Esai bin Tarif and his dependents abandon Kenn, and settle at Biddah, a dependency of Bahrein.
Dec.	The ex-chief revisits Bushire, with the avowed object of having an interview with the Resident, but declines the latter's invitation to meet him on board a vessel of war. His real object appears to be to endeavour to procure the aid, so unauthorisedly promised by Shaikh Sulman.
	He earnestly urges his claims by letter to the Resident, to the interference and assistance of the British Government in his behalf, which are not admitted.
	A Bahrein boat, seized near Aseeloo by the dependents of the ex-chief, is, after much correspondence, restored in July 1844.
Jan. 1844	The ex-chief, still in Bushire Roads, again urges his claims to assistance, and is peremptorily refused.
	The long promised land forces under the Wahabee ruler arrive, and lay siege to Damaum, which is under blockade by the fleet of the coalesced chieftains.
	Two boats, despatched by the chief and people of Koweit, with supplies for Damaum, are captured at Khore Balbul, by some vessels detached from the blockading fleet. Although the seizure is perfectly legal and just, Mahomed bin Khaleefa is subsequently induced to restore the boats, rather than incur the risk of a war with the powerful Shaikh of Koweit. The ex-chief lands, is received with honours, and takes up his residence on shore, his hopes of military aid from the Persian Government increased ; but after waiting three months without any signs of intention to join his cause being shown, determines upon taking his departure. He visits the Resident.

UTTOOBEES—WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1844	He proceeds towards Damaum, and endeavours to throw supplies into the beleaguered fort, now driven to the last extremity for provisions; but fails, is himself chased, and takes refuge at Koweit.
	Damaum capitulates, and is garrisoned by Wahabee troops.
April.	The ex-chief revisits Bushire, and has an interview with the Resident on the sea shore, about three miles from the town, on the subject of certain overtures made to him by the Wahabee ruler. The British Resident declines interfering.
	The ex-chief proceeds to Nabend, on the Persian Coast.
	Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the *de facto* ruler, is required to pay the value of that portion of the property plundered from the Charrak boat, which had fallen to the share of the Suloota, who had abandoned the cause of his opponent, and become his adherents. He accedes without hesitation.

WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1795-97	The Wahabees take Lahsa, and annihilate the power of the Beni Khalid Arabs; threaten Bussora, and excite the fears of the Turkish Governor of Bagdad, who despatches an Arab force against them, under the command of Shaikh Sweynee, Chief of the Montafig, who is killed, and the expedition fails.
1799	A Turkish force is sent from Bagdad against the Wahabees, and a battle on the eve of being fought, when Abdool Azeez, the commander of the latter, hearing of the death of his father, the Wahabee Chief, submits to proposals of peace. Abdool Azeez succeeds his father.
1800-02	The Wahabee influence established throughout the whole coast from Bussora river to Dibbah, the boundary between the Muskat and Joasmee territories.
1802	Kerbelah attacked and pillaged by the Wahabees, and many of the inhabitants cruelly massacred (21st April).
1803	The Wahabees take Mecca; occupy Taif, and convert that fertile region into an absolute desert; invest Jeddah, and

WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	reduce it to great distress. Its Imaum buys it off for one lakh and forty thousand dollars. The Wahabees are now in possession of nearly the whole sea coast on the western frontier of Arabia.
A. D. 1803 Nov.	The Wahabee ruler, Abdool Azeez, murdered (as he was about to make the conquest of Oman) in his capital of Deriah, whilst at evening prayers in a public place of worship, by a religious fanatic, who is immediately killed by his adherents. Saood succeeds his father as Wahabee ruler.
1806	Saood takes the field with about 50,000 men; first plunders the Dufeeh, and then the Aneeza Tribe; proceeds and attacks Meshid Ali, and afterwards Semowka, from both of which places he is repulsed. He then proceeds to Zobeer, a few miles from Bussora, upon which town local obstacles prevent his making any attempt, but which is nevertheless thrown into great consternation.
1808	The preponderance of the Wahabees completely established in Oman.
1811-12	Mecca and Jeddah taken, without opposition, by the Turkish troops of Mahomed Ali Pasha, also Taif; thus the Wahabee power in that part of Arabia is annihilated.
1814	Saood dies on the 10th April, and is succeeded by his eldest son, Abdoolla.
1817	Ibrahim Pasha defeats the Wahabees at Manwiah, seven stages from Deriah; and, following up his success, invests
1818	and reduces the city on the 10th September; destroys the fortifications, town, and plantations of date trees, and removes the inhabitants to Lahsa, the intended future seat of his government.
	Abdoolla bin Saood is taken prisoner, and sent off to Egypt. Kateef, the principal Wahabee seaport, next surrenders to the Turkish troops.
1824	Shaikh Toorkey, the son of Abdoolla bin Saood, collects a considerable force, and marches against the Turkish provinces to the westward, but is repulsed by Ahmed Pasha. He soon after makes another attempt, and is successful.
Mar. 1830	The Beni Khalid are outmanœuvred, and attacked at disadvantage by the Wahabee forces, under Toorkey bin Saood and his son Fysul, and are completely routed, their families,

WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	tents, baggage, camels, and cattle falling into the hands of the enemy.
A. D. 1830	The Wahabees occupy Lahsa without resistance.
	Kateef also surrenders. The Beni Khalid Shaikhs are thus expelled from their hereditary dominions.
	Toorkey had agreed and continued to pay a small annual tribute to Mahomed Ali Pasha, who approves of his proceedings.
	Toorkey establishes himself at Deriah, and governs with great prudence and moderation.
1831	The Imaum, in the hope of forwarding his views upon Bahrein, tenders submission to Fysul, and promises tribute. The Bahrein Chiefs, to counteract the Imaum's designs, are induced to adopt a similar course : thus the whole of the Arabian Coast from Ras-ool-Hud to Koweit, with the exception of Aboothabee, became tributary to the Wahabees.
	The Wahabee ruler intimates to the Governor of Bombay, through Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, his desire to be on the same friendly footing as that formerly existing between the British Government and his ancestor Saood. A friendly but general reply is returned, through the Resident in the Persian Gulf.
1831-32	Musharee, a relative of the Wahabee ruler, Toorkey bin Saood, rebels against his authority, and joins the Amayir and Beni Khalid Tribes, who had refused to acknowledge his supremacy. Hostilities continue between the Wahabees and Bahrein, the chief of which island blockades Kateef, Sohat, and Ajeer.
1833	The Wahabee ruler's influence established throughout the coast. He begins to levy tribute, but will not countenance lawless proceedings, and opposes the renewal of piracy, contrary to the expectation of the Joasmees, who had in this idea hailed the re-establishment of his authority.
	The demand for redress upon the Joasmee Chief directly, by the British Government, on account of a piracy committed by his subjects, offends the Wahabee Agent in Oman, Abdool Azeez, who addresses an intemperate letter to the British Native Agent at Shargah, claiming for his master, as being the ruler of the *country*, whose authority had been acknowledged by all, or his delegate, the right of judging in all cases connected with the Maritime Arabs.

WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1834	The annoyance and distress created by the blockade of his seaports leads the Wahabee to call in the assistance of the Joasmees against Bahrein.
	The application for the Joasmee naval resources, and the discussion started by the Wahabee Agent, Abdool Azeez, in 1833, relinquished in consequence of the violent death of Toorkey bin Saood by the hand of his nephew, Musharee. The maritime tribes return to their former relative positions.
	Fysul, the son of Toorkey, puts Musharee and twenty others to the sword, and succeeds his father as Wahabee ruler.
1835	The Pasha of Mecca farms Kateef and the surrounding district to one Abdoolla bin Musharee, for 20,000 or 24,000 reals. This individual proceeds to, but precipitately quits the place, on the approach of troops despatched by the Wahabee ruler, who asserts his right over, and determination to keep it. Ahmed Pasha's design in this act supposed to be to engage Fysul in operations towards the north-east, whilst Mahomed Ali Pasha was prosecuting his conquests in the south-west quarter of the Arabian peninsula.
1836	Ameer Fysul summoned by the Egyptian Viceroy to meet either of his Generals, Ibrahim or Hussain Pasha, and afford his co-operation against the Asser Tribe, who had successfully opposed their advance. A large Egyptian force collected at Medina. Fysul excuses hinself, but sends his brother with a present.
	Ameer Fysul glad to listen to overtures of peace on the part of the Bahrein Chief.
1837	Khalid, supported by an Egyptian military force, urges his pretensions to be Wahabee ruler.
	Fysul, but now too late, tenders submission to the Egyptians.
March.	The pretender captures Gusseem and Deriah, and defeats Fysul in a pitched battle near Riaz.
Dec.	Fysul, besieged in Dillum, surrenders himself, and is sent a prisoner to Egypt.
	The Egyptian General now throws off his disguise as the

WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	auxiliary of Khalid, and declares Nujd a possession of his master's, and avows his intention of improving and extending his conquests.
A. D. 1839	Syud bin Mootluk, formerly Naib or Deputy of Ameer Toorkey at Brymee, but removed by his son and successor Fysul, joins the Egyptian commander, and is by him despatched to Ras-ool-Khyma, to persuade the chiefs on the Coast of Oman to acknowledge in reality the authority of Mahomed Ali Pasha, but ostensibly that of his tool Khalid.
	The Joasmee Chief, at his instigation, summons the Beni Naeem, who had lately got possession of Brymee, to surrender it to the Nujdees. They nobly refuse, and apply to the Beniyas and Sohar Chiefs for aid to meet the common enemy. The latter sends 200 men, under his brother Ghes, to reinforce the garrison of Brymee.
	The Resident, with a view to re-assure the Arab Tribes, and check and counteract the increasing influence of the Egyptians, enters a solemn protest against the proceedings and intrigues of Korshid Pasha, as being in direct opposition to the assurances given by His Highness Mahomed Ali to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and invites the several Maritime Chieftains of Oman to certify in writing their determination to cultivate more sedulously their relations with the British Government, to abide by its wishes and instructions, and to resist to the last extremity all attempts of Korshid Pasha to subjugate them.
	Syud bin Mootluk, after repeated remonstrances, at length quits Oman, and, embarking at Shargah, proceeds to Ajeer. On his way he lands on the island of Kenn, on the Persian Coast, and forcibly carries off 400 sheep, and other property.
	The Shaikh of Kateef is informed that any expedition against Oman or the territories of the Imaum would be opposed by the British squadron in the Gulf.
	Mahomed Effendi, an Egyptian officer of rank, is murdered by some Arabs in the suburbs of Lahsa.
Nov.	A Ghooncha arrives at Kateef from Hodeida, in the Red Sea, with ammunition and military stores, for the use of the Egyptian forces in Nujd.
1840	Quarrels and dissensions arise among the Egyptian Agents

WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	themselves. The jealousy of the Egyptian Viceroy excited against his General Korshid. The disaffected tribes, particularly that of Ejman, commence rising in open rebellion. Communication between the different ports is seriously interrupted; the supplies for the Egyptian forces need considerable escorts. Syud bin Mootluk is distrusted, and sent under surveillence to Riaz. The remonstrances of the British Government have effect.
A. D. 1840 May	The Egyptian forces evacuate Nujd. Korshid's last act was to put to death Burgeish, the Chief of the Ali Humeed, as a sacrifice to the memory of Mahomed Effendi, his deputy.
	Intrigues are commenced, to deprive the pretender Khalid of his usurped authority.
1841	The Sublime Porte advance claims to authority over Nujd, and, having received presents from Khalid, appoint him their Wulee over that province.
	Khalid threatening, notwithstanding his utter want of power, to send a force into Oman, an officer is deputed to wait upon him in his camp at Lahsa, with written and verbal communications, indicative of the disapproval of the British Government to such a measure. He disavows any intention to do so.
Sept.	Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, the son of Mahomed, a younger brother of Saood, father of Khalid, retiring to Koweit, rises in rebellion against Khalid, seizes Zoomah, Iyah, and Munfoohad, and threatens Riaz; is defeated in a skirmish before that place, but contrives to get possession of it by treachery. Khalid flies to Lahsa, but that town favouring the cause of his opponent, and tendering its allegiance to him, he is obliged to take refuge with Moobaruk, the son of the Bahrein Chief, at Damaum, whence he proceeds to Koweit, and thence to Gusseem, where he supposes himself to have some staunch adherents. He subsequently makes an abortive attempt, or rather feint, to recover his lost position.
Feb. 1842	Abdoolla bin Sooneyan acknowledged Wahabee ruler.
	Abdoolla bin Sooneyan adresses letters to the Chiefs of Oman, intimating his intention of sending Syud bin Mootluk as his deputy to them, and inviting them cordially to unite with, and afford him every aid and assistance, upon which he is addressed by the British authority, deprecating

WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	his present attempts to bring them again under Wahabee influence, &c. He, in reply, declares his intention of co-operating with the Government to check piracy; that he had promulgated the same to the people of Oman, whom he terms his subjects, &c. The Arab Chieftains are generally inclined to the restoration of Wahabee influence.
A.D. 1842 May June	Ameer Fysul is released, and returns to Nujd. His march attended with uniform success to Riaz. He invests the fort of that place, in which Abdoolla bin Sooneyan had taken refuge, and the latter is shortly compelled to surrender at discretion.
July.	Ameer Fysul makes the usual intimation to the Shaikhs of Oman of his intention shortly to send his deputy to them.
Nov.	The Chiefs of Brymee address the Resident, expressing their assurance of the earnestness of the Wahabee ruler, and requesting the aid and support of the British Government to repel the invaders, but are informed that no valid reasons now exist for interference. At this very time Ameer Fysul opens a correspondence with the Resident by a letter expressive of a desire for the renewal of the amicable relations which formerly existed between his father, Toorkey, and the British Government, sentiments of course fittingly responded to, the objects of the British Government in this quarter being at the same time explained.
Dec.	Ameer Fysul attempts to mediate a reconciliation between the contending Chieftains of Bahrein, but fails.
Mar. 1844	Ameer Fysul espouses the cause of the younger Chief, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and his colleagues, and aids him with a land force against Damaum, which the latter are blockading by sea. Damaum falls, and is taken possession of by Fysul, who maintains a garrison there, to the prejudice of Busheer bin Rahmah, one of the colleagues, whose patrimony it is.

BENIYAS.

BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1793	Shaikh Zheab, the superior Chief of Aboothabee, murdered by his relative, Huza bin Zaed.
1795	Shaikh Shakboot, the son of the murdered chief, defeating and expelling the murderer, succeeds his father, and
1816	remains in authority until 1816, when his eldest son Mahomed deposes him, and usurps the chiefship.
1818	Shaikh Tahnoon, a younger son, succeeds, with the assistance of the Imaum and the good will of the majority of the tribe, in expelling the usurper, who escapes with difficulty, and takes refuge at Bahrein. Tahnoon gradually assumes the superior authority and executive power, to which the father quietly submits. The alliance and connection of the Imaum with the Beniyas is the cause of weakening the close intimacy and friendship hitherto existing between that tribe and the Joasmees.
1820	The Beniyas Chief is admitted a member of the General Treaty.
1822	Sooedan bin Zaal, an individual of some rank, secedes from Aboothabee, and takes refuge at Biddah (a Bahrein dependency). Shaikh Tahnoon prosecutes active measures against him, which, being calculated to lead to the renewal of piracy, he abandons, at the desire of the British authority.
1823	Mahomed bin Shakboot collects a force, and attacks and plunders Aboothabee. Shaikh Tahnoon marches to the relief of the town, and defeats his brother with some loss. Mahomed takes refuge at Shargah, but that place being threatened by Tahnoon, quits the protection of its chief, and proceeds to Huailah (a Bahrein dependency).
1824-25	A Treaty is formed between the Imaum, Beniyas, and Joasmees, through the influence of the British Resident. Sultan bin Suggur, the Chief of the last, violates it, and hostilities commence.
1825	No material advantage having been gained by either side, a peace is concluded at the end of the year, through the mediation of the Imaum.
1826	War between the Beniyas and Uttoobees, arising out of the

BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
	predatory aggressions on the former by the followers of the seceder Sooedan bin Zaal, who had taken asylum with the Uttoobees, is with difficulty averted, through the influence of the British authority.
A. D. 1827	The Imaum visits the coast with two vessels, and in support of one of the conditions of the Treaty which his protégé, Tahnoon, had failed to fulfil, destroys Derah. The Imaum supplies the Beniyas Chief with guns and ammunition.
	Shaikh Tahnoon, availing himself of the support thus afforded, makes a sudden and vigorous attack upon Debaye, which is successful. The Joasmee Chief declares war, but does not commence hostile operations.
1827-28	The Debaye Governor, Khaleefa bin Dumeeta, seizes several Shargah boats, and their cargoes, but is compelled by the British authorities to make restoration.
Oct. 1828	Shaikh Tahnoon joins the Imaum's expedition against Bahrein, but acts with great imprudence, if not treachery, and a signal failure is the result.
1828	The seceder, Sooedan bin Zaal, and his followers, effect a reconciliation with Shaikh Tahnoon, and return to Aboothabee. Two Bahrein Buggarahs and a Koweit Buteel are seized by the Beniyas ; the boats and property are recovered and restored, but the pirates escape.
Feb. 1829	Hostilities again break out between the Joasmees and Beniyas. Shaikh Sultan blockades Aboothabee, and reduces it to great distress. Both parties, anticipating the loss of the advantages to be obtained from the prosecution of the pearl fishery, accept the mediation of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb, Governor of Lingah, and a peace is concluded.
Dec.	Shaikh Tahnoon becomes a member of the Treaty of Peace concluded between the Imaum and the Uttoobees.
1831	The Beniyas Chief volunteers his aid to the Imaum on the occasion of his declaring war a second time against his relation Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, but his fidelity being suspected, it is declined, while that of the Joasmee Chief and the Shaikh of Ejman is accepted.
	Irritated at this rejection, and dreading any alliance between the Imaum and his rivals the Joasmees, Tahnoon throws himself into the opposite scale, and commences aggressions upon the territories of the latter, the accepted allies.

BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
	Sultan bin Suggur declares war, and prepares to blockade Aboothabee, but hostilities during the pearl fishery at last creating great discontent in the minds of both Joasmee and Beniyas subjects, a peace is concluded, after a short negotiation, through the mediation of Syed bin Guzeeb of Lingah.
A. D. 1832-33	Shaikh Tahnoon gives refuge to three Joasmee pirates, inhabitants of Khan, and draws upon himself the responsibility of their acts, and the consequent obligation to afford redress, which he does by paying the sum of 1,500 German crowns. The Joasmee Chief is compelled to pay 2,000 German crowns for the part taken by the accomplices of the above.
Mar. Apr. 1833	Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot is murdered by the hands of his brothers Khaleefa and Sultan. The former of the two succeeds him in authority.
	Shaikh Khaleefa tenders allegiance and the annual payment of tribute to the Wahabee ruler, Toorkey bin Saood, who in return informs the Joasmee Chief that the Beniyas are under his protection, and that he will permit of no aggressions upon them.
	In consequence of the oppressive and arbitrary conduct of the usurper, a conspiracy is formed to put him to death. The plot is betrayed to Shaikh Khaleefa, who puts three of the conspirators to death, and severely punishes the others. The Boo Felasa and Rumshah tribes, to the number of about 800 persons, secede from the main Beniyas Tribe, and establish themselves at Debaye, a dependency of Aboothabee. The Joasmee Chief takes advantage of the division in the Beniyas Tribe, espouses the quarrel of the Boo Felasa, and proceeds with the whole of his disposable forces, increased by boats and men from Lingah, to the attack of Aboothabee, which he expects to find an easy conquest.
	The combined troops land at Khore Suffan ; are unexpectedly surrounded by a superior force, supported by horse and camel men, and completely defeated, and driven to their boats. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur narrowly escapes drowning. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur returns with a large fleet, and blockades Aboothabee.

BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1833	Three Beniyas' vessels evade the blockading squadron, and proceed to Cape Bostinah ; capture an Ejman Buggarah with a crew of eight men, seven of whom they put to death. They then attack a Muskat Buggalow, and plunder her to a considerable amount, and kill five of her crew. They escape from the Joasmee boats sent in pursuit, and return in safety to Aboothabee. The Muskat authorities receive the explanation offered by the Beniyas, and remove the necessity for any interference on the part of the Resident.
	The blockade is raised, and a peace effected, through the mediation of the Shaikh of Lingah.
1833-34	Mutual aggressions are committed by the Beniyas and Joasmees ; their boats are in consequence withdrawn from the pearl banks. Shaikh Khaleefa, at the earnest solicitation of his tribe, sends his father Shakboot to conclude a peace ; one of the conditions is that the Debaye people shall be henceforth under the authority of the Joasmees.
1834	Some of the Soodan of Aboothabee attack a Buteel belonging to Muttrah, and plunder her of property to the amount of 1,000 dollars. The appearance of a squadron before Aboothabee induces Shaikh Khaleefa to comply with the requisitions of the British authorities for reparation.
1835	The Beniyas break out into open and avowed piracy. They commit the most daring depredations, attended with the greatest cruelty. All the available vessels of war of the squadron are immediately despatched in quest of their boats. The *Elphinstone* falls in with the piratical fleet, which, confident in its own power, prepares for engagement, but is very shortly put to flight, with the loss of many killed. Full redress is demanded and obtained from the Shaikh of Aboothabee. The two chief pirates are surrendered, and sent to Bombay for trial. The one was convicted and transported for life, the other, against whom unfortunately no prosecution could be sustained, was returned, to be handed over to the Joasmee Chief, but effected his escape from the vessel off Shargah, and swam to the shore, four miles distant.
1836	The Gubeezat tribe, under Khadom bin Nahman, to avoid a participation in the consequences of their late piratical acts (the payment of the value of the property plundered or

BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
	destroyed), secede from Aboothabee, and establish themselves at Adeed.
A. D. 1836	Jassim bin Jubbur Rugragee, of that tribe, and two others, Soheel bin Ateesh and Ali Howly, each acting independently, and commanding each a small boat containing from twelve to eighteen men, commence a systematic course of plunder. A naval force visits the ports of Biddah, Wukra, and Adeed, whose chiefs bind themselves to do their utmost to seize the boats of the pirates, and are held responsible for their future acts. The latter is further required to afford security in money and property for the fulfilment of the engagement (which is subsequently restored). Three of Jassim bin Jubbur's gang are seized by the Chief of Aboothabee, and are detained in confinement four months, during which period one dies. Their boat is publicly burnt on the beach, in presence of the Resident.
	Shaikh Khaleefa solicits permission to espouse the cause of his guest, Esai bin Tarif, against Bahrein, but is refused, until the special sanction of Government can be obtained, on the grounds of the late serious misdemeanors of his tribe.
	Esai bin Tarif and his dependents leave Aboothabee, and join the expedition of the Imaum against Mombassa, where they render good service.
May 1837	Shaikh Khaleefa attacks the Gubeezat seceders at Adeed, surprises them, kills fifty, and completely destroys the place. His subsequent lenient and moderate conduct induces those who had fled and taken refuge at Debaye and elsewhere, to return and settle under his authority at Aboothabee.
1838	The whole of the Boo Eyneen tribe, numbering about three hundred families, inhabiting Wukra, vacate and destroy that place, and take up their residence at Aboothabee.
May	Khaleefa proceeds with a force to Debaye, while the inhabitants are absent in their vocation on the pearl banks, and obtains possession of the sea tower. The Debaye people return, and, with the assistance of the Shargah people, dislodge the Beniyas garrison, and destroy the tower. Hostilities take place at sea in consequence. All the

BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
	pearl boats are recalled, but mutual restitution of the captured property being made, peace is restored, and the fishery resumed.
A. D. 1839	Contrary to his engagements and promises, Shaikh Khaleefa opens a friendly correspondence with the Egypto-Wahabee Agent in Oman, Syud bin Mootluk. He further, in direct opposition to all his pledges, and in pursuance of the policy of that functionary, proceeds in person to the attack of the Naeem tribes of Brymee (who had been encouraged by the British Government to maintain their independence against the invaders), but is repulsed. He
1840	is held responsible therefore by the British authority for the property plundered by them.
	A misunderstanding arises between Aboothabee and Debaye in consequence of some aggressions at sea, but is amicably adjusted through the interference of the British authority.
1841	A piracy is committed by some of the Monasir and Howamil tribes under the authority of Khaleefa bin Shakboot, upon a Bahrein boat. That chief, upon the circumstance being brought to his notice, adopts the most vigorous measures to punish the delinquents.
1842	It was proposed to Khaleefa bin Shakboot to become a party to a truce forbidding all aggressions and hostilities by land. He declines.
	Shaikh Khaleefa visits Debaye, and a peace is concluded between him and the chief of that place, an arrangement offensive to the Joasmees.
1843	Esai bin Tarif invites Shaikh Khaleefa to join the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa and his colleagues against Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein. He declines doing so without the permission of the British Government. Shakboot, the brother of Khaleefa, makes a foray into the territories of the Joasmees and their allies, and inflicts much injury.
	A hollow treaty of peace is entered into between the Beniyas and Joasmees, but is soon violated by Khaleefa, who, at the instigation probably of the Shaikh of Debaye, makes a foray upon the Bedouin allies of the Joasmees.

DEBAYE—BOO FELASA.

DEBAYE—BOO FELASA.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1834-35	The Boo Felasa, shortly after their secession, commence depredations upon the general trade of the Gulf. Sultan bin Suggur disclaims any control or authority over Debaye. The Shaikh of that place is called upon to make reparation. It becomes necessary to resort to a demonstration of force, and threats of coercive measures, to enforce compliance with the requisitions.
1836	Obed bin Subt, principal Chief of Debaye, dies, and supreme and undivided authority devolves upon Muktoom bin Butye.
1838	The Beniyas Chief seizes the sea tower of Debaye, but is shortly compelled to abandon it.
1839	A Debaye boat commits a piracy upon one belonging to Khaboorah. The Shaikh is compelled to make redress.
1840-41	In consequence of some aggressions by his dependents upon some boats belonging to the Beniyas, the Shaikh of Debaye is called upon to pay a certain sum, and restore the captured Buggarahs. Two shells are fired over his town at a long interval, before he consents to accede to the demand. In consequence of an epidemic, which attacks his people and carries off a great number, the Shaikh of Debaye temporarily abandons his town, and, with the permission of the Joasmee Chief, builds a fort at Derah.
	Five hundred of the Boo Muhair tribe secede from Debaye to Shargah.
	The Beniyas Chief takes advantage of the absence of its inhabitants to attack Debaye, guarded only by a small garrison. He does much injury to the date groves, gains possession of the town and fort, plunders the market and houses, and burns all the stores of dates, &c. as also a Buteel belonging to Shaikh Muktoom. He quits before the combined Debaye and Shargah forces can march against him. He continues his depredations against them inland, greatly harassing them, and constraining them to keep incessantly on the alert.
1842-43	Shaikh Muktoom is victorious against the Beni Ghuflah Bedouin tribes, but receives eight wounds, one of which causes him the loss of an eye.

1.14
Captain Robert Taylor's description of the 'Pirate Ports' and the pearl industry, 1818

EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF NOTES,

CONTAINING

HISTORICAL AND OTHER INFORMATION

CONNECTED WITH THE

PROVINCE OF OMAN; MUSKAT AND THE ADJOINING COUNTRY; THE ISLANDS OF BAHREIN, ORMUS, KISHM, AND KARRACK;

AND OTHER PORTS AND PLACES IN

THE PERSIAN GULF;

PREPARED, IN THE YEAR 1818, BY

CAPTAIN ROBERT TAYLOR,

3RD REGIMENT BOMBAY NATIVE INFANTRY,

ASSISTANT POLITICAL AGENT IN TURKISH ARABIA.

PIRATE PORTS.

Tribe Shihiyyin.

From this cape to the first pirate port at Ramse, on a line of coast of little more than fifteen leagues in extent, lie, at small distances from each other, five towns belonging to the Tribe Shihiyyin, who also possess Amsandam to the eastward of the cape. These towns are named Dar Sinni,* Khasab, Jadi, Julfar, and Boka. From Amsandam to Dar Sinni is three Furseekhs to the south; thence to Khasab four; thence to Jadi two; and lastly to Boka four. Of these Khasab is now the largest; and Julfar, at which the Portuguese once entertained an establishment, protected by a fort, for the purpose of pearl fishing, is the next in size. They are occupied by the stationary and more civilized part of the tribe, who are employed in pearl fishing, in trade, and in agriculture. Their food consists of dates, wheat, barley, meat, and fish, in abundance. The remainder of the tribe is employed in gaining a precarious livelihood, by fishing in the small bays on the coast, or in the islands at the head of the cape, or else, in the character of pastoral Arabs, wandering over the arid and barren rocks of the interior portion of this country, which afford a scanty supply of burnt vegetation for their flocks. These people live on milk and cheese, and dates also, and some little fish, which they procure from their lowland clansmen on the coast, in exchange for the produce of their flocks, which are numerous. The male adults of this tribe are said to amount to fourteen thousand; are the constant and persevering enemies of the Joasim, friendly to Muskat, and easily conciliated. Their pearl fishery is worth 3,000 Tomans yearly, and they have a fleet of two hundred and fifty small boats.

PIRATE PORTS.

Ramse, &c.

Hence we enter on the Pirate Ports at Ramse, southward of Musseldom, in lat. 25° 33′ N., at two days' journey from Khasab. The town is composed of four hundred houses, under the government of Shaikh Abdurrahman bin Saleh, of the Tribe Tannay; and hence to Mahhara, a small village of a hundred houses, under Hussan bin Ali Tannaiye, is four Furseekhs. Two miles off shore is here found a depth of four and a half fathoms; the anchorage is in four and a half fathoms, sand, with Ramse town SE. by E. three miles, and Ras-ool-Khyma six miles distant.

Now the chain of rocky mountains, which formed the promontory of



Ras-ool-Jabal, retires from the sea, forming low sandy plains, and the depth of water begins to decrease.

From hence to Shargah the coast is generally low, and thinly planted with date trees, and full of shallow creeks, well calculated to afford protection to the peculiarly constructed boats of the pirate tribes. That of Ramse is particularly safe, from a bar at its entrance, on which the surf breaks heavily. To ships it were hazardous to approach this coast during the prevalence of a north-west wind, lest they become embayed ; no danger, however, is apparent to the eye between Musseldom and Boo Haile, a line of shore nearly thirty leagues in extent. The whole of this southern shore of the Gulf, which is very imperfectly known, even by tradition, to European hydrographers, is said to abound in shoals, with a bottom generally of coral and sand, and bearing, as far as Grane, in lat. 29° 12′ N., beds of the richest pearls in the universe.

Ras-ool-Khyma.

At a distance of seven miles further, lat. 25° 48′ N., and long. 56° 4′ E. we reach Ras-ool-Khyma, the centre of the Pirate Ports, and their chief town, containing a thousand houses. It bears SW. ½ W. from the Great Quoin, about fifty-five miles distant. The town is situated on a point of land projecting into the sea, in a north-east direction, and terminating in a bank, extending itself parallel with the coast to the westward, at the distance of two and two and a half miles off shore, with two, two and a quarter, and two and a half fathoms, hard sand, upon it. Within this point is a deep, narrow bay, which first takes a south-westerly direction, to the back of the town, along which the Dows and larger boats are sheltered, and hence proceeds further inwards in a south-easterly line. The entrance to the bay is shallow, and impeded by a strip of land, extending obliquely from the point towards the opposite shore, and forming a bar on which, at spring tides, there is scarcely eleven feet water, although at these periods there is a rise of six feet above the usual level. Small vessels, however, or gunboats, drawing not more than three feet water, may advance within pistol-shot of the beach, and much within point-blank range of the town; but it is not safe for vessels of fourteen feet draught to approach under two and a half or three miles. The best anchorage is six fathoms, soft sand, the Point bearing SE. about four miles.

Amulgavine, Ejman, &c.

Eleven miles SW. by W.½ W. of Ras-ool-Khyma is situated a small, low, sandy island, containing four hundred houses, defended by bastions, erected in the most commanding positions. It is insular only at high-

water, as at other times the western end is nearly connected with the main, and is called by the Arabs Jazirat-ool-Hamra. Anchorage in three fathoms, sand ; with extreme of Hamra from Ras-ool-Khyma ENE. to SW. ; centre of the town SE. Between this and Shargah lie the small ports and villages of Amulgavine, Ejman, and Fasht, all defended by towers held by musketeers. The first of these intermediate places consists of a group of four villages, containing together dwellings, belonging to the tribe Ahli Ali, under Shaikh Majed bin Sultan. It lies four leagues SW. by W. of the Jazira, between which and Shargah (which lies in lat. 25° 24′ N., eleven leagues south-west of that place) the coast, at five miles from Amulgavine, takes a more southerly direction.

Shargah..

Shargah has five fathoms at a quarter of a mile off shore ; the anchorage is with the town and fort from ESE. to SE., distant three miles, in seven fathoms. It is defended by towers, without cannon, and a frigate may approach to within two cables length of the shore, to the westward of the town ; but as the soundings are irregular, it is probable there are hidden dangers.

The piratical Dows lie in a small lagoon to the westward of the town. A bank of sand, thrown up along this coast by the violence of the sea, forms a good parapet for the Native matchlockmen.

Boo Haile.

Three leagues south-west of Shargah lies Boo Haile, a town of two hundred houses, defended by towers, under Shaikh Ali Mahomed, of the tribe Matarish.

Khor Hussan.

At two days hence are the Khiran Beniyas, or ports lying along an extent of coast from Shargah to Huailah, a station one day's journey south of Khor Hussan, a port and town near the island of Bahrein, on which villages are very thinly scattered for two days' journey along the sea shore. This district stretches inland also for the same distance.

The Beniyas.

The Beniyas are a pastoral clan, of the province of Oman. They inhabit a part of its northernmost district, called Sir, which is of a very sandy, barren soil. It is divided into three branches ; one called Beniyas, another Manasir, and a third Owaimir. Those who dwell in the interior possess camels of the finest breed ; while those on the coast have boats of a light construction, each carrying four persons, and equipped for fishing ; the produce of which is taken to the town of

Lahsa for sale. Their pearl fishery is accounted to produce yearly 10,000 Tomans. They do not commit piracies on the high seas, but take advantage of the approach of the smallest boats to their coast, and seize them; for which reason their conduct is not so openly stigmatized as that of the other inhabitants of Sir. They have small date groves dispersed among their sand hillocks, which yield a scanty supply of fruit, and amidst which they live during the summer, until their crop is consumed. In this season, the water is very brackish, and in the wintry months the shepherds ascend Lahsa and Qutar, to find pasture for their cattle. They can furnish twenty thousand excellent musketeers.

Huailah.

Huailah lies to the southward, by one day's journey, of Khor Hassan, and is a small station of Baddoos. Its maritime population exists by pearl fishing, while that of the interior follows the occupation of husbandmen, and are less impoverished than their clansmen on the sea coast.

Zukhirah.

The port Zukhirah, under Shaikh Nasir bin Salmin, in common with the other ports of the Arabian shore, fish for pearls.

Khor Hassan.

From hence three days' journey lies Khor Hassan, the former retreat of Shaikh Rahmah bin Jabir Yalahimi, a tribe derived from Nujd. The town is composed of 400 houses, among which his own is conpicuous, from its height, and from the upper story bearing the appearance of a fortification, pierced with loopholes for the convenience of musketry. Towers, too, are erected for its defence. The port within has two fathoms at high-water, and two or three feet at low-water. Ships cannot approach nearer than two or three miles, but the large Native boats come within musket-shot of the shore. The anchorage is rocky, and exposed to the north-west wind, which excites a tremendous swell. Within the space of twelve hours, five thousand Baddoos may be marched down from the interior to defend the coast.

Zobara.

Near this is the port of Zobara, the inhabitants of which are allied to those of Khor Hassan; it has a town of 400 houses.

Ogair.

Ogair lies opposite to the island of Bahrein, and may be esteemed the chief seaport of the Wahabees. A custom house, at which all imports direct for Lahsa and Dareyah are landed, is established at this place, as their conveyance to their several destinations by land is thus greatly shortened. All merchandize pays here ten per cent., date grounds and agricultural produce generally twenty per cent. It can boast of only forty or fifty dwellings. Hence to Dareyah six days, during two of which no water is procurable.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

The extreme general sterility of those parts of the continents of Persia and Arabia which confine the intervening Gulf has contributed to present to the view of its Natives the life of a freebooter in a more inviting form than could have been given to it had they been situated in a country of greater resources. But this reflection, however it may be admitted as a slight extenuation of their guilt, can never wholly excuse it, particularly when it is known that previous to these piratical pursuits, which are almost the growth of the present century, an extensive and lucrative commerce first gave them a fleet, and a band of able and hardy mariners, which they have since turned to purposes so different from these civilized habits, the primary cause of their aggrandisement.

From this the British were among the first sufferers, by the attack on one of their smallest cruisers, assailed in the roads of Bushire with ammunition which had, in an hour of friendly communication previous to the attack, been solicited and bestowed on the chief of the assailing fleet. These hollow friends were, however, beaten off, with considerable loss on their side.

To proceed, then, on a plan of methodical and comprehensive detail, it were perhaps advisable, in order to prove their addiction to commercial pursuits, to premise an account of these tribes in the days of their upright and honorable exertion, previous to their conversion to the Wahabee faith, which paved the way to every subsequent atrocity. These, and other particulars given in the course of this Report, relating to the Arabs of the Persian Gulf, are the results of personal investigation, or of cautious gleanings from Natives of authority, and capable of close observation.

They were originally employed, as these authorities state, in commercial enterprise, in the cultivation of extensive groves of the date tree, and the pursuit of a lucrative pearl fishery. The sale of the yearly produce of their date grounds placed the proprietors in possession of an equivalent amounting to Rs. 80,000, of which the governing power received a tenth, or Rs. 8,000. Their fleets consisted of large boats, as the Dow and Buggalow, and smaller ones, or the Buteel and Bugareh. The former visited the ports of India, Yemen, Africa, Sind, Kutch, Muskat, and Bussora, and in each of these different voyages the value of a single share of a seaman was as follows: in the voyage to India, from Rs. 50 to Rs. 60; to Yemen, Rs. 80; to Africa, Rs. 40; to Sind and Kutch, from Rs. 25 to Rs. 30; to Muskat, Rs. 12;—in the voyage to Bussora they gained nothing, but shipped a cargo of fish and dried dates for the different ports above mentioned. The lesser vessels traded generally to Bahrein and Kateef, which gave a single dividend to each sailor of from Rs. 4 to Rs. 6. They also used to visit Bussora, and load with grain for Ras-ool-Khyma, and its adjacent tributaries, which paid each seaman one share of Rs. 10; as did the voyages to the Hoolch ports of Congoon, Aseeloo, and Kishm, from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3.

From the produce of each of these voyages, the governor was entitled

to one share, equal to that of a seaman, at which time the number of large vessels was sixty, and of the lesser ones two hundred.

Their pearl banks, which were famous for their extent, and the admirable quality of their produce, lay from three to six miles off shore, in six to seven fathoms water, on which four hundred boats of different sizes annually prosecuted the fishery. Each of two hundred large boats carried a crew of one master, twelve divers, and twelve assistants, in all twenty-five persons; one hundred boats of an intermediate size were furnished each with one master, eight divers, and eight assistants, in all seventeen persons; one hundred of the smallest boats each contained one master, six divers, and six assistants, in all thirteen persons. The sale of the yearly produce of the fishery was estimated at the lowest rate at 40,000 Tomans, and each Toman at 18 Piastres Roomee. The shares of the crews of these boats were determined after the subtraction of one-fourth of the produce of each boat for the proprietor of it, as follows: for the master three shares, for the diver two shares, and for the assistant one share. The fishing season lasted for three months.

The crews of these boats used generally to borrow sums of money, sufficient to support themselves and families, from bankers resident on the spot, in the following proportions: of the larger 100 Tomans, of the intermediate 50 Tomans, and the smallest 30 Tomans, either in grain or money, or both. On the advances of grain only, the lender never gained less than fifty per cent., often one hundred per cent., as the markets indicated; but on the cash loans their faith admits of no interest being given or received.

In unfavourable seasons of the fishery, these bankers occasionally deferred the pressure of their claims until the third year, when, if the boat belonged to the debtor, they sold it, and recovered the amount of their claim; if not, the debt was paid by degrees, from the profits of the debtors, who in these cases undertook voyages to sea in the service of merchants, or themselves made a venture to some of the neighbouring ports, with fish and other cargo of their own.

By long custom, the fishermen were obliged to offer their pearls for sale first to their creditor, who enjoyed the advantage of a discount of ten per cent. if he approved of the article; if not, they were sold to the highest bidder, and the debt of the year paid off. The governor gained from each boat yearly the portion, or two shares, of a diver, with the additional privilege of purchasing at half price all pearls exceeding in value 110 Tomans. He used to be extremely rigid in the exaction of this right, and employed spies in each boat, who reported any delinquency, which was punished by the forfeiture of the full price of the gem attempted to be concealed. This effectually prevented the crime.

1.15
Historical sketches of the Arab Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1747–1854

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

JOASMEE TRIBE OF ARABS;

FROM THE YEAR 1747 TO THE YEAR 1819.

PREPARED BY

MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,

MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

WITH

CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,

FROM THE YEAR 1819 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNELL;

FROM 1832 TO JULY 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

JOASMEES.

THE Joasmees are a race of Arabs descended from the inhabitants of Nujd, and named Beni Nasir, as being on the left hand side of the Caaba; and called also Beni Gafree. They have possessed the principality of Seer, in Oman, and been an independent tribe, from the earliest ages. Their territory on the line of coast of that province extends from Musseldom to Zobara, or the island of Shargah, to the northward. That part of Oman contains many tribes,—the Shahee, Zoheree, Joasmee, Beni Kuttub, and Beni Naeem, &c. The Beni Naeem was for many years the head tribe, but the disturbances that followed the death of Nadir Shah having compelled

A. D. 1747. Moolla Ali Shah,* the Governor of Ormus, Gombroon, and Minao, to call to his assistance some Arab Tribes for the purpose of resisting the unjust demand of tribute which every competitor for the throne of Persia preferred, without any consideration to its having been collected by his predecessor, he fixed on Rashid bin Muttur bin Kasim, with whom he formed alliances by marriage, and was enabled, from the vessels under his command, to avail himself of their services whenever required.

2. The Kasimees, or, as we shall hereafter call them, the Joasmees, retained the vessels occasionally sent for them, and being well paid for their assistance, and having opportunities of procuring arms, they soon acquired an ascendancy among their own tribes, and were enabled to take possession of the town of Kishm, and of Luft, and of Lingah and

A. D. 1765. Shinas on the Persian main, and were extending their conquests over all Moolla Ali's possessions, when their career was checked by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Moien,† who retook Ormus and Bunder Abbas from Moolla Hussein, and Kishm and Luft from the Joasmees. The Joasmees remained passive within their ports whilst Abdoolla lived, but on his death, his sons disagreeing, and their government becoming imbecile, the Joasmees reappeared in the Gulf, plundering the weaker tribes.

* That monarch's Duryah Beg (or Admiral) in the Persian Gulf.

† Appointed by Kureem Khan Governor of Ormus, Kishm, and Bunder Abbas.

JOASMEES.

3. In 1772 we find Shaikh Rashid, of Ras-ool-Khyma, who had

A. D. 1772. succeeded his father Shaikh Muttur, in alliance with the Imaum of Muskat, and co-operating with Shaikh Khulfan, the governor of that port, against the Persians. They destroyed two Persian gallivats off Gombroon, and a magazine which the Persian troops had formed at Lingah.

4. In 1775 the Imaum of Muskat was at war with Shaikh Rashid,

A. D. 1775. who had become very powerful by land; the Shaikh captured some Bushire craft, under the plea that their cargo belonged to Muskat.

5. Shaikh Rashid retiring from public life, resigned the Shaikhdom to his son Shaikh Suggur, who, marrying one of Shaikh Abdoolla's daughters, all differences between them were settled.

6. The Joasmees now appeared as traders, and, in a very few years, by their activity, carried on a most profitable concern; but, adds Captain Seton, their rash and treacherous disposition was constantly showing itself, and leading to petty wars and quarrels, both among themselves and their neighbours.

7. The Ras-ool-Khyma fleet, in consequence of the decline of the

A. D. 1778-79. Persian ascendancy in the Gulf, being constantly on the cruise, roused almost every petty chief to fit out armed boats, manned by lawless crews, under no control, but who depended solely on plunder for their maintenance, which they indiscriminately practised. This state of affairs arose out of the war between Ras-ool-Khyma and Muskat.

8. The internal state of Persia being unsettled, the war with Ras-ool-Khyma continued; Shaikh Abdoolla of Ormus was at variance with Karrack; the Shaikh of Al Haram with the Jamia people; and the Uttoobees of Zobara and Grane with the Chaab.

9. Shaikh Suggur next appears endeavouring to negotiate a peace between the Persians and Uttoobees, who had plundered and taken Bahrein; but failing in his efforts, he joined Shaikh Nassir of Bushire in an expedition for the recovery of the island, the Joasmee Shaikh having taken part against the Uttoobees, in consequence of their having captured a boat of his, and murdered eighteen of her crew. These attempts for reducing Bahrein were repeatedly made, and not abandoned until 1785.

10. The Joasmees appear not to have taken any part in the disputes

A. D. 1785 to 1796. which occurred between the Montific Arabs and the Turkish Government, nor is any mention made of the Joasmees for a number of years. The Gulf enjoyed, also, every degree of tranquillity in 1793, 1794, 1795, and 1796.

JOASMEES.

11. In 1797 the first capture was made by the Joasmees of a British vessel. The *Bassein Snow*, under British colours, and charged with public despatches, was taken on the 18th of May, off Ramse, by a fleet of Dows belonging to Ras-ool-Khyma: she was, however, released by the Shaikh two days after.

A. D. 1797.

12. In October following, the *Viper* cruiser was attacked by the Joasmees, whilst at anchor in Bushire Roads. The Joasmee Dows had arrived about six days before the *Viper*, under the command of Shaikh Saleh, Chief of the Beni Joasmee Arabs, and nephew to the Joasmee Shaikh, who were at war with the Imaum of Muskat. Their object was to intercept the Sooree Arabs, who were at Bussora. On the day the *Viper* arrived, Shaikh Saleh had an interview with the Resident at Bushire, when, after the strongest professions of friendship, he stated what his views were, and begged that we would not protect the Sooree Dows, nor ship any British property on board; but if we did, he promised that it should be held sacred. After these professions, Shaikh Saleh requested a supply of balls and powder from the *Viper*, which having been furnished, he treacherously attacked the cruiser, but was beaten off.

A. D. 1797-98.

13. The Resident at Bussora remonstrated against both these acts: they were met on the part of Shaikh Suggur by professions of regard for the English, contending, in respect to the attack of the *Viper*, that the cruiser had fired first on the Dows. He stated that Shaikh Saleh left Ras-ool-Khyma, separated himself from the tribe, had proceeded to the Persian shore, and there established himself among the Beni Khalid Arabs, marrying a woman of that tribe, which was one of a villanous nature and character; that since the commencement of hostilities between the Joasmees and people of Oman, Shaikh Saleh had acted independently of Ras-ool-Khyma, committing depredations according to his inclination; that the Joasmees had no disputes with the English, and considered the people of Oman alone as their enemies.

14. These disputes arose in consequence of the unsettled state of the Muskat Government on the death of Syud Ahmed, and the usurpations of Syud Sultan. He had involved himself in serious disputes with the Arabs of the Gulf, which brought on a war with many of them, who had united against him; and the Bombay Government conceived that those acts of aggression experienced by British vessels had been from Arabs in the interest of the deposed Prince of Oman.

15. At the close of the year 1798, the Imaum of Muskat was threatening Bussora, on account of some ancient claims he possessed against the Pasha of Bagdad. In order to enable him the more effectually to execute his hostile intentions, Syud Saeed negotiated a peace

JOASMEES.

with his formidable enemies the Joasmees. They desisted from these hostile intentions through the interposition of the Resident at Bussora.

16. The Joasmees do not appear to have co-operated with the Imaum in his attack on Bahrein; nor do we hear anything more of them until 1802, when the attention of the Imaum was directed to the formation of an alliance with the Joasmees, which failed;—its object probably was to assist in the attack on Zobara and Bahrein. Shaikh Suggur dying in 1803, was succeeded by his son, Shaikh Sultan.

A. D. 1802-03.

17. The Joasmees must have been kept in check by the progress of the Wahabees, who had by the month of May 1802 reduced to nominal submission the whole coast from Bussora to Dubba, which included their territory. They appear, however, towards the close of 1804, to have been in alliance with the Uttoobees, since it was in an engagement with these two tribes that Syud Sultan, the Imaum, lost his life.

18. We may now date the period when the Joasmees may be said to have engaged in piratical depredations. Up to the close of 1804, they committed no act of piracy; but, with the exception of the attack on the *Bassein Snow*, and *Viper* cruiser, manifested every respect to the British flag.

19. The influence of the Wahabees having been introduced over the principality of Seer, and the Government of Muskat having, on the death of Syud Sultan, also fallen under the control of that power, the characters of the different tribes in the Gulf underwent a material change, and the attention of the British Government was directed to check the spirit of piracy which at this period began to display itself.

A. D. 1805.

20. The contentions for the succession, between the members of the Muskat family, threw the Gulf into a state of great confusion: the Joasmees captured two vessels (the *Shannon* and *Trimmer*), belonging to Mr. Manisty, with public despatches, and treated the commanders with great severity and cruelty; and a fleet of forty sail surrounded and fired into the *Mornington* cruiser, but a broadside or two compelled them to sheer off. They were co-operating, also, with Moolla Hussein of Kishm, with whom they were allied, against Bunder Abbas and Minao; whilst Beder, the successful competitor for the Imaumship, was projecting a plan (notwithstanding the support he was receiving from the Wahabees) with the Uttoobees, to destroy the Joasmees, who were at this time in subjection to Abdool Azeez.

21. Syud Beder, on the adjustment of the disputes with Syud Ghes of Sohar, proceeded with a land and sea force for the recovery of Bunder Abbas, Minao, and Ormus, which he effected. Operations were at this time actively prosecuted by the British against the

JOASMEES.

Joasmees, in conjunction with the Government of Muskat. The combined forces proceeded to Kishm, where they blockaded a Joasmee fleet, which were reduced to such distress as to solicit a peace. Captain Seton agreed to grant them a truce until the pleasure of Government should be known; explaining, as his reason for not prosecuting hostilities with vigour, the impossibility of doing it without offending either the Persians or the Wahabees.

22. The Joasmees, according to their engagements, restored the *Trimmer*, the *Shannon* having been previously given up, after having been completely stripped.

23. In the month of October an Agent arrived at Muskat from Moolla Hussein, deputed by the Joasmees to negotiate a peace for them. The instructions of the Bombay Government having been applied for, Captain Seton was informed, that in the event of its becoming a party to the peace, it should not be of a limited nature, but extend generally to the whole Gulf, and every other place and situation, and he was to require full indemnification for the losses we had sustained.

24. Captain Seton, finding it impracticable to obey the orders of the Government to obtain the required indemnification, without having recourse to hostilities, which would have involved us in a general warfare with the whole Gulf, judged it advisable to enter into the agreement with the Joasmees dated the 6th of February 1806, the whole bulk of whom he represented as desirous of returning to their former mercantile pursuits. This agreement* does not appear to have been negotiated with the consent, or even with the knowledge, of the Wahabee Shaikh.

25. The Joasmees continued true to their engagements in every point that regarded the British; but they co-operated in the following year with Syud Beder, the Imaum, in an attack on Syud Ghes, who had refused to become a party to the peace, which he could not in honour do until he had revenged the blood of Syud Sultan. A. D. 1807.

26. Precluded by the Treaty of 1806 from carrrying on their cruises in the Gulf, and urged by the Wahabees, the Joasmees extended them to India. In the month of April 1808 they made their first appearance as pirates in the Indian Seas, on the coast to the northward of Bombay. The Wahabee Shaikh had long contemplated the extension of piratical cruises to India. The Joasmees had by a late order of the Wahabee been rendered independent of their lawful Shaikh, Sultan, who had at this period nothing left but Ras-ool-Khyma. Ramse, Shargah, and other places sent out their boats without his permission. Gadeef, an A. D. 1808.

* A copy of which will be found at page 75 of this Selection.

JOASMEES.

Arab Chieftain of the Joasmee Tribe, on the Persian main, was also averse to piracy; but his subjects, cut off from trade on account of the general disrepute of their tribe, sought a livelihood in the vessels of others. These piracies (as stated by Captain Seton) "can only be considered as a general one at the instigation of the Wahabees." In one cruise in this year they captured twenty country boats, which so elated them that they determined on sending a fleet of fifty towards Sind and Kutch. A. D. 1808-09.

27. On the 20th of October they committed a breach of the Treaty of 1806, by attacking and capturing the *Sylph* cruiser, in the Gulf of Persia. She was re-taken by H. M.'s frigate *Nereid*, which was in sight when the Joasmees boarded the cruiser.

28. In the following year, the Wahabees directed the Joasmees and the Uttoobees to proceed against Grane. The latter excused themselves, but the former offered to go if they were supported by ships. A. D. 1809.

29. The Persians from Lar attacked the Joasmees at Lingah, and the town of Karrack, and compelled them to retire to Basside, in the island of Kishm. The Joasmees were however successful against a fleet fitted out by Mahomed Nubhee Khan against Khor Hassan, which twenty-two Joasmee boats encountered, beat, and took six of the Bushire vessels.

30. The Wahabee Chief having appointed Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, and who was the Shaikh of Ramse, his vicegerent in the Seer principality, vested him with authority over Ras-ool-Khyma, and nominated Wahabee officers throughout the Joasmee country. Shaikh Sultan, the Joasmee Chief, having been invited to Deriah, proceeded to that capital, and was detained and imprisoned by the Wahabee Chief. He contrived to escape from prison, and finding his way to Yemen, embarked at Mocha, and, proceeding to Muskat, made overtures to the Imaum, besought His Highness' protection, disclaiming all countenance to, or concurrence in, the attack of the *Sylph*, and professing on this occasion a desire to conform to the Treaty of 1806. The Imaum took him to Shargah, and placed him over the Joasmee Tribes at that place, Shaikh Sultan occasionally living at Lingah.

31. The British Government, determining to relieve the Imaum from the power of the Wahabees, and to suppress these piracies, an expedition proceeded to the Gulf under the instructions dated the 7th of September 1809. Their first operations were directed against Ras-ool-Khyma. The attack commenced by a bombardment during the 12th of November. On the following day, the Joasmees were vigorously attacked by sea and land: after a bloody but ineffectual resistance, they were driven into the interior of the country. The town, with the

vessels in port, amounting to upwards of fifty, with the English prize ship the *Minerva*, were burnt.

32. The Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma, in the most insulting manner, had the audacity to demand a tribute from the Government to allow British ships to navigate the Persian Gulf in safety.

33. From Ras-ool-Khyma the armament proceeded to Lingah, where twenty Dows were destroyed, the inhabitants abandoning the town on the approach of our ships. Finding no vessels int he ports of Congoon, Bunder Mullim, and Homeram, the armament proceeded to Luft, situated on the north side of the island of Kishm. The town was soon taken possession of by our troops, but the unexpected strength of the fort, and the desperation with which it was defended, frustrated every attempt to carry it by storm. All the essential objects of the attack were however fully attained; their boats and Dows were completely destroyed. The bombardment having continued, Moolla Hussein surrendered the place, together with property to the amount of two lakhs of rupees, belonging to the Imaum, which, with the fort, were delivered in trust for the Imaum to Shaikh Dervish, the head of the Beni Naeem, a tribe of Arabs who have always been firmly attached to His Highness.

34. On the reduction of Luft, the armament proceeded to Muskat. The commanders of the expedition expressed their readiness to co-operate with His Highness in the recovery of any other of his ports. He proposed to accompany the armament with a considerable force to the attack of Shinas and Khore Fukaun.

35. The joint forces arrived at Shinas on the 31st of December, which was summoned on the following day. As this had no effect, it was bombarded. The situation of the fort, however, being too distant to be reduced by these means, the troops were landed. Shinas was defended with the most determined and heroic bravery. After an obstinate and sanguinary resistance, the fort was surrendered, and made over to the Oman troops, but was so much demolished that the Imaum did not think it prudent to keep possession of it.

A. D. 1810.

36. The Imaum having expressed some hesitation on the policy of attacking Khore Fukaun, from apprehending a similar obstinate resistance to that made at Shinas, which would render it untenable by His Highness' troops, the object was abandoned, there being no British interest connected with it, as there were no pirate vessels belonging to the port.

37. The commanders were unable to form a treaty with Ras-ool-Khyma, Shaikh Sultan, their chief, having been seized by the Wahabees, and their Government completely overthrown; independently of which, no treaty could be binding on the Joasmees without the direct authority

and participation of Saood, on which tribe they were entirely dependent; but the commanders observed,—such had been the impression of our operations against the principal pirate ports, that they succeeded in their demand to destroy all the Dows and large boats of the petty chieftains from Ramse to Abookeyle, on the Arabian side, as well as Mogoo, on the Coast of Persia. The Chief of Charrak, not having any Dows or large boats, was admonished to refrain from giving encouragement or protection to future pirates. A similar message was sent to the Chief of Nakheeloo, with a demand, at the request of the Imaum, for the release of Shaikh Jubara of Congoon, the friend of the English. It was not deemed material to insist on the destruction of Tromkeys and small boats,—a measure that would have been hard on the poorest of the inhabitants, and created an odium against the British name which did not generally exist, many of the small villages on both sides of the Gulf having been compelled to join in piratical pursuits.

38. As the Uttoobees had never committed any depredations against our trade, even at times when the Joasmees were enriching themselves by their frequent captures of British vessels, the commanders determined on not attacking Khor Hassan.

39. It was the prevalent opinion in the Gulf, founded on the result of this expedition, that the Joasmees had been rendered quite incapable of committing any further depredations by sea. The Resident at Bussora confirmed this opinion; but added,—"such was the revengeful and vindictive spirit of the Wahabee Tribe, and of the inhabitants on the Arabian side of the Gulf under the jurisdiction and authority of Shaikh Saood, that they will attempt to wreak their vengeance on any defenceless British vessels which they may meet. At all events, such people are not to be trusted, and Mr. Manisty recommended a prohibition being imposed on the exportation of timber from the ports of India either to those of the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, even including Muskat; from which place the pirates will by some means or other contrive to procure it. Their countries do not produce any kind of timber proper for ship or boat-building; if therefore the pirates be deprived by the regulations of the British Government of their ordinary supply of teak, they cannot long possess a naval force of any importance."

40. The pirates reappeared in the beginning of 1812, and in the following year destroyed several large Dows and Buggalows belonging to the ports of Bussora and Congoon. Boats navigating under British colours did not escape depredations, whilst others were detained at Porebunder, and prevented from prosecuting their mercantile pursuits.

A. D. 1812.

JOASMEES.

41. In the following year the Imaum prepared an expedition against the port of Ras-ool-Khyma, for the purpose of reinstating the Joasmee Chief in his government, Shaikh Sultan promising that if His Highness would restore him to his hereditary possessions and consequence he would ever consider himself as a vassal of the Imaum and his allies, and would never again, or his tribe, commit piracies. The Imaum requested that Mr. Bruce, who was at Muskat, would accompany him to witness the treaty which he should enter into with Sultan bin Suggur, and for the purpose also of negotiating a treaty with the Joasmee Chief on the part of the British Government, which, as observed by the Imaum, would have more effect in keeping him to the performance of his engagements than anything else, as Sultan bin Suggur was now aware of our determination not to allow the slightest insult to pass unnoticed.

A. D. 1813.

42. As the renewal of the treaty entered into by the Joasmee Chief with Captain Seton in 1806 was deemed essential for restraining the piratical acts of his subjects, Mr. Bruce was instructed to adopt the necessary measures accordingly, and to contract similar engagements with the other chieftains in the Gulf.

43. This expedition failed, and a second one, equipped in 1814, for a similar purpose, terminated in a peace, concluded between the Imaum of Muskat and the Joasmees, to which Shaikh Suggur was compelled to become a party. He agreed, it is said, to His Highness possessing Ras-ool-Khyma, and to his being established at Shargah.

A. D. 1814.

44. Mr. Bruce, on the 7th of August, forwarded a letter from Shaikh Suggur, communicating the capture of the ship *Ahmed Shah* by the Shaikh of Charrak, and requested good offices in favour of an Agent he was deputing to the Prince at Shiraz, on business of importance. In transmitting that letter, Mr. Bruce remarked that the Joasmee Chief, who was residing at Lingah, was much attached to the British Government. The only further account we have of this mission is contained in a letter from the Broker at Muskat, dated the 7th of November, stating that the King of Persia had sent an honorary dress for Sultan bin Suggur, to obtain his co-operation with Persia in the reduction of Bahrein.

45. In consequence of some depredations committed on the trade, remonstrances were transmitted to the Chiefs of the Wahabees and the Joasmees, on the impropriety of their proceedings. A reply was returned from Hussein bin Rahmah, the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, stating that he was not aware that any vessels bearing the British pass and colours had been captured by the Joasmees, but that if it should prove to be the case, such property as might be forthcoming would be restored, but that

JOASMEES.

in future he would issue instructions to his tribe not to molest or come near any ship or vessel under British colours; nor did they wish to interrupt the British trade in any way. As he was proceeding to Deriah, Hussein bin Rahmah took Mr. Bruce's messenger with him, to obtain a reply to the letter to the Wahabee Chief.

46. The messenger returned with another letter from Shaikh Hussein bin Rahmah, in which, though he acknowledges that his cruisers had visited the northern ports of India, yet denied that they had knowingly molested any vessels navigating under British pass and colours, and repeating his assurances of a desire not to molest the British trade. At the suggestion of Mr. Bruce, the passes were ordered to be written in the Arabic language also, to prevent the Joasmees pleading ignorance of any pass being on board.

47. On the 2nd of October a Vukeel, named Hussein bin Mahomed bin Gaith, arrived at Bushire, with letters from the Wahabee Chief, and Hussein bin Rahmah; the former disapproving of the conduct of that chief, and of his tribe, and binding himself to compel the latter to deliver up such property as we could prove them to have captured; who, on the other hand, denied having captured any British property, expressing a hope that we would not be too severe in scrutinizing the past. The Vukeel was authorised to enter into an engagement with Mr. Bruce. He stated that the Joasmees were anxious to be on the best terms with the British Government, whose good will they would study hereafter to merit; that they would respect our flag and subjects; but that they hoped we would not insist on their leaving off cruising against those States who were at enmity with them; as, according to the law of nations among the Arabs, blood could only be repaid by blood; that if they did not follow this kind of warfare, they would lose their rank amongst the Arab States, and that their enemies would come to their very homes to attack them; that they were, moreover, compelled by the Wahabee Chief to wage war against the Mahomedan States of the Gulf, to bring them under the yoke and religion of the Wahabees; and only to respect the British flag and subjects, to whom they were directed to be attentive, and to cultivate their alliance; that if we would guarantee, on their leaving off this mode of proceeding, that none of the Arab States would molest them or their vessels, and would guarantee also their safety against the vengeance of the Wahabee Chief for not obeying his commands, they would then abandon the course of life they were pursuing; but otherwise their natural situation in the Gulf was such that they were compelled to be enemies to the greater portion of it.

48. Mr. Bruce confirmed the truth of Hussein bin Gaith's statement regarding their peculiar situation, and the system among the

JOASMEES.

Arabs; as also in respect to the tenets of their religion, so different from the other Mahomedan sects, which rendered them the enemies of all other Islam sects, and these to be their enemies; and deemed it advisable to enter into a few preliminary articles of agreement with Hussein bin Gaith, renouncing all claims, and passing an act of oblivion on the past, on the conditions specified in the engagement. The Joasmee Chief having resolved to depute an Agent to Bombay, Mr. Bruce was induced to conclude the preliminary agreement in question.

49. Some boats bearing the British pass and colours having been taken off Porebunder in the month of August 1814, Mr. Bruce, conformably to orders to remonstrate against that act, despatched a boat to Ras-ool-Khyma, with letters to Hussein bin Rahmah and to his Vukeel, who had entered into the preliminary engagement above specified, of a friendly tenor, and with a letter also to Sultan bin Suggur of Lingah.

A. D. 1815.

50. To Mr. Bruce's astonishment, the Nakhoda returned in a few days after his departure in a most wretched plight, and almost starved to death. The Chief of Lingah, to which island the boat first proceeded, took 80 frazils of dates out of her, and seemed disposed to keep the boat itself; but on anchoring off the town of Ras-ool-Khyma, a boat put off the shore, came alongside, and inquired what vessel it was. On being informed, they greeted them on their arrival, and recommended them to get under weigh, and stand in for their greater security, and offered to pilot Mr. Bruce's boat in; on which the Nakhoda weighed, being towed in by the Joasmee boats. Shortly after, about twenty armed men came out of the latter, drew their sabres, and immediately drove the Nakhoda and part of the crew, who were in the leading boat, overboard. Those in the other, seeing this, cut the tow rope, and pulled away, taking up those who had jumped over, and reached Bushire.

51. The capture of this boat, which had been despatched on the faith of engagements so very recently made, and which had actually arrived at the very door of their dwellings, proved the little reliance that could be placed in any treaty with such lawless banditti. The act was at variance, also, with the conduct which so strongly characterises the Arabs, who fulfil the obligations of hospitality even towards an enemy seeking their protection, and reposing in their confidence. This flagrant breach of faith sufficiently proved a determination on the part of the Joasmees of attacking all vessels, of whatever description they might be, or under any colours.

52. This attack was followed by the capture by the Joasmees of a Buggalow belonging to the Imaum of Muskat, whilst at anchor in the roads of Mogoo.* She was laden with horses for the remount of the 17th dragoons, and with sulphur on account of the British. Six boats were moreover captured off the coasts of Kurachee and Sind.

JOASMEES.

53. The success that attended the subsequent cruises undertaken by the Joasmees added so much to their strength, that it induced most of the other ports on the coast, from Cape Nabend to the southward, to follow the same system. The Shaikh of Charrak in particular was encouraged to form a connection with Ras-ool-Khyma, and Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein openly avowed his determination of prosecuting piracy, as the surest mode of acquiring wealth and strength.

54. The Joasmees engaged and defeated the Imaum's fleet, and had very nearly taken the *Caroline* frigate, of thirty-two guns.

55. A vessel belonging to Bombay, sailing under a British pass and colours, was this year captured off Muskat, the greater part of her crew put to death, and a ransom exacted for the release of the remainder.

56. The audacity of the pirates increased to such a degree that they attacked the *Aurora* cruiser, and chased and fired at the American ship *Persia*, and *Cintra* schooner; and so great was the dread entertained of the Joasmees that Lieutenant Bruce could not obtain a boat to despatch to Ras-ool-Khyma, to convey a letter of remonstrance to the chief in regard to these depredations.

A. D. 1816.

57. Three vessels belonging to the port of Surat were taken in the Arabian Gulf, sailing under British pass and colours, and many of their crew murdered. The loss of property by this capture was estimated at ten lakhs of rupees.

58. Many other captures were made of vessels sailing under our protection, attended by similar acts of atrocity; and at length most indisputable proof was afforded of the faithlessness of their promises to respect the British flag and pass, by the capture of the Company's armed boat the *Turrarow*.

59. The measures of the Government were limited to remonstrances, and to the disposal of the cruisers for the protection of the trade, until the exigencies of the public service in other quarters should admit of an expedition being detached against the pirates.

60. A deputation was sent to Ras-ool-Khyma to obtain redress for the capture of the vessels in the Arabian Gulf, which failed. The Joasmees explicitly and boldly declared "that they would respect the sect of Christians, and their property, but none other; they did not consider any part of Western India as ours besides Bombay and Mangalore; that if we interfered in favour of the Hindoos and other

* The people of Mogoo were privy to this depredation, and had, in fact, given information of the Buggalow being there.

JOASMEES.

unbelievers of India, we might take all India, and Muskat also, when nothing would be left for them to plunder."

61. A small squadron of Joasmee boats landed in the month of October in Busheab, and burnt and plundered the villages at the western part of the island, carrying off all the cattle, and killing great numbers of the inhabitants.

A. D. 1817.

62. At the close of the year we find them in the harbour of Aseeloo, which they had entered, and taken five large laden Buggalows, valued at three lakhs of rupees, and had murdered their crews. The inhabitants of Bushire were thrown into the greatest consternation from the Joasmees contemplating an attack on that place. The Governor of Bushire with great difficulty restrained the inhabitants from leaving it, and retiring further into the interior.

A. D. 1818.

63. The Joasmee fleet remained twelve days at Aseeloo, and thence proceeded to Congoon, but finding the place prepared to receive them, they weighed, and, standing to the northward, anchored off Daire, where they landed and destroyed a number of date trees. They were repulsed, however, in an action with the inhabitants, and obliged to take to their boats.

64. Apprehending an attack by the Turkish troops, the Joasmee Chief sent a number of people from Ras-ool-Khyma to build a fort at Bassadore, on the west end of the island of Kishm, which they intended to garrison, as a place of security for their property, should they not succeed in repelling the Turkish troops. Bassadore has a harbour well secured for vessels, and cannot be approached but by boats of light draught. It was formerly in possession of the Portuguese, who built several large reservoirs for water, and a large town with fortifications all round, now nearly destroyed, and a fine pier jutting into the sea, which, with the reservoirs, are in very good repair. This port, if possessed by the Joasmees, would from its situation be a source of greater annoyance to the trade going up and down the Gulf than Ras-ool-Khyma has proved.

A. D. 1819.

A letter has lately been received from Hussein bin Rahmah, referring to a treaty of peace concluded between "his Imaum" and us, and professing a desire of continuing on terms of friendship with the English Government; which of course has been positively declined; and by the last accounts from the Gulf it would appear that the Imaum of Muskat was preparing an expedition against Ras-ool-Khyma, in conjunction with Shaikh Sultan and the Beniyas Tribe of Arabs.

JOASMEES.

CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING SKETCH, TO THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNELL.

Mr. Warden's notices of the Joasmee Tribe are brought down to the year 1819; and conclude by stating that, alarmed at the rapid success of Ibrahim Pasha over the Wahabee power, and apprehending that after the reduction of Kateef the next operations of the Turkish General would be directed against Ras-ool-Khyma, the Joasmees contemplated forsaking that town, and forming a settlement and building a fort on Bassadore (the western extremity of the island of Kishm). Information of this intention having been received in India, orders were given to the commander of the British naval squadron in the Persian Gulf to prevent their carrying it into effect. It appears, also, that Hussein bin Rahmah, the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, probably alarmed by the reports of an expedition preparing in Bombay for the Gulf of Persia, made a proposal, about the commencement of the year, to continue on terms of friendship with the British Government, which was declined without hesitation. Mr. Warden likewise alludes to the Imaum having in contemplation an expedition against the Joasmee capital, in conjunction with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot.

A. D. 1819.

In the month of October 1819 an expedition, which had been contemplated for some time, but which various causes had operated to delay, was prepared in Bombay, for the purpose of completely crushing the lawless and sanguinary proceedings of the Joasmees. This force consisted of 3,069 men under arms, viz. 1 company of artillery; H. M.'s 47th regiment; H. M.'s 65th regiment; 1st battalion 2nd regiment Native infantry; the flank companies of the 1st battalion 3rd regiment Native infantry; and those of the Marine Battalion; together with half a company of pioneers; making a total of 1,645 European, and 1,424 Native soldiers, under the command of Major General Sir William Grant Keir. The naval part of the expedition (which was composed of H. M.'s ships *Liverpool*, *Eden*, *Curlew*, and the vessels of the Honorable Company's Marine) was placed under the orders of Captain Collier, C.B. A short time previous to the sailing of the expedition, a communication was made by the Governor of Bombay to His Royal Highness the Prince of Shiraz, explanatory of the objects in equipping so large a military and naval force; and after intimating that no course of proceeding would be adopted inconsistent with the friendly relations so long established between the two Governments, expressed an earnest wish

JOASMEES.

that His Royal Highness would co-operate in the measures to be carried on against Lingah, Mogoo, Tawoonee, and Charrak, as those places had completely identified themselves with the Joasmees. A letter was likewise addressed to His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, nearly to the same purport as the above, and intimating that Dr. Jukes and a commissariat officer had been sent on in advance to make arrangements for the co-operation of His Highness, and the provisioning troops after their arrival at Kishm, where they were to rendezvous.

The expedition at last sailed from Bombay on the 4th November, the commanding officer proceeding on board the *Liverpool* to Muskat, which place he reached on the 13th, while the remainder of the convoy proceeded on to Kishm. His Highness the Imaum on this occasion agreed to furnish 4,000 men to act by land against Ras-ool-Khyma, and three vessels of war to join the naval force.

After the troops had been refreshed at Kishm, the expedition proceeded over to Ras-ool-Khyma, which was immediately invested, and battered in breach. After an active resistance of six days, the town was taken possession of by the British force on the 9th December, the enemy evacuating it on one side as the troops entered on the other. Hussein bin Rahmah and Guzeeb bin Ahmed, the Chiefs, together with their followers, who composed the garrison, surrendered at discretion. The effect of this success was soon shown by many of the most powerful and independent chieftains on the coast sending an unqualified offer of submission to the British General.

On the 8th January 1820 a General Treaty* of Peace was concluded, in Ras-ool-Khyma, between Major General Keir, on the part of the British Government, and nearly all the Chiefs of the Maritime Arabs in the Gulf of Persia, by whom it was subsequently signed at different times and places. The sole purpose and scope of this treaty was the entire suppression of piracy, and the adoption of such measures of precaution and general co-operation as seemed best adapted to attain the object in view.

A. D. 1820.

A separate Treaty† was concluded with Hussein bin Ali the same day, stipulating for the surrender of all his vessels (excepting the fishing-boats), the release of all Indian prisoners, and the occupation of the towns of Ras-ool-Khyma and Maharra by the British Government.

A similar Treaty‡ was likewise entered into with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, of Shargah, for the surrender of the towers, guns, and vessels of Shargah, Ejman, Amulgavine, and their dependencies; stipulating, however, that the British troops were not to enter the towns, or lay them waste.

A short time after these arrangements had been made, General Keir

* Vide pages 76 to 80 of this Selection. † Vide pages 81 and 82 of ditto.
‡ Vide pages 80 and 81 of ditto.

JOASMEES.

returned to Bombay, leaving a garrison in Ras-ool-Khyma, consisting of twenty artillerymen, and the 1st battalion 2nd regiment Native infantry, under the command of Captain Thomson, of H. M.'s 17th dragoons. In April of the same year, the Government resolved to remove the detachment from Ras-ool-Khyma to Kishm, and orders were accordingly transmitted to Captain Thomson to evacuate the former place, after dismantling the sea defences, and giving up the town to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. On a communication, however, being made to this chief, he positively refused to take possession, if the works were destroyed. A reference was consequently made to India, when final orders were issued for the defences to be destroyed, and the town abandoned, which directions were carried into effect on the 18th July 1820.

In the commencement of 1823 Shaikh Sultan began the erection of a fort at Shargah, but was informed that he must suspend the work until the instructions of the Government respecting it could be received. An application from the inhabitants of Ras-ool-Khyma to be allowed to erect a wall across the isthmus was likewise referred to the Government, which intimated, in its reply, that it was not intended to prevent the erection of forts or buildings on the Arabian Coast, as the treaty concluded by Sir W. G. Keir did not appear to authorise any such interference. About this time the Shaikh of Ramse (one of the Joasmee ports) was deposed, through the influence of Sultan bin Suggur, and succeeded by Mahomed Abdool Rahman, the son of a former Shaikh, who had been removed by Hussein bin Ali. Shaikh Guzeeb bin Ahmed, of Jazirat-ool-Hamrah (another of the Joasmee ports), having died the same year, was succeeded by Shaikh Mahzem bin Abdool Rahman. All the Joasmee ports, with the exception of Ejman, appear to have acknowledged the general supremacy of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, but Rashid bin Humeed, the chief of that place, complained very earnestly to the Resident at Bushire of the aggressions committed upon him by Shaikh Sultan, and declared he would never submit to his authority.

A. D. 1823.

In February 1823, on the occasion of Captain Macleod paying a visit to the Joasmee Shaikh, he produced a paper, signed by the chiefs in the vicinity of Ras-ool-Khyma, admitting their dependence upon him, and he expressed himself very anxious that his rights as a feudal superior should be recognised by the British Government. In reply, he was informed the Government had nothing to do with his disputes for supremacy, and must look to every individual chief to answer for those immediately subject to him. Captain Macleod, in reporting upon this tribe, stated as follows:—"The Joasmees procure all their materials for building, as well as their warlike stores, from Muskat, Bahrein, and the Persian ports in the lower part of the Gulf. In the construction of their vessels, they use no other wood than Indian teak,

JOASMEES.

and, in respect to arms, those principally of Persian manufacture. They possess no articles of export, since their pearls are generally purchased by merchants on the spot, and the produce of their country is not even sufficient for their maintenance. Their only employment is fishing, diving for pearls, and importing dates, grain, and other necessaries of life, which they purchase with the price of their pearls. Their dates are chiefly brought from Bahrein and Bussora; grain and cloth from Muskat and the Persian ports. They are very poor, and perhaps can never find much employment in commerce, unless in carrying for others; although it is said they at one time pursued a very extensive trade."

About the end of 1823, an inhabitant of Shargah, named Hassoom, armed a boat, and sent her to cruise in the neighbourhood of Cape Jask. She however returned without making any prizes, and was immediately seized by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who, after instituting an inquiry into the affair, liberated the owner, on the plea of want of evidence.

A. D. 1824.

The first undoubted instance of piracy committed by the Joasmees, subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty, appears to have taken place in the beginning of 1824, when two boats from Shargah fell in with and captured a Buggalow belonging to the Mehra Tribe, near Socotra, on which occasion they are said to have put every one on board to the sword, and then sailed for Zanzibar. That Sultan bin Suggur was fully acquainted with the purpose of the boats in question is evident, from his making a communication soon after their departure to the senior officer of the marine, intimating their having sailed on a piratical expedition, and regretting his want of means to pursue them. In June 1824, these two boats returned to the Gulf, one of them having the audacity to touch at Muskat on her way up, and only escaped being detained by producing a passport from the Captain of H. M.'s ship *Minerva*. Finding, however, that orders had been issued for their seizure whenever they made their appearance in the Persian Gulf, they did not venture to return to Shargah, but one of the vessels in question was subsequently found abandoned at Charrak, and having been taken possession of by a cruiser, was to have been sent over to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, to be identified, but owing to its dilapidated state, was obliged to be broken up. The other boat took refuge at Muttra, where it remained unmolested for several months; and under the particular circumstances of the case no further steps were taken by the Government regarding it.

The Wahabees having about this time obtained considerable success over the Turks, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, in concert with Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed (who had lately acknowledged his supremacy), opened a negotiation with that sect. This measure he did not attempt

JOASMEES.

to conceal, but assigned self-preservation as his only motive for adopting it. The Shaikh of Al Hamra, Mahomed bin Mahzem, having given umbrage to the Joasmee Chief, was removed by him from the government of that place, and Ahmed bin Abdoolla bin Ooseyah established in his room.

A dispute having arisen between His Highness the Imaum and Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, on the subject of the occupation of the towers of a place on the frontiers of His Highness' territory, called Brymee, which had by a solemn treaty been previously declared neutral, His Highness' cause was taken up by his dependent, Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee. Independently of this chief threatening Shargah, some aggressions were committed on the boats of that place by the Sooedan Tribe, under Salmin bin Nassir, which had separated itself from the Joasmees, and taken refuge in Debaye, between which place and Shargah they were erecting a fort, called Derah, a proceeding which drew down strong remonstrances from Sultan bin Suggur. The general peace and tranquillity of the Gulf appearing likely to be endangered if this dispute remained unsettled, the Resident (having previously had an interview with His Highness the Imaum upon the subject), proceeded to Shargah in December 1824, and there, by his mediation, a reconciliation was effected, upon the conditions that on the side of the Joasmee Chief the towers of Brymee should be destroyed, while a similar measure should be carried into effect in respect to the fort of Derah on the part of Shaikh Tahnoon, who was to assign some other part of his dominions for the residence of the Soodan Tribe.

Shaikh Sultan, however, took no steps to fulfil his part of the agreement, and in February 1825 the Resident was under the necessity of addressing a very strong remonstrance upon the extraordinary hesitation shown by him in carrying into effect the very first article of the treaty. Shaikh Sultan, however, in reply, threw all the blame of the delay which had taken place upon the Imaum's Agent at Brymee, who had persuaded his (Sultan's) man to disobey his orders; and further, in proof of his sincerity, offered to send a person in company with a messenger from Syud Saeed, and one from the Resident, to execute the conditions of the engagement entered into. A short time before the Huzah, the Governor of Debaye, and a kind of Agent of the Muskat Government, died, and was succeeded by his young son Mahomed, whose sister Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur had obtained in marriage. By means of this connexion, the Joasmee Chief acquired a very considerable degree of influence in Debaye, and was secretly intriguing to get possession of it, as its position and vicinity to Shargah rendered the place, when under the authority of an enemy, peculiarly obnoxious to him.

A. D. 1825.

JOASMEES.

In May 1825, the Resident having occasion to proceed to Muskat, availed himself of the opportunity to endeavour to effect the fulfilment of the article in the treaty mediated by him between Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Tahnoon, relative to the demolition of the towers at Brymee. Accordingly, having obtained full authority from Shaikh Sultan for their destruction, he determined to send Goolab, the British Agent at Muskat, along with His Highness the Imaum's troops, to see the above stipulation executed. Before, however, the result of his mission could be known, Shaikh Sultan violated the truce, by suddenly attacking Derah. Reinforcements were immediately sent by Tahnoon to the relief of that place, but being intercepted by the Joasmee Chief, they were compelled to retreat, with the loss of a hundred and fifty men. This proceeding of course put an end to any further attempt at mediation on the part of the British authority, who, however, considered it necessary to take every precaution to prevent the war from degenerating into indiscriminate plunder; and for this purpose he directed two vessels of war to be kept constantly cruising on the pearl banks. On the return of Goolab Anundas from the mission mentioned above, he represented that all Sultan bin Suggur's representations relative to the obstacles thrown in the way of the demolition of the towers of Brymee by the Imaum's Agent were totally false, and that the delay which had taken place had been produced solely by his own intrigues.

The irregularities which were apprehended as likely to arise from the naval warfare between the two most powerful Arab Chiefs of the Gulf made their appearance shortly after the commencement of hostilities. A boat from Bahrein was attacked by some Shargah cruising vessels near the island of Anjar, without any provocation, and dollars to a considerable amount forcibly carried off, besides three or four of the crew being put to death. In consequence of this piracy, it was deemed necessary by the British authorities to adopt active measures, in order to check the piratical disposition thus manifesting itself, as well as to give confidence to the neutral tribes, who had become greatly alarmed at the lawless spirit which had appeared. Accordingly, instructions were issued, in August 1825, to the Commodore of the Marine, to proceed over to Shargah, and demand full satisfaction for the loss of both life and property from Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and in the event of this not being acceded to, to remove the British Agent from Shargah, and capture all vessels belonging to that place. This decisive proceeding was attended by the most favourable results: the Joasmee Chief, terrified at the firm line of conduct adopted by the British authority, lost no time in affording every redress to the Chief of Bahrein, who, in a letter to the Resident, expressed himself entirely satisfied with the arrangement made. The successful termination of

JOASMEES.

this business created a sensation throughout the Gulf highly creditable to our Government, and tended greatly to establish a favourable impression of the efficacy of the general treaty.

Exhausted by continual and fruitless warfare, and their exclusion from the pearl fishery in consequence, both Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Tahnoon gladly availed themselves of the conciliatory offers made by the Imaum of Muskat, and a speedy adjustment of all differences took place under his mediation in October 1825, upon the conditions of the demolition of Derah, the removal of the Sooedan Tribe,* and the reception of a small body of the Imaum's troops into Debaye. Not a word was said on this occasion about Brymee, and this singular omission, notwithstanding its being in the power of the Imaum to dictate his own terms, would seem to remove the blame of the non-fulfilment of the stipulation in the former treaty regarding this place from Shaikh Sultan to His Highness.

In the course of an interview held with the British authority in the Gulf of Persia, in November 1825, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur expressed great alarm at the increasing power and intrigues of the Wahabees, and professed himself very anxious to learn whether he might look to the English for assistance in the event of his endeavouring to maintain his independence. In reply, he was informed, in general terms, that he was the best judge of his own interests; but that no connection or authority would be received by the British Government as an excuse for any proceedings bearing a predatory character. The Shaikh then adverted to the very difficult dilemma into which he would be cast in the event of the Wahabees attacking the territories of the Imaum, and calling on him for his support against that prince. To this he was answered, that his forming any connection prejudicial to His Highness would be considered unfriendly by us, and it was in every point of view advisable that he should not adopt that line of conduct. The language held on this occasion was confirmed by the Governor in Council, with a further intimation, that however improbable it might be that we should act against the Wahabees so long as they confined their conquests to the shore, it was still not desirable that we should bind ourselves to abstain from interposition, or hold out so great an encouragement to the invasion of the Imaum's territories as our avowed indifference would be likely to afford.

A boat belonging to Amulgavine having been taken by the followers of the notorious Sooedan bin Zaal (who had settled at Biddah, in the territories of the Shaikh of Bahrein, on fleeing from Aboothabee), the Joasmee Chief affected to consider this act as more than balancing the piracy committed on the Bahrein boat captured by his subjects in 1825,

* A body of Arabs, under Salmin bin Nassir, inhabiting Derah.

JOASMEES.

and therefore displayed a determination not to pay the remuneration money, which he had promised through the influence of the British on that occasion. This pretence, however, was not admitted by the authorities in the Gulf.

In an interview held with the British Resident in October 1826, Shaikh Sultan complained of the injury his subjects were exposed to, in consequence of the proceedings of the Sooedan Tribe under Salmin bin Nassir (who still held possession of Derah, notwithstanding Shaikh Tahnoon having formerly agreed to its demolition), and therefore requested permission to expel the occupants by force of arms. As this measure would have led to an immediate rupture with Shaikh Tahnoon, and involved the Gulf once more in hostilities, he was requested to defer taking any steps of this nature until it was seen whether the Beniyas Chief could be prevailed upon to withdraw his countenance from Salmin bin Nassir. Shaikh Tahnoon, however, obstinately refusing to attend to any recommendation having for its object the demolition of Derah, a representation was in consequence made to the Imaum, who, indignant at the continued contumacy of the Aboothabee Shaikh, promised to send two vessels of war to co-operate with Sultan bin Suggur's troops against the place above alluded to.

A. D. 1826.

Having observed the marked disinclination with which the occurrence of maritime war among the tribes of the Persian Gulf was viewed by the British Government, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, with his usual acuteness, in a letter to the Government, dated December 1826, revived a number of dormant and unfounded claims against the people of Congoon, for the seizure of a Buggalow several years before, and also against Bussora, for the imprisonment and detention of the Nakhodas of some of his vessels. At the same time he intimated, that unless the Government made good his losses on this occasion, he required their permission to go to war.

The Government, in their reply, dated February 1827, intimated that the Resident in the Persian Gulf would be required to report on the subjects of his complaint, but that if he did not consider that justice had been done him, he was at liberty to commence hostilities, provided that it did not degenerate into piracy. The report was soon after made, showing that real facts had been grossly misrepresented by the Shaikh, who, failing in his object of inducing the Government to interfere actively in behalf of his unfounded claims, prudently remained quiet.

A. D. 1827.

About March 1827, His Highness the Imaum appeared off Derah with his fleet, and redeemed his pledge to the British Government, by directing that fort to be demolished. The presence of the Imaum,

JOASMEES.

however, so far from tending to promote the general tranquillity, appears to have occasioned a speedy rupture of the good understanding which had been lately established between Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Tahnoon, in an interview they had held at Shargah only a few days before. The Joasmee Shaikh, after informing the British authority of the conclusion of peace between himself and the Beniyas Chief on the 17th March, wrote again, on the 22nd of the same month, stating that he found it quite impossible to maintain any engagement with a person of so faithless a character as his late enemy. Certain it is that, whether as an offering to the offended dignity of Shaikh Tahnoon, which had been sorely touched by the demolition of Derah, or in order to sow dissension between him and the Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma, the Imaum presented the former with artillery and warlike stores, and likewise endeavoured to induce the inhabitants of Debaye to acknowledge his (Tahnoon's) jurisdiction. Encouraged by this support, Shaikh Tahnoon seized the ruler of Debaye by treachery, and afterwards attacked and carried that place by storm.

Anxious to avert the great and general distress so invariably occasioned by the breaking out of hostilities during the pearl fishing season, the British Resident proceeded to the Arabian Coast in June, but on his arrival found that peace had been again concluded between the contending chieftains. In an interview held with Shaikh Sultan, the latter endeavoured in vain to obtain the guarantee of the English to the treaty between himself and Tahnoon, and likewise entered into a long discussion upon Article IV. of the General Treaty,* which, he maintained, bound the British Government to prevent the Arabs from fighting with each other. A written explanation of the real tenor of this article having been given him by the Resident, he did not touch again upon the subject.

About this time some acts of a piratical nature having been committed by a person named Udwee (a subject of Rashid bin Humeed), upon two Debaye boats, a remonstrance was made to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur by the British authority, in consequence of which the above individual, together with one or two of his followers, was placed in confinement, and detained there for a considerable period.

As might have been expected, the amicable relations, mentioned above as having been entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur with the Chief of Aboothabee, were very soon interrupted by their mutual jealousy, and the collisions of their Bedouin dependents. In a letter dated November 1827, the Joasmee Shaikh declared war against Tahnoon, and detailed his reasons for so doing to the British authority. Notwithstanding this declaration, Shaikh Sultan appears to have given up his intention, and affairs remained in their former situation.

* Vide pages 76 to 78 of this Selection.

JOASMEES.

A. D. 1828.

In April 1828, Ras-ool-Khyma was visited by the British authority in the Gulf of Persia, who thus speaks of its state at that time :—"A square tower, of no great strength, has been built on the mound raised by the ruins of the strong outwork destroyed after the siege in 1819. A straight stone wall nearly connects one side of the town with the backwater or harbour, but as yet there are no defences towards the sea, excepting two old guns. The ruins of the old walls and towers serve as stone quarries, and the town of Ras-ool-Khyma is rapidly increasing. The houses are of stone and chunam, and, although small, are carefully built, and remarkably neat, even with some finish. Building is yet very cheap, from the old materials being so close at hand; and Shaikh Sultan is said to encourage it."

About this time, when a profound peace had happily extended itself over every part of the Persian Gulf, the commercial inhabitants were thrown into considerable alarm, in consequence of a very daring and atrocious piracy being committed by a man named Mooslim bin Rashid (an inhabitant of Ras-ool-Khyma), upon a boat from Sohar, on the Coast of Batinah. This vessel, after being plundered of cargo to the value of three or four thousand rupees, and the whole of her crew, fourteen in number, being tied to a grapnell, and thrown overboard, was scuttled, and sunk. The pirate Buteel, after selling portions of the plunder, was met off Lingah by a Buggalow which Shaikh Sultan (alarmed at the probable consequences of this infamous proceeding, and the strong remonstrance addressed to him) had sent in pursuit. A sharp action ensued, which terminated by the Buteel being run on shore at Lingah, and Mooslim bin Rashid, together with the greater part of his crew, made prisoners, and carried off to Ras-ool-Khyma. Shortly afterwards, Shaikh Sultan having assembled the heads of tribes, laid the affair before them, and at the same time mentioned his fears of being brought to a severe reckoning by the British Government. In consequence, it was unanimously resolved that Mooslim bin Rashid should be put to death: he was accordingly taken out of his prison during the night by four of Shaikh Sultan's slaves, and, having been conveyed to the sea beach, was there strangled, and buried; declaring, however, with his dying breath, that the piracy had been committed under the knowledge and approbation of the Joasmee Shaikh, who, he further stated, had even given him a document in writing to that effect, which he had lost when his Buteel was captured.

The rest of the crew were kept in close confinement for several months; but were subsequently set at liberty with the consent of His Highness the Imaum, to whom the pirate vessel, together with all the plundered cargo recovered, had been given up.

JOASMEES.

A. D. 1829.

The peace between the Joasmee Chief and Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, although frequently shaken, was never wholly ruptured, until the commencement of 1829, when Shaikh Sultan again declared war against the latter. Whether really irritated against the Imaum for the secret and open assistance which he alleged was furnished by His Highness to Shaikh Tahnoon, or whether he was desirous of taking advantage of the unfortunate position in which Syud Saeed was placed, in consequence of his failure at Bahrein, the Ras-ool-Khyma Shaikh, in a letter to the British authority in the Gulf, intimated an intention of likewise commencing hostilities against His Highness. He did not, however, think proper to proceed to any overt acts of warfare, and his relations with the Muskat Government gradually resumed their old footing.

It being considered by the British Government that the cruising of the ships of war on the pearl banks, as usual during the fishing season, was not unlikely (with reference to the very general state of warfare in which all the tribes on the Arabian Coast were engaged) to involve us as principals, or at all events to produce an impression that we did not act up to our declaration touching our non-interference in lawful war, while carried on after the manner of civilized nations, it was resolved to discontinue the practice for that time, and to trust to the monthly visits of our cruisers for the protection of neutral vessels.

About the end of May 1829, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur represented to the British authority in the Persian Gulf, that although he had given due intimation of his intention of blockading Aboothabee, yet he had been given to understand that a vessel carrying an English pass and colours had been hired, by some of the people of Muskat, to convey provisions and warlike stores to the Beniyas capital (Aboothabee), which was suffering in consequence of the scarcity of food. On the arrival of the vessel in question (the merchant ship *Sunbury*) off Shargah, she landed a portion of her cargo, destined for that place, and was about to proceed on her voyage to Aboothabee, in spite of Shaikh Sultan's earnest remonstrances, when an arrangement was made by the agent of the owner, without the knowledge of the Captain, to sell all her cargo to the Joasmee Shaikh. Boats were accordingly sent off, the crews of which boarded the ship in a very insolent manner, and an attempt was made to haul down the British colours, which the Mate resisting, he was struck with some violence by one of the Arabs. Shaikh Sultan, however, on the Captain protesting against such conduct, disavowed the whole of the proceedings, and the opportune arrival of the *Amherst* sloop-of-war removed all apprehensions of any further violence. The Joasmee Chief, to prove the truth of

JOASMEES.

his statement that the insult to the vessel had been offered without his knowledge, directed the first boat that had boarded the *Sunbury* to be burnt, and the individual who had hauled down the colours to be tied up and flogged.

In June 1829, a peace was concluded between Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaik Tahnoon bin Shakboot, through the mediation of the Chief of Lingah, the principal condition of which was that neither party should interfere in any way with the subjects or dependents of the other.

The Imaum of Muskat being on the point of proceeding to his dominions on the African Coast, deemed it prudent to provide for the tranquillity of his Arabian territories by paying an annual sum to each of the Joasmee Chiefs;—2,000 German crowns a year was the amount fixed for Shaikh Sultan. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the Shaikh was on the point of sending 400 men to assist the sister of Syud Hillal, the Governor of Soweik, in the war which she was carrying on against the Imaum (in consequence of the unjust imprisonment of her brother); but the chief men of his tribe, having assembled together, represented the disgraceful nature of such a proceeding so strongly as to induce him to desist for the time. Soon afterwards, he received a communication from the British authority in the Gulf, acquainting him that any hostile steps against His Highness' territories would be viewed as a declaration of war by his Government.

A. D. 1830.

In May 1830, the minds of the inhabitants of the Arabian Coast were much agitated, in consequence of the great and unexpected success of Toorkey bin Saood, the Wahabee Chief, over the Beni Khalid Tribe, and the gradual advance of that sect to the southward. To the bulk of the Joasmees, and particularly to Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, and Mahomed bin Rashid of Amulgavine, the prospect of the re-ascendancy of the Wahabee power appears to have given unmixed satisfaction,—the lower orders anticipating a return to their former piratical habits, and the above two chiefs expecting to emancipate themselves from their dependence upon Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. This latter personage, however, viewed the successes of Shaikh Toorkey in a very different light, and plainly saw that he could expect nothing but a diminution of influence and revenue in consequence. These sentiments he however carefully concealed, and professed himself outwardly as hearty as any one in the cause of Wahabeeism; but in a letter addressed to the British authority in the Gulf, in July 1830, he expressed his earnest desire to co-operate with the British Government in checking their further progress, and went so far as to declare that he was determined to oppose

JOASMEES.

them, even in the event of his not receiving any support. In reply, it was intimated to him that the views of the British Government in these quarters were confined solely to the suppression of piracy, without interfering in the internal affairs of the Arabian States.

The fear, however, of any material or immediate alteration in his situation, appears to have been removed soon after from the mind of Shaikh Sultan, in consequence of the Wahabee Chief having refused to furnish Rashid bin Humeed with a body of troops to enable him to obtain the ascendancy in the Joasmee territories, at the same time intimating to him that he should always continue to look upon the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma and the Imaum as the heads of all the Arabian Tribes in Oman.

A. D. 1830-31.

In the latter part of 1830 and beginning of 1831 Shaikh Sultan was busily engaged in negotiating with the Imaum of Muskat, regarding the terms on which he should lend his support against Sohar, as, notwithstanding his having already received half the amount of subsidy, he now refused to move unless either Dubba or Khore Fukaun (places on the Coast of Batinah) were given up to him. This proposal the Imaum rejected at once, and in consequence Shaikh Sultan desisted from the preparations he had begun for the assistance of His Highness. His dependent, Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, however, proceeded to join the Imaum, but on the defeat of the troops of the latter before Sohar, Rashid and his tribe turned their arms against their late allies. On their return to their own country, they found that their flocks had been carried off, and Ejman plundered, by a party of the Beniyas and Monasir, sent by Shaikh Tahnoon. In consequence, both Shaikh Sultan and himself declared war against Aboothabee, and extensive arrangements were made by the former for the blockade of that place; but finding that their subjects were entirely disinclined to carry on hostilities during the season of the pearl fishing, both parties requested the mediation of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb of Lingah, and peace was once more concluded between these unquiet and turbulent spirits.

These amicable relations were however soon disturbed by the lawless conduct of Shaikh Sultan's subjects, who, in the month of September, committed a piracy upon two Beniyas pearl boats near Bahrein. On the intelligence of this proceeding reaching Shaikh Tahnoon, he laid an embargo upon fourteen Joasmee vessels which chanced to touch at Aboothabee for provisions. Alarmed at this decisive measure, the Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma immediately disavowed the conduct of his people, and after punishing the person who had committed the piracy, he restored the captured boats, with their crews and cargoes, to the

STATEMENT of the Number of Inhabitants, Vessels, Houses, and Date Trees of the Joasmee Ports

Names of Places.	In 1826.				In 1831.				Increase.	Diminution.	In 1826.					In 1831.					Increase.	Diminution.
	Number of Men.	Number of Women.	No. of Youth and Children of both Sexes.	Total.	Number of Men.	Number of Women.	No. of Youth and Children of both Sexes.	Total.			No. of Pearl Boats.	No. of Fishing Boats.	No. of Bungalows for Trade.	No. of Boats or Buteels for Trade.	Total.	No. of Pearl Boats.	No. of Fishing Boats.	No. of Bungalows for Trade.	No. of Boats or Buteels for Trade.	Total.		
Shaam and Kuleela	250	300	700	1,250	250	300	700	1,250	..	..	..	15	..	..	15	..	15	..	..	15	..	..
Ramse	250	300	700	1,250	300	350	1,000	1,650	400	..	..	15	..	..	15	..	18	..	..	18	3	..
Ras-ool-Khyma	800	950	2,000	3,750	1,150	1,250	3,000	5,400	1,650	..	10	15	5	15	45	14	35	10	30	89	44	..
Jazirat-ool-Hamrah	400	600	1,600	2,600	650	850	2,600	4,100	1,500	..	15	10	..	8	33	20	22	..	12	54	21	..
Amulgavine	400	500	1,450	2,350	750	900	2,900	4,550	2,200	..	15	15	..	8	38	32	25	..	14	71	33	..
Ejman	500	650	1,800	2,950	650	850	2,600	4,100	1,150	..	30	20	..	15	65	45	20	..	19	84	19	..
Heera	100	150	500	750	250	300	900	1,450	700	..	10	5	..	4	19	25	10	..	7	42	23	..
Shargah and Fasht	1,700	1,800	4,000	7,500	2,500	2,600	8,800	13,900	6,400	..	160	77	..	67	304	210	80	5	75	370	66	..
Khan	..	..	..	..	150	200	400	750	750	..	..	..	..	..	..	17	..	..	..	17	17	..
Total	4,400	5,250	12,750	22,400	6,650	7,600	22,900	37,150	14,750	..	240	172	5	117	534	363	225	15	157	760	226	..

NOTE.—The reason of the number of houses exceeding the total of male inhabitants is, that only the fixed residents are enumerated in this list; but at certain times of the year great numbers of the Bedouins they do not remove when they take their departure.

Ports in 1826, *contrasted with the same in* 1831.

In 1826.			In 1831.			Increase.	Diminution.	1826.		1831.		Increase.	Diminution.	Remarks.
No. of Stone Houses.	No. of Huts.	Total.	No. of Stone Houses.	No. of Huts.	Total.			No. of Date Trees.	Total.	No. of Date Trees.	Total.			
..	250	250	..	270	250	..	..	9,000	9,000	11,000	11,000	2,000	..	Most of the fishing and trading boats are likewise employed in the pearl fishery.
..	250	250	..	300	300	50	..	4,500	4,500	6,720	6,720	2,220	..	
200	1,000	1,200	300	1,300	1,600	400	..	28,000	28,000	38,000	38,000	10,000	..	
100	300	400	360	600	900	500	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
15	400	415	27	600	627	212								
10	650	660	10	800	810	150								
..	150	150	..	250	250	100	..	8,000	8,000	11,000	11,000	3,000	..	
175	2,000	2,175	450	2,600	3,050	875								
..	..	..	..	150	150	150								
500	5,000	5,500	1,087	6,850	7,937	2,437	..	49,500	49,500	66,720	66,720	17,220	..	

Bedouins come in from the interior, and remain four or five months in the towns. Many of these individuals have fixed places of residence, which

owners. Upon this satisfaction being afforded, Shaikh Tahnoon liberated the Joasmee vessels, but detained the slaves and pearls belonging to Shargah, as a pledge for the settlement of debts due to one of his subjects by a former inhabitant of Debaye, but now residing under the protection of Shaikh Sultan, in Shargah. At the present time (December 1831) a correspondence is still carrying on touching the pearls (the slaves having effected their escape to their old masters), but little if any probability appears to exist of the affair being brought to a final and peaceable termination.

FURTHER CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING, TO THE YEAR 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

In the latter end of December 1831, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and his dependent (the Chief of Ejman) declared war against the Beniyas, in consequence of the injury they had received at the hands of the latter while the Ejman Shaikh was engaged in the assistance of the Imaum's forces against Shinas; or rather, on the contrary, while acting the part of a traitor towards His Highness, and accelerating and completing the defeat of his troops. The good offices and mediation of the Lingah Chief had succeeded in delaying the threatened hostilities, but depredations having nevertheless been mutually committed at sea by the subjects on either side, negotiations were being carried on for the settlement of the claims arising therefrom, and of others of ancient date, from which most unsatisfactory results were anticipated.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur having intimated to the Resident his intention of declaring war against the Imaum of Muskat, and of immediately commencing hostilities upon his possessions, had, previous to the arrival of the naval force at Muskat, destined for the assistance of the existing Government against the Chiefs of Burka and others, and to the receipt of the Resident's communication, taken advantage of the very disturbed state of the affairs of the Imaum, consequent upon the imprisonment of his son and nephew by the Chief of Burka, to proceed with a strong force against Khore Fukaun, Khulla, and Dubba, and succeeded, either by surprise or treachery, in obtaining possession of these places, with their surrounding country; and had been only deterred from attacking Shinas, a place of considerable strength, by the opportune arrival there of two of the Imaum's frigates, with a reinforcement of men and warlike stores. In the meanwhile his dependent, Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, in direct opposition to the orders of the Joasmee Chief,—as it would appear from the latter complaining of his proceedings to the Resident, and recommending the despatch of ships to bring him to order,—committed the most daring and open depredations* upon the trade, not only of Sohar, but of Muskat.

* Upwards of twelve boats, with their cargoes, fell into his hands. The origin of these lawless proceedings of the Shaikh of Ejman is to be traced to his conduct on the occasion of the siege of Sohar. Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, Chief of the Beniyas Tribe, the great rival of the Joasmee Shaikh, Sultan bin Suggur, having been suspected of treachery while acting as the ally of the Imaum of Muskat, on his expedition against Bahrein, found his

JOASMEES.

The defenceless state into which many of the places in the neighbourhood of Bushire had been thrown, by the ravages of the plague, tended to encourage a return to habits of plunder and piracy, and was taken advantage of by some Joasmees, who, on their return from Bussora, finding that the towns of Bunder Dillum and Bunder Reig had been deserted, plundered them, as likewise a boat returning from Congoon to Bushire.

When called upon to afford satisfaction for the outrages committed by the dependents of Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur distinctly stated, (as he had before done by letter, which referred also to the Shaikh of Amulgavine,) that he no longer possessed any authority over him, nor could either control or be answerable for his proceedings, any participation in which he most positively disavowed. Upon this explicit avowal, therefore, of the virtual independence of Shaikh Rashid, the British authority turned for redress to that chief himself, and a formal demand, backed by the presence of two vessels of war, was accordingly made upon him, for the restoration of such vessels and property, belonging to Muskat, as had been captured and plundered by his subjects, and twenty-four hours were allowed him to consider the same, or abide by the consequences.

A. D. 1832.

The Shaikh at first attempted evasions, upon various grounds:—his counter claims upon the people of Bussora, Grane, Amulgavine, Aboothabee, and Sohar; the discontinuance of late of the payment of the annual allowance, and the non-fulfilment of the promise of a Buggalow made to him by the Imaum; his being now a subject of the Wahabee Chief, and the necessity, therefore, for a reference to that personage; the people of Muskat having taken possession of an Ejman Buteel with her cargo, worth 1,500 dollars, &c.; but was informed, in reply, that being in his own person a member of the General Treaty, he must be held responsible for the acts of his subjects. His assertion, however, regarding the seizure of his Buteel, having been confirmed (with the

assistance declined when he again offered it to His Highness, for the reduction of his revolted dependent Humood bin Azan, and in consequence threw himself into the opposite scale. Accordingly, when Rashid bin Humeed, who, subsidised by His Highness, had joined his enemies, declaring in their favour, returned to his territory, he learnt that Ejman had been plundered, and several of his people killed and carried away by a party of the Beniyas during his absence. Immediate retaliation and hostilities between these parties were the result, and because the Sohar people refused to admit the Ejman boats into their ports, while those of Aboothabee were permitted to trade and export provisions as formerly, Rashid bin Humeed commenced aggressions against them, and now, in opposition to all that had of late occurred, setting up the plea that they were subjects of His Highness the Imaum, proceeded without further notice to an attack upon the trade of Muskat.

JOASMEES.

exception of that portion referring to its value), it was admitted as a set-off against the cargoes of the Muttra and Mukran boats, and their restitution was foregone; but with this modification entire compliance was yielded, after some little delay and hesitation to the demand, by the delivery of the boats, money, jewels, &c. in lieu of the missing cargo, the property of the passengers, &c. As his hostilities against the Chief of Sohar had been proclaimed and acknowledged, no notice was taken of his proceedings in capturing the boats of that place, nor, for the same reasons, of the seizures of Dubba and Khore Fukaun by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who now, anticipating with apprehension the chances of reprisals on the part of the Imaum for the loss of those towns, or a declaration of war at his instigation by the Beniyas Chief, to whom he was known to have furnished military stores, despatched a Vukeel to the Resident, to learn from him the sentiments and intentions of the British Government in the event of such taking place; and was, in reply, informed that the British Government had determined, in case of exigency, to afford the Imaum every assistance in their power to preserve his independence, but would not interfere in quarrels involving a minor stake, which His Highness might see fit to prosecute; and consequently that Shaikh Sultan, if unable to effect a reconciliation, and measures of hostility were pursued against him, would be at liberty to use his own means of defending himself, provided the above reservations with reference to those means and their ends were duly attended to.

In the latter end of November a large fleet of Joasmee boats, containing from one thousand to fifteen hundred of the tribe, under the command of Sultan bin Suggur in person, appeared at the head of the Gulf, with a view to affording assistance to Shaikh Nassir, the hereditary Governor of Bushire, who, giving umbrage to the Persian authorities, had been ejected from the town, and had taken to his boats, and commenced a blockade of the port, according to a previous engagement with that person, by which, in addition to certain other considerations, the plunder of the place was to be the reward of a successful attack. Previous to their arrival, however, the blockade had been raised, and it was evident, from late events, that Shaikh Nassir had no longer any expectation of regaining his inheritance, but was now merely intent upon inflicting injury upon the town and its inhabitants, which must have involved the destruction of a large amount of British property. Under these circumstances, and, moreover, the cause of humanity, and the protection of those connected with the British Government, calling for the exertion of every endeavour to ward off so great a calamity as that of a band of infuriate plunderers like the Joasmees being let loose in the midst of a peaceable and mercantile community, the Resident,

JOASMEES.

Mr. Blane, adopted the strongest arguments with the Joasmee Chief,—indeed threatened to resort to actual force, if he did not abstain from a measure which, as had been explained to the Vukeel above alluded to, on his mentioning the subject, would be contrary to the wishes of the British Government. The fleet accordingly withdrew.

One very trifling case only of a piratical nature occurred this year,

A. D. 1833.

indicative of the innate spirit of the Joasmees for plunder,—a spirit which they found it difficult to restrain even where British property was concerned, and the immediate infliction of punishment must certainly ensue.

One of their boats putting into Korgoo for water, its crew seized and carried off some portion of a tent, lining the building which had been erected on that island for the accommodation of the Resident's establishment, during the prevalence of the plague at Bushire and in its neighbourhood, notwithstanding that they were warned that the same was the property of the British Government. Trifling as was the value of the articles taken, the more wanton and insulting appeared the conduct of the plunderers, and the more urgent the reason for its not being permitted to pass unnoticed. A vessel of war was therefore despatched in quest of the boat, and to demand the surrender of the delinquents. These were found at Mohumrah, and brought to Bushire, together with the stolen property; but the object having been gained, were immediately freed, in consideration of the Shaikh of that port having begged their forgiveness.

After his signal defeat at Khore Suffan (near Aboothabee*), the Joasmee Chief commenced making great preparations for the attack and blockade of the Beniyas capital, and having secured the support of the Shaikh of Lingah, and Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, the combined fleets sailed from Debaye on the 9th of November. The two Chiefs of Aboothabee had however collected a large force of Bedouins and citizens, and moored with iron chains to the shore six or seven of their largest vessels, well manned, for the protection of their shipping. After a cannonade of three days, which was promptly and effectually answered by the besieged, Shaikh Sultan's Buggalow having received two shots in her hull, his whole fleet weighed out of range of the guns on shore, and anchoring, confined itself to the maintenance of a close blockade. The besieged were shortly reduced to the greatest distress from the want of provisions, and the departure of His Highness the Imaum for his African possessions removed all prospect of relief from foreign assistance. Their difficulties were further greatly increased by the capture of thirty of their boats in Khyran Beniyas, and the loss of ten men killed by the people of Debaye (of the seceded

* Vide Sketch of the Beniyas, in a subsequent part of this Selection.

JOASMEES.

tribe), who, also acting on the offensive by land, intercepted and carried off a caravan of fifty camels, laden with dates from Brymee.

Pressed by famine, they fitted out three boats,* manned with five hundred men, and secretly despatched them to sea by night. Twenty vessels of the blockading squadron went in pursuit, but unable to come up with them, returned after three days to resume their position off Aboothabee, reinforced by some additional vessels from Bussora. The blockading squadron was not without its difficulties and privations: provisions and water had to be brought from Ras-ool-Khyma and Lingah, and each individual being required to send for his own food, great suffering was experienced.

Both parties, therefore, tiring of these protracted hostilities, and disposed to come to an arrangement, a peace was easily effected, though the mediation of Mahomed bin Guzeeb, the Lingah Chief, on the condition that Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot should give up all the boats and property his people had captured since the commencement of the war; and the blockading fleets were withdrawn.

A. D. 1834.

The Wahabees were desirous of befriending the Beniyas in this quarrel, but the threats of their representatives at Brymee proved insufficient to overawe the Joasmee Chief (whereby a decrease of the power of the sect at that time may be argued), and had the effect only of restraining the Bedouins from affording any assistance to Hussein bin Rahmah, who had been despatched into the interior to raise troops for the purpose of cutting off the communication with Aboothabee by land.

At the period of the disturbances in the Imaum's dominions, owing to the aggressions of his relative Humood bin Azan, Sultan bin Suggur proceeded with a large fleet to his possessions of Khore Fukaun and Dubba. Although formerly requested by the Imaum to assist his representatives in Muskat in any quarrels with their neighbours, it was evident that, far from any intention to exert his power and influence in favour of His Highness' relatives, his sole object was to avail himself of the state of affairs to benefit and promote his own interests, at the expense of either party.

A. D. 1835.

The proceedings of his fleet, however, were not confined to depredations upon the boats belonging to Sohar and its dependencies, as the enemies of the Imaum, whose interests he pretended to serve, as also upon the property of the subjects of the Muskat Government, his ally, but were extended to acts of a decidedly piratical nature, upon the vessels of individuals having no concern or connection whatever with the contending parties. For these of course he was compelled by the

* For the proceedings of these vessels, vide Sketch of the Beniyas.

JOASMEES.

British Government to afford redress; but with reference to the seizures of vessels belonging to Muskat, the acting governors of that place, fearing to incur his more decided enmity, so far from remonstrating, tacitly, and in some cases openly, sanctioned them.

A. D. 1837. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur applied for permission to grant assistance to the Shaikh of Towanah against him of Charrak, both Persian subjects, who were preparing to decide their quarrel by the sword,—a request with which his engagement connected with the establishment of the restrictive line of course afforded one just plea, among others, to the Resident, for refusing compliance.

The people of Heera, under the authority of Sultan bin Suggur, committing a piracy upon a boat belonging to Bunder Abbas, that chief of his own accord compelled restitution of the property plundered, and adopted measures to prevent a recurrence of the offence.

A. D. 1838. The Joasmee Chief superseded his brother Saleh in the government of Shargah, and appointed in his place his son, Suggur bin Sultan; a change which was viewed with some dissatisfaction by the British authorities, the former being by them considered one of the most enlightened and intelligent Arabs on the coast, who had ever laboured to check the predatory spirit of his countrymen, and maintained a continued cordial understanding with the British Agent, Moolla Hussein, residing at this port.

Two piracies were this year committed, by two Joasmee subjects, named Sultan bin Sohar and his brother Mahomed; the former attended with the murder of several persons, and the plunder of much property, to the north of the Gulf, upon a boat belonging to Karrack, having on board a wealthy subject of Chaab, who had fled Mohumrah on its attack and capture by Ali Pasha of Bagdad, and was now on his return; the other on a Batinah boat off Ras-ool-Hud. Sultan bin Sohar was after some time discovered and seized at Lingah, and placed at the disposal of the Resident, who sent him to Shaikh Samur, the Chaab Chief, to be dealt with as he might think proper; the other, Mahomed, took refuge at Ejman, but, as a subject of Sultan bin Suggur, was upon demand subsequently given up by that chief, together with the Nakhoda of the pirate vessel. As the first of these had suffered severely from his confinement in chains at Shargah, he was released, together with his fellow-prisoner, on their furnishing a bond to pay the sum of 100 crowns.

Alarmed at the threats held out against them by Shaikh Samur, the Governor of Chaab, in consequence of the piracy committed on the Karrack boat, having on board one of his most wealthy subjects and firmest adherents, by Sultan bin Sohar, the Joasmee Chiefs of Lingah

JOASMEES.

and Ras-ool-Khyma despatched their boats in a body, forming unitedly a fleet of twenty-two sail, in order that, in paying their annual visit to Bussora, they might be prepared to repel force by force. On their arrival at Bushire, the Resident addressed a letter to the Shaikh of Chaab, deprecating any interference or molestation on his part towards the Joasmee boats, on the grounds that neither Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur nor his subjects had the slightest concern in the piracy on the Karrack boat, and that Shaikh Syud bin Guzeeb had done all in his power to forward justice, inasmuch as he had, at great trouble and expense, seized and given over the perpetrators. The misunderstanding was thereby amicably arranged, to the satisfaction of both parties.

A. D. 1839. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, after various unsuccessful attempts by land against the Shehaheen tribe, residing at Casaab, Koomza, and Ras Musseldom, resolved to despatch a naval force to blockade their ports, and thus bring them under control. Although the Shehaheen were completely enclosed on the land side by the territories of the Joasmee Chief, whose alleged authority over them was admitted by His Highness the Imaum to the British authorities in the Gulf in 1836, yet that tribe had long continued to maintain a sort of independence, and, keeping up a friendly intercourse with Muskat, to exhibit little disposition to submit to the claim of supremacy advanced by the Joasmee Chief.

The immediate cause of the present quarrel arose from the treacherous surrender of one of the Shahaheen forts to the Naib of Shaikh Sultan, residing at Dubba, who immediately dismantled it. Skirmishes and predatory inroads on either side were the consequence, until the Joasmee Chief, finding that he could make no impression by land, meditated the adoption of the measures before alluded to.

Alarmed, however, at the rapid successes of the Egyptians, and their tool Ameer Khalid, he relinquished his hostile intentions against the Shehaheen, and both parties being thus equally averse to war, amicable arrangements were quickly concluded, through the means of an envoy from himself.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who had previously applied to the British authorities in the Gulf, to be informed whether he might look to the British Government for support in the event of his subjugation being contemplated by the Pasha of Egypt, was now (March 1839) compelled to receive his Agent, Syud bin Mootluk,* and by him induced to summon the Beni Naeem to surrender their fort of Brymee into his hands. The only effect of his summons was to lead that tribe to make the most active preparations for self-defence,—a measure of bold determination, which did not fail to give him secret pleasure.

* Vide Sketch of the Wahabees, in a subsequent part of this Selection.

JOASMEES.

He nevertheless hesitated to expel Syud bin Mootluk and his party (which had been destined to form a garrison for Brymee) from his territory, fearing lest the Aboothabee Chief, or some other neighbouring enemy, might receive them into his country and alliance; but at a general meeting of the maritime chieftains, convened in the presence and through the influence of the Assistant Resident, on board a British vessel, Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot having pledged himself, on oath, to Shaikh Sultan, neither to admit this party nor any others sent by the Egyptian commander, nor to ally himself in any way with him, the latter sent to Syud bin Mootluk to desire him to quit his country, and return to Nujd; but on that person's producing letters from the Egyptian commander to the several Shaikhs of Oman, to the effect that he was his envoy, and that, therefore, whoever opposed him would be considered inimical to the Egyptian cause, finally withdrew his demand, and acquiesced in his remaining, pending the return of the messenger he had despatched for instructions.

Shaikh Sultan, deceived in his expectation that the Chiefs of Brymee would place themselves under his authority, in order to secure his support in their contest with the Beniyas Chief, with a view to which he had directed all the tribes under his control to abstain from affording them (the Naeem) the assistance they had hitherto done, now that the Brymee Shaikhs made peace with Shaikh Khaleefa,* had cause deeply to regret his short-sighted policy, which had the very opposite effect to that anticipated and desired, his ill-timed neutrality not even saving his own districts from aggression; for two of Shaikh Khaleefa's inland tribes foraying his territories, that chief, in reply to his remonstrances, excused himself from returning any of the plundered property, by falsely alleging that the tribes in question were not under his orders, but those of the Egyptian authorities at Lahsa.

Two Debaye men having been killed in the desert, owing to their having been mistaken for men of the Monasir Tribe, by a party of six individuals of different tribes, of whom two belonged to that of Abdoolla bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine (who had long since thrown off any real allegiance to the Joasmee Chief), that chief, on discovering the error, lost no time in proceeding to Shargah, in order to settle the affair, by paying his share of the Deeah, or price of blood, on the behalf of his two followers. The *amende* was not accepted, and the attempts of the Resident shortly after to effect a reconciliation also failing, the parties were left to adopt their own means by land, precluded from hostilities by sea by the terms of the Maritime Truce, of which a period of two months remained yet unexpired.

* Vide Sketch of the Beniyas.

JOASMEES.

In the mean while, however, Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye (having been informed by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, in reply to his demand for the surrender of those concerned in the death of his two subjects, that he was at liberty to take his own measures for redress) had left his town for the purpose of foraying the neighbourhood of Amulgavine; but, finding the inhabitants upon their guard, had been obliged to retreat, leaving six of his people in the hands of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, who placed them in confinement. Suggur bin Sultan, Shaikh of Shargah, now took part with Shaikh Muktoom, and demanded the liberation of the six prisoners, which being refused, he joined his forces to those of Debaye, making a total of 2,500 men, and marched against Amulgavine. The inhabitants, to the number of 400, coming out to meet them, were decoyed to some distance by a pretended flight of the attacking force, and, suddenly overwhelmed, were compelled to retreat, with the loss of twenty men killed, besides many wounded. A peace was shortly after temporarily adjusted, through the mediation of three influential Moollas, upon the conditions that the six Debaye men should be set at liberty by Abdoolla bin Rashid, and proportionable compensation afforded by him for the share the two men of his tribe had taken in the death of the two dependents of Shaikh Muktoom.

It was considered of great importance that every information should be obtained relative to Brymee and its inhabitants. An officer (Captain Hamerton) of the Karrack field force was therefore despatched there with this object; but it was not without the greatest difficulty, nor until the principal Naeem Shaikh, Humood bin Saroor, himself voluntarily offered to accompany him, that he reached his destination, owing to the intrigues and obstacles offered by the Joasmee and Debaye Chiefs.

A. D. 1840.

Immediately previous to this officer's departure, with a view to combine the power and resources of the inland tribes, who were disposed to resist to the utmost any aggressions of the Egyptian Agent, their chiefs were invited to an assembly, convened at Ejman by the Resident: small presents of money were distributed, and their differences reconciled, through his mediation and influence; with the exception of a misunderstanding between the Chiefs of the Zowahir and Beni Kuttub Tribes, regarding some mares belonging to the latter, which had been stolen, and sold to the former, and which he would not upon any consideration consent to restore.

They were informed, that although they could not be received under the immediate protection of the British Government, yet that their efforts in the maintenance of their independence were viewed with satisfaction, and would insure its good will and countenance,—indeed

JOASMEES.

assistance, in the shape of a moderate supply of military stores and provisions.

Some of the Bedouin Naeem Tribes, under Humeed bin Obed bin Subt, the Chief of Heera, under the pretence of prior right over the then ruler, Rashid bin Humeed, to authority over Ejman, surprised the town at night, and gained possession of the fort. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur in the first instance declined to interfere in favour of the lawful governor, but considering, without any grounds, that he would thereby give umbrage to the British Government, subsequently directed his son Suggur, and Muktoom bin Butye, to proceed and eject the Shaikh of Heera, which they did, and moreover burnt his town, in retaliation for the injuries he had inflicted upon the people of Ejman.

As anticipated, the Joasmee Chief, having lulled his opponent into supposed security, by declaring himself satisfied with the extent of punishment he had already inflicted by means of his son and the Shaikh of Debaye, was only awaiting the lapse of the term of the annual Maritime Truce, whose conditions were guaranteed by the British Government, to commence an attack upon Amulgavine by sea and land. He then despatched a fleet, composed of three Buggalows and sixty Buggarahs, conveying 1,500 men, under the orders of Suggur, his son, and Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye, to blockade the place by sea, while he assumed the personal command of a force of 700 Bedouins, to invest it by land.

The only operations which had been carried into effect previous to the Resident's arrival on the coast, for the purpose of establishing the Maritime Truce for another year, were directed against a tower commanding the entrance to the backwater, which it was necessary to take or destroy before the blockading boats could pass. An entrenchment, erected in advance of this tower, had been carried by the Joasmee force, who, however, in attempting to improve their success, by advancing upon the fort, had been received so warmly as to be obliged to retire, with the loss of eight men killed and forty wounded. An attempt by Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot to create a diversion in favour of Amulgavine, by surprising Debaye, had failed. Affairs had reached thus far when the timely mediation of the Resident effected an arrangement of the quarrel, and the siege was raised.

It was agreed that Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur should withdraw the demand he had made for the destruction of the tower commanding the wells of fresh water, while Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid on his part should make good the losses sustained by the Joasmee Chief in the several skirmishes which had taken place prior to the siege. Upon this basis, a formal treaty of alliance and friendship was completed, with the additional stipulations, that Shaikh Abdoolla should erect no new

JOASMEES.

fortifications, and that he should pay the value in coin of what he could not restore in kind.

These proceedings, as above detailed, were the result of the intrigues of the Joasmee Chief to bring under his immediate authority and subjection the Chiefs of Ejman, Amulgavine, and Debaye,—a design which, in the records of the Residency, he is repeatedly mentioned as having entertained for some time previous; but the settlement of the serious disturbance they had caused happily removed all further obstacle to the renewal of the Maritime Truce.

Suggur bin Sultan, the son of the Joasmee Chief, at the instigation of that intriguing and restless character Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye, now attempted to cast off the authority of his father. He commenced by ingratiating himself with the people, inducing many to join him, by persuading them that if he were chief he would deal more leniently with them, and greatly reduce the tax upon the pearl divers (levied by all the chiefs at a rate ranging from 1½ to 7 crowns,—the latter being the amount recovered by Sultan bin Suggur upon each at the last season).

The father, Shaikh Sultan, at first resolved upon a recourse to arms, but was at length persuaded to negotiate; and an arrangement was agreed to, by which the son, instead of being Governor of Shargah, and receiving a salary, as before, was to hold it as a permanent possession, paying annually a stipulated sum. To these terms he (Sultan bin Suggur) was compelled by circumstances to yield, but with a reluctance which indicated that he only did so in the hope of being sooner or later able to avail himself of some favourable opportunity to overthrow the illegally acquired authority of the son. The loss of the most productive and populous of his seaports appears to have been to him a source of great distress, and to have had a material effect upon his health and person. Affairs remained in this state until December, when the Shaikh's brother, Saleh bin Suggur (the former Governor of Shargah), and some of the principal residents in the place, disgusted at the influence Muktoom of Debaye had acquired over the mind of Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan, and foreseeing the injurious results to the best interests of the Joasmee Tribe likely to accrue from the division the irregular proceedings of the latter had introduced among them, determined, by a vigorous and well arranged effort, to restore the legitimate authority of their chief. Accordingly they informed Shaikh Sultan, that if he would contrive to be clandestinely in the neighbourhood of Shargah on a certain night, they would introduce him into the town, and, partly by the aid of their own adherents, assisted by the moral effect of his actual presence, put him in possession of the person of his son Suggur.

JOASMEES.

This plot seems to have been attended with complete success. Shaikh Suggur, surprised while asleep, found himself deserted by all his followers, and a prisoner in the hands of his justly offended father, who forthwith commanded him to make immediate preparation for his removal to Ras-ool-Khyma. Prior, however, to his departure, some of his adherents found means to communicate with him secretly, and intimating their intention of seeking refuge with Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, advised him to take an opportunity, while on the road to Ras-ool-Khyma, to slip away and join them. This scheme was carried into execution; and the only reply made by the Debaye Chief to Shaikh Sultan's indignant remonstrances and demands for the fugitives was that he could not, as an Arab, violate the rights of hospitality, by giving up, against their own wish, those who had sought his protection. The Joasmee Shaikh being now convinced that his son had been counselled and encouraged in his undutiful conduct by Shaikh Muktoom, determined to keep terms with the latter no longer; and accordingly, summoning all his own adherents, he effected a reconciliation with his former enemies the Chiefs of Amulgavine and Aboothabee, and forming an offensive and defensive alliance with them, required their aid in the siege of Debaye. Rejoiced at the prospect of indulging his long cherished hatred against Shaikh Muktoom, the Beniyas Chief willingly engaged to meet Shaikh Sultan's wishes, upon condition that, when captured, Debaye should be entirely demolished, and the inhabitants permitted to locate themselves either at Shargah or Aboothabee, agreeably to their own inclinations.

These vigorous measures, and the extensive arrangements in progress for the attack of Debaye, greatly alarmed Shaikh Muktoom and his people, and they lost no time in endeavouring to avert the storm which threatened, by making professions of unlimited obedience and submission, and employing the cogent argument of a bribe of 1,000 crowns. Unable to resist this offer, Shaikh Sultan added another to the many proofs already afforded of his faithless and insincere character, by coolly breaking all his engagements with the Beniyas and Amulgavine Chiefs, reconciling himself with Shaikh Muktoom, and, what is more extraordinary than all, replacing his son Suggur in the government of Shargah; thus leaving his brother Saleh, and the faithful adherents who had supported him so well, to all the bitter effects of the hatred and revenge of the now reinstated and triumphant governor, without the slighest attempt to shield them from him.

Shaikh Khaleefa was of course highly indignant at this unexpected breach of formal and written engagements, which he would naturally take the first opportunity that might offer to resent. Neither Shaikh Muktoom nor Suggur bin Sultan were likely soon to forget or overlook

JOASMEES.

the proceedings of Shaikh Sultan in respect to themselves; and as the faithless conduct of the latter towards his own adherents and allies would necessarily deprive him of all internal or external aid for the future, full scope was given to the ambitious projects of his son.

On the conclusion of the pearl fishery of this year, a Ras-ool-Khyma boat, with money and cargo on board, arriving at Biddah, excited the cupidity of some lawless characters residing there, who, on her quitting again, went in pursuit, and overtaking her off Khore-al-Jullaya, captured her, and after stripping the crew, and putting them on shore, proceeded with their prize to Khore Shugeer, a backwater between Aboothabee and Adeed.

Shaikh Salmin bin Nassir, of Biddah, on gaining the intelligence, despatched two Buggarahs in pursuit; but these arrived in time only to find the Ras-ool-Khyma boat abandoned, and quite stripped. Among the pirates was the old delinquent and notorious character, Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee,* who had in the course of the last five years been guilty of two or three similar acts, and who, as he had invariably proceeded into the interior with his plunder, nor returned until the following fishing season, had always escaped detection.

Strong suspicions existed—indeed little doubt was entertained—that were it not for the protection afforded by the Biddah Shaikh, who, it was believed, actually shared the booty, he could not thus have found the means and opportunity for these almost yearly acts of piracy. Further, one thing was certain, that Jassim had resided at Biddah during the whole of the last pearl fishery. With reference, therefore, to the warning personally given by the Resident, in September 1836, regarding this notorious character, and the chief having on that occasion actually asked for and received a written authority from that functionary for his seizure, he could not be looked upon as other than a direct or indirect accomplice, and therefore deserving of being held responsible for his acts. His sending out two boats in pursuit was evidently a mere blind, for he acknowledged that his people, fifty in number, fell in with the pirates, consisting only of twelve men, whereas these brought back to Biddah the Ras-ool-Khyma and pirate vessels mere shells, stripped of sails, and every moveable article in them. Accordingly the Indian Naval squadron then in the Gulf, consisting of the *Auckland*, steam-frigate, the *Coote*, sloop, and the *Tigris*, brig, under the command of Commodore Brucks, proceeded to Biddah, to demand the surrender of the pirate boat and its prize, and the payment of 300 dollars, with an additional 40 dollars as the value of the property subsequently plundered by Rugragee, together with the boat which on that occasion fell into his hands.

* Vide Sketch of the Beniyas, in a subsequent part of this Selection.

JOASMEES.

The affair was most judiciously arranged; but it was not, however, till eleven shots had been fired, one into the curtain of the fort, two into the fort itself, and one into a house hard by, that Shaikh Salmin bin Nassir was induced to afford compliance. The remaining shots either fell short of their mark, or were intentionally directed, to avoid the infliction of injury; and it was a matter of gratification that the object desired was fully attained, without any loss of life on shore. Rugragee's boat was publicly burnt previous to the squadron's sailing from Biddah. These proceedings were attended with decidedly good effects: Salmin bin Nassir lost no time in seizing the slaves and effects of Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee at Biddah, and the Chief of Bahrein issued the strictest orders to all the places on the sea coast, belonging to himself, not to afford shelter to suspicious characters, under pain of severe punishment. It was subsequently ascertained that Rugragee and some of his people were actually in Biddah when the squadron arrived off that port, but had been sent off with all haste by Salmin bin Nassir, who had, on finding matters so serious, and that he was held fully to account, despatched a party to bring back the pirates; but it was then too late,—they had got beyond his reach.

A. D. 1841.

Shaikh Sultan, on receiving information (false and unfounded) that Ameer Khalid contemplated sending Syud bin Mootluk and Bin Buteel with a force against Brymee, opened a communication with them, with a view to promote the ruin of the Brymee Shaikhs. His letters by some means fell into the hands of the latter themselves. The character, however, of the old Joasmee Shaikh, for faithlessness and intrigue, was so well established throughout these quarters, and he was so entirely distrusted by all parties, that his machinations seldom produced, comparatively speaking, any evil consequences.

Abdoolla bin Rashid, the Shaikh of Amulgavine, desirous of taking advantage of the divisions existing in the family of the Joasmee Chief, to complete the building on the sea side, commenced previous to the attack upon his tower, but to which he was precluded from adding by one of the conditions of the treaty entered into on that occasion with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, through the mediation of the British Resident, expressed his wish to this effect in an interview with that functionary. He admitted that Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur had as yet displayed no signs of enmity; that he had, indeed, carefully adhered to the terms of the treaty; but remarked, that he considered it hard that he alone of all the chiefs should be restrained from altering or improving his defences as he thought proper, the more so as the incomplete state of his towers left him exposed to the attack of his enemies by sea. Such a proceeding was deprecated by the Resident, as involving a

JOASMEES.

breach of the treaty negotiated at his mediation, at a time when, but for the timely exertion of his influence, he would have been placed in a situation of great difficulty and peril, and as inevitably leading to a renewal of hostilities with the Joasmee Chief.

The only occurrences of notice during this season were some petty misunderstandings between the Shargah and Aboothabee people, in consequence of the arrest of a person in the latter port for debt, and the seizure of a mast from a Shargah boat. This spar had originally been lost from a wrecked vessel belonging to Sultan, the brother of the Beniyas Chief, and, having been picked up at sea, had been sold to its present possessor. An accidental collision between a Shargah and Aboothabee Buggarah on the pearl banks led to blows with sticks between the crews; but the quarrel was made up, and the Nakhoda of the former craft severely taken to task by his chief for his irregular conduct.

Subsequent to the visit of the Resident to the Arabian Coast, as before mentioned, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, the Chief of Amulgavine, notwithstanding the remonstrances he had received, and the disapprobation with which his designs had been viewed, commenced the building of the proscribed towers, and the construction of another for the defence of the back-water. The Joasmee Chief's repeated representations, calling upon the Resident, as mediator, to compel fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty entered into through his mediation, now thus openly violated, induced that functionary to depute his Assistant to the Arabian Coast in November of this year, with a view to the settlement of the misunderstanding between them.

A. D. 1842.

The charge made by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur was found to be correct. It was, indeed, admitted by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid; nor could he adduce any palliatory plea for his conduct in the commission of any, the slightest breach of the compact, on the part of the former; but urged merely, in excuse of his faithless act, the necessity of every precaution in self-defence against so intriguing and treacherous a person as the Joasmee Chief. He further expressed his determination, on the same grounds, not only to complete the tower in question, but to build others; and on being reminded of the circumstances under which the Resident's timely mediation had been afforded, by which he had been saved from inevitable ruin, and pressed to consider the necessity of fulfilling strictly the conditions by which he was bound, under pain of the severe displeasure of Government, and the probable chance of its coercing him in the event of hesitation or refusal, he stated positively that he would not destroy the buildings he had lately erected, but that his tower, and all that belonged to him, being at the disposal of the Government, it might act

JOASMEES.

as it saw fit. The Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma, on the other hand, refused to listen to any compromise; and, with reference to a proposition to afford him assistance in enforcing compliance, declared that he had washed his hands of the business, and that he looked entirely to the British Government to hold both parties to their agreement, as entered into through the mediation of its representative. The Amulgavine Shaikh being called upon to suspend the further addition to the old or the construction of any new works, the case was now referred for the decision of Government.

In accordance with the instructions thereon received, the Assistant Resident, then in charge, proceeded in May 1843 to Amulgavine, and finding the Shaikh as little disposed as ever to make the requisite *amende*, by destroying such towers as had been built or added to, in contravention of the treaty, was constrained, after the failure of every other argument, to have recourse to threats of coercion, before that chief would be induced to concede and pledge himself to a compliance with his just demands.

A. D. 1843.

The establishment of the Maritime Truce for the extended period of ten years, which took place at this time, overturned in a great measure the arguments of the Amulgavine Shaikh for the non-destruction of the proscribed towers, particularly that erected as a defence towards the sea, and in like manner removed the objections of the Joasmee Chief to their existence. It was therefore agreed, that on the former's acting fully up to his engagements, he would be at liberty to rebuild or erect what towers or defences he pleased, and that the British Government would thenceforth be relieved of all further responsibility arising from its guarantee,—in short, that the treaty should be considered null and void.

The British Agent was directed to remain a month or a month and a half at Amulgavine, for the purpose of reporting every ten days the progress that should have been made.

Before the expiration of the period thus allotted, when one of the towers had been levelled with the ground, Muktoom bin Butye becoming mediator, and the Amulgavine Shaikh threatening to withhold his adherents from the pearl fishery, for the purpose of foraying the territories of his opponent,—a proceeding which would have subjected the latter to great injury, either by debarring his dependents from the profits to be derived from the fishery, inasmuch as he would have been compelled to retain them in a similar manner at home in self-defence, or by exposing them to such losses, during their absence on the banks, as the former had it in his power to inflict,—Sultan bin Suggur formally intimated his consent to forego the further destruction of the proscribed towers, if it were any longer permitted him to do so.

JOASMEES.

Such consent was evidently quite sufficient grounds for relinquishing the demand made on the part of Government, the office and duty of a guarantee being to prevent one party from neglecting, while the other fulfils, the obligations imposed by the compact, and not to interfere should they mutually determine to annul the same; and the object of impressing the Maritime Arab Chiefs with the conviction that the breach of an engagement, entered into through the mediation of the British Government, would never be passed over, having been fully gained, it was a matter of the greatest satisfaction that this long pending dispute was now fully terminated, to the apparent satisfaction of both parties, without the exercise or even demonstration of actual force, and without any loss of credit on the part of the British Government.

A Debaye Kafila having in November 1843 been plundered by some of the Beni Ghuflah, Shaikh Muktoom, in retaliation, made a sudden foray into the lands belonging to that tribe, and to the Chiefs of Brymee, and carried off a large number of camels and other cattle, whereby he gave great umbrage to the Joasmee Chief, Sultan bin Suggur, who at the time determined to come to an open rupture with the Debaye Chief, and compel him to restore the plunder. Wiser councils, however, prevailed (the fear of Muktoom's attaching himself more closely to the Beniyas Chief, which would have thrown the balance of power into the hands of the latter, and have proved highly prejudicial to his interests, having its due weight); and in disgust at Shaikh Sultan's change of determination, which deprived them of their revenge, the Chiefs of Brymee (Beni Ghuflah) threatened on their side to submit to Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot of Aboothabee, and actually commenced aggressions upon their former ally. The death of an inhabitant of Shargah by the hand of the brother of Shaikh Muktoom, notwitstanding that the payment of the Deeah or price of blood was immediately tendered by the latter, had nearly brought things to a crisis. The Joasmee Chief's conduct at least embittered the feud between his uncontrollable but in a measure dependent allies. A smart action took place, inland, between the Beni Ghuflah and Muktoom, in which the former were worsted, with the loss of several men killed on both sides. The Debaye Chief paid somewhat dearly for the victory, having himself received several wounds, one of which caused him the loss of an eye.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur now (July 1844) exerted himself to effect a reconciliation with the inland Bedouins; but his attempts having been unsuccessful, he was about to despatch a person to Aboothabee to sound Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, the Beniyas Chief, touching his inclination to receive proposals for a treaty of peace. In the event of a favourable reply, the

A. D. 1844.

Joasmee Chief will probably despatch his brother Saleh bin Suggur to open negotiations.

Some cases of irregularities on the pearl banks have occurred during the present season, in which the Joasmee subjects are the principal aggressors, and the proper remedies have been, or are in the course of being applied, with every prospect of a speedy settlement.

CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

We are told by Captain Kemball, at the close of his Sketch of the Joasmee Tribe, that a few irregularities had occurred on the pearl banks during the present season, "in which the Joasmee subjects were the principal aggressors," and for which "the necessary remedies were being applied, with every prospect of a speedy settlement."

A. D. 1844.

It would appear that five vessels pertaining to the Boo Mahir Tribe, which then resided at Shargah, and was consequently subject to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, attacked, in June 1844, two boats of Debaye, and took from them a quantity of pearls and arms, on the pretext of the people on board the latter owing them a sum of money, which they refused to disburse.

Another case occurred about the same period. It consisted in an "aggression committed by one of Shaikh Sultan's subjects, called Mahomed bin Majid, in taking a native of Chaab from a Debaye boat, while on the pearl banks."

These being the first instances of an open violation of the Maritime Truce, so lately entered into with the Arab Chiefs, it was highly necessary that prompt and immediate steps should be adopted to bring to an account the parties who had been guilty of infringing it. Colonel Hennell therefore addressed a letter to the Joasmee Chief, calling upon him to summon his refractory subjects from the pearl banks, and demanding the instant return of the five boats to Shargah, where they must be made to surrender to the injured parties of Debaye all the property they had plundered. In the second case, Mahomed bin Majid was to be likewise summoned to Shargah, and be compelled to deliver up the man he had captured; and in either case was an additional security for future good behaviour in the shape of 50 German crowns to be demanded from the chief parties implicated (the Nakhoda of each boat, and Mahomed bin Majid), until payment of

which, and the fulfilment of the other requirements, not one of the boats, or of the people belonging to them, were to be permitted to go back to the fishery. A vessel of war was despatched with the above communication, and she had not been long away ere she returned, to inform the Resident that the Joasmee Chief had shown the greatest "zeal and alacrity in taking measures for the execution of the requisitions made upon him"; that the property and captive had been given up to the people of Debaye, and the money demanded as security for the peaceable bearing of the delinquents had been paid, and deposited in the hands of the British Agent.

This was all satisfactory enough; but, unfortunately, the very vessel that was the bearer of such welcome tidings was also charged with other intelligence, of a less satisfactory nature. She brought news of a fresh violation of the Maritime Truce in September 1844.

The Joasmees were again the offenders: one, Esai bin Jassim, a native of Shargah, quarrelled with the master of an Ejman boat; high words ensued, and these were shortly succeeded by blows. Esai bin Jassim boarded and attacked the Ejman craft, and severely wounded one of the crew on board with a spear. This case, though more grave in its character than any preceding it, was likewise brought to a settlement without any difficulty. Shaikh Abdool Azeez having begged the Resident to obtain reparation for the wrongs his people had suffered, that officer called upon Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur to make Esai bin Jassim disburse the sum of 200 crowns, "by way of punishment for his irregular conduct."

The Joasmee Chief, on his part, did not hesitate to comply with the requisitions preferred against him, but hastened, in December 1844, to furnish an order for the 200 dollars demanded. The money was lodged in the hands of Moolla Hussein, the British Agent at Shargah, and subsequently made over by him to the Chief of Ejman, as compensation for the wounds inflicted on his subject.

In the early part of the ensuing year (1846),* hostilities commenced between the Joasmee Tribe and the Chief of Debaye. Shaikh Sultan, it would seem, with a view to extend his authority over the minor ports of Ejman and Amulgavine, determined, as a preparatory measure, to erect a number of towers at a place called Khan,† which, although in his own dominions, bordered also upon those of Debaye, the growing influence of whose chief it was his particular interest to keep in check and restrain. Shaikh Muktoom was by no means inclined to permit the plan to be carried

A. D. 1846.

* Nothing worthy of notice occurred in 1845.

† The actual site of the fort was at a place called Aboo Heyle, within gunshot range of Khan, and distant from Debaye three miles.

JOASMEES.

into execution. He at once resolved to oppose the erection of the fortifications with all the means in his power, and the better to enable him to cope with his powerful enemy, he entered into a close alliance with the chiefs of the two ports (Ejman and Amulgavine) whose subjection was eventually contemplated.

The Joasmee was equally determined and obstinate,—the fort should be built, and no one should prevent it. He opened negotiations with the Chief of Aboothabee, and, strange to say, notwithstanding the feud so long existing between the Joasmee and Beniyas Tribes, he contrived to persuade Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon to forsake the side of Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, and come over to that of himself. Preparations were set on foot for active operations, and hostilities were on the eve of commencing,—nay, a trifling case of aggression had already occurred, in the seizure* of two Ejman boats by the people of Ramse and Himreeah,—when the opportune arrival of Her Majesty's and the Honorable Company's vessels of war off the port of Shargah induced the belligerents to refrain for a while, and attend to the voice of a mediator.

Commodore Sir H. Blackwood, R. N., desired the chiefs to await the result of a reference that should be made to the Resident, on the subject of the fortifications in course of erection. His proposition was readily agreed to, and Shaikh Sultan gave a solemn assurance to the British Commodore, that until the Resident's reply had been received not a hand should be laid to the building. This was well ; but, unfortunately, it was not in the nature of the Joasmee to adhere to a promise. He proceeded, in direct violation of the pledge he had given, to erect and complete the structure at Khan. Hostilities were renewed, and conflicts were daily occurring between the forces of the hostile chiefs, when Captain Kemball, who had been deputed to strive and bring matters to a peaceable settlement, arrived in March 1846 off the Arabian Coast. That officer did all in his power to effect a reconciliation between the contending chiefs. He remonstrated with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur for breaking his promise; he pointed out, that although the British Government had it not in their mind to interfere with the inland affairs of the Arabs, yet they viewed with extreme displeasure his present line of behaviour, both as being opposed to the general peace and tranquillity of the tribes in the Gulf, and as showing a " spirit of ill-will and defiance."

Shaikh Sultan, after urging, in defence of his conduct, a host of excuses, as lame in their nature as they were false in reality, began to assure the Resident how much he was grieved to think that any act he

* Seized from the shore, and not by boats at sea.

JOASMEES.

had committed should have been distasteful to the British Government; but that, as he himself must admit, every chief has a right to erect in his own territories structures of whatsoever description he chooses, so he was puzzled to imagine how, by the construction of the fortifications at Khan, he could possibly have given just cause for offence.

He at first denied, but subsequently granted, that he had pledged himself to the Commodore not to complete the towers until he had learned the Resident's opinion regarding them. That promise, however, was furnished, he said, on a distinct understanding that the Chief of Debaye was on his part to keep the peace; and as the latter proved a constant thorn in his side, and was for ever annoying him, he had no alternative left but to continue the building.

Captain Kemball plainly perceiving that further discussion would be unattended with success, proceeded on the 14th and 15th March 1846 to hold interviews with the Shaikh of Debaye, and his allies of Ejman and Amulgavine.

These three chiefs expressed a great desire for peace, but at the same time most justly observed, that so long as Shaikh Sultan acted the part of an aggressor, which he most undoubtedly had hitherto done, it was but right and proper that they, weak individually, though strong collectively, should combine to repel his attacks ;—in short, that as they were well aware he was anxious to reduce them from a state of independence to one of subjection, they had resolved to stand by each other to the last extremity. Should the British Government, however, guarantee that no inland aggressions would be permitted against their territories, they would at once withdraw their forces, and abstain from the prosecution of warfare. This proposition, being one that could not be entertained for an instant, was at once rejected ; and the inveterate obstinacy of Shaikh Sultan, coupled with the determined opposition of Shaikh Muktoom and his allies, leaving no room for hope that affairs could be peaceably arranged without compromising the British Government, Captain Kemball quitted the coast, and returned to his post at Bushire.

He had scarcely been gone a day and a night ere an event took place that paved the way for the re-opening of negotiations.

Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan, the Chief of Shargah, together with Abdoolla bin Howeylim, the head of the Beni Kuttub, having made a foray into the neighbourhood of Amulgavine, were suddenly attacked by a large body of troops, under the personal command of Abdoolla bin Rashid (Chief of Amulgavine). A fierce struggle ensued, neither party yielding an inch, until Shaikh Suggur fell from his horse, mortally wounded; on perceiving which the Shargah party took to their heels, and hastened back to their homes.

JOASMEES.

Shaikh Suggur had all along been looked upon as "the prime mover and instigator of the aggressive proceedings of Shaikh Sultan," his father; and this supposition was now confirmed, for Shaikh Sultan, although he expressed himself anxious to avenge the death of his son, showed a greater anxiety for the cessation of hostilities. He on the 2nd and 3rd April 1846 addressed the Resident, "expressing his regret at not having followed the advice of the Assistant Resident" when he was lately on the coast; he told the British Agent in the plainest terms that he had been blinded by the counsels of his son, Shaikh Suggur, now no more; that he was for ever wishing disorders might cease, but the evil instigations of others would not permit him to act as he wished. "What he now hoped was that the Resident would again depute some person, on his part, in a British Government vessel, to quiet affairs," and reconcile all who were at feud with each other. Here was a golden opportunity for putting an end to disorder,—here was a time for mediation;—nor was it lost sight of. Commodore Hawkins succeeded in bringing hostilities to a close, and through his intervention was a temporary peace concluded between the contending parties, whereby it was agreed that all the chiefs should withdraw with their troops to their respective territories, and, until the ensuing 12th of November, a period of more than six months, one and all should be at peace with each other. A satisfactory arrangement this,—one highly beneficial to the interests of all parties. The pearl season was now at hand, and the people of every tribe would be able to flock to the banks, and pursue their vocation. There would be no fear of molestation either, for the treaty had been signed in the presence of a British Commodore, and that alone would insure its being kept inviolate.

Such, we may readily suppose, were the feelings generally uppermost in the minds of both chiefs and subjects; such the assurances of peace and quiet that reigned in their breasts;—and such, we are convinced, would have been the state of the case, had the wily Joasmee not been one of the members affected. He unfortunately was one of the number. It was he, too, that had promises to fulfil beyond the mere abstaining from warfare: he had engaged to demolish the towers he had lately erected; he had promised to permit the people of other tribes to come and go among those of his own tribe, whensoever and wheresoever they listed. These, besides many others, were the engagements entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. Let us inquire with how much faithfulness he adhered to his promises.

He forbade the people of Debaye admittance into Shargah; he commenced building, in lieu of demolishing; he strove to instigate Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, but late his ally, to offend and annoy

JOASMEES.

Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye; he seduced a party of the Al Huza from their allegiance to the Amulgavine Chief;—in short, we may safely say that he put his hand to the treaty with every intention to infringe it.

To give a description of all the intrigues he stooped to engage in were both idle and useless. I shall therefore confine myself to the mention of one so inconceivably glaring that his character for deceit will stand naked before us.

To describe the case I refer to, I cannot do better, I think, than furnish an extract from a letter, detailing the affair, that was addressed to the Resident at the time it occurred by Moolla Hussein, the British Agent at Shargah. It is thus that he writes:—

"I have understood that Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, when visiting Syud bin Tahnoon at Aboothabee, from a deficiency of sense, entered into engagements for the due execution of their designs,—that Syud bin Tahnoon should get ready a force of horsemen and camel riders to plunder the territories of the Bedouin Tribes, such as the Ghuflah and the Khuaiter, and those connected with them, viz. the Al Ali of the Tribe of Abdoolla bin Rashid, and others; and with a view solely to inflict loss and injury upon Abdoolla bin Rashid, Chief of Amulgavine. On the 2nd December, accordingly, did a force set out, and at daylight of the 15th attacked a position of the Ghuflah, containing about thirty men, resting in fancied security, who were taken by surprise. I understand that the Beniyas killed of the above all but five, who escaped by flight, carried away all the property from the dwellings, and captured five hundred camels, and a number of sheep. It is reported that of the Beniyas one man was killed, the son of Rashid bin Fazil. Most people possessed of the slightest reason and sense lament and condemn these proceedings on the part of the Beniyas, who were, however, prompted and instigated by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur himself to the slaughter of his dependents and subjects, because those Bedouins, such as the Ghuflah, the Khuaiter, the Naeem, &c. were all of them formerly connected with the Joasmees—particularly the Ghuflah. This senseless conduct of Shaikh Sultan will ruin and depopulate those districts. The Bedouins, on this event, were thrown into the utmost consternation, and the elders of Shargah despatched a messenger with the intelligence to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who affected to disapprove of the proceedings of the Beniyas against the Ghuflah, and yet it was he himself drew them on them. On the arrival of the messenger on the 7th of December, Shaikh Sultan came to Shargah, and immediately despatched a boat to Aboothabee, to intimate to Shaikh Syud that the act of his people against the Ghuflah had caused no change in his sentiments or feelings,

JOASMEES.

and in their friendly relations, but requesting that if, among the camels plundered from the Ghuflah, there should be found any belonging to the people of Shargah or Ras-ool-Khyma, they might be restored. I hear that Shaikh Syud returned an answer which satisfied him on every point."

Let us go on to consider the result of this chief's single-minded and upright behaviour.

At the close of the year 1846, when the pearl season was over, and the land truce at an end, Shaikh Sultan began to revolve in his mind plans of revenge upon the Chief of Amulgavine, for the slaughter of his son, Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan. He resolved to fall with all his power upon Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and, after the reduction of that chief, to fulfil his designs against Abdoolla bin Rashid, who, when unaided by others, would fall an easy prey to the wrath of his more powerful opponent. Shaikh Syud was once more summoned to assist in the undertaking. He cheerfully responded to the call, and hastened to join the Joasmees, with all his available forces. The plan of attacking Debaye in the outset was precisely the thing: nothing could be more consonant to the wishes of the Beniyas Chief than to aid in the reduction of Debaye, and by no other means would the Joasmee be able to wreak his vengeance on Abdoolla bin Rashid. Such was the language held by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon. Shaikh Sultan, however, was not to be duped: rather than see Debaye fall into the hands of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, he would forego his revenge,—he would change his plan of attack: he would proceed against the town of Amulgavine, and not against that of Debaye. To this Shaikh Syud would not for a moment agree: a difference of opinion arose, which quickly led to a quarrel, and either chief veering round, and suddenly shifting his policy, made overtures to Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, who humoured the one and rejected the other.

A. D. 1847.

With Shaikh Syud he refused to treat on the terms that were offered. With Shaikh Sultan he in February or March 1847 entered into a treaty, in consequence of the latter faithfully promising to destroy the towers he had erected at Aboo Heyle, within a period of three months,—a promise, it is scarcely necessary to add, he never intended to fulfil.

A. D. 1848.

Nothing worthy of notice occurred from this date until the commencement of the year 1848, when, "after friendly negotiations had been for some time carried on between Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and the Chiefs of Debaye and Amulgavine, the people of Ejman," (who were now once again on the side of the latter,) "fancying themselves secure, re-opened their intercourse with the people of Shargah." Abdoolla bin Sultan, son of the

JOASMEES.

Joasmee, who was chief of the place, and on a par with his father for uprightness in dealing and single-mindedness of purpose, made a treacherous attempt to surprise and capture the fort of Ejman on the 12th January 1848. His plot, deeply laid though it was, signally failed, and led to all the maritime chiefs once more uniting and breaking off relations with the sons of Shaikh Sultan.*

With regard to Shaikh Sultan himself, Moolla Hussein tells us, in a letter dated February 1st, 1848,—"When he (Shaikh Sultan) heard of the proceedings of his sons, and the failure of their stratagem to capture Ejman, which had led to an alliance between the minor chiefs and Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon of Aboothabee, he was much grieved, since detriment and injury could not fail to accrue therefrom to his interests; and he immediately wrote to the several Shaikhs, denouncing and disavowing their act: but this communication was dictated by the result,—had the attempt been successful he would have approved of their conduct." We entirely concur with the Agent in the opinion he has above expressed, and are moved to pity for the Joasmee Chief, who was doomed to witness so many of his gigantic and disinterested plans both foiled and frustrated.

About this period, hostilities commenced between the Nujdee Lieutenant and the Chief of Aboothabee. The course pursued by Shaikh Sultan throughout the war was of a piece with the rest of his conduct. The following extracts from letters addressed to the Resident by Moolla Hussein, British Agent at Shargah, will sufficiently illustrate Shaikh Sultan's character; and laid down, as they are, in regular order, they furnish a clear though diminutive outline of the part he played in the struggle.

The first passage selected is one from a letter of the 29th of May 1848, wherein he writes:—"Great animosity before existed on the part of Shaikh Sultan against Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and he was exciting Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon to attack the latter; but when he observed Syud bin Tahnoon had joined the coalition against Mahomed bin Syf, he secretly sent to Muktoom to propose an alliance."

Again, in a letter of the 14th of June 1848, he says:—"On the 10th of June, Shaikh Sultan returned to Shargah, and wrote to Syud bin Tahnoon, that he had at first determined to come for the purpose of arranging matters between the parties, but when he learned that he did not desire it, he had given up the intention; and at the same time I have heard privately he wrote to Mahomed bin Syf that he had prepared to go to his assistance, but could find none of the chiefs of the coast to

* Ibrahim is the second party referred to. He too took part in the plot against Ejman.

JOASMEES.

support him; encouraging him, however, to hold out bravely, and, please God, reinforcements would shortly arrive from Nujd."

Again, at the close of the same month, when talking of Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, he writes on the 25th June 1848:—"He has no confidence in Syud bin Tahnoon. With regard to his relations with Shaikh Sultan, outwardly a constant intercourse is kept up between them, but inwardly God knows! A constant correspondence is also going on between Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Syud. I cannot distinguish the false from the true men, as the chiefs of these parts are all endeavouring each to deceive his neighbour."

In a further letter he writes:— "On the 6th Shaban (8th July 1848) Shaikh Syud despatched from Brymee a special courier to Ras-ool-Khyma, with a letter to Shaikh Sultan, to the effect, I understand, that if he desired the continuance of their alliance on its present footing, he must at once commence hostilities against the people of Debaye, and prohibit and cut off their intercourse with his (the Joasmee's) territories. Shaikh Sultan was greatly perplexed, and knew not what reply to give. He resolved therefore to return an evasive answer, in terms of acquiescence,—to the effect that their engagements remained unaltered, and that he had prohibited all commerce and intercourse between his territories and those of Debaye. On the night of the 9th Shaban (11th July), after the above answer had been sent, Soleyman, one of Shaikh Sultan's followers, secretly took his departure from Shargah for Debaye, without the knowledge of the inhabitants, apprehensive lest it should reach the ears of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon. On meeting Shaikh Muktoom and his elders, he informed them that at heart Shaikh Sultan desired the closest alliance and friendship with them, but that he begged them for the present to forbid their tribe from continuing their intercourse with Shargah, and he purposed proclaiming publicly in Shargah that none should communicate with Debaye, in order that the rumour might spread abroad in the country. Shaikh Muktoom and his elders replied that they would not oppose the views of Shaikh Sultan."

Some three or four months later in the year, after Shaikh Sultan's territories had been forayed by the troops of the Aboothabee Chief, and after he had complained of the said foray in the bitterest terms to the Resident, reproaching Shaikh Syud with breaches of faith, and all manner of treachery, but omitting, of course, to mention how he, by his own conduct, had brought the attack upon himself,—after all this, he committed himself to a most extraordinary piece of duplicity. On one and the same day (30th October 1848) did he make overtures of peace to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, and issue an order to the people of Shargah, forbidding them "to proceed on their voyages,"

JOASMEES.

his object being, it was supposed, to march with his forces in aid of the Wahabees; and on the 4th of December we learn from another communication that the combined forces of Shaikh Sultan, Muktoom bin Butye, and Humeed bin Rashid, set out from Shargah with Syud bin Mootluk, and the remnant of the Nujdees, to attack Shaikh Syud at Brymee. The Joasmee had now therefore plainly identified himself with the cause of the Wahabees, and was at open war with the Chief of the Beniyas. How matters would have ended, or what would have been the next step of the Joasmees, had hostilities continued, it is difficult to say. No general engagement, however, took place between the contending armies.

Peace was concluded in February 1849, and the Brymee forts restored to the Wahabee commander,—all things to all parties reverting to the condition they were in before the strife commenced.

A. D. 1849.

Shaikh Sultan had for some time past been planning an expedition against Khore Fukaun, a port on the Batinah Coast, now in the possession of His Excellency Syud Soweynee; but, owing to the strong terms in which both Syud bin Mootluk and Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye expressed their aversion to the proposed measure, he abandoned the plan.

In the early part of the ensuing year, however, when the Sohar Chief sought his assistance against the Muskat authorities, who had seized upon his brother, and invaded his territories, Shaikh Sultan gave ear to the request, and finding that Syud Ghes promised, in the event of being freed from his obnoxious opponent, to aid and support the Joasmee in recovering his lost possessions upon the Batinah Coast, as also to pay tribute, the same in amount as he had hitherto paid the Wahabee, assistance was speedily proffered.

A. D. 1850.

The Joasmee troops were yet on the way, when they were met by Syud Ghes, who, having successfully resisted the convulsive efforts of the Muskat Governor to take the fort of Sohar, had driven His Excellency Syud Soweynee to retreat from the neighbourhood, and return to Muskat. The combined chiefs now proceeded at once against the fort of Shinas, and, after a stout resistance had been offered, compelled the place to capitulate on the 10th May 1850. They were equally successful in their attacks upon Ghulla and Khore Fukaun, and having thus reduced the whole of the Batinah Coast from Merya to Cape Musseldom to a state of subjection, and come to a satisfactory understanding of the partition to be made, they both returned to their seats.

JOASMEES.

Passing over the countless intrigues which the Joasmee stooped to commit, and confining the narrative to a bare relation of the actual deeds he performed, the doings of Shaikh Sultan in the year 1851 can be told in a word: he made peace with Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, out of spite to the Wahabee, because he favoured Shaikh Muktoom more than himself.

A. D. 1851.

He received a remonstrance from the Ameer for effecting the alliance, and replied to His Highness that, in accordance with the wishes he expressed, he would break off the friendship contracted,—a promise it is needless to say he never intended to fulfil, for it was opposed to his interest to do so.

He rushed to the assistance of Syud Ghes, Chief of Sohar, in his conflict with the Imaum of Muskat, according to engagement, and was deceitful enough to accept presents in gold, and forsake the cause he had faithfully promised to uphold.

Such was the character of the Joasmee's proceedings during the year 1851.

In the spring of the ensuing year a Ras-ool-Khyma Buggalow, when on her return to the Persian Gulf from the African Coast, and while still in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar, committed a piracy upon a vessel belonging to that port.

A. D. 1852.

The uncertain and tardy means of communication existing between the ports of Zanzibar and Bushire caused considerable delay in obtaining the information necessary to establish the true particulars of the case, and to fix the just amount of satisfaction to be demanded from Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur; for although Captain Kemball wrote to Major Hamerton on the subject of the piracy so early as the month of June 1852, and, receiving no reply up to the 3rd of August following, again addressed him regarding it, and finally, on the 4th of February in the succeeding year, found it necessary to write a third despatch, begging to be favoured with an answer to his previous communications, it was not until the month of August 1853 that a reply from that officer reached the Resident at Bushire; and even then, the offending Buggalow, though owned by a native of Ras-ool-Khyma, yet being manned, as she was, by people of Kusbeeah, who are the acknowledged subjects of His Highness Syud Saeed, and the Joasmee Chief "repudiating his liability" to afford redress in consequence, Captain Kemball, considering the arguments adduced by Shaikh Sultan to be deserving of attention, thought it right to make a further reference to Major Hamerton on the subject, and up to the close of the year, no reply having been received, the matter remained unadjusted and pending.

A. D. 1853.

JOASMEES.

During the years 1852 and 1853, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur would seem to have laboured under feelings of extreme irritation, and to have done all in his power to incur the displeasure of the British Government.

Twice during the period I have mentioned was our British Agent at Shargah subjected to insults whilst residing at his post within the Joasmee dominions,—once from people of Shargah, with the connivance of its chief, a son of the Joasmee, and once from parties in the interest of the Wahabee Ameer, whom Shaikh Sultan professed his inability to control. In either case was redress demanded and afforded; but scarcely had satisfaction been given, and a reconciliation between Shaikh Sultan and the British Agent been effected, in the presence of Commodore Robinson, than the former addressed a letter to the Resident, preferring a fresh set of charges against the latter, for misappropriation of monies entrusted to his care for delivery to others,—charges both vague and groundless, as was proved by the fact of his being compelled to retract every particle of the accusation he had made, when called upon to furnish proof of the truth of the allegations. Again, towards the close of the year 1852, Shaikh Sultan wrote a letter to the Resident, complaining bitterly of the manner in which he was brought to account for even the slightest case of maritime irregularity committed by his dependents, whilst the other subscribers to the truce, he said, were permitted to act with impunity, and were not remonstrated with on occasions of infraction of their engagements with the British Government. The Joasmee was favoured, in reply, with a communication from Captain Kemball, completely refuting every charge of partiality he had thought fit to adduce, and proving most clearly that one and all of his insinuations were groundless.

Much of this soreness of feeling was supposed to have arisen out of an ill-will borne to the British Agent, in consequence of divers disclosures he made to the Resident regarding the traffic in slaves carried on by the Joasmee's dependents. Another and far stronger cause of irritation, however, was to be attributed to an intimation conveyed to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur by Captain Kemball, "in compliance with the orders of the Honorable the Court of Directors, that Government refused its confirmation of the arrangement he (Shaikh Sultan) proposed to Colonel Hennell, for the payment through him, instead of direct to the injured parties, of monies which might be recovered hereafter as compensation for piracies, homicides, or other injuries sustained by his subjects."

This announcement would appear to have well nigh maddened the Joasmee. "He was very wroth";—so writes the Agent in a letter

JOASMEES.

dated 11th November 1852, some three months after the order had reached its destination, when he heard that some money exacted from Shaikh Syud bin Butye, for some people of his, who had been injured at sea, had been paid to the sufferers, and not to himself. Again, so late as the month of August in the ensuing year, Hajee Yacoob complained of the unfriendliness shown him by the Joasmee, in consequence of monies, exacted as compensation for irregularities at sea, "being paid to the individuals aggrieved" in lieu of himself.

During the absence of Shaikh Syud bin Butye, the Chief of the Boo Felasa, from his post, at Muskat, to which port he had repaired on a visit to His Highness the Imaum, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur supported the pretensions of the sons of the late Muktoom, who dared to aspire to the chiefship. His intrigues, however, were not attended with much success. He contrived, it is true, to bribe and entice Syud bin Maanaul Moheyree to quit Debaye with his tribe, and settle at Shargah, but all his endeavours in behalf of the youthful heirs to the chiefship were utterly frustrated by an alliance, offensive and defensive, that was suddenly concluded, on the 17th December 1852, between Shaikh Syud bin Butye and the Chiefs of the Beniyas and Amulgavine Tribes.

There remains but to notice the part that was played by the Joasmee during the complications that arose in the spring of 1853, between the Wahabee and Muskat authorities. The course pursued by Shaikh Sultan was as objectionable as ever. He hastened to wait upon Abdoolla bin Fysul, so soon as he heard of his arrival at Brymee; he strove all in his power to prevent the conclusion of a peaceable arrangement between the contending parties; though made aware that the Resident had arrived off the coast for the purpose of meeting him, he manifested no inclination to return to his seat and wait upon him, but "proposed to make up for his absence by appointing certain deputies to communicate with Captain Kemball in his stead,"—deputies whom, there was every reason to suppose, he had not "vested with powers to conclude any definitive arrangement"; he strongly counselled an immediate march upon the Batinah districts; he pointed out the defenceless condition they were in; and he succeeded in raising himself to the highest favour in the eyes of the Wahabee commander.

His counsels, his plans, beyond those of the rest of the chiefs, one and all were agreeable to the wishes and desires of Abdoolla bin Fysul; and considering that a day had been fixed (so said Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon) for the march of the coalesced forces on the Imaum's dominions, matters might indeed have proved serious, had not a combination of circumstances conspired to damp the ardour of both Joasmee and Wahabee for a recourse to hostilities. The project of an invasion

JOASMEES.

was abandoned, and affairs were peaceably settled. Shaikh Sultan thereon returned to Shargah, and waited upon Captain Kemball on the 4th May 1853, on board the Honorable Company's sloop-of-war *Clive*. That officer did not fail to upbraid him for the detention to which his protracted stay at Brymee had subjected him, and to make him fully aware how distasteful his late proceedings would be to the British Government, when they learned that it was their old and faithful ally the Imaum of Muskat he so basely was striving to harm and injure.

The subject of the new treaty for a lasting peace being brought under discussion, Shaikh Sultan exhibited considerable readiness to become a member thereto, and affixed his seal to the document without hesitation or demur.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

BENIYAS TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1761 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,

PREPARED BY

LIEUTENANT S. HENNELL;

WITH

CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,

FROM 1832 TO SEPTEMBER 1843,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO MAY 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

BENIYAS.

NEITHER Aboothabee, nor the Beniyas Tribe inhabiting it, appears to have met with a separate notice in Mr. Warden's Sketches. It is situated just below Ras Suffan, on a portion of land formed into an island by a backwater, which admits boats, but which is fordable at one spot during low-water. The anchorage off the town is unsafe: vessels drawing fourteen feet water are obliged to lie a mile and a quarter off from the shore, and are completely exposed to the violence of the north-westers; while, from the low nature of the shore, and prevalence of hazy weather, it is extremely difficult of access. The town, with the exception of the Shaikh's house, or small fort, is built entirely of cadjans, the policy of the present ruler, Tahnoon, being opposed to the erection of stone buildings, as rendering his subjects too independent of him, and, at the same time, causing him to be more tangible by an attack on the sea side. The number of inhabitants fluctuates, but may be taken on an average at about 18,000 souls. During the pearl fishing upwards of 600 boats visit the banks, each carrying from seven to fifteen men. The soil is arid, and unproductive, and the water on the island brackish. Aboothabee is consequently dependent upon other places for its supplies of provisions, and is soon reduced to great distress by anything like an effective blockade.

The Beniyas Tribe is composed of several others, such as the Marier and the Kemzan, descended from the Beni Sukur; the Hawamul and the Mujalibah, from the Al Ali; the Sumeesat, from the Abedal; the Rameesat, from the Beni Humeed; the Maharibah, from the Beni Naeem; the Bomaher, from the Shubeeb and Kalazy; the Al Boo Felasa, from a branch of the Beniyas; and the Beni Kaab, from the Kaab. The rulers over this collection of tribes have generally been selected from the Huboo Fulah family, from which Shaikh Tahnoon is descended.

The original seat of the Beniyas, like that of the Arabian Tribes, was in Nujd, but on leaving that part of Arabia they settled in the tract of country extending between Biddah and Brymee. The larger portion of the tribe was composed of Bedouins, residing in the interior, and tending their flocks and herds; but some few individuals, reduced

to poverty through the loss of their cattle, took up their abode on the shores of the Persian Gulf, on the line of coast between Debaye, and a short distance from the island upon which the town of Aboothabee now stands, but which at that time, from its being supposed to be wholly destitute of water, was uninhabited. It was, however, sometimes visited by the Beniyas fishermen, as a place well adapted for the prosecution of their employment; but on these occasions they were under the necessity of taking their supplies of water with them. One of these individuals, however, having occasion to dig into the ground, was delighted to find the pit fill with tolerable water; a discovery which induced the visitors to take up their permanent residence upon the island of Aboothabee.

A. D. 1761 to 1763.

The first establishment (which consisted of twenty houses) took place about the year 1761. The intelligence of water having been found quickly spread through the tribe, and before two years had elapsed the place had increased to four hundred houses; from which period to the present additions to the population and dwellings have been constantly making. The Shaikhs of the tribe for many years continued to reside in the interior, paying occasional visits to Aboothabee, and receiving presents from the inhabitants. According to one opinion, the original founder of the Huboo Fulah family was Shaikh Yas bin Amer bin Ghes bin Nuzur. (From the last the Prophet of Islam is said to be descended.) It is, however, asserted by others that Shaikh Tahnoon's ancestor was Zhelal, a lineal descendant of Gharrem-ool-Zeighee. Nothing, however, appears to be known regarding his successors until after the death of the great grandfather of Shaikh Shakboot, the father of the present ruler of Aboothabee. This person left four sons, named Inhian, Saadoon, Mahomed, and Sultan. These soon quarrelled with each other, and the Beniyas Tribe, being consequently divided into four parties, a sanguinary and protracted contest was carried on between them. On the death of the three first, they were succeeded by their respective sons, Esa bin Inhian, Zaed bin Mahomed, and Sultan bin Saadoon, during whose lifetime the feud became still more virulent. Esa was succeeded by his son Zheab, as the nominal head of the Beniyas. The new chief observing that the inclinations of the bulk of the tribe were inclined to his uncle Zaed bin Mahomed, availed himself of a favourable opportunity, and put him to death, by which means he finally established his authority over the whole of the Beniyas. He continued to govern undisturbed for some time, until a grandson of Mahomed, named Huza bin Zaed, who resided in Aboothabee, endeavoured to stir up the neighbouring tribes against him. At this time Shaikh Zheab resided in the interior, paying only occasional visits to his capital.

BENIYAS.

On the occasion of one of these visits, in 1793, Shaikh Zheab thought proper to give orders that the family of Huza, together with all his dependents, should leave Aboothabee, and settle in the interior. At this time Huza was absent in Bahrein, but, receiving intelligence of the proposed removal, he hastened back, and, in the course of an angry dispute with his relative (Zheab), drew his sword, and struck him dead upon the spot. This action again split the Beniyas into two divisions, one of which supported Huza, while the other and larger portion adhered to Shakboot (the son of the murdered chief), who prosecuted the feud with such success as to put to death the ten individuals who were present at the time of his father's murder. Dreading a similar fate, Huza at last left Aboothabee with his dependents, and settled in Aboo Ali.

A. D. 1793.

After his departure, Shaikh Shakboot assumed undisputed possession of the chief authority in the tribe, and continued at its head until 1816, in which year his eldest son, Mahomed, succeeded in deposing him. Mahomed remained as Shaikh for two years, when his younger brother, Tahnoon, having received a Buggalow, together with a considerable sum of money, from the Imaum, returned from Muskat to Aboothabee, and, with the assistance of his father, and good will of the majority of the tribe, succeeded in expelling the usurper in 1818. For some time after this event both father and son acted together as heads of the tribe, but gradually the authority of Shaikh Tahnoon became superior. To this alteration in their respective relations Shakboot appears to have submitted quietly, as he continued to reside in Aboothabee and its neighbourhood, and was at all times employed by Tahnoon in the arrangement of any affairs of negotiation he might be engaged in. Mahomed bin Shakboot with some difficulty saved his life by flight, and, taking refuge in Biddah, claimed the protection of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein. Until this period the Beniyas had always been the close and intimate allies of the Joasmees, but the connection formed by Shaikh Tahnoon with the Imaum of Muskat gradually weakened the friendship existing between the two tribes, until at last a total change ensued in their relations, and they became bitter enemies.

A. D. 1795 to 1819.

In 1820 the Beniyas Tribes were admitted members of the General Treaty* concluded by the British Government with the Maritime Arabs of the Persian Gulf, for the effectual suppression of piracy in that sea.

A. D. 1820.

About the year 1822, an individual of some rank, named Sooedan bin Zaal, fled from Aboothabee, to avoid the payment of his debts, and at the same time

A. D. 1822.

* Vide pages 76 to 80 of this Selection.

BENIYAS.

carried off a number of boats belonging to that place with him. After leading a wandering life for some time about the Gulf (during which his proceedings were viewed with more than ordinary suspicion by the British authorities), he finally settled in Biddah, under the protection of the Bahrein Shaikh. Shaikh Tahnoon, enraged at his flight, prosecuted very active operations against him, and succeeded in capturing some boats and property belonging to him. These proceedings being considered as likely to endanger the tranquillity of the Gulf, and lead to a renewal of piracy, an intimation was made to His Highness the Imaum (who was supposed to hold some control over the Beniyas Chief), through Colonel Kennett, (the Political Agent), that unless Shaikh Tahnoon gave up what he had seized, and desisted in future from any such proceedings, a vessel of war would be sent to Aboothabee to compel restitution, and destroy his fortifications.

In the end of 1823 Shaikh Tahnoon's brother, Mahomed bin Shakboot, having collected together a body of the Monasir Tribe, attacked and plundered Aboothabee. The former immediately marched with 1,500 men to relieve the town, and after an action, which lasted some hours, Mahomed was forced to retreat, after losing thirty-five men, and subsequently took refuge in Shargah. This place being threatened by Shaikh Tahnoon if the fugitives were not given up, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur collected troops, and prepared to resist, but soon after Mahomed bin Shakboot left his protection, and took up his residence in Huailah, under the authority of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein.

A. D. 1823.

About this time a treaty of peace between the Imaum, Shaikh Tahnoon, and Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, was concluded, through the mediation of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, the principal condition of which was the destruction of the towers of Brymee, as well as the fort of Derah, a small fort between Shargah and Debaye, occupied by the Sooedan Tribe, under Salmin bin Nassir. A number of secret intrigues appear to have been carried on in respect to the former place, which cannot now be unravelled; but Shaikh Sultan showing considerable hesitation in fulfilling his portion of the engagement, the Beniyas Chief made preparations for the renewal of hostilities, which were only averted by the influence of the Imaum and the Resident in the Persian Gulf, both of whom, it was at last arranged, were to send messengers along with Sultan bin Suggur's people, to see the stipulation of the treaty regarding the destruction of the towers of Brymee carried into effect. This arrangement was, however, rendered useless by Shaikh Sultan violating the truce, and attacking Derah. This proceeding was the signal for the renewal of hostilities, which were carried on for some time, without any material advantage being gained by either party over the other.

A. D. 1824-25.

BENIYAS.

About the latter part of the year 1825, the Imaum having arrived in the Gulf with a fleet, His Highness offered his mediation, which was accepted, and a peace between the Beniyas Chief and Sultan bin Suggur was again concluded. The terms agreed upon were that the fort of Derah should be demolished, and Salmin bin Nassir, with the Sooedan Tribe, removed out of Shaikh Sultân's territories, while the fort of Debaye was to receive a party of troops, under the command of an officer of the Imaum.

A. D. 1825.

In 1826 Obed bin Sadoon (a follower of Sooedan bin Zaal, already mentioned as having fled from Aboothabee in 1822) and Syf bin Thykhan sailed from Biddah, and captured a Buggalow belonging to Aboothabee, killing and wounding several of her people. They also took possession of an Amulgavine boat, in which there was one man killed, and another wounded; but afterwards allowed her to proceed on her voyage. Subsequently, these marauders stripped a Bahrein boat, and carried all the plunder to Biddah, from which place they made their escape. These proceedings created a lively indignation in the mind of Shaikh Tahnoon against Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein, for the countenance and shelter afforded to his rebellious subjects. He appealed very earnestly to the British authority for redress, and was with some difficulty restrained from declaring war against the Uttoobee Shaikh.

A. D. 1826.

The terms of the treaty lately concluded between the Joasmee and Beniyas Tribes, relating to the demolition of Derah and the removal of the Sooedan Tribe, not having been carried into effect by Shaikh Tahnoon, the Joasmee Chief applied, in September 1826, to the Resident, for permission to endeavour to dislodge the occupants by force. He consented however to delay his proceedings until it was seen whether the Aboothabee Shaikh would attend to the recommendation given him by the British authority for him to withdraw his countenance and support from the Sooedan Tribe. No attention, however, was paid by Tahnoon to the personal exhortations of the Resident, who, in the course of an interview at Aboothabee, endeavoured to convince him that the evacuation of the place in question had become necessary for the preservation of the public peace, which was constantly perilled by the outrageous conduct of Salmin bin Nassir's followers towards the neighbouring tribes, and that both his credit and interest depended in a great measure upon the due performance of his engagement regarding the demolition of Derah, as the treaty containing this article had received the sanction of His Highness the Imaum, and the English Government. Finding the Beniyas Chief inflexible, the British authority proceeded to Muskat, and there, having acquainted His Highness the Imaum with the contumacy displayed by Shaikh Tahnoon, His Highness promised to send two

BENIYAS.

vessels to cruise off the fort, to prevent assistance being sent by him, while the Joasmee troops from Shargah and Ras-ool-Khyma invested it by land.

No steps, however, were taken in the affair till March 1827, when the Imaum sailed with his fleet for Derah, and caused that place to be demolished. At the same time, as a sort of compensation to Shaikh Tahnoon's wounded dignity, he supplied him with cannon and ammunition, besides using all his influence to induce the inhabitants of Debaye to place themselves under his authority. Prior to His Highness' appearance, a negotiation for peace had been commenced between the rival Shaikhs, which had nearly been brought to a favourable termination, when the arrival or intrigues of His Highness (who has always felt disposed to view with a jealous eye any combination between these powerful chieftains) threw matters into the same disorder and confusion which had formerly existed. Tahnoon, availing himself of the support afforded to him by the Imaum, made a sudden and vigorous attack on Debaye, which was successful.

A. D. 1827.

In November 1827 Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur declared war against Tahnoon, on account of his continued aggressions. Among these was the seizure of several Shargah pearl boats by Khaleefa bin Dumeethar, the Governor of Debaye, who, however, was compelled, by the prompt and efficient measures taken by the officer commanding the vessel of war cruising on the pearl banks, to restore both the vessels and cargo.

The proceedings of Dumeethar produced a strong remonstrance from the political authority to Shaikh Tahnoon, and subsequently, in an interview held with that personage in April 1828, Major Wilson pointed out the ill effects likely to arise if he permitted his dependents to conduct themselves in such an irregular manner. Shaikh Sultan, however, does not appear to have acted upon his declaration of war, as he took no further steps after publishing it, and affairs remained as they were.

A. D. 1828.

Agreeably to the arrangement previously made with the Imaum, Shaikh Tahnoon joined His Highness with a large contingent in October 1828, and accompanied the expedition against Bahrein. From what has since transpired, there is reason to believe that a secret understanding existed between the Beniyas Chief and the Shaikh of Bahrein; for after the appearance of the fleet before that island, the inhabitants were minutely informed of everything in agitation, while the irregular and insubordinate conduct of Shaikh Tahnoon and his followers was the principal cause of the total failure of the whole affair.

The two notorious characters Sooedan bin Zaal and Syf bin Thykan, mentioned as having carried off a number of boats from Aboothabee,

BENIYAS.

and fled to Biddah in 1822, having effected a reconciliation with Shaikh Tahnoon, left the latter place, and returned to their old residence in the Beniyas capital.

In July 1828 two Bahrein Buggarahs and one Koweit Buteel were captured near the former place, by some of the Beniyas Tribe. These vessels were, however, subsequently recovered, and restored to their owners; but the pirates, making their escape into the interior, avoided the punishment they so well deserved.

In September 1828 a boat, manned principally by people of the Beniyas Tribe, under the command of an inhabitant of Bahrein, named Obed bin Mohunnah, proceeded over to the Persian Coast, for the purpose of cruising, but their leader having been seized while landing at Zeerah, a small village on the Persian Coast, they returned to the Arabian side of the Gulf. On their way back they fell in with four Aseeloo boats, near Seer Beniyas, which they plundered; and afterwards proceeded to the neighbourhood of Aboothabee, to which place the sufferers likewise hastened, to lay their complaints before Shaikh Tahnoon, who behaved on this occasion in a very creditable manner, having afforded them such compensation for the aggression committed as fully satisfied them.

Hostilities having again broken out in February 1829 between Shaikh Tahnoon and the Joasmee Chief, Aboothabee, the capital of the former, was at one time reduced to very great distress, by the blockade maintained by Shaikh Sultan. Both parties, however, felt the inconvenience of carrying on war during the season of the pearl fishing, and at length a peace was concluded between the belligerents in the month of June 1829, through the good offices of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb, the Governor of Lingah.

A. D. 1829.

The Imaum of Muskat and the Shaikh of Bahrein having dropped further hostilities, and entered into amicable relations with each other, Shaikh Tahnoon, as the ostensible ally of His Highness, was admitted as a member of the treaty of peace concluded in December 1829, although no act of hostility had ever been displayed towards him by the Uttoobees.

The Beniyas Shaikh appears to have remained quiet till the beginning of 1831, when, on the occasion of the Imaum declaring war a second time against his relation Humood bin Azan of Sohar, he sent down a number of men to Muskat, with an offer of their services in the approaching contest. Whether suspicious of the Shaikh's fidelity, from observing the invariable ill success which attended all the operations in which a share was borne by the Beniyas Tribe, or from some other cause, is uncertain, but all his proffers were peremptorily rejected by His Highness. Irritated at this repulse, and probably alarmed at the increase of influence likely to be acquired by his rival, Sultan bin Suggur, from the favour of the Imaum, Shaikh Tahnoon appears to have thrown himself into the opposite scale, and, by a well-timed expedition into the Joasmee territories, prevented that tribe from affording any efficient support to His Highness' operations against Sohar. The consequence of this foray was a declaration of war on the part of Sultan bin Suggur, who made extensive preparations for the blockade of Aboothabee. The prospect of hostilities, however, during the pearl fishing season, excited great discontent in the minds both of the Joasmees and Beniyas, in consequence of which the good offices of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb of Lingah were sought by both parties, and after a short negotiation a peace was concluded, in July 1831, through the mediation of that chief, and the subjects of both parties proceeded forthwith to the pearl banks.

A. D. 1831.

Shortly after this arrangement, a piracy was committed by some people of Shargah upon two Beniyas pearl boats. In retaliation for this outrage, Shaikh Tahnoon laid an embargo upon fourteen Joasmee Buggarahs which happened to touch at Aboothabee. These, however, on the restoration of the captured boats and cargoes by Shaikh Sultan, he liberated, but detained the pearls and slaves belonging to the Shargah vessels, until certain claims preferred by one of his subjects against a man of Debaye (now residing under the protection of the Joasmee Chief) should be settled. At the present time (December 1831) this affair still remains unadjusted, and it is to be feared will eventually terminate in the renewal of hostilities.

CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING, FROM 1832 TO 1843,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

The latter end of the year 1831, according to the historical sketches up to that time, found Shaikh Tahnoon, the Beniyas Chief, in the course of negotiation with his enemies, Sultan bin Suggur and his dependent the Chief of Ejman, relative to the mutual restoration of property taken at sea by the subjects of either party. The war which had threatened in consequence of the depredations of Tahnoon upon the territories of his opponents, at a time when they were occupied with their forces on the Batinah Coast, had been averted through the mediation of the Chief of Lingah.

BENIYAS.

BENIYAS.

The only measure adopted by Shaikh Tahnoon during this year was one of precaution, in despatching some well armed Buggalows to convoy his trading vessels, and secure them from the attack of the Joasmee boats, which were cruising against the trade of Muskat, &c.

A. D. 1832.

By giving asylum and protection to three refugees, inhabitants of Khan (a place near Shargah, under the authority of the Joasmees), who had been concerned in the piracy and plunder of a boat belonging to an English subject, off the Persian Coast, he greatly offended the British authorities, and drew upon himself the responsibility of their act, which, as being Joasmee subjects, would otherwise have properly attached to the Joasmee Chief.

Although the piracy was committed in May 1832, it was not until early in the following year, in consequence of the repeated evasions and delays of Shaikh Tahnoon, and immediate means to enforce redress not being available, owing to the pressing contingencies in other quarters (Shaikh Nassir's proceedings at Bushire, &c.) requiring more urgently the services of the cruisers of the Gulf squadron, that the Resident's demand upon him for the exposure and delivery of the culprits, or the payment of 1,500 German crowns, was acceded to, by the adoption of the latter alternative. The satisfaction thus afforded, however, put it out of the power of Shaikh Sultan to excuse any further delay in making good his share of the value of the property plundered; and he was accordingly called upon to disburse the sum of 2,000 German crowns.

A. D. 1833.

In the exaction of the full penalty in the latter case it became necessary, on the part of the officer commanding the vessels despatched on this duty, partially to fulfil his threat of destroying a Buteel belonging to Shargah, lying near Ejman, which he crippled, by knocking away her poop deck, and lodging several shot in her hull.*

In April 1833 Shaikh Tahnoon's life was sacrificed to the ambition and jealousy of his two brothers Khaleefa and Sultan, who with their own hands put him to death. Apprehending the chances of their intriguing against his life and authority, he had long excluded them from Aboothabee, but yielding at length to the entreaty of the father, Shakboot, recalled them from banishment, under the proviso that they should not exercise any share in the government, or carry arms. A very short time, however, served to discover them in league with some of the principal men of the tribe to murder him, upon which he cast the latter into prison, but thereby unfortunately so

* This paragraph perhaps more properly belongs to the section on Joasmees, but it is inserted here in consequence of Shaikh Tahnoon having been mixed up in the affair, as above detailed.

BENIYAS.

offended and alarmed the remainder that they too secretly entered into a conspiracy in order to put the original design into execution with the brothers. Accordingly, Shaikh Khaleefa, having concealed a loaded pistol under his clothes, took the opportunity of Tahnoon's being off his guard to shoot him in the side, when Sultan immediately despatched him with his dagger. While Tahnoon lived, the reduction of the tribe to submission promised much difficulty to the Wahabee Chief; but the first act of the usurpers was to tender allegiance and the payment of Zukat, in return for which, Toorkey bin Saood intimated to the Joasmee Chief that they were under his protection, and that he would permit of no aggressions upon them.

The oppressive and arbitrary conduct of the usurpers very soon disgusted the tribe, and a conspiracy was formed (August-September 1833) by some of the principal members, who communicated their plot to a nephew of Shaikh Shakboot, the person they had selected to put his cousin Shaikh Khaleefa to death, and become chief in his room. This individual, however, betrayed them to Shaikh Khaleefa, who retired within the fort, and seizing the chief conspirators, put three of them to death, viz. Sultan bin Majid, Mahomed bin Rumeen, and Mahomed Muleefa. He likewise imprisoned two merchants, with the intention of killing them; but the ferment thereby raised among the people of Aboothabee, combined with his brother Sultan's entreaties, induced him to spare their lives. One of them, Bin Iyan, however, after beating and stripping him of his property, he sent away, together with his relatives, in a Buggarah to Lingah. Consequent upon the discontent and disgust created by these proceedings, two branches of the Beniyas, the Boo Felasa and Rumsha, consisting of about eight hundred persons, determined upon leaving the place on the first favourable opportunity: accordingly those on the spot, leaving all their effects behind them, proceeded to Debaye, which town was after a little hesitation and delay given up to them by the Beniyas Governor, and they summoned the rest, who were on the pearl banks, to join them there. Nothing could have afforded more satisfaction to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the Joasmee Chief, than these dissensions and divisions among the Beniyas, and the prospect of destroying his enemies by means supplied by themselves. He lost no time in proceeding to Shargah, and agreed to assist Bin Iyan with a large force in an attack upon Aboothabee. Accordingly, despatching two boats, he recalled his subjects from the pearl banks, and likewise sent orders for all the disposable men in Ras-ool-Khyma to meet him at Shargah. Impressed with the belief that, under present circumstances, he had only to land with a few men near Aboothabee, to ensure the capture of that place, Shaikh Sultan refused to attend to the remonstrances of his principal adherents, pointing out the injury he

BENIYAS.

was inflicting upon his people by withdrawing them from the pearl banks before the season had half elapsed, the probability of his involving himself with the English and the Wahabees, and the advisability of permitting the Beniyas to destroy themselves, without his interference.

On the 7th September the united forces, consisting of seven hundred men of the Boo Felasa and Rumsha Tribes in eighty boats, and five hundred and twenty men in twenty-two boats, under the command of Sultan bin Suggur and Hussein bin Rahmah, set sail for Aboothabee, in the full conviction that the place was deserted, and would be taken without difficulty.

The threatened attack, however, had had the effect of settling the disputes between Shaikh Khaleefa, Sultan, and the father Shakboot, and a force of 3,500 men of the Beniyas and Monasir Tribes had been assembled in Aboothabee. On the afternoon of the 10th, the Joasmee force landed at Khore Suffan, about four miles from the Beniyas capital, where they intended to pass the night, and make the attack on the following morning. At sunrise they were astonished to find themselves surrounded by a much superior force, supported by cavalry and camel-men, and a panic seizing them, they broke at the first discharge of firearms, and fled towards their boats, the greater portion of which, owing to the ebb tide, were now high and dry. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, with four of his slaves, got into a small boat, which sank under their weight, and he had a narrow escape from drowning. His loss amounted to thirty men killed, including the brother of the Shaikh of Lingah, and a Buteel and five boats taken; that of his allies to fifteen men killed, and sixty boats taken; besides two hundred and thirty-five men made prisoners, who had no other resource but to return to their families at Aboothabee.

The three Beniyas boats mentioned under the head "Joasmees" as having evaded the blockading squadron now before Aboothabee and put to sea, proceeded to Cape Bostana, where they captured an Ejman* Buggarah carrying eight men, seven of whom they killed. They afterwards fell in with a Muskat Buggalow to the westward, out of which they took some kharas of dates, 3,000 dollars, and all her guns, and killed five of her crew. The Joasmee fleet in pursuit now heaving in sight, they deserted the Buggalow, and, making all sail, escaped from their pursuers, and returned in safety to Aboothabee. Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot made a foray upon the Ghuflah Tribe, who had assisted the Debaye people in cutting off the supplies by land; and, surprising one of their villages, killed thirteen men and wounded eleven, and

* The people of Ejman were acting as allies to the Joasmees, and consequently declared enemies of the Beniyas.

BENIYAS.

carried away three hundred head of cattle. Encouraged by his success, he made several other incursions into the interior, killing and plundering wherever he went. These vigorous measures alarmed the Bedouins, who thenceforward refused to give any further assistance to the Debaye people.

The explanation afforded by the Beniyas Shaikhs, for the plunder of the Muskat vessel before mentioned, having been accepted by the authorities of that place, (who, since the occurrence, had made the former a present, with the desire, probably, of conciliating them, as a counterpoise to the Joasmees,) rendered the interference of the Resident uncalled for.

Peace was shortly after concluded between the contending parties, through the mediation of the Shaikh of Lingah, but it was destined not to be of very long duration. A successful predatory inroad into the Joasmee territories by the Monasir, a Bedouin Tribe closely connected with Aboothabee, and the capture in retaliation of ten Beniyas pearl boats, carrying about eighty men, and pearls worth 4,000 dollars, on the banks, by the Boo Felasa of Debaye, led to the renewal of hostilities. Both parties having been necessarily obliged to withdraw their subjects from the banks, to avoid the effect of reprisals on the one side, and of further aggressions on the other, apprehensions of future distress were raised, by their being thus deprived of their share of the produce of the annual pearl fishery, forming the chief source of subsistence to the Maritime Arabs of the Gulf, as being almost the only means they possess of gaining a livelihood. Moved by the earnest solicitations, therefore, of his dependents, Shaikh Khaleefa sent his father (Shakboot) to Shargah, who succeeded in concluding a peace with Sultan bin Suggur; one of the conditions being that the Boo Felasa, the branch of the Beniyas residing in Debaye, should thenceforth be under the authority of the Joasmees.

A. D. 1834.

While the people of Debaye, about the middle of 1834, evincing a piratical spirit, were making depredations upon the general trade, some of the Sooedan Tribe, formerly from Ejman, but now residing at Aboothabee, attacked a Mootarish Buteel from Muttra, and plundered her of property to the amount of 1,000 dollars; fortunately no lives were lost. Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot failed to afford redress, in compliance with the demands of the Resident, until he was made aware, by the appearance of vessels of war off his port, of the determination to enforce it.

The predatory spirit which had from time to time evinced itself on the part of the different Arab Tribes, by the occasional plunder of individual vessels, for which satisfaction and ample reparation had always, however, been exacted, now broke out into open and avowed

BENIYAS.

piracy on the part of the Beniyas, not only upon Native boats, but likewise those under British colours.

They openly asserted to their captives that they were determined to leave off all trade, and commence piracy; that their dwellings, constructed of sticks and cadjan mats, could be moved into the interior at will, and thus placed, with themselves, out of the power of the English.

The extent of their success of course depending upon despatch, their fleets cruised for a length of time on the Persian Coast, in the general track of the Gulf trade, committing the most daring depredations, attended with the greatest cruelty, involving in some cases the murder of the whole of the crews of the boats that fell into their hands. The most speedy and ample retribution was therefore imperatively necessary, to deter the other tribes from following the example, and thus rendering unsafe the commerce between this Gulf and the Indian seas.

All the available vessels of war were immediately despatched on a cruise, to intercept the piratical fleets. One only, however, had the good fortune to fall in with them, and the following is a detailed account of the action which ensued, in the words of Captain Sawyer, her commanding officer:—

"At daylight of the 16th, observed three Buggalows, one Buteel, and three Buggarahs, to the NW., standing SW. Turned the hands out, and made all possible sail to come up. At 6 A. M. got them broad off the lee bow, and found we gained upon them. Beat to action, and prepared to engage. At 7 o'clock fired the larboard bow gun, and hoisted our colours. Discovered the headmost Buggalow to be completely crowded with men, and having in tow a large one. She fired a gun, hoisted a red flag, and dipped it three times, apparently in contempt and defiance. The whole then closed, and formed, and fired a shot, which fell rather short. The leading Buggalow immediately returned it, and the shot was seen to take the water about midway. The whole then struck their colours, and one of the Buggarahs lowered her sail, and pulled towards us, evidently with the intention of attracting our attention. On minutely observing her, found she was full of men. There was now no doubt of this being the piratical fleet belonging to Aboothabee, and the Arab pilot confidently assured us they were. On closing, he recognised the vessels, and declared the leading one contained Shaikh Sultan bin Shakboot. On finding we were gaining, he cast off the tow, and they lowered their sails, and closed within pistol-shot, with the other boats formed on their beam for battle. We immediately stood between them, having just room to do so without touching, having the Shaikh's Buggalow on the starboard, and the tow on the larboard side. In passing between them we poured into each a broadside, round and grape, the guns nearly touching. The crew of the Shaikh's vessel cheered,

BENIYAS.

crying 'Alla Akbar al Kaffer.' Some were seen in the act of attempting to throw grapnels into us, but were immediately shot. About ninety or a hundred men rushed towards the head, with their long spears, which touched our quarter, for the purpose of boarding us, in which they failed, having met with a most destructive fire from small arms. There must have been at least two hundred men in this vessel, and they presented a most formidable phalanx, with their towering spears. Very serious damage must have been sustained by these vessels, as large splinters were seen flying in all directions. Immediately after passing, about ninety men jumped overboard from the tow, and were picked up by the Shaikh's vessel, who hoisted her sail, and stood to the northward, accompanied by one of the Buteels, which afterwards parted. Endeavoured to close with him, but he outsailed us. Shifted the bow gun to the bridle port, in the hope of being enabled to cripple him, but without effect, the shot falling short. The remainder of the boats hauled up for the abandoned Buggalow, and stripped her of her sail, and some other small articles, and then stood to the SW. At 9 o'clock observed the chase heaving overboard some articles that we could not make out. The wind decreasing, plied his sweeps, by which he gained. Lowered the two cutters, sent them ahead to tow, and got out the longest oars for sweeps, but without effect. We continued the chase until sunset, when he rounded the eastern point of Polior, about five miles ahead of us. Having lost sight of her, and night coming on, deemed it advisable to give over the pursuit in our present direction, and hauled up to the southward, in the expectation of meeting with her at daylight; which not doing, stood on for Aboothabee, and about 8 A. M. of the 17th discovered the abandoned Buggalow, and stood for her. At 10 o'clock observed a raft, with men waving flags, about five miles to the eastward. Sent an officer to take possession of the Buggalow, who found eight bodies on her deck, and committed them to the deep. Sent the pinnace to the raft, who found nine men on it, and brought them on board. On examining them, they stated that they were part of the crew of the Buggalow we had taken possession of, called the *Nassir*, belonging to Congoon; had been forty days from Mangalore, when she was captured by the fleet we found her with, near Koong, four or five days ago; the crew consisted of forty originally,—a few are supposed to have escaped, but the others and Nakhoda were put to death; that the mode of intended attack was to board us in passing between the two Buggalows in different points, and that they were confident of success. They boasted of having large vessels of oil boiling for the purpose of dipping us in when taken. They had no idea of the effects of a broadside from 32-pounders, and were completely paralysed; so much so, that they forgot to fire themselves, and immediately jumped overboard. Salim states that

BENIYAS.

his party threw twenty-five bodies overboard, and that the same number were taken away wounded. This makes thirty-three killed in this boat alone, and it is highly gratifying to me to find that none of the survivors originally belonging to the vessel were hurt by us. Two of them had been cut and stabbed by the pirates, and two others injured in the contest with them. They abandoned the Buggalow about 4 P. M., preferring the peril of a raft to again falling into the hands of the pirates, whom they expected to return. The other Buggalow must have suffered much more, and it is a matter of deep regret that we could not get up with her. Salim states that it was the intention of the pirates, after taking the *Nassir*, to proceed to Ras-ool-Hud, for the purpose of committing more depredations."

This exhibition of the determination and power to put down piracy very materially facilitated the attainment of our objects, and accelerated compliance with the demands now made, of which the following is a list, enumerating the various vessels plundered, not including the Muskat brig *Curlew*, the British Buggalow *Durya Dowlut*, and various boats belonging to the Joasmees and others (between whom, however, and the Beniyas war had again lately broken out) :—

List of the demands to be made on the Chief of Aboothabee, in compensation for the outrages committed by the Beniyas on the peaceable Arabs of the Persian Gulf.

Number.	Description of Vessels.	Value of Vessels and Cargoes, in German Crowns.
1	Muskat Buggalow and cargo	10,000
2	Bahrein Buteel	439
4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 15	Boats of various descriptions of Lingah	5,903
3	Bahrein Buggalow *(Nukhlowe)*	500
6	Nukhlowe Buggarah *(Mahomed)*	250
7	Lingah Buggarah	250
11	Karrack Buggalow	500
12	Bushire Buggarah	766
13	Moolla Hussein	300
14	Losses inflicted on people of Bassadore	..
16	Bunder Malla, &c.	439
17	Bin Saleh's Buteel	500
18	Sooedad's Buteel	250
19	Congoon Buggalow	4,500
	Total	24,597

A Beniyas Buteel, with a valuable cargo from India, touching at

BENIYAS.

Muskat, was placed under embargo by the authorities there, who were authorised to detain her as a set-off against the claim of 10,000 dollars advanced by them for the Muskat Buggalow plundered by these pirates.

With reference to the other cases, one brig, seven Buggalows, two Buteels, five Buggarahs, and the greater part of the goods on board the *Durya Dowlut*, were recovered, together with upwards of 10,000 German crowns in cash and property, besides an engagement for 1,600 more on the termination of the pearl fishery, towards the liquidation of the claims made for the cargoes of the vessels destroyed and plundered. All their captives were released, and the two pirates Mahomed bin Suggur bin Zheab and Mahomed bin Majid, who headed the outrages upon the British flag, surrendered. The three principal Beniyas vessels concerned in the late piracies were put into our possession, as pledges for the settlement of the balance due on account of the English Buggalow. Add to this the seizure of their own Buteel with a valuable cargo in Muskat, as above mentioned, in compensation for the loss occasioned by the plunder of a Buggalow belonging to that port, and the chastisement inflicted upon the piratical fleet, which make up a summary account of the reparation obtained from the Beniyas, without any further recourse to hostilities.

The engagements entered into by Shaikh Shakboot, the father, and accredited Agent of the Beniyas Chief, for the gradual liquidation of the amount of the claims remaining unadjusted, were confirmed by his son, and subsequently strictly fulfilled. The surrendered pirate commanders were sent to Bombay, where the principal one was tried, found guilty, and condemned to death; but a point of law being raised, the question was referred to the King in Council, and the sentence subsequently commuted to transportation for life. The other, Mahomed bin Majid, against whom, unfortunately, no prosecution could be maintained, was returned, to be handed over a prisoner to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, to whom was left the infliction of adequate punishment. The prisoner, however, effected his escape unobserved, by swimming from the vessel in which he was being conveyed, on its arrival off Shargah, and succeeded in reaching the shore, distant about four miles. This just retribution exacted from the Beniyas led many of the tribe, who had actively engaged in the late piratical proceedings, and shared in the advantages resulting from their success, to take shelter under the protection of another power until the demands pressing so heavily upon them should be liquidated, in order thus to avoid a participation in the consequences of their acts—a punishment they so justly merited.

BENIYAS.

To prevent Aboothabee being depopulated, and the consequent impossibility of enforcing our demands, it became necessary to comply in a measure with the request of their chief, and discourage the different Arab Chieftains from affording asylum and protection to Beniyas subjects. The Gubeysat branch, under Khadim bin Nahman, nevertheless seceded, and proceeded to establish themselves at Adeed, leaving debts to a considerable amount unsettled. Previous to taking their departure, they plundered some Aboothabee fishing-boats. All arguments and endeavours on the part of the Resident to bring about a reconciliation having failed, he was under the necessity of withdrawing himself from any further interference, and of permitting the parties to take their own measures for the settlement of their respective claims.

A. D. 1836.

The situation of Adeed and Wukra afforded particular facilities as places of resort to pirates, and other desperate characters, who supposed themselves intangible to our naval force; and the evil effects of the secession of the Gubeysat from Aboothabee, and their establishment at the former place, began now to manifest themselves. A member of that tribe, Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee, and two others, Soheil bin Ateesh, and Ali Howlee, each acting independently of the other, and commanding each a small boat, containing a crew of from twelve to eighteen men, principally Bedouins of the interior, commenced a systematic course of plunder. Their practice, on the capture of a boat, was to convey it or the cargo found in it to Merfa, a desert spot situated between Adeed and Aboothabee, behind Khore Bizzum, near Ras Aswamee, there load their booty on camels kept in readiness, and, having made arrangements for its disposal, re-embark, and put to sea in the prosecution of further depredations.

It became imperatively necessary to undeceive the perpetrators of this dangerous species of piracy with regard to their fancied security; and Merfa being utterly inaccessible to the means at the disposal of the Resident, the only course left to him was to hold the Chiefs of Biddah, Wukra, and Adeed responsible for their acts,—a measure justifiable on the grounds of their having identified themselves with them, inasmuch as Jassim had, in the first instance, issued from the last place, and, there was every reason to believe, received support from Khadim bin Nahman, until the publicity of his conduct had rendered it dangerous to countenance him any longer. A portion of the property had been sold at the other places; and further, it was known that it was in their power to put an end to these lawless acts, by the seizure of the persons in question, and the destruction of their boats, they being dependent upon them for their water, and other necessaries of life.

BENIYAS.

With these objects, and to remove the impression that that part of the dangerous and intricate coast between Ras Reccan and Adeed could not be approached by our cruisers, two sloops of war and a schooner were despatched to make the attempt, which succeeded, after threading the numerous and dangerous shoals, in touching at Biddah, Wukra, and Adeed, and returning in safety. The governors of these places (Salim bin Nassir, Ali bin Nassir, and Khadim bin Nahman) bound themselves by an engagement to do their utmost to seize the boats of the pirates. The last (Khadim) was, through his Agent (Mahomed bin Ateef, the chief himself being absent) further required to afford security, in the shape of money or property, in value to the amount of 600 dollars, to be returned on the fulfilment of his promise.

A fleet of Uttoobee boats, well manned and armed, also sailed in quest of the pirates, with whose secret haunts the commanders professed themselves to be well acquainted, but effected nothing. Although the pirates themselves were not seized, their lawless proceedings were put down, and the objects of the expedition fully attained. The amount, therefore, of the pledge, with the exception of 227 dollars in cash, (returned also in May 1838,) was after the lapse of several months restored to the Wukra Shaikh, who, with the others before mentioned, were informed that they would be held responsible for their future acts.

Three of Jassim bin Jabbur's gang were subsequently secured by the Chief of Aboothabee, while engaged in an act of piracy, attended with loss of life, upon a Bahrein boat. After having detained them in confinement four months, during which time one had died, he set the remaining two at liberty, further punishing them by the seizure of their boat, which he subsequently, at the request of the Resident, and in his presence, publicly burnt on the beach.

The Shaikh of Aboothabee, at the instance of his guest Esai bin Tarif, and probably at the instigation of the Imaum, who had for some time maintained a correspondence with the disaffected members of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed's family, intimated to the Resident his wish to join his (Esai's) cause; but was in reply informed, that permission could not be granted without the special sanction of the British Government, whose decision he was called upon to await, on the grounds of the late serious misdemeanours of his tribe, and of his having no *causa belli* with the Uttoobees. The departure of Esai bin Tarif and Sultan bin Salameh, with a large proportion of their followers, from his territories and protection, for the purpose of joining the expedition of the Imaum against Mombassa, deprived him of any pretext for further urging his proposal to wage war against Bahrein.

BENIYAS.

Shaikh Khaleefa at length availed himself (May 1837) of the permission afforded by the Resident, to adopt his own measures against Adeed, held by the Gubeysat seceders from Aboothabee. He contrived to surprise them, killed fifty of their number, and rendered the place uninhabitable, by destroying all the forts and buildings, throwing into the wells the bodies of the slain, and filling them up with the ruins.

A. D. 1837.

This act of vengeance caused much irritation and alarm in the minds of the Joasmee and Debaye Chiefs, with the latter of whom some of the Gubeysat took refuge; but the conduct of Shaikh Khaleefa towards his revolted subjects, subsequent to his bringing them again under subjection, being characterised by moderation, all those re-located in Aboothabee having had their boats restored to them, and the Shaikh publishing a full amnesty and pardon to such of the fugitives who might choose to return, at the same time promising to give back to them their vessels and property, on the condition of their demeaning themselves for the future as quiet and obedient subjects, Shaikh Khadim bin Nahman, and most of the heads of the tribes who had made their escape on the occasion, were shortly induced by these favourable terms, held out by the Beniyas Chief, to return and resettle in Aboothabee.

The whole of the Boo Eyneen Tribe, to the number of about three hundred families, inhabitants of Wukra, on the Guttur Coast, under their Chief, Ali bin Nassir, having vacated and destroyed that place, now (March 1838) took up their residence at Aboothabee. This measure they adopted in order to avoid the probable consequence of their long continued insubordinate conduct towards their ostensible chief, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of Bahrein, who, having removed from the island to Khor Hassan, on the main, greatly increased his influence over the Coast of Guttur, and brought its inhabitants more under his immediate surveillance and control.

A. D. 1838.

Shaikh Khaleefa, who had suffered for a length of time much injury and annoyance at the hands of his lately rebelled subjects, the Boo Felasa of Debaye, now (May 1838) determined upon retaliation. During the absence of the majority of the tribe on the pearl banks, he went clandestinely with a small force, for the purpose of destroying their date groves in the neighbourhood; but ascertaining that the sea tower was badly garrisoned, was tempted to make the attempt, and succeeded in getting possession of it. On hearing of this occurrence, the people of Debaye returned from the banks, and having obtained the powerful assistance of the Shaikh of Shargah, Suggur bin Sultan, after three days dislodged the Beniyas garrison (to which their chief could afford no relief), and completely destroyed the tower. The effect of the above

BENIYAS.

was to render necessary the recall of all the fishing-boats belonging to the parties concerned, and hostilities at sea, in the shape of aggressions upon each other's boats (highly irregular, as being contrary to truce), were the result. An accommodation was, however, immediately effected, by the mutual restoration of the slaves and plundered property, and their boats returned to resume the fishery.

Subsequent to the meeting of the several maritime chieftains, who had been assembled on board a British vessel, Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, contrary to his promise, held friendly communication with Syud bin Mootluk, the Egyptian Agent; and it was not until required by the British authorities to declare openly, in writing, his views and intentions, that he avowed his determination to abide by the wishes of the British Government, in opposing to the last extremity the Egyptian aggressions. In direct opposition to all his pledges and engagements, however, Shaikh Khaleefa proceeded in person with a force to the attack of the Naeem Tribe of Brymee, in pursuance, it was asserted, of an agreement between himself and Syud bin Mootluk, by which he bound himself to harass the people of that place by every means in his power, pending the return of the Egyptian emissary with a large and efficient force.

A. D. 1839.

The Naeem Tribe of Brymee, however, repulsed these treacherous attacks, and gave him so severe a check that he proposed terms of peace, which they in their turn rejected, being fully aware that his object was only to save his Bedouin allies from the retaliation they had lain themselves open to at the hands of those they had so much injured. He contrived subsequently to effect a peace with two out of the three tribes, upon the understanding that all past aggressions were to be buried in oblivion; but was nevertheless informed by the Resident, that if within the space of three months he had not restored the camels belonging to Ras-ool-Khyma and Debaye, or did not produce a satisfactory letter from the Brymee Chiefs, certifying that he had fully adjusted all the causes of complaint existing against him, he would be considered an enemy to the British Government, and compelled to pay down the sum of 1,000 German crowns, as a moderate compensation for the injuries he had inflicted upon the Naeem and Shuwamis Shaikhs, and as a punishment for the violation of his most solemn pledges and promises to the British Government.

On his at length, after some vain excuses, producing a letter from the Naeem Chiefs, acknowledging their terms of friendship with him, and their satisfaction for injuries received, these demands were foregone, but conditionally upon the future tenor of his conduct with reference to Brymee and the Egyptians.

A. D. 1840.

BENIYAS.

A misunderstanding, of which the following are the particulars, arose during the year 1840 between the Shaikh of Debaye and Aboothabee, whose settlement was delayed until the present time, but which happily led to no serious consequences. It appeared that an inhabitant of the latter place, named Belor Shat, had proceeded to the pearl banks with a boat furnished to him by his Chief, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, but, instead of returning to his own port, had conveyed the boat to Debaye, where he remained until the present season, when, having manned her with other men, from the Boo Felasa Tribe, he proceeded to the island of Azema to fish for pearls. At this spot several other Debaye and Aboothabee boats were assembled, and Sultan bin Shakboot, the brother of the Beniyas Chief, happening to visit the island, and finding the crew of Belor Shat's boat on shore, took possession of her, and seizing his brother's fugitive subjects, returned with his capture, including pearls, arms, &c. to Aboothabee. The Debaye men, finding themselves thus unexpectedly left on the island, with the loss of all they had in Belor Shat's craft, embarked in a boat belonging to some of their own people, and surprising a Beniyas Buggarah, seized her, and carried her into Debaye, where she and her crew were detained. Two other boats were seized by either tribe, but subsequently returned uninjured by the respective chiefs, who now contented themselves with referring the dispute for the decision of the Resident, their subjects prosecuting the fishing in the interim without any further interference with each other.

Towards the final adjustment of the dispute, it was insisted that Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot should release Belor Shat, together with the boat, arms, pearls, &c. taken by Sultan, his brother; that person being left at liberty to return to Aboothabee or not as he pleased, and the boat, if proved to belong to Shaikh Khaleefa, being returned to him at the termination of the pearl fishery; and that Muktoom on his part should surrender the Beniyas boat (seized in retaliation), with her cargo and crew, and make good whatever articles his people might have taken therefrom.

These requisitions were acquiesced in by the respective chiefs.

A. D. 1841. A respectable person of the Amayir, who some years previously had separated himself from his tribe, and taken up his abode at Taknoonyah, opposite to Bahrein, south of Ajeer, was on his way from the former place to Bahrein with his family and property, when his Buggarah ran aground. He landed, with his family, leaving his property in the boat, intending to return to it at the rise of the tide. At night they observed a Buggarah, manned by fourteen persons, approach their boat, for the purpose of plundering her. A fight ensued; but the pirates succeeded, after killing one man

BENIYAS.

and wounding several, in effecting their object, and gaining possession of all the money and property she contained. The perpetrators, it was ascertained, belonged to the tribes of Monasir and Howamil, established in the Khorain Beniyas. On their crime being brought to the notice of Khaleefa bin Shakboot, that chief imprisoned five of the Howamil, who were at Aboothabee, as also several of the chief men of the Monasir; and embarking, went in person, with two or three Buggarahs, and cruised on that ground (Khore Beniyas) in search of the remainder, and finding a boat in one of the creeks, he burnt it. Fifty camel-riders were also despatched, to trace them into the desert: these succeeded only in seizing five of the Howamil, known thieves, together with their women, children, &c., and bringing them with fifty camels to Aboothabee. The above measures on the part of the Beniyas Chief, when contrasted with the late atrocities committed under his sanction by the tribe, afforded a pretty good proof of the success and efficiency of the policy pursued by the British Government.

A. D. 1842. It was proposed to Khaleefa bin Shakboot in April 1842 to become one of the subscribers to a truce, binding the parties to abstain from making aggressions upon each other by land as well as by sea, during the pearl fishery,—a proposal which he not only declined, but intimated that he was just preparing to attack the Joasmees during the fishing season, as the time most suited for success, in revenge for the checks and losses he had sustained in his late forays. He had accordingly opened a negotiation with Muktoom of Debaye, who agreed to remain neutral.

On the termination of the pearl fishery, in October 1842, Muktoom sent his cousin, Syf bin Dulmooj, to Khaleefa bin Shakboot, who received and treated him with much kindness. His representations so much gratified the Beniyas Chief that he was induced to depute, in return, his relative, Viab bin Esai, to the Chief of Debaye, to make a final settlement, and establish a lasting alliance.

When the Aboothabee ambassador arrived at Debaye, the Chief, Muktoom, considering it politic to invite Sultan bin Suggur and Suggur bin Sultan to join in the friendly relations about to be established, and being also afraid to enter into bonds of amity with Khaleefa without apprising these chiefs of his intentions, and in a measure obtaining their consent, sent a message to them, to ascertain their wishes in regard to the proposed arrangement. They answered that they would be very glad to be at peace with Khaleefa bin Shakboot, if that chieftain was sincere in wishing for peace. They therefore requested that Viab bin Esai should come to them; but on his arrival, Sultan bin Suggur having ascertained that the basis of any terms of peace must be his abstaining from molesting the Imaum of Muskat, his

BENIYAS.

cousin Syud Humood bin Azan, and their subjects, broke off the conference, and declined entering into the proposed league. The envoy then returned to Debaye, and from thence to Aboothabee.

A deputation now (March 1843) went from Debaye to Aboothabee, to invite and escort back the Beniyas Chief, in the hope that a personal interview between the chiefs might lead to a mutual understanding and settlement of disputes, and promote and confirm their reconciliation. A meeting took place in the fort, where Shaikh Khaleefa was received with all honours, and it was agreed, after the usual manner, that all differences should thenceforth be forgotten, and a lasting peace established between them.

A. D. 1843.

These proceedings, as might have been anticipated, gave umbrage to the Joasmee Chieftains, who but ill concealed their disapprobation. Shaikh Muktoom declared them, however, necessary to his best interests, and offered his services as mediator for peace between them and his new ally, knowing full well at the same time that it would not, and in fact little intending that it should, prove effectual. Debaye being situated between the territories of the two great rival chieftains, good policy demanded that Shaikh Muktoom should use every endeavour to maintain the best possible terms with either, and yet a perfect neutrality in their endless quarrels. His advantage and independence, indeed, depend upon their being inimical; for the balance of power would be with him who, reducing Debaye to subjection, secured, whether by force or conciliation, the resources of its inhabitants to forward his own ends. Thus the choice of peace or war may in a manner be said to rest with Muktoom, the execution of whose threat to join his opponent is dreaded by either.

In the course of the struggle for supremacy between the rival Chieftains of Bahrein, Sultan bin Sulameh came to Aboothabee as the envoy of Esai bin Tarif, to solicit, with most tempting offers, the assistance of the Beniyas Chief. Khaleefa, however, replied that he could not grant it without the permission of the British Government.

Shortly after the visit of Khaleefa to Debaye, his brother, Sultan bin Shakboot, left Aboothabee with one hundred and fifty camel-riders, on a Chupao (plundering excursion). They attacked the Beni Kuttub (allies of the Joasmees), killed three men, and carried away seventy camels, and much property. They then plundered two Kafilas, one of which was bound from Brymee to Shargah, and robbed and killed three men of the Naeem Tribe. After an absence of seven days, they returned to Aboothabee with the loss of two men killed, and two wounded.

BENIYAS.

A hollow treaty of peace on land was entered into in July 1843 by the Joasmee and Beniyas Chiefs, but immediate or temporary advantage, of however trifling a nature, being the only rule of action among Arabs, it was not destined to have a longer existence than its predecessors. Khaleefa bin Shakboot, accompanied by a respectable force of horse and camel-men, principally of the tribes of Monasir and Moozareah, proceeded (August-September 1843) on a foray, and plundered the Beni Kuttub, Ghuflah, and Naeem Bedouins, tribes in alliance with the Joasmee Chief, the greater portion of whom were themselves absent on a Chupao on the Batinah Coast, of a great number of camels and sheep, and much property. On their return, they also carried off a number of camels belonging to the same tribes, which had been sent for security to Zeit, in the immediate neighbourhood of Ras-ool-Khyma, and under the protection of its chief.

Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye was supposed to have instigated this open rupture of the treaty of peace by land, which had so lately been formed. The remonstrances of Sultan bin Suggur, and his son Suggur, prevailed only so far as to draw forth promises of restoration of the plunder on the part of the Beniyas, which were of course never meant to be fulfilled.

CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

Captain Kemball informs us, at the close of his Sketch of the Beniyas Tribe, that a hollow treaty of peace on land was concluded between the Joasmee and Aboothabee Chiefs, in the month of July 1843; that the latter, at the supposed instigation of the Chief of Debaye, hastened to break the peace, by proceeding on a foray in August and September 1843, and plundering the Beni Kuttub, Ghuflah, and Naeem Bedouin Tribes, in alliance with the Joasmees, the greater portion of whom were themselves away on the Batinah Coast; and finally, he tells us that promises to restore the plunder were made by Khaleefa bin Shakboot, which it was supposed he never meant to fulfil.

A. D. 1843.

Such was the posture of affairs at Aboothabee towards the close of the year 1843, and in such a condition did they remain until the summer of the ensuing year, when we gather, from reports furnished by the British Agent at Shargah,

A. D. 1844.

BENIYAS.

that Khaleefa bin Shakboot set out, in the commencement of the summer months, on a tour of the country around, and contrived, by a rare combination of dexterity and skill, to induce the very tribes he had but lately been plundering to forsake the Joasmees and enter into alliance with himself. Other tribes, too, did he manage to win over to his side,—indeed he appears to have conciliated the whole of the people he met with; for Syud Humood bin Azan, Chief of Sohar, quitted his territories, and repaired to Brymee to meet him; Syud Kahtan bin Syf, the Governor of Shinas, hastened to wait upon him; and with one and all was he said to have entered into a close and strict confederacy.

While at Brymee, too, he invited Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye to go and join him, telling him he was anxious to settle the feuds existing between himself and the people of Ghuflah. The Debaye Chief, however, somewhat mistrustful of Khaleefa bin Shakboot's motives, politely declining the kind invitation he had received, on the plea of the expected arrival of a British vessel at his port, deputed his brother Syud bin Butye to proceed and wait upon him, instead of himself.

In the month of December 1844, after Shaikh Khaleefa had returned to Aboothabee, an affair occurred that led to endless correspondence and trouble, which I will endeavour to describe in the fewest possible words.

Shaikh Faris, the Chief of Chaab, at a time when all was peace and quiet, took it into his head, without the slightest provocation, and upon the frivolous pretext of a claim he possessed upon the Aboothabee Tribe of more than thirty years' standing, to seize and detain a Buteel belonging to the subjects of Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, that happened to touch at the port of Mohumrah. This aggression, as uncalled for as it was sudden, led to an appeal to the Resident by the Shaikh of Aboothabee, who begged that officer either to cause full reparation to be afforded him, or to permit him to proceed with his maritime forces against the presumptuous Shaikh Faris.

The Resident, after inquiring into the particulars of the case, and finding that the Chaab Chief had acted in a most unjustifiable manner, addressed a communication to Shaikh Faris, pointing out to him the injustice of his behaviour, and advising him to release the Buteel, and everything appertaining to her.

Shaikh Faris not only disregarded this appeal to his feelings, but expressed his intention to commit further injuries upon the people of Aboothabee, unless their chief chose to make good the claims he insisted he had a full right to demand,—claims, it may here be observed, that not only referred to occurrences which transpired previous to Shaikh Khaleefa assuming the reins of government, but which, also, were found to have been forfeited by the course of subsequent events.

BENIYAS.

Such was the language held by the Chief of Chaab,—high and mighty it must be admitted. Notwithstanding, however, the haughty tone of the reply, Major Hennell determined, ere leaving the respective chiefs to decide their quarrel by a recourse to hostilities, to depute his Assistant, Captain Kemball, to remonstrate with the wayward Shaikh Faris, to point out to him the folly of the conduct he was so blindly pursuing, and, in fine, to strive and induce him to give up the Buteel and her cargo.

Captain Kemball proceeded accordingly, in February 1845, in the Honorable Company's schooner *Emily*, on the performance of the duty assigned him, but was unable, on arrival at Mohumrah, though Shaikh Faris was but two days' journey inland, and though he was allowed a period of eleven days to make his appearance, to obtain an interview with the chief, who carried his want of courtesy so far as to omit replying to a written communication he received from the officer deputed to meet him. The mission therefore of necessity failed.

A. D. 1845.

Major Hennell, still anxious to prevent warfare and bloodshed, referred the matter to Colonel Sheil, the British Minister at Tehran, who transmitted in reply a Firman from the Shah, and a letter from Hajee Meerza Aghasee, the Persian Prime Minister, to Suliman Khan, the Sirteep in command at Mohumrah, directing him to cause the restitution of the Buteel and her cargo, or its value, amounting to about 150 Tomans. Even this did not produce the desired effect, as might well have been expected, at once. Recourse was had to shifts and evasions: the Buteel should be delivered up, but not so her cargo; the cargo should be surrendered, but a portion retained;—and it was not until fresh orders had been elicited from the Persian Prime Minister, and forwarded to the Resident for delivery, that the matter was finally settled. In the month of May 1845, the Beniyas Buteel and her stores were recovered, and handed over to Lieutenant Ford, who had been deputed in the Honorable Company's schooner *Constance* to obtain her release.

Khaleefa bin Shakboot succeeded to the Chieftainship of Aboothabee in 1833, after having, with the assistance of his younger brother, Sultan, killed his elder brother Tahnoon.

From that time to the present (A. D. 1833 to July 1845) he remained at the head of the tribe, and by his gallantry, firmness, and prudence, raised it to be one of the most powerful of the maritime and inland communities of the Persian Gulf. He moreover ever showed himself disposed to cultivate a good understanding with the British Government, and strove, not without success, to restrain his people and dependents from committing irregularities at sea.

Such was the character of Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, who in the

BENIYAS.

month of July 1845, together with his brother, fell victims to the revenge of Esai bin Khalid. The latter chief, as it should seem, had long meditated carrying this plan into effect; but, owing to a favourable opportunity not presenting itself, deferred its perpetration until a time when the town of Aboothabee was nearly denuded of inhabitants, who had gone for the most part to the date groves in the neighbouring districts; then, considering the season had arrived for striking the blow, he repaired to meet the unsuspecting Shaikh Khaleefa and his brother on the beach, and after partaking of an entertainment that was spread under the shade of a Buteel, he rose, with his sons and other accomplices, and slew Shaikh Khaleefa and his brother. Having committed this dastardly act, he assumed the reins of government, summoned the heads of the tribes around, and was quickly acknowledged the chief of the place.

Scarcely, however, had Esai bin Khalid been in power a couple of months, ere he, an assassin, was assassinated by one Zaab bin Esai, who, in his turn, fell a prey to the revenge of Khalid bin Esai, the son of the murdered Esai bin Khalid.

The latter chief, who brought the scenes of bloodshed and murder to a close, did not attempt to usurp the authority he had managed to destroy, but "left Aboothabee, and returned to Shargah after a slight skirmish with some people of the Beniyas." His brother, however, contrived to get possession of the fort of Aboothabee, whence he was speedily ejected by the Beniyas, under the command of two influential leaders, named Mahomed bin Humeed and Rashid bin Fazil.

These chiefs declared their intention to retain the authority they had gained until the arrival of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who was considered the rightful heir to the chiefship, and had been invited to come and assume it. In due course Shaikh Syud arrived, and finding himself well received by the majority of the Beniyas Tribe, and also that he was supported by the Resident, who had been studiously watching the course of events, and now hastened to give all the moral aid in his power to ensure the establishment in authority of the lawful chief, he at once placed himself at the head of affairs, and was speedily recognised by the whole of the Beniyas as their true and rightful chief.

Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon had not been long installed in his new position ere he received and accepted overtures to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the hereditary enemy of his tribe, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. How the Beniyas Chief was induced to listen to proposals of such a nature from one bearing the name of Joasmee it is hard to comprehend; how he induced the people of his tribe to act in concert with those of Shaikh Sultan is more incomprehensible still: that he did so, however, is certain. The Beniyas and Joasmee Chiefs

BENIYAS.

united cordially for the purpose of crushing Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and his allies of Ejman and Amulgavine, and they remained in

A. D. 1847.

alliance until the commencement of the year 1847, when a difference of opinion arising regarding a proposed attack upon the town of Debaye, a rupture shortly after ensued.

Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, deserted by the Joasmees, and perceiving no hopes of reducing Debaye, thought it advisable—now that he stood alone, and, moreover, knowing as he did that the Wahabee Lieutenant owed him a grudge, for an attack he had made upon the people of Ghufta*—to strive and conciliate Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye. The Joasmee pursued the self-same policy, and succeeded in gaining his object. Shaikh Syud, however, requiring the Bedouins of the Beni Kuttub to be included as parties to the treaty about to be concluded, and the Debaye Chief refusing to admit them, difficulties presented themselves (February or March 1847), that only found a solution in angry words and disputes; and somewhat thus did matters remain

A. D. 1848.

until early in the succeeding year, when Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, incensed at the treachery of the sons of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, in making an insidious attack upon the fort of Ejman, and responding to the invitation of Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, whose turn it now was to make overtures, consented in January 1848 to join in alliance with the rest of the maritime chiefs, leaving the Joasmee and his treacherous sons to stand alone, and to lament the folly of their perfidious behaviour. The alliance, however, was merely nominal, and did not, as far as I can ascertain, lead to a direct aggression upon the Joasmee dominions.

Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon shortly after, detaching himself from the rest of the tribes, none of whom appeared inclined to do more than to plot and intrigue the one against the other, formed the project of expelling the Wahabee Lieutenant from the Brymee territories,—a bold and daring step, it must be admitted; one, the accomplishment of which all the maritime chiefs were anxious to behold, for they were weary of Wahabee oppression; one which nought but a general coalition of the tribes, it was thought, could bring to pass, and jealousy precluded their coalescing; one which, as will be seen in the sequel, was bravely and skilfully carried out by the Beniyas Chief, and which led to a great increase of his power; one which compelled the crest-fallen Wahabee to crave the assistance of the rest of the tribes, and induced Shaikh Syud—who, though unaided by others, shrank not from a conflict with

* The people of Ghufta called upon the deputy of Ameer Fysul, to whom they had paid tribute, to afford them redress. He responded to the call, and Shaikh Syud disregarded his orders.

BENIYAS.

all the troops they could summon—to agree to a peace, and to give back the forts he had so ably possessed himself of. The mode in which all these things were accomplished may be thus briefly related.

Shaikh Syud invited Shaikh Syf bin Humood, the son of the Sohar Chief, as also the head of the Naeem Tribe, to enter into an alliance with himself. They did so, and made preparations to join him. Their aim and plan were one,—they resolved to crush and trample under foot the high-aspiring and boastful Wahabee.

The Beniyas, impatient of delay, and calculating his own strength, as well as the weakness of the enemy, determined to proceed to work at once, and not to wait the approach of his allies,—promptness of action was the chief thing needful. The minor lieutenants at all events could be fought and conquered, if not the great lieutenant himself. On the 4th of May accordingly did he, with his own troops, and a number of men from the Zowahir, Amayir, and other subordinate tribes, hasten to attack Shaikh Syf bin Ali, who held command of one of the Wahabee forts in the Zowahir country. Resistance was offered, but not with success: the fort, with all it contained, was quickly surrendered into the hands of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who was wise enough to rest content with the laurels he had won, and to await the arrival of his expected allies ere venturing to beard the lion in his den at Brymee. These shortly arrived, and on the 16th of June operations commenced in good earnest against the stronghold of Brymee. The one, Soobauh, was occupied by Mahomed bin Syfut Ujajee in person, and after a cannonade of two days' duration was compelled to surrender. Mahomed bin Syf, however, was not to be found; he had deserted his followers, and, unknown to all the soldiers in the fort, he, the chief of the place, had fled in the dead of night, and sought refuge among the troops in the adjoining and only remaining fort of Khunduk, which, so confounded were the Wahabees at the activity displayed by the enemy, so disheartened at the fall of Soobauh, and the ignominious flight of its commander, they did not attempt to retain. The fort was vacated, and handed over, together with the horses and property therein contained, to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who permitted the vanquished Nujdees to quit the place without being harmed or molested.

These were great and heroic exploits no doubt,—sweet to Shaikh Syud, but bitter to the Wahabee, and equally bitter to the rest of the maritime chiefs, who, though inwardly abhorring the latter, viewed with still more abhorrence the growing power of the former. A coalition was formed against the Beniyas,—he who had forcibly ejected the Nudjees was in his turn to be forcibly cast out from Brymee. Such a plan was in course of formation, and such a plan, had not dissensions and jealousies arisen amongst the allied parties, might well, perhaps,

BENIYAS.

have succeeded, for the son of the Sohar Chief, owing to a misunderstanding between himself and the Beniyas, was suddenly expelled the fort of Brymee, and thus was Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon left to contend single-handed against the formidable league about to be arranged against him. No way daunted, however, and fearful for nothing, he proved for a length of time more than a match for the whole of his enemies. He fought and shamefully discomfited a considerable Nujdee force that was sent to annihilate him; he forced the proud and not unskilful Syud bin Mootluk to flee for protection to Shargah; he showed himself ready to confront the combined forces of the Nujdee, Joasmee, Debaye, and Ejman Chiefs; he experienced but one reverse, and that but a slight one; when, finding he was not likely to receive the succours promised by the Muskat Government, he gave ear to the voice of a mediator, who had been sent by the Sherreeff of Mecca to conciliate the contending parties.

A peace was concluded in February 1849, by the terms of which "the Brymee forts were restored to Syud bin Mootluk, all that had passed was to be buried in oblivion, and all parties were to return to the *status quo ante bellum*."

A. D. 1849.

Judging from the subsequent movements of Shaikh Syud, however, it does not appear that he had any intention of remaining satisfied with the settlement that had thus been effected. Peace, it is true, was concluded; but his visit to Shinas and Muskat, which occurred some few months later in the season, was supposed to have been for the sole purpose of conferring with Syf bin Kahtan and His Excellency Syud Soweynee on the subject of what could be done against the Wahabees. The plans that were concerted, the complications that ensued,* and the result of those plans and complications, will be learned in the sequel. Before prosecuting, however, this part of the narrative, it is necessary that we should accompany Shaikh Syud home to Aboothabee, and watch his proceedings on arrival.

The year had well nigh drawn to a close when Shaikh Syud reached his seat, and found, to his great disgust, that "on the termination of the pearl fishery, all the boats of the Gubeysat Tribe, that should have returned to Aboothabee in October, had proceeded to the Guttur Coast, and sought an asylum at Biddah."

The Gubeysat Tribe originally dwelt at Aboothabee, and there continued to reside until the year 1836, when the piratical acts of the subjects of the Beniyas Chief leading the British Government to demand payment of considerable sums of money, by way of compensa-

* The complications are detailed more fully in the Sketch of Muskat than in any of the others.

BENIYAS.

tion to the injured parties, they seceded, and located themselves at Adeed, "a town situated in a backwater between Bahrein and Aboothabee, and considered by the inhabitants to be quite inaccessible to our vessels of war."

In this, however, they were sadly misktaken; for they had scarcely taken up their position, and commenced indulging in piracy, ere Major Hennell proceeded with the squadron of the Gulf, in command of Commodore Lowe, and exacted full satisfaction for past offences. In the following year (1837) they were again disturbed by Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, then Chief of the Aboothabee Tribe, who attacked them in their den, and completely demolished the place. The greater portion of the Gubeysat members, now scattered and powerless, were induced to go and reside once more at Aboothabee, where they remained until the present year (1849), when, partly from the dissatisfaction with which they viewed the friendly demeanour of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon towards the people of the Moharibah, a tribe at feud with themselves, and partly owing to the intrigues of Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, who assured them Bin Saood would shortly send a force to rebuild Adeed, and re-locate them therein, they were led to adopt the course of proceeding to Biddah.

The intrigues of his enemies, the cause of the secession, and the mischief likely to emanate therefrom, all these things were perceived at a glance by the discerning Shaikh Syud.

He resolved (November-December 1849) to nip the evil in the bud, and by promptness of action to crush the disaffected spirit of the offending members. The measures he adopted bore the impress of his wonted energy; but were far removed from the uprightness and honesty of spirit that had hitherto been the principal characteristics of his dealings with others.

He seized the heads and rulers of the tribes still left in Aboothabee, and cast them into prison; he deputed a messenger to induce the leaders to return to their homes; he received and welcomed them, on return, with marks of the utmost kindness and respect; he gave them every reason to believe that past offences were forgiven, and forgotten,—that they were no longer labouring under the displeasure of their Chief;—in short, he succeeded in lulling them into a state of unsuspecting security. What, then, must have been their surprise, when the day succeeding their arrival dawned upon them, to awake and find their boats had been stripped in the night of sails, masts, and rudders, and that means of escape had been snatched from their hands; to find orders had been issued to the people of Aboothabee that all parties possessing claims upon the Gubeysat Tribe were to enforce immediate payment; that a fine of no less than 2,000 dollars was inflicted upon them;—in

BENIYAS.

fine, to perceive that they had been ensnared by one whom they never suspected of deceit. The position they were in was a painful one: they were driven to the greatest straits, and so much pressed for payment of the money demanded, that they had no resource but to dispose of their boats and all the goods they possessed.

We now revert to the proceedings of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon and His Excellency Syud Soweynee.

They entered into a strict alliance, and set on foot preparations for acting offensively against the Wahabee Lieutenant in Oman. Such at least was the ostensible reason for which they united, and such, too, was the real and sole desire of the Beniyas Chief, who was anxiously longing for an opportunity to drive the Nujdees at the point of the sword once more from their position of Brymee. His Excellency, however, had many plans in contemplation: he wished to oppose the ambitious designs of the Joasmees against Khore Fukaun, and his other possessions on the Batinah Coast; he was anxious to persuade, or, failing persuasion to compel, the Sohar Chief to coalesce with himself, and the Beniyas. All these matters have been so fully discussed in the Sketch of the Muskat Tribe that to repeat them here is unnecessary.

The first mention we find of the despatch of troops by the Beniyas Chief in the direction of the Wahabee position is in the month of March 1850, when "four hundred men of the Beniyas and Monasir Tribes joined His Excellency Syud Soweynee at Shinas, having been sent by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, under the command of his cousin, Mahomed bin Syf, and Fazil bin Mahomed.

A. D. 1850.

As to Shaikh Syud himself, he proceeded with a large force to the immediate vicinity of Brymee, and commenced destroying the water-courses that irrigated the date trees around. Meanwhile, the combined forces of the Joasmee, Debaye, Ejman, and Amulgavine Chiefs arrived on the spot, and, luckily for Shaikh Syud, perhaps, the ends and aims of the allies were opposed the one to the other,—no two of their number had wishes alike: the Joasmee had in his mind ambitious expectations of aggrandisement on the Batinah Coast; Shaikh Muktoom possessed but one desire, that of expelling Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon from the Brymee territories; the minor Chiefs of Ejman and Amulgavine, whose contingents were small compared with the rest, appear to have had no fixed purpose or object whatever;—in short, after some discussion, and not a little hesitation, the Joasmee counsels prevailed, and a move was made in the direction of Sohar, when commenced the operations against the fort of Shinas and others that have been so fully recounted in the Muskat history.

The exact course pursued by the Beniyas after the departure of the

BENIYAS.

allies is not known. He would seem, however, after perpetrating all manner of mischief on the plantations and country adjacent to Brymee, to have gone back to Aboothabee, and there to have remained for a while, when he again returned to Brymee, and amused himself foraying the districts of Shargah and Ras-ool-Khyma, and engaging in skirmishes with Mahomed bin Abdoolla and the tribe of the Naeem Al Boo Kheriban.

He does not appear to have afforded active support to His Excellency Syud Soweynce against the Joasmee confederacy; and as regards the subsequent aggressions upon the Brymee territories, with which we are more immediately concerned, no further mention is made of the subject until the month of November 1850, when we find the Joasmee, Beniyas, and Naeem Chiefs acting in concert against the Nujdee garrison at Brymee.

The years 1849 and 1850 were noted for the number of disputes that occurred between the people of Aboothabee and those of Debaye, regarding the seizure and counter-seizure of slaves from boats at sea. These were all satisfactorily settled through the endeavours of Colonel Hennell, and the remonstrances he addressed to the chiefs of the respective tribes.

In the autumn of 1850 a gross violation of the Maritime Truce was made by the subjects of the Beniyas Chief, who seized upon a boat of Himreeah, and killed two of the crew on board of her.

The vessels of war were despatched to demand satisfaction from Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, in the shape of the payment of 600 dollars, the sum required as the Deeah or price of blood for the two Joasmees slain, and the surrender of the captured Himreeah boat, with the stores pertaining to her.

The boldness displayed by Lieutenant Manners, in command of the *Tigris*, as also by Lieutenant Tronson, of the *Euphrates*, in taking their vessels through the intricate channel that leads for upwards of three miles to the inner harbour of the port of Aboothabee, thereby bringing them within effective gunshot range of both the town and the native craft on the beach, somewhat astonished Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who had never before beheld a British cruiser so close to his home, and led him to comply with the requisition preferred against him without hesitation or demur. The 600 dollars were paid in October 1850, and the boat and stores surrendered so soon as demanded.

A. D. 1851.

A few words will suffice to relate the proceedings of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon in the year 1851. He concluded a peace with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, notwithstanding the intrigues set on foot by Shaikh Muktoom to prevent it; he proceeded to the assistance of the Bahrein Shaikhs in their struggle with the Wahabee ruler, and through his good offices it was that

BENIYAS.

matters were brought to an amicable settlement in July between the belligerent parties; and finally, in the operations carried on by His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and the Shaikh of Debaye, against the ill-starred Syud Ghes, the Chief of Sohar, the part sustained by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon was selfish, and savoured rather of duplicity than honesty.

A. D. 1852.

The next occurrence worthy of notice connected with this tribe is a case of maritime irregularity that took place early in the spring of 1852, which would seem to have been committed by order of Shaikh Syud himself. The circumstances attending the affair were these:—On the 31st of March 1852 a person called Obed bin Butya, an inhabitant of Debaye, called upon Hajee Yacoob, the British Agent at Shargah, and informed him that, having a boat which he was desirous to sell, he had embarked in her for Biddah with this object, and that after disposing of her there, he had embarked on board a Buggalow, belonging to Zaal, of the Beniyas Tribe, located at Biddah, in order to return to his home.

When they arrived opposite Aboothabee, so near as to discern the place, a Buggarah came out by order of Syud bin Tahnoon, and seized the boat, and conveyed her into that port, when they hauled her on shore, and appropriated to themselves whatever was in her. From the people of Debaye they took two slaves, five Kerans, two Abbas, and an Arab head-dress, releasing four men who belonged to that place, and sending them away in a Buggarah; but they detained two of the crew belonging to Biddah, whose slaves they also took. Syud bin Tahnoon observed to the people of the boat that he had received orders from Ameer Fysul bin Saood to seize all Beniyas vessels he might find at sea, unless they returned to Aboothabee.

The crew of the boat that issued from Aboothabee consisted of twenty-five men.

A letter of remonstrance was addressed to the Beniyas Chief, calling upon him to afford redress for so open a case of infraction of the Maritime Truce, and desiring the immediate restitution of all the property and individuals that had been so unlawfully seized. Commodore Robinson followed in the wake of the letter, with a view, in the event of contumacy being displayed by the delinquent chief, "to give weight by his presence to the requisition preferred against him, and to warn him of the consequences which must ensue from such a wilful disregard of his engagements with the British Government." Such were the steps adopted to bring Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon to account, and nothing could exceed the readiness exhibited by him to obey the Resident's instructions. Before the arrival of the Commodore, immediately on receipt of Captain Kemball's letter, he despatched a special messenger

to Hajee Yacoob, for the purpose of handing back the property plundered, and of intimating his intention to restore the slaves he had taken, so soon as they returned from the pearl banks.

But two more points remain to be noticed ere we draw this Sketch to a close.

Towards the end of the year 1852 the Beniyas Chief espoused the cause of Shaikh Syud bin Butye, the new Shaikh of Debaye, whose right to the chiefship being disputed by the sons of the late Shaikh Muktoom, his brother, had led to the latter fleeing for protection to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and craving his assistance towards regaining the seat they had so lately won, but been unable to retain.

In the spring of the ensuing year, on the occasion of the advent to Brymee of Abdoolla bin Fysul, with a considerable Nujdee force, the course pursued by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon was diametrically opposed to that of the Joasmee. Finding that the latter was doing all in his power to induce the Ameer's son to invade the districts of Batinah, he at once expressed his strong disapproval of the proposed plan, by dismissing to their homes the larger portion of his followers, and begging, if the expedition were finally determined on, to be permitted to withdraw.

A. D. 1853.

The measures adopted by the Resident, coupled with the above show of opposition, and the assumption of a hostile attitude by His Excellency Syud Soweynee, dictated to Abdoolla bin Fysul the advisability, if not the necessity, of abandoning the project of an attack on the Imaum's territories, and satisfying himself with demands for payment of an increased amount of tribute.

When matters had been brought to a settlement, Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon returned to Aboothabee to wait upon the Resident, who was off that port on his tour of the Gulf, and on arrival he subscribed to the new Treaty of Peace* (May 4th, 1853) concluded by the Maritime Chiefs of Oman, for a complete cessation of hostilities for ever at sea.

* Vide pages 88 and 89 of this Selection.

1.16
The Arabian Coast Surveys, 1821–1829

The following Memoir was drawn up at my request by Lieut. R. Houghton, the Draughtsman to the Survey. Continued indisposition and variety of occupations having delayed me to delegate that portion of the duty to him, who had more leisure to make the necessary researches. The Memoir comprises an Account of that part of the Southern Coast, or Arabian Side of the Persian Gulf, contained between Ras Mussendem, at the entrance, & where the Survey commenced, to Debay, a place situated at the Extremity of what is generally termed the Pirate Coast.—

/Signed/ J. H. Guy
Lieutenant Commanding the H. C. Cutter
Discovery, And in Charge of the Survey.—

Passé Khyma point, on which the ruins of the town, is distant from Ras Mussendem Nwd, and bears from it near NNW½W. It forms the western side of the Entrance to a Back water, which runs nearly parallel with the Coast, and is

The Town of Passé Khyma bears from Ras Mussendem N 38° 30' W dist 6 7/8 miles
Lat 25° 58' 15" N
Long 56° 0' 0" E

3 Miles long by one and a half in breadth near the center, but the entrance is not more than the sixth of a Mile wide, across which is a bar of sand, having only two feet water on it at low spring tide. The soundings in the vary from 16 to 6 fathom and are very irregular at low water. The whole is nearly dry, and it is only in the center, in a narrow stream, close off the ruins of the town that enough water is found to float a small vessel. Opposite the town, within the back water, are two or three small flat Islets, on one of which, named Maharah, is a village containing fifty or sixty huts, the inhabitants of which are fishermen. On the Eastern

27

Side of the entrance to the Creek, stands another village named Meid Hea, containing between two & three hundred inhabitants of the same race, the huts are merely made of Cadjan, as through plenty of Building Materials might be found among the ruins of the old town. — About a Mile and half N.E.ly from the town, the date grove Commences, the Creek which appeared and still Can seems to be taken off them. Fresh water is only to be procured from hence. The remains of the town are situated on a Narrow strip of sand forming the boundary of the creek to sea-ward. More complete demolition could not have been Made, not one building of any kind remaining entire, proven sufficient to form to denote what may have been its form, with the exception of a few fragments of two round towers at its West end. The principal part of its former inhabitants have retired to a town some distance within the date groves, some few occupy the villages above named, and others have Emigrated to Sharja and various other places on the Coast. They are now completely subjected to the power of the Sheik of the latter place, and during our survey of the Creek, his Brother was in attendance to prevent our Meeting with annoyance. We found him of much assistance here, and at other places, but only on one occasion were necessitated to complain of aggression on the part of the natives. Some shutten flags had been stolen during the night, and on application being Made for their restoration the thieves soon found, they surely be eaten. Generally speaking, however, we met with civility from the inhabitants to whom we were led to believe, took ground to the time when Rasel Khyma may yet again rear its head. Hold chief Hassan Ben Rahma is now Sheik, under Bundegee of a Large village named Khyfud, situated in the date groves, about six Miles from Rasel Khyma.

On a cursory survey of the Back-Coasts on this coast, a survey of them appeared of Primo importance, and of this on the least so, from the shallow entrance, but during the Expedition Bedrone hundred vessels of the largest size used by the Arabs, were lying at anchor in the creek, which had been hailed over the bar after having been lightened, & when the largest only drew seven feet Water. It was deemed, therefore, by Lieut. Guy necessary to Make a More Minute Survey than had been originally intended, and More especially as our boats Can always enter at high Water. The Soundings off the town deepen gradually from one to four fathoms, and are very regular, over a bottom of sand, with the exception of one spot, which has two and half fathoms on it. This bears about

28

West from the Island, and is distant from it a little other than two Miles. There are four fathoms within it, and from four outside, the Soundings gradually deepen to Nine, five Miles off Shore. The rise of Tides is 7 feet high Water Full & change. —

Bullocks fowls vegetables and butter could always be procured here, and at very reasonable rates, supplies are obtained at some distance from the Creek, and as no want of these articles was experienced on any part of what is generally termed the Pirate Coast, it is reasonable to infer that the Country Must be fruitful at some distance in the interior, though a Coast offering greater appearance of Sterility could not be imagined. The only sign of vegetation being in the date groves in which the trees are thinly scattered, and a few straggling trees to the Southward of the town. They use send many small boats to the pearl fishery from hence, but we were not able to ascertain the returns, however, they May be Considerable under those at Sharja, the whole falling to the Sheik of that place. Sharks' fins are collected in Considerable quantities, and sent to Muscat, where they are purchased by the Banyans of the Persian Master. From each person embarking in the pearl fishery the Sheik of Sharja demands a tribute, which is a dollar for the season, and may produce from one thousand to twelve hundred dollars yearly. —

From the Southern side of the Eddystone a small range of low hillocks Commences, running to the back of Ul Emrah. They were of reddish coloured Earth, and appeared to be composed of Red sand-stone, but I had no opportunity of examining them. —

Between 10 & 11 Miles West from Rasel Khyma is the town of Ul Emrah, the Coast between them, forms a slight curve, with a beach of sand, about a Mile in shore of which, is a range of red dish coloured hillocks, carried with Bable Rees. The Soundings of this space are from 3½ fathoms at 2½ Miles off shore to 10 fathoms at six Miles, very regular, over a Bottom of Sand. —

Ul Emrah bears from Rasel Khyma N 68° West distant 10½ miles Lat. 25° 52' 52" North Long. 56° 55' 15" East

Ul Emrah is situated on an Island of the same name, and is commonly called by the Arabs Jezeerat Ul Emrah, or Red Island, from the Colour of the hills at a short distance to the Eastward of it. It is in the

center of a back-water, about two Miles dist, ranging in a N.E.ly & W.ly direction, having a narrow Slip of Sand with boundary to Seaward.—
6th The entrance are several small sandy Isles & Banks, but as there are not more than two & three feet water in it at low tide, and not being frequented by boats but such as are of the smallest size, it is useless to describe it minutely.. The town, or rather the remnant done is about a Mile in Circumference, and defended by two round towers on the land face, now much out of repair, and only calculated for Matchlock defence. Others formerly stood to sea-ward, but they were destroyed during the Expedition. This place have evidently been of some importance, as the buildings are numerous, and far better Constructed than in most Arab places. On the western side, close to the Water, stands a Mosque of Considerable size, which appears to be, but the architecture has nothing to boast of. It is rather a rude attempt at raising arches in the Moorish style. The Columns are very clumsy and not more than 9 feet high. There are five ranges in its length, and four running them at right angles. Between each row are four Columns supporting in form of a dome, which from without has the appearance of several rows of eggs. The whole edifice is of friable sandstone, much out of repair.— The inhabitants are principally fishermen of the Joasmee tribe, and do not amount to more than between two & three hundred. The Sheik is placed here by the Chief of Ras'ga. He was employed during the Expedition as a Secretary and interpreter by Capt.n Thompson, and appears a shrewd Character. During the Pearl fishery, many natives from the interior visit the Coast, when the population is nearly doubled, and the new comers find no want of lodging among the ruins of the town. Each adventurer pays a dollar, but the tribute cannot produce much, as the number of boats is small. The returns are also of no importance. There were several small boats upon the stocks building, but the place had an air of desertion from the population being so disproportioned to its size.— The only drinkable water they have is procured from the high ground, about a Mile and half from the town, but even this is brackish during the hot months. There are no date groves near, or within sight of the town.—

Off the Coast The soundings are very regular over sand, from two fathoms close to the beach, to 4 fm at Ras'ga Mid distant.—

From this they were gradually deepened to 12 fathoms, between 6 & 7 Miles off shore. The rise of tide is six feet on the Springs.—

Amulgawain, the next place to the Southward of Al Umrah is situated on the Northern point of the entrance to one of the most extensive Back-waters on this part of the Coast. It bears from Al Umrah NW½W and is distant from it about 16 Miles. The Coast between the two places is low and sandy, forming an irregular Curve, of which there is a dangerous Coral Reef, projecting a Mile and half from it in some places. The South and extreme of the reef bears from Al Umrah S65°30'West, 10½ Miles, and from Amulgawain Town N.38°40'East 5¾ Miles, with 4 fathoms water close to it, which is the depth along the edge in its whole extent. At one Mile distant there are 8 fathoms, and at four Miles from it 10 to 12, sand and rocks. The entrance to the Back-water is formed between the point on which the Town stands, and a low sandy island to the Westward of it, about the sixth of a Mile distant. Off it, there is a large bank of sand and rocks, which narrows the Channel to a few yards in width, in which, near the entrance, the depth of water is only three feet. To describe the various windings would be more tedious than useful: it will be sufficient to mention that Close to the East side of the Island, the depth is from 3 to 4 feet, and the various Channels have from 6 to 20 feet, generally, at low water, but at high tide the back-water appears nearly in one Continued Sheet. About 3 Miles of the Coast have been examined to the NW at which distance from the entrance there are several islets, covered with low bushwood. The extent to the Southward is very considerable, but at low tide there is very little water in that direction. Close under the town it branches off to the North-Eastward, taking the direction of the Coast for about four & Miles, where it communicates with the sea, & affords a channel for small boats. On its bank, about 2¾ Miles N.32°E from the Town, stands a large quadrangular tower in ruins and deserted round, which are some straggling date trees. This is an useful object when passing the Coast from the Northward, being the first object seen.—

The town of Amulgawain is deserted, but appears to have been a very Considerable place, and might, with little labour and expence, be put upon a very respectable footing, as most of the buildings only require a roof, the walls being entire. It bears the appearance of having been suddenly abandoned. Like most of the places on this coast, it is probably declined as Pearl fishing resorts

importance. The Island off which above named, is connected with the coast by a narrow sand bank, which is dry at low water, and on its centre stands a small town named Lūmi inhabited by about five hundred Arabs who depend on the Sheik of Sharga. There are no fortifications near it, the Sheik's house being the only place capable of offering resistance in case of attack. They have a few fishing boats, and send a small number to the pearl fishery. The place is wretchedly poor. There are no date groves excepting some nearly planted to the Southward, and their water is not good. About a Mile from the point to the Westward of the Island, is a small village near some wells of water, which is brackish during the hot weather.

The soundings at the entrance of the Back-water are from 2 fathoms close to the rocky bank, to 6 & 7 about a Mile off shore. The best anchorage is to the Southward of the entrance with the Sheik's house, which is the highest building in the Island, bearing about E. by N. in 7 fathoms. The soundings here are from 2 fathoms close to the beach to 6 fathoms half a Mile off, and at a Mile and half they are seven & eight, sand and reefs. The rise of tide is 6 feet on the springs. Time of high water 11.h 40m. —

It is not advisable to anchor any where on the coast between Dibay & Amulgawein near the shore, as the ground is uncommonly rocky, and the anchor is liable to hook a rock, owing to this three were broken about by us in a few days.

Opposite the village is a small sand-cliff regularly stratified, which must have been deposited by the sea at no distant period. It is too regular to have been thrown up.

From Amulgawein the Coast takes a N.W.b.W. direction to Aymaun. Harbour, flat & sandy, with a few straggling date trees near the sea. Midway between the two places, there is a village situated at the mouth of a very small Creek. It is unworthy of any particular notice. —

Aymaun is a small town situated on the Southern point of the entrance to one of the best Back-waters on the Coast, as it has five feet water on the bar at low water, though the soundings within are not deep. Off the Northern side of the town there are from 6 to 14 feet in a narrow channel. The Entrance is about a quarter of

Aymaun bears from Amulgawein W.b.N. 14½ miles
Lat. 25° 25' 30" Long. 55° 35' 0"

a Mile wide, and within the point the Creek at high water forms a kind of basin, but at low tide there is only a narrow channel, affording from 6 to 12 feet water. —

The town is small, but contains from one thousand to twelve hundred inhabitants of the Nhaim tribe, under Sheik Rashid bin Ahmed, who considers himself independent of the Sharga Chief, to whom however, he is too near a neighbour to be altogether free from control. The only building capable of offering resistance in case of attack, is a small Barrie, now converted into a residence for the Sheik, and which was partially destroyed during the late expedition. The houses are of Mud and Cadjan. The Country is uncommonly sterile, and fresh water is procured from wells about three quarters of a mile to the N.W. of the town. Being situated in the open desert, they are often nearly filled with sand during a South West Gale. The inhabitants depend for subsistence upon the pearl fishery, and during the season they send one hundred and forty boats to the bank. The returns cannot be ascertained exactly, but they may amount to between twelve and fifteen thousand dollars annually.

The anchorage off the town is bad owing to the ground being rocky. There are ten fathoms within a very short distance of the shore, and a mile off five fathoms, from which they gradually deepen to 8 at three miles distant, but a small ten fathom bank lies just without the three fathom line, bearing N.E. a Mile distant from the town. The rise of tide is six feet, and time of high water 11.h 20m. —

Between Aymaun and Sharga is the small village of Tusht, standing at the mouth of a small creek. It is not now a place of any importance, contains very few inhabitants, and is only a mile distant from the entrance of Sharga back-water. —

Sharga bears from Aymaun S.b.E. and is distant from it five Miles, the coast between forming nearly a straight line. The town stands on the eastern side of a very narrow & considerable back-water, running parallel with the Coast, the entrance of which is about a Mile to the Northward of the town, and across which is the usual bar of sand. The breadth varies from

one hundred & twenty to two hundred yards, and it has not more than two and three feet water at low tide. The length is about three Miles and at Abbo House it joins the East-Coast there. The western side has a narrow spit of sand as a boundary, which is isolated the Southern end forming one side of the entrance to Abbo House. On this spit, and directly West half a Mile from the town, is a small square tower, round which are collected many huts containing from five to seven hundred of the Suidan tribe, who formerly inhabited the village of Kaum situated on the Northern side of the entrance to Abbo House. The village was destroyed by themselves on the arrival of the last expedition, when they retired to Shariga for greater security. They have several boats for fishing, and a date grove at the center of the Island, but which cannot produce a sufficient quantity of fruit to supply a fourth part of their number.

The Agent at Sharga Lieut. Jones Abbo S.E. 5 miles Latt. 25° 21' 30" Long. 55° 25' E.

The town of Sharga is open and undefended, the walls and towers have not been destroyed during the late expedition. The houses are principally ruined, and from the Sheiks downward, have a mean appearance. Each house has a Compound laid out according to the fancy of the owner, and like all Arab places, the Streets, in consequence, are very irregular. The principal part of the population consists of from seventeen hundred to two thousand Arabs of the Joasmee tribe. Sharga being the seat of Commerce on this side of the Gulph contains many others of every description, but as they are seldom long residents, it is not easy to fix the limit of their number. During the pearl fishery the population is nearly doubled, from the influx of natives from the interior. Sultan ben Segger, the present Sheik, since the fall of Rasel Khyma, has been generally acknowledged chief or Imam of the Joasmee tribe. He appears a crafty enterprising character, but is not reckoned a good warrior. His countenance is rather handsome, his Manners are urbane & rather dignified, and taken the whole person to be any thing but a Pirate Chieftain. He is very studious of cultivating the good will of the English, and only wants our acknowledgement of his being head of the different tribes on the Coast, to become actually so. He is too powerful to meet with much resistance, and even now they may be considered as under his Controul, although at one

or two places they do not actually render homage. His revenue is derived principally from the Pearl fishery. During the season Sharga sends out three hundred boats, on each person embarking pays a dollar to the Sheik for permission to fish. This tribute amounts to between two and three thousand dollars yearly. There are several other duties levied on Merchandize, fishermen, and Sheik Keshas, but they are not of moment. The Sheiks principal source of wealth is in Mercantile adventure. In most Arab places the Sheik is the principal Merchant.

The returns from the pearl fishery are very considerable, the export of that article amounting to between Eighty and Ninety thousand dollars annually. Sharks fins are collected in considerable quantities, and carried to Muscat, & sold to Gujerat Banyans, who make the tour of the Coast occasionally for the purpose of purchasing them, and collecting Pearls. The sea supplies an abundance of Fish of various kinds. The low date groves afford a very scanty supply of their principal article of food, so that their dependance is upon Bahrein and Bussorah. The Coast for a considerable distance in and is sandy & barren affording no sign of cultivation, the date trees appearing in small Patches. Fresh water is procured from Wells, half a Mile East of the Sheik's house.

To the Southward of the town is a ledge of hard sand-stone considerably higher than any ground near it, may be said to command the town, yet it does not appear ever to have been fortified. This and the small tower in the Suidan village, are the first objects seen from seaward, for the Sheik's from its round backed form is not very distinct.

The bottom being covered with sharp pebbles of coral & rock makes the anchorage bad in the road, and the heavy Sea rolling in with even a Moderate breeze from N.W. renders it a Bad Road. The Ships ought not to be approached too closely in anchoring, on account of the absolute necessity as the heavy Westerly Storms with, generally speaking, very little warning. The soundings are regular, from two and three fathoms close to the beach, to ten at one mile, and ten at four Miles off Shore. Rise of tide six feet, on the Springs. Time of High Water 1h

Debai the next town in succession to Sharga, from which it bears W.S.W. distant 7¾ Miles, stands

on the Southern side of the entrance to a small Creek, in which are from Ten to twenty fathom fair water near the Town, but the entrance has only two feet at low tide. There are several small Banks off it, and a long reef extends from it nearly to three quarters of a Mile off shore, to near the entrance of Debai Hoyle. The Soundings off the Bank are very regular, from one and a half Cable to Twenty, to six fathoms a Mile off and at three Miles they vary from six to Eight fathoms and Sand. The rise of tide is seven feet.

The Centre of the Town of Debai bears from Ras Hasyan S.S.W. distant 7 miles. Lat. 25° 16' 30" N. Long. 55° 22' 30" E.

The Town is a miserable assemblage of mud houses, surrounded by a low mud wall in which are several Breaches, & defended by three round towers, and a Square Castellated building, with a tower at one angle much dilapidated, and having only three or four guns mounted, which are old & rusty. The western tower, which stands on a small cliff on the Creek, has also three or four Guns, and is in moderate repair. The inhabitants are innumerous from one thousand to twelve hundred, and of the Beni Yas tribe. The district is under Sheik Syed, who is acting for a minor, and subject to the Imam of Muscat, who maintains a body of one hundred and fifty negroes as soldiers, a guard to the town. The inhabitants are supported by fishing, Collecting Shanks fins, and particularly by the Pearl fishery. Ninety boats are sent from hence in the season, and the yearly returns amount to between twenty and thirty thousand dollars. There are two or three small date groves, in which are contained the only fresh water wells in the place, at the back of the town, wherein the Country is uncommonly barren from the tower. The creek was observed taking a winding Course to the S.Eastward for five or six Miles, where it was lost in a marsh. Its banks were studded with small brushwood, which, with rushes collected in the marsh, supplies the inhabitants with fuel. Dates are procured from Dahreid, and a small quantity of Rice from Muscat.

There are several small Cliffs of clay, hard sand-stone on the northern face of the town, and the town itself is built on a firm foundation of the same material. Its Elevation, where highest, may be about twenty

feet from the water at high tide.

Midway between Abbo Hoyle and Debai stands a small village of about twenty huts, the inhabitants of which are fishermen, and a mile and half to the Southward of Debai are two other small places, but neither of them are deserving of particular notice.

Debai may be Considered as the termination of the Pirate Coast, as the natives to the Southward and Westward, have been generally less addicted to plundering, & always more friendly inclined to, & perhaps stood more in awe of the English.

Transcription of previous document

The following Memoir was drawn up at my request by Lieut. N. Houghton, the Draughtsman to the Survey; continued indisposition and variety of occupations having obliged me to delegate that portion of the duty to him, who had more leisure to make the necessary researches. The Memoir comprises an account of that part of the Southern Coast, or Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, contained between Ras Moosendem, at the entrance, and where the survey commenced, to Debay, a place situated at the extremity of what is generally termed the Pirate Coast.

Signed J. N. Guy

Lieutenant Commanding the H.C. Ship

Discovery, and in Charge of the Survey

Rasel Khyma point, on which lie the ruins of the town, is distant from Raumps six miles, and bears from it near SSW. It forms the western side of the entrance to a Backwater, which runs nearly parallel with the Coast, and is 3 miles long by one and a half in breadth near the center, but the entrance is not more than the sixth of a mile wide, across which is a bar of sand, having only two feet water over it at low spring tide. The soundings inside vary from 16 to 5 feet, and are very irregular. At low water the whole is nearly dry, and it is only in the center, in a narrow stream close off the ruins of the town that enough water is found to float a small vessel. Opposite the town, within the back water, are two or three small flat Islets, on one of which, named Naharah, is a village containing fifty or sixty huts, the inhabitants of which are fishermen. On the Eastern side of the entrance to the creek, stands another village named Neidthea, containing between two and three hundred inhabitants of the Joasmee tribe. The huts are merely made of cadjan, although plenty of building materials might be found among the ruins of the old town. About a mile and half ESE from the town, the date groves commence, the trees of which appear old, and little care seems to be taken of them. Fresh water is only to be procured from hence. The remains of the town are situated on a narrow spit of sand, forming the boundary of the creek to sea-ward. A more complete demolition could not have been made, not one building of any kind remaining entire, or even sufficient of one to denote what may have been its form, with the exception of a few fragments of two round towers at its West end. The principal part of its former inhabitants have retired to a town some distance within the date groves, some few occupy the villages above named, and others have emigrated to Sharga, and various other places on the Coast. They are now completely subjected to the power of the Sheik of the latter place, and during our survey of the Creek, his brother was in attendance to prevent our meeting with annoyance. We found him of much assistance here, and at other places, but only on one occasion

were necessitated to complain of aggression on the part of the natives. Some station flags had been stolen during the night, and on application being made for their restoration the thief was soon found, and very severely beaten. Generally speaking, however, we met with even civility from the inhabitants who, we were led to believe, look forward to the time when Rasel Khyma may yet again rear its head. Its old chief Ibassan Ben Rahma is now Sheik, under Ben Sugger, of a large village named Khassual, situated in the date groves, about six miles from Rasel Khyma.

On a cursory view of the Back-waters on this coast, a survey of them appeared of no importance, and of this one the least so, from the shallow entrance, but during the Expedition near one hundred vessels of the largest size used by the Arabs, were lying within the creek, which had been hauled over the bar after having been lightened, when the largest only drew seven feet water. It was deemed, therefore, by Lieutenant Guy necessary to make a more minute survey than had been originally intended, and more especially as our boats can always enter at high water. The soundings off the town deepen gradually from one to four fathoms, and are very regular, over a bottom of sand, with the exception of one spot, which has two and half fathoms on it. This bears about WbN from the fort, and is distant from it, a little better than two miles. There are four fathoms within it, and from four outside, the soundings gradually deepen to nine, five miles offshore. The rise of tides is 7 feet, high water 11h. 40pm on the Springs.

Bullocks fowls vegetables and butter could always be procured here, and at very reasonable rates; supplies are obtained at some distance from the creek, and as no want of these articles was experienced on any part of what is generally termed the Pirate Coast, it is reasonable to infer that the country must be fruitful at some distance in the interior, though a coast offering greater appearance of sterility could not be imagined. The only sign of vegetation being in the date groves, in which the trees are thinly scattered, and a few straggling trees to the southward of the town. They yet send many small boats to the pearl fishery from hence, but we were not able to ascertain the returns, however, they may be

comprised under those at Sharga, the whole falling to the Sheik of that place. Sharks fins are collected in considerable quantities, and sent to Muscat, where they are purchased by the Banyans for the Bombay market. From each person embarking in the pearl fishery the Sheik of Sharga demands a tribute, which is a dollar for the season, and may produce from one thousand to twelve hundred dollars yearly.

From the southern side of the Back-Water a small range of low hillocks commences, running to the back of Ul Umrah. They were of reddish coloured earth, and appeared to be composed of Red sand-stone, but I had no opportunity of examining them.

Between 10 and 11 miles SWbW from Rasel Khyma is the town of Ul Umrah. The Coast between them, forms a slight curve, with a beach of sand, about a mile inshore of which, is a range of reddish coloured hillocks, covered with Bable trees. The soundings off this space are from 3½ fathoms at 2½ miles offshore to 10 fathoms at six miles, very regular, over a bottom of sand.

Ul Umrah is situated on an island of the same name, and is commonly called by the Arabs Jeezurat Ul Umrah, or Red Island from the colour of the hills at a short distance to the Eastward of it. It is in the center of a back-water, about two miles deep, ranging in a NEly & SWly direction, having a narrow spit of sand on its boundary to sea-ward. Off the entrance are several small sandy islets and banks, but as there are not more than two and three feet water in it at low tide, and not being frequented by boats but such as are of the smallest size, it is useless to describe it minutely. The town, or rather the remnant of one is about a mile in circumference, and defended by two round towers on the land face, now much out of repair, and only calculated for matchlock defence. Others formerly stood to sea-ward, but they were destroyed during the expedition. This place has evidently been of some importance, as the buildings are numerous, and far better constructed than in most Arab places. On the western side, close to the water, stands a Mosque of considerable size, which appears aged, but the architecture has nothing to boast of. It is rather a rude attempt at raising arches in the Moorish style. The columns are very clumsy, and not more than 9 feet high. There are five ranges in its length, and four crossing them at right angles. Between each square of four

columns a roof is turned in form of a dome, which from outside has the appearance of several rows of ovens. The whole edifice is of friable sand stone, and much out of repair. The inhabitants are principally fishermen of the Joasmee tribe, and do not amount to more than between two and three hundred. The Sheik is placed here by the Chief of Sharga. He was employed during the Expedition as a secretary and interpreter by Captain Thompson, and appears a shrewd character. During the pearl fishery, many natives from the interior visit the coast, when the population is nearly doubled, and the new comers find no want of lodging amongst the ruins of the town. Each adventurer pays a dollar, but the tribute cannot produce much, as the number of boats is small. The returns are also of no importance. There were several small boats & trankeys building, but the place had an air of desertion from the population being so disproportioned to its size. The only drinkable water they have is procured from the high ground, about a mile and half from the town, but this is brackish during the hot months. There are no date groves near, or within sight of the town.

Off the Creek the soundings are very regular over sand, from two fathoms close to the beach to 4½ at half a mile distant. From this they very gradually deepen to 12 fathoms, between 6 and 7 miles off shore. The rise of tide is six feet on the springs.

Amulgawein, the next place to the southward of Ul Umrah is situated on the northern point of the entrance to one of the most extensive back-waters on this part of the coast. It bears from Ul Umrah SWbW and is distant from it about 16 miles. The coast between the two places is low and sandy, forming an irregular curve, off which there is a dangerous coral reef, projecting a mile and half from it in some places. The outward extreme of the reef bears from Ul Umrah S65 30W dist, 10 8/10 miles, and from Amalgawein town N38.40E dist, 5½ miles, with 4 fathoms water close to it, which is the depth along the edge in its whole extent. At one mile distant there are 8 fathoms, and at four miles from 10 to 12, sand and rocks. The entrance to the

back-water is formed between the point on which the town stands, and a low sandy island to the westward of it, about the sixth of a mile distant off it, there is a large bank of sand and rocks, which narrow the channel to a few yards in width, in which, near the entrance, the depth of water is only three feet. To describe the various windings would be more tedious than useful; it will be sufficient to mention that close to the East side of the island, the depth is from 30 to 48 feet, and the various channels have from 6 to 20 feet, generally, at low water, but at high tide the back-water appears nearly in one continued sheet. About 3 miles of the creek have been examined to the SSE at which distance from the entrance there are several islets, covered with low brushwood. The extent to the southward is very considerable, but at low tide there is very little water in that direction. Close under the town it branches off to the North-Eastward, taking the direction of the coast for about 7 or 8 miles where it communicates with the sea, and affords a channel for small boats. On its banks, about 2¼ miles N52E from the town, stands a large quadrangular tower in ruins and deserted round which are some straggling date trees. This is an useful object when passing the coast from the northward, being the first object seen.

The town of Amulgawein is deserted, but appears to have been a very considerable place, and might, with little labour and expence be put upon a very respectable footing, as most of the buildings only require a roof, the walls being entire. It bears the appearance of having been suddenly abandoned. Like most of the places on this coast, it probably declined as Rasel Khyma rose into importance. The Island off it, above named, is connected with the coast by a narrow sand bank, which is dry at low water, and in its center stands a small town named Libini inhabited by about five hundred Arabs who are dependent on the Sheik of Sharga. There are no fortifications near it, the Sheiks house being the only place capable of offering resistance in case of attack. They have a few fishing boats, and send a small number to the pearl fishery. The place is wretchedly poor. There are no date groves excepting some newly planted to the southward, and their water is not good. About a mile from the point to the S. Westward of the Island, is a small village near some wells, the water of which is brackish during the hot weather.

The soundings off the entrance of the back-water are from 2 fathoms close to the rocky bank, to 6 and 7 about a mile offshore. The best anchorage is to the southward of the entrance with the Shaik's house, which is the highest building in the Island, bearing about ENE in 7 fathoms. The soundings here are from 2 fathoms close to the beach to 6 fathoms half a mile off and at a mile and half they are seven and eight, sand and rocks. The rise of tide is 6 feet on the springs. Time of high water 11h.40m.

It is not advisable to anchor any where on the coast between Debay and Amulgawein near the shore, as the ground is uncommonly rocky, and the anchor is liable to hook a rock, owing to this three were broken or lost by us in a few days.

Opposite the village is a small sand-cliff regularly stratified, which must have been deposited by the sea at no distant period. It is too regular to have been thrown up.

From Amulgawein the coast takes a SWbS direction to Aymaun. It is low, flat, and sandy with a few straggling date trees near the sea. Midway between the two places, there is a village situated at the mouth of a very small creek. It is unworthy of any particular notice.

Aymaun is a small town situated on the southern point of the entrance to one of the best back-waters on the coast, as it has five feet water on the bar at low water, though the soundings within are not deep. Off the northern side of the town there are from 6 to 14 feet in a narrow channel. The entrance is about a quarter of a mile wide, and within the points the creek at high water forms a kind of bason, but at low tide there is only a narrow channel, affording from 6 to 12 feet water.

The town is small, but contains from one thousand to twelve hundred inhabitants of the Nhaim tribe, under Sheik Raschid ben Amed, who considers himself independent of the Sharga Chief, to whom, however, he is too near a neighbour to be altogether free from control. The only building capable of offering resistance in case of attack, is a small Ghurrie, now converted into a residence for the Sheik,, and which was partially destroyed, during the expedition. The houses are of

mud and cadjan. The country is uncommonly sterile, and fresh water is procured from wells, about three quarters of a mile to the SW of the town. Being situated in the open desert, they are often nearly filled with sand during a North West gale. The inhabitants depend for subsistenace upon the pearl fishery, and during the season they send one hundred and forty boats to the bank. The returns could not be ascertained exactly, but they may amount to between twelve and fifteen thousand dollars annually.

The anchorage off the town is bad, owing to the ground being rocky. There are two fathoms within a very short distance of the shore, and a mile off five fathoms, from which they gradually deepen to 8 at three miles distant; but a small two fathom bank lies just without the three fathom line, bearing NE, a mile distant from the town. The rise of tide is six feet and time of high water 11h20m.

Between Aymaun and Sharga is the small village of Fusht, standing at the mouth of a small creek. It is not now a place of any importance, contains very few inhabitants, and is only a mile distant from the entrance of Sharga back-water.

Sharga bears from Aymaun SWbS, and is distant from it five miles, the coast between forming nearly a straight line. The town stands on the eastern side of a very narrow and inconsiderable back-water, running parallel with the coast, the entrance of which is about a mile to the northward of the town, and across which is the usual bar of sand. The breadth varies from one hundred & twenty and two hundred yards, and it has not more than two and three feet water at low tide. The length is about three miles and at Abboo Heyle it joins the back-water there. The western side has a narrow spit of sand as its boundary, which is isolated; the southern end forming one side of the entrance to Abboo Heyle. On this spit, and directly west, half a mile from the town, is a small square tower, round which are collected many huts containing from five to seven hundred of the Suidan tribe, who formerly inhabited the village of Kawru situated on the northern side of the entrance to Abboo Heyle. The village was destroyed by themselves on the arrival of the last expedition, when they retired to Sharga for greater security. They have several boats for fishing, and a date grove at the center of the Island, but which cannot produce a sufficient quantity of fruit to supply a tenth part of their number.

The town of Sharga is open and undefended; the walls and towers having been destroyed during the expedition. The houses are principally of mud, and from the Sheik's downward, have a mean appearance. Each house has a Compound laid out according to the fancy of the owner, and, like all Arab places, the streets, in consequence, are very irregular. The principal part of the population consists of from seventeen hundred to two thousand Arabs of the Joasmee tribe. Sharga being the seat of Commerce on this side of the Gulf, it contains many others of every description, but as they are seldom long residents, it is not easy to fix the limit of their number. During the pearl fishery the population is nearly doubled, from the influx of natives from the interior. Sultan ben Sugger, the present Sheik, since the fall of Rasel Khyma, has been generally acknowledged chief or Imam of the Joasmee tribe. He appears a crafty enterprising character, but is not reckoned a good warrior; his counternance is rather handsome, his manners are urbane, rather dignified, and betoken the possessor to be anything but a Pirate Chieftain. He is very studious of cultivating the good will of the English, and only wants our acknowledgement of his being head of the different tribes on the Coast, to become actually so. He is too powerful to meet with much resistance, and even now they may be considered as under his control, although at one or two places they do not actually render homage. His revenue is derived principally from the pearl fishery. During the season Sharga sends out three hundred boats, when each person embarking pays a dollar to the Sheik for permission to fish. This tribute amounts to between two and three thousand dollars yearly. There are several other duties levied on merchants, fishermen and shop keepers, but they are not of moment. The Sheik's principal source of wealth is in mercantile adventure. In most Arab places the Sheik is the principal Merchant.

The returns from the pearl fishery are here very considerable, the export of that article amounting to between eighty and ninety thousand dollars annually. Sharks fins are collected in considerable quantities, and carried to Muscat, or sold to itinerant Banyans, who make the tour of the coast occasionally for the purpose of purchasing them, and collecting pearls. The sea supplies abundance of fish, of various kinds.

The few date groves afford a very scanty supply of their principal article of food, for this their dependance is upon Bahrein and Bussorah. The country for a considerable distance inland is sandy and sterile affording no sign of cultivation, the date trees appearing in a wild state. Fresh water is procurred from wells, half a mile east of the Sheik's house.

To the southward of the town is a hillock of hard sand-stone considerably higher than any ground about, and may be said to command the town, yet it does not appear ever to have been fortified. This and the small tower in the Suidan village, are the first objects seen from seaward, but the hillock from its round backed form is not very distinct.

The bottom being covered with sharp patches of coral rock makes the anchorage bad in the roads, and the heavy sea rolling in with even a moderate breeze from NW, renders it still more so. The shore ought not to be approached too closely in anchoring, unless in case of absolute necessity, as the heavy N Westers set in with, generally speaking, very little warning. The soundings are regular, from two and three fathoms close to the beach, to six at one mile, and ten at four miles off shore. Rise of tide six feet, on the springs. Time of high water 1h.

Debai the next town in succession to Sharga, from which it bears SWbSouth distant 7½ miles, stands on the southern side of the entrance to a small creek, in which are from ten to twenty seven feet water near the town, but the entrance has only two feet at low tide. There are several small banks off it, and a long reef extends from half, to three quarters of a mile off shore, to near the entrance of Abboo Heyle. The soundings off the bank are very regular, from one and a half close to them, to six fathoms a mile off, and at three miles they vary from six to eight, over rocks and sand. The rise of tide is seven feet.

The town is a miserable assemblage of mud hovels, surrounded by a low mud wall in which are several breaches and defended by three round towers, and a square castellated building, with a tower at one angle much dilapidated, and having only three or four guns mounted, which are old and rusty. The western tower, which stands on a small cliff over the creek, has also three or four guns, and is in moderate repair. The inhabitants are in number from one thousand to twelve hundred, and of the Beni Yass tribe. The district is under Sheik Syed, who is acting for a

minor, and subject to the Imam of Muscat, who maintains a body of one hundred and fifty negroes as soldiers, or guard to the town. The inhabitants are supported by fishing, collecting sharks' fins, and particularly by the pearl fishery. Ninety boats are sent from hence in the season, and the yearly returns amount to between twenty and thirty thousand dollars. There are two or three small date groves, in which are contained the only fresh water wells in the place, at the back of the town; otherwise the country is uncommonly barren. From the tower the creek was observed taking a winding course to the S Eastward for five or six miles, where it was lost in a marsh. Its banks were studded with small brush wood, which, with rushes collected in the marsh, supply the inhabitants with fuel. Dates are procured from Bahrein, and a small quantity of rice from Muscat.

There are several small cliffs of very hard sand-stone on the northern face of the town, and the town itself is built on a firm foundation of the same material. Its elevation, where highest, may be about twenty feet from the water at high tide.

Mid way between Abboo Heyle and Debai stands a small village of about twenty huts, the inhabitants of which are fishermen, and a mile and half to the southward of Debai are two other small places, but neither of them are deserving of particular notice.

Debai may be considered as the termination of the Pirate Coast, as the natives to the southward and westward, have been generally less addicted to plundering, always were friendly inclined to, or perhaps stood more in awe of, the English.

MEMOIR

DESCRIPTIVE OF THE

NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA;

WITH BRIEF NOTICES

OF THE

MANNERS, CUSTOMS, RELIGION, COMMERCE, AND RESOURCES OF THE PEOPLE INHABITING ITS SHORES AND ISLANDS.

PREPARED BY THE LATE

CAPTAIN GEORGE BARNES BRUCKS,

INDIAN NAVY.

NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

In laying the following account of, and directions for, navigating the Gulf of Persia, before the Government, it is necessary for me to state that much of that part from Ras Musseldom to Gebil Ali, on the Coast of Arabia, has been compiled from my Private Journals, kept prior to my joining the survey, corroborated by such information as I have since been able to obtain, and from the surveys themselves.

Not having been present during the greater part of the period the above coast was examined, and my predecessor not having left me any information on the subject, I trust that should any errors be found, which I confidently hope, if they exist at all, do so only in a trifling degree, I shall stand acquitted of a want of care in drawing up this Memoir.

On the remaining part of the coast I have been constantly employed, and consequently can vouch for the accuracy of what is there remarked relative to navigation.

In regard to the population, religion, manners, customs, trade, and resources, it cannot be expected that a person situated as I am, having been at sea ever since I was eleven years of age, should be able to write these, either in an historical manner, or with that attention to grammatical rules which a person having had proper time to benefit by education would do: what I have done is to try and place the situation, numbers, and manners of the people I have visited, and who are little if at all known, in as clear a point of view as my information and abilities would permit.

My information has been obtained in the following manner: I have proposed to the chiefs certain questions relative to the tribes, and their localities, of the revenues, trade, &c., which I have noted, with their replies. This I have done to several other persons at different periods, and then taken such of the substance as appeared to agree the best; but it is impossible to trust to the native accounts in this part of the world, consequently it can at best be considered but an approximation to the truth.

Another difficulty I consider it necessary to notice is, my short stay at the several places; the different accounts, particularly as to the

population, I have had to reconcile; also the disinclination in the more respectable classes of natives to give information on these subjects. I have endeavoured to render everything as plain as possible: in all places the native name is retained; and on the Persian side, of such objects as are known to, and have been named by European navigators, the native name is given in addition to the one by which it is generally known to the European.

It is also necessary to notice that the Bushire Residency is throughout considered as our first meridian, calling it in lat. 29° 00′ 15″ N., and long. 50° 51′ 30″ E. Except the survey of the first season, and part of the second, the variation of the compass has always been obtained on shore, and it may as well be here mentioned, that from observations obtained at different periods during the sixteen years I have been in the marine, and corroborated by those made by Lieutenant McClure and others, the variation in the Gulf is decreasing at the rate of about four miles and a half yearly.

All the latitudes and longitudes have been observed on shore with an artificial horizon, as the refraction in the Gulf has been found so great that observations made with the natural horizon seldom agree two days together.

The soundings have mostly, when near the shore, been carefully taken by the boats, always anchoring when any particular change occurred, and being fixed by angle taken between two well defined objects. All shoals have been fixed by a trigonometrical chain being carried round them. In all cases where the survey has been trigonometrical, which has been the case altogether, except from Bushire southward and westward, and here it has been partly so, care has been taken, by occasionally measuring bases of corroboration, and obtaining celestial observations, to verify the work.

I beg to state that the utmost care has been taken throughout the survey to prevent errors, but that some may occur I think more than probable, but trust they will be so trifling as to be of no importance to the navigation of the Gulf.

In regard to the statement that closes this Memoir, relative to the rise of piracy, its causes, and suppression, it is from the best information I could get, and might be considered a subject for another pen than that of a sailor in regard to that part relative to keeping it down. It is impartially drawn up, from an intimate knowledge of the people, and what from long experience I know to be both the least expensive and most efficient means. To Lieutenant Houghton, of the Honorable Company's Marine, and Lieutenant Haines, of the same service, I feel indebted for much useful information.

GEORGE B. BRUCKS.

NAVIGATION OF THE

PART I.*

ARABIAN SIDE OF THE GULF.

Ras Musseldom.

Ras Musseldom, in lat. 26° 23′ 45″ N., long. 56° 35′ 10″ E., is the south-eastern point of the Gulf of Persia, and the outer or lowest point of the island of the same name. The island is a barren rock, about two miles in length, and half that in breadth. Its highest part is about four or five hundred feet, formed of steep cliffs. All round the cape is the lowest part, which is about thirty feet high, increasing in some parts to one hundred and fifty. It is at the southern entrance of the Gulf. Between the island (Jazeerat Musseldom) and the opposite promontory of Ras Goberhindee there is a channel, with from twenty to forty fathoms in it; the narrowest part is not quite one-third of a mile wide, and the currents being strong and irregular, together with being liable to sudden shifts of wind, it is unsafe for navigation.

Ras Goberhindee.

Ras Goberhindee (Cape of the Indian's Grave), or Ras-ool-Gebal (Mountainous Cape), the name by which it is best known to the Arabs, is the Maceta of the Greeks, and part of the Asabo or Black Mountains of the ancients; is in lat. 26° 22′ 18″ N., long. 56° 33′ 44″ E.; is opposite to Jazeerat Musseldom, and is about one hundred and fifty or one hundred and eighty feet perpendicular above the sea.

Ras-ool-Bab.

Ras-ool-Bab is a high, remarkable promontory, consisting of basaltic rocks; is nearly W. by S. from Ras Goberhindee, and forms one point of a bay, about three miles in depth, and one in breadth. At its entrance, round the whole of which the land is high, barren, and rugged, the soundings are from twenty-eight to forty fathoms close to the rocks, the bottom hard sand and rocks. This bay should never be entered unless in case of necessity, the anchorage being bad, and the winds baffling. Close to Ras-ool-Bab stands a high perpendicular rock, with deep water close to it, and appears a part of the cape until you are close to it.

Koomza.

Koomza is a town situated at the bottom of a cove, having soundings

* Dated 21st August 1829.

GULF OF PERSIA.

of from twenty to ten fathoms, over a bottom of sand and rocks, in lat. 26° 20′ 40″ N., long. 56° 29′ E.; bears fromt he Great Quoin S. 29° W. It contains about three hundred inhabitants, subject to the Imaum of Muskat. These people are very poor, and appear a separate class from either Arab or Persian. Although most of them speak Arabic or Persian, amongst themselves they have a separate language. Some few of them reside on the sides of the hills, and live by their scanty flocks of goats, which feed on the few shrubs found there.

Jazeerat Goon.

About three miles north-east of Koomza is situated Jazeerat Goon, a high, rugged island, about one mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, having on its south-east end a point like a steeple. The depth round it is from eighty to sixty fathoms.

The Quoins.

The Quoins are three rocks, near each other; two of them forming in some views like a Quoin, which name has been given them by European navigators. By the Arabs they are called Salama (welcome). The Great Quoin, called by the Arabs Salama, is in lat. 26° 30′ 25″ N., long. 56° 34′ 20″ E. It bears N. 8° 34′ W. from Ras Musseldom, distance seven miles nearly, and is between two and three hundred feet high, its highest part being to the north-west. The Little Quoin bears from it S. 41½° E., nearly two miles; and Gap Island, the smallest of the three, bears S. 70° 24′ E. from the Great Quoin. Both these latter are called by the Arabs Bennaat. They have safe channels between them, which may be passed in case of necessity with soundings from twenty-two to forty-five fathoms; between them and the main the soundings are from forty-five to ninety fathoms.

Bab Shereetah.

Bab Shereetah, or Perforated Rock, in lat. 26° 23′ 54″ N., long. 26° 57′ 32″ E., bears from the Great Quoin S. 45° 8′ E., distant nine and a quarter miles; is thirty or forty feet high; has a hole through its centre; is a few yards long, and narrow.

Jazeerat Aboorashid.

Jazeerat Aboorashid is north of Koomza two and a half miles, is about one mile long, and rather more than a quarter of a mile broad; has a conical hill on its southern part, and steep cliffs all round. It is about one-third of a mile off shore. Near this, in mid-channel, is a remarkable rock, called Bab Makaliff.

Remarks.—Several small rocks, some fifteen feet, others less, above water, lie near this, and the eddies caused by them, together with the irregularity of the currents, render it unsafe for navigation. Between

Perforated Rock and Aboorashid are three small coves, with soundings, over a bottom of sand and rocks, from eighteen to twenty fathoms, and twenty-five to thirty-five fathoms at their entrances. The centre cove has some remarkable basaltic rocks at its extremity. The hills are from six to twelve hundred feet high, with steep acclivities; one exhibits the basalt in the form of mountain caps. At the extremity of the eastern cove is a small basin, formed by a turn of the land, where, in case of great necessity, a vessel may haul in to repair, in three or four fathoms. All these coves are much open and exposed, with bad anchorage.

Jazeerat Gunnem.

Jazeerat Gunnem, its north point forming the northern entrance to Discovery Strait, is in lat. 26° 23′ N., long. 56° 26′ 10″ E., and about two miles to the SW. of Perforated Rock. There is at this point a natural jetty of rock, about thirty-six feet above the level of the sea, and contracting the strait here to one-third of a mile. The island is about four miles long, and one wide in its broadest part, rugged, and increasing in height to the southward, over which stands a conical hill five or six hundred feet above the level of the sea. The southern point is in lat. 26° 20′ 15″ N., and long. 56° 25½′ E. A few fishermen were found at the southern point, and a number of goats seen on the hills.

Discovery Strait.

Discovery Strait, formed by the above island and the main, is about one-third of a mile wide at the northern, and one mile at the southern point, near the village of Ghurrum. The soundings are from fifteen to twenty-four fathoms, over a hard sandy bottom. The tide sets fairly through the strait, but runs strong, and requires great caution. At the southern part of the strait, near the village of Ghurrum (which is inhabited by some of the same tribe as those of Koomza), is a small bay, with from twenty to fifteen fathoms. The only danger in these straits is a coral reef off the pier, which has ten and twelve fathoms close to it, to avoid which do not come under seventeen fathoms in anchoring.

Kubbai.

Kubbai is a village nearly opposite Ghurrum, in lat. 26° 19′ 40″ N., and long. 56° 26′ 20″ E.

Remarkable Cliff.

Remarkable Cliff, one mile and a half S. by W. of Gunnem Island, is nearly two hundred feet high, and surmounted by a conical hill, the summit of which is about nine hundred feet above the sea; its southern and western acclivities are less abrupt. Close in you have twelve and fourteen fathoms water, and forty fathoms about three quarters of a mile off shore.

Colville's Cove.

The entrance to Colville's Cove is in lat. 26° 17′ 50″ N., long. 56° 24′ 10″ E.; is nearly four miles deep, and generally about one mile wide; has soundings from twenty-eight fathoms at the entrance to seven fathoms at the bottom of it. At the northern point of the entrance is a high steeple rock, which is situated about one mile to the southward of Remarkable Cliff. At the entrance, both sides of the cove are formed of cliffs from one hundred to about one hundred and fifty feet high,—the northern one is nearly perpendicular; large masses of rock are constantly detaching themselves, and falling at the base. The rocks are much excavated by the beating of the sea against them. The cove runs nearly NW. and SE., and consequently is exposed to north-westers, when the sea runs high, and dashes with great fury against the rocks.

Roob Ali.

Roob Ali, a village at the bottom of Colville's Cove, has a small sandy beach in front of it, and a small mosque; a few date and fig trees grow among the houses. Some wells of good water were found here. The inhabitants are about one hundred, subject to the Shaikh of Kassaab, and are of the Shehaheen Tribe, mostly fishermen.

Elphinstone Inlet.

The entrance to Elphinstone Inlet is in lat. 26° 12′ 30″ N., long. 56° 24′ E. This inlet stretches in various undulations nearly eight miles, exhibiting many romantic aspects. Its width, at the entrance, is nearly two-thirds of a mile, and its narrowest part one-third of a mile. The hills, like most others about this part, are high and rugged, and the separation from the coves on the opposite side are in some places not above two hundred yards at the base. This was one of the many places into which the pirates used to escape from our cruisers.

Kassaab Fort.

Kassaab Fort is in lat. 26° 13′ 10″ N., long. 56° 20′ 46″ E., and bears from Ras Shaikh Mansood S. 31° E., about three and a half miles; is situated on a sandy beach, forming between two points of land, which project from it in a curve of about a mile wide, and the same depth. The hills are high and rugged, in some parts hanging over the sea. On the western one is a small look-out house. A flat runs off from the fort a considerable way, and dries at low-water. Under one of the hills, on the eastern side, are some wells of good water, convenient for watering. I watered here in the Honorable Company's cruiser *Psyche* in December 1821, with great ease. The hills at this time were covered with

foxes, which were so tame as to allow you to get within a few yards of them without their moving. The fort is a quadrangular stone building, with towers at the angles. It appeared to have been strong, but was fast going to decay. I saw but one gun, which was lying near it, old and unserviceable. The inhabitants are scattered about in the date groves. The place a little inland appeared to be well cultivated; wheat, barley, and vegetables growing in most parts. There appeared plenty of fresh water in the date groves, by which they were well watered. There are about three or four hundred inhabitants, of the Shehaheen Tribe, partly cultivators, and partly fishermen; they send boats to the pearl fishery, and have some little trade in salt fish, getting dates and grain in lieu.

The Shaikh acknowledges the authority of the Imaum of Muskat, and reckons under his government near five thousand men, distributed in different villages about the hills, and round the several bays hereabout. Close to the western point of the small sandy bay, in a small cove, is the village of Kuddai, situated in a date grove, with a small tower for its defence, having about forty or fifty inhabitants. The cove is half a mile wide, soundings eight to three fathoms, sandy bottom. On the western side of the entrance is the village of Mokkai, containing about three or four hundred inhabitants, mostly fishermen. Here are some wells of good water, and the high tabular rocks on which the houses are built give it a very romantic appearance.

Ras Shaikh Mansood.

Ras Shaikh Mansood is in lat. 26° 16′ 15″ N., long. 56° 19′ E.; bears from the village of Mokkai north about three miles, the coast forming several small bights between, in one of which is the small village of Hennai, having about forty inhabitants, mostly fishermen. There is a small date grove near it. Over this village, on the summit of a hill elevated nearly seven hundred feet above the sea, is the Bedouin town of Alareef, subject to the Shaikh of Kassaab, and containing nearly eight hundred inhabitants. From Ras Shaikh Mansood the Great Quoin is seen nearly in one with Perforated Rock, bearing N. 46° 23′ E., distant twenty and a half miles, and the NW. point of Jazeerat Gunnem N. 45° E. Between this and Kassaab the soundings over the bay are from seventeen to twenty-two fathoms, within five hundred yards of the shore, over a bottom of rocks and sand, being all sand towards Kassaab.

General Remarks.—From Ras Musseldom to Ras Shaikh Mansood there is a continuation of coves and inlets, as heretofore described, with numerous rocks, some elevated little more than ten feet, others as high as two hundred feet above the level of the sea. The whole of these coves are safe to run into in case of necessity or in chase, but there is a risk in all, unless you have a commanding breeze, and in all it should be recollected the ground is bad for anchorage, especially where exposed to the prevailing winds.

The soundings outside are from twenty-two to ninety fathoms, but in some parts you will have thirty and forty fathoms. When under the perpendicular cliffs between Perforated Rock and Kassaab Bay, care is required to prevent your being carried into the coves, or Discovery Strait, by the tides, either ebb or flood, especially on the springs, when they are very strong, or in light winds.

Discovery Strait is easy of access, and forms a good sheltered anchorage for cruising vessels on this coast, if taken in blowing weather, but I would rather recommend Kassaab Bay for cruising vessels to run to during the hard north-westers in the winter months; but vessels having no object in view I should advise never getting on this part of the coast if possible, for in light winds it will often cause considerable delay in their getting clear of the Gulf. In 1821 the variation in these parts was 4° 5′ W., now (1827) it is 3° 35′ W.

Ras-ool-Yeddee.

Ras-ool-Yeddee, in lat. 26° 13′ 42″ N., long. 56° 16′ 30″ E., is a high, bluff point, not very conspicuous unless when you are close in with the land. There are eighteen fathoms of water close in. The villages of Algeerea and Yeddee are situated between this and Bokkai Point; they contain about one hundred and sixty inhabitants of the Shehaheen and Tannagee Tribes, mostly fishermen. At Yeddee are some wells of pretty good water, easy of access, but the exposed anchorage renders it a place unfit for watering, except in cases of necessity. The beach commences at Ras Yeddee. Ras Yeddee bears S. 41° W., nearly three miles and two-thirds from Ras Shaikh Mansood.

Bokha Point.

Bokha Point, in lat. 26° 9′ 27″ N., long. 56° 14′ 10″ E., is something similar, when close in, to Ras-ool-Yeddee. In a small sandy bay, towards Yeddee, is a ruinous square Ghuree, with a few unserviceable old guns, mostly dismounted. The village contains between three and four hundred men, principally of the Tannagee and Shehaheen Tribes. The Shaikh is a dependent of the Imaum of Muskat. He has under his government about sixteen or eighteen hundred people of all descriptions. There are some other trifling defences about here, but none of any consequence. There are a few straggling date groves, and a small plain near. Before the pirates obtained such power as they possessed before the expedition, there were very extensive date groves about here, but destroying the date trees being a principal object in Arabian warfare,

these were mostly cut down by the pirates; but now (1827) they are getting thick again, and will no doubt resume their former state. Between this and Shaam Point are the villages of Fudthra, Rumpthra, and Tibbat, inhabited by fishermen, partly of the Shehaheen and partly of the Tannagee Tribe, in all about two hundred and fifty souls. The soundings about here are seven fathoms near the beach, to forty fathoms at two miles distant, sand and rocks.

Shaam Point.

The land about here is high; there are three small bights, with sandy beaches, between this and Bokha, from which it bears S. 32° 20′ W., distant seven miles nearly.

Shaam.

Shaam is a considerable village, in lat. 26° 1′ 53″ N., long. 56° 11′ 14″ E. (the fort), two miles to the southward of Shaam Point, and is inhabited by about two hundred and fifty of the Tannagee Tribe, with nearly as many strangers of mixed tribes; they are principally fishermen. A short distance from this place is a remarkable white patch in the high land that forms the Point of Shaam, and when the sun shines on it, it is seen at a considerable distance. The Shaikh of the village is also governor of the small district of the same name, and has altogether about nine hundred persons under his government, of the tribes above mentioned. This is the boundary of the dominions of the Imaum of Muskat. They suffered much during the predominance of the pirates, but are now recovering from it. Inland there is, towards the hills, a considerable tract of cultivated ground. In the date groves were found some good wells of water. Small supplies of cattle, poultry, &c. are procurable, and the Shaikh and people were quite civil. The range of hills runs from here southerly to some distance beyond Ras-ool-Khyma, where they take a south-easterly direction, and are soon lost sight of from the coast; the hills about here are about twelve hundred feet high. Here the bank commences with regular soundings from three fathoms near the beach to twenty fathoms two and a half or three miles off shore. The inhabitants here, as well as at those places before described, are Mahomedans of the Soonee faith, although some few Wahabees may be found among them.

Ramse.

Ramse was a town of some consideration, belonging to the pirates. It is situated on the side of a creek capable of receiving large boats at high-water, but small ones have a difficulty in getting in at low-water, the entrance then being nearly dry. This town is now in ruins, and is in lat. 25° 53′ N., long. 56° 8′ 20″ E. Prior to the last expedition this place was rising into some importance under Hussein bin Ali,

an enterprising Shaikh, and who stood high, on account of his strict observance of the Wahabee tenets, with the late head of that faith, whose representative he was among the pirates; but since the fall of Ras-ool-Khyma, and his own hill fort of Zyah, it has fallen fast to decay, and is at present under the Shaikh of Shargah. There are in the date groves about three or four hundred of the Tannagee tribe, the remains of the former inhabitants. They send boats to the pearl fishery, and at other times employ themselves in the trading boats of Ras-ool-Khyma, and in fishing. Some few supplies may be obtained here. The soundings abreast here are three fathoms close to the beach, five to eleven from one to three miles off shore; bottom sand and broken rock. A little to the southward of this place there is a small creek running nearly from Zyah to Ras-ool-Khyma, but not navigable. The whole coast is flat and marshy.

Ras-ool-Khyma.

Ras-ool-Khyma (or the Cape of the Tent). The Point is in lat. 25° 48′ 12″ N., long. 56° 4′ 10″ E. It was, prior to the expedition in 1819-20, the principal pirate port; was surrounded on three sides with a wall, flanked with towers, and to the south-westward of the town had a further defence of a strong square fort or Ghuree, and was at that time supposed to be defended by between six and seven thousand men, including the auxiliaries collected from the country round about, and about eighty boats of different sizes, from two hundred and fifty to forty or fifty tons, some mounting eight and ten guns. They had also about sixty or seventy pieces of cannon, of various descriptions, mounted round the walls, but most of them would be considered unserviceable by Europeans. A large number of their best boats were sent to Lingah and other friendly places, by which they escaped being destroyed, and are now employed in trade.

At the present time, from the best information I have been able to obtain, there are about two thousand four or five hundred inhabitants, of the Joasmee, Shehaheen, Zaal, and Mootarish, and strangers of various tribes. The Point forms the western side of the entrance to the backwater, which runs in about three miles, and is capable of receiving the largest boats unladen. The entrance is blocked up by a bar; the channel is very narrow, not having more than two feet water at low-water spring tides. The soundings inside vary from sixteen to five feet, but at low-water spring tides there is only a stream left in mid-channel.

Opposite the ruined town inland is the island of Maharah, on which was a tower; there is now a village. The present town is on the eastern bank of the creek, and is rapidly increasing; they have a square Ghuree in it, and several good houses. They now participate in the

trade of the Gulf, and have a number of boats thus employed, of from two hundred to forty tons. They trade to Bombay and the Malabar Coast during the north-east monsoon, and to the Red Sea; they also take a large share in the pearl fishing.

To the ESE. of the old town are situated the date groves, among which are several towers. The former chief, now a dependent of the Shaikh of Shargah, resides here, as Shaikh of the village of Huatial Faal. Wells of indifferent water are found scattered about among the date groves. In front of the town is a bank, with only seven or eight feet water on it, and within it two and a quarter and two and a half fathoms. A ship in anchoring here should do so with the creek open, in four and a half or five fathoms. Supplies of cattle, poultry, and other refreshments are to be had here, at reasonable rates. The town was completely destroyed by the Honorable Company's Marine, and parties from the military, when the force was removed to the opposite coast in 1820; and so effectually was this done, that it is now difficult to tell what might have been the form of the houses. This was done in the height of the hot weather, and cost several officers and many valuable men their lives, from fever brought on by the exposure. It is high-water here at 11h. full and change, rise and fall seven feet.

Jazeerat al Hamra.

Jazeerat al Hamra, a small island with a backwater, joined to the main at low-water, with a town, was, prior to the expedition in 1819, fortified with a few towers, and is now inhabited by about one hundred and fifty or two hundred of the Zaal Tribe; they are principally employed in the pearl fishery; they have also two or three small trading boats. It is in lat. 25° 43′ N., and long. 56° 55′ 10″ E. The backwater is shallow, and only capable of holding middle-sized boats. The Shaikh is a dependent of the Shaikh of Shargah. There is very little water here, and that quite brackish; trifling supplies are procurable. The coast between this and Ras-ool-Khyma is low, with soundings from two fathoms inshore, to five and seven at two and two and a half miles distant; bottom sand and broken rock.

Amulgavine.

Amulgavine, in lat. 25° 35′ 12″ N., long. 55° 41′ 38″ E., is situated on the outer point of a very extensive backwater, which runs inland several miles in different branches, and has seven fathoms water in some parts within, but the entrance is blocked up by a very extensive reef. There are ten or eleven feet on the bar at high-water full and change, and the rise of tide, as on most parts of this coast, is seven feet. The town of Amulgavine, now in ruins, appears to have been of some consequence. It bears from Al Hamra S. 57¾° W., distant sixteen miles.

The coast between them is rather curved and low, fronted by an extensive coral reef, commencing soon after passing Al Hamra and ending off the creek of Amulgavine. A vessel in passing this should not come under seven fathoms in the night; in the day-time the reef shows itself. The backwater is formed by what is an island at high tides, and the point on which the ruined town stands.

The present town of Libini is situated on this island, and contains about six hundred inhabitants, of the Al Ali Tribe, subject to the Shaikh of Shargah: they take a share in the pearl fishery, and have a few trading boats. Supplies of cattle, very good, are procurable; water is also to be had, and the most delicious fish are in great plenty; but the inhabitants are indolent in the extreme, and seldom go to fish, unless driven by necessity. I was on shore among them surveying the backwater for nearly three weeks, and found them generally civil, but eager to impose on me. They were in 1822 strict Wahabees, and the Shaikh did not seem to be at all pleased with the present state of things. The best anchorage is with the square house on Libini E. by S. ½ S., in five or six fathoms; but the anchorage is very bad, being a bottom of sand and rock; high-water at 11h. 40m.

Ejman.

Ejman, in lat. 25° 25′ 12″ N., long. 55° 33′ E., bears from Amulgavine S. 37° 10′ W., fourteen miles; is situated on the southern bank of a backwater,—one of the best on the coast, having a better entrance than any other. There are five feet on the bar at low-water, and about ten to fourteen feet inside. The rise of tide is much the same as at other places, except when influenced by the wind, when it will rise one or two feet higher. It is high-water full and change at 11h. 20m.

The town is small, and in 1822 had a fortified house belonging to the Shaikh; but I believe its defences have been increased since. It contains, during the pearl season, from fourteen to seventeen hundred men, of the Mahamee Tribe. During the date season most of them retire to a place named Brahamee, distant a day's journey inland. The Shaikh, Rashid bin Ahmed, is independent, but the Shaikh of Shargah does not acknowledge it, although he has no power over him. They are mostly strict Wahabees.

Fresh water is procurable about half a mile from the town. The best anchorage is abreast the creek, in five fathoms, about a mile and a quarter off shore; just without the line of three fathoms is a rocky bank, with only two fathoms on it. Between this and Shargah the coast is nearly straight, with regular soundings from three to five fathoms, sand and rocks. About one mile from Shargah Creek entrance is the ruined village of Fasht, having a small creek for their fishing-boats, and inhabited by a few fishermen.

Shargah.

Shargah (the square tower) is in lat. 25° 21′ 40″ N., long. 55° 29′ 13″ E., and bears S. 44¼° W., nearly five and a quarter miles. The town stands on the eastern bank of the backwater, which is narrow and shoal, being from one hundred to two hundred yards wide, with about three or four feet water at low tides. The entrance is about a mile to the northward of the town, and, like all others on this coast, has a bar. It runs about three miles, to Aboo Heyle, where it unites with the backwater there. The western side is bounded by an insulated sandbank, on which they are now erecting their huts. Shargah is at present the chief place of the Joasmee Tribe, and the head of it, Sultan bin Suggur, chiefly resides here.

The town is long, narrow, and open: the defences are a fort a little inland, mounting six pieces of cannon, together with some detached towers. In case of alarm from an enemy, it is stockaded round with date trees and wood sufficient for repelling the attack of Arabs, although of little service against regular troops. The inhabitants consist of the Joasmees, Al Ali, Shehaheen, and some mixed tribes, and are variously calculated from 2,300 to 5,500 men: but from my own observation, aided by inquiries on the spot, I should think in the pearl season, when most numerous, they may amount to about 3,500 or 3,800. Shargah sends from three to four hundred boats of various sizes to the pearl fishery. Each boat pays the Shaikh a tax of from one to two and a half dollars, according to the number of divers employed. The returns are reckoned at about a lakh of dollars.

The country for some distance inland is a complete desert, with a few scattered date groves; in the interior it is said to be better cultivated, but it does not afford sufficient supply for the inhabitants, who get large quantities of dates from Bussora and Bahrein. They have several considerable sized boats employed in the Gulf trade, and to the Malabar Coast and Bombay, but Ras-ool-Khyma, on account of its superior backwater, seems likely to form the principal place of trade on this side the Gulf.

A number of Banians are also settled here, as pearl merchants, goldsmiths, and cloth and grain-dealers. They generally adopt the Arab dress. Sultan bin Suggur, the chief, is, with the exception of Ejman, Shaikh of all the places from Ramse to this place. He is crafty in the extreme, enterprising, and, for an Arab, has tolerable abilities. He is more dignified in his manners than any other chief on this coast. He pretends great good will towards the English, but is not to be trusted. He possesses a good countenance, but rather a crafty one, and he is held as much in fear as reverence by the different Shaikhs along the coast.

Cattle, very fine, though small, and other supplies, are to be had here; fresh water is procurable about half a mile from the town. Nearer the entrance of the creek, to the southward of the town, is a mound of a round form, which will be discerned before the town, and by which it may be known. The shore may be approached, in case of an attack on the town, to within two or three cable-lengths, but the anchorage is very bad, being broken rock, and sand. You have here two and three fathoms close to the beach, and five about a mile and a quarter out; but you should not anchor under five fathoms, with the entrance of the creek about SE. by S. Fish are plentiful. The inhabitants are all strict Mahomedans, partly Soonees and partly Wahabees. It is high-water here full and change at 12h. 40m., rise and fall between six and seven feet.

Aboo Heyle.

Aboo Heyle is a small village, situated about three miles to the SW. of Shargah, on the same creek with Khan village, on the other bank. They jointly contain about two hundred and fifty inhabitants, of various tribes, mostly fishermen, and are subject to Shargah.

Dara.

Dara, a small village in lat. 25° 16′ 50″ N., long. 55° 26′ E., now deserted and in ruins, was lately occupied by about four hundred of the Souidan Tribe, having established themselves there after some quarrel with the Shaikh of Shargah, when they quitted that place in 1826.

Debaye.

Debaye, in lat. 25° 16′ 26″ N., long. 55° 24′ 42″ E., bears from Shargah S. 36° W., distant seven and a half miles, and stands, like most other towns on this coast, on the banks of a backwater, although rather more elevated than most of them, being about twenty feet above the level of the sea. It is inhabited by about seven or eight hundred of the Beniyas Tribe, and is defended by some towers. They are in some measure dependent on the Imaum of Muskat, who pays for the alliance of this tribe.

They possess several trading boats, and send a number of boats to the pearl fishery. There were here about one hundred Siddees, in the pay of the Imaum of Muskat, who formed a sort of garrison. Debaye may be considered the end of the Pirate Coast, although I believe they never took a very active part in it. There are several small banks off Debaye, and the coast is fronted by a reef to the distance of about three-quarters of a mile, extending nearly to Aboo Heyle. From this bank the soundings are a fathom and a half close to it, five fathoms about a mile and a half off, and increasing to seven, eight, and nine, four or five miles off. The rise and fall are about seven feet; high-water full and

change about 1h. There are wells of fresh water at the back of the town, near some small date groves; cattle and poultry may be procured. Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee has recently taken possession of this place, and is acknowledged the head of the Beniyas Tribe.

Remarks on the Navigation, &c. between Ras Shaikh Mansood and Debaye.—In passing Ras Shaikh Mansood, two and a half to three miles will be a good distance, until you get off Shaam, when keep along shore in five fathoms in the day-time, or six at night, until you pass Al Hamra, when I would advise your not coming under seven fathoms, especially in the night, until you are past Amulgavine Reef, which begins shortly after passing Al Hamra, and continues until abreast of the town of Amulgavine. This reef is composed of coral rock, and dry in many parts at low-water. It projects in some places to a mile and three-quarters nearly, and is dangerous to approach under four or five fathoms, even in the day.

After passing Amulgavine you may keep in any depth not under four and a half fathoms until past Ejman, where there is a small two-fathom bank about a mile off shore, in the line of three fathoms. Off Shargah you should anchor in five fathoms, with the creek SE. by S. There being little or no trade, except in fish and dates, at any of these places, I do not think it likely any merchant vessel will visit them, as I am convinced the smallest vessel could not sell half a cargo along the whole coast.

It is necessary that vessels on this coast, during the winter months, should be well found with ground tackling, and have good sails; but otherwise it is unsafe to be on the coast, as during the heavy north-westers, which set in with very little warning, the sea runs high, rolling on a dead lee shore; and the ground being sand and rock, is bad for holding, and if too close in you would find it difficult to work off shore. In Shargah Roads, in 1822, on one occasion the *Discovery* lost all her anchors, and was nearly wrecked, clearing the shore with great difficulty. From Ejman to Debaye five fathoms is a good depth to keep in.

Gebil Ali.

Gebil Ali is a moderately elevated hill, nearly three miles inland, and in lat. 25° 1′ 47″ N., and long. 55° 14′ 10″ E.

Ras Hassan.

Ras Hassan is a low, projecting point, in lat. 24° 52′ 40″ N., long. 55° 00′ 45″ E.

Ras Guntoor.

Ras Guntoor, in lat. 24° 50′ 20″ N., long. 54° 55′ 30″ E., is low, and not easily distinguished.

Gonada.

Gonada, in lat. 24° 48′ 5″ N., long. 54° 52′ 8″ E., forms the entrance to a backwater of the same name, shoal at the entrance.

Gorabee.

Gorabee, in lat. 24° 47′ N., long. 54° 50′ E., is another entrance to the same backwater.

Ras Ellora.

Ras Ellora, in lat. 24° 41′ 40″ N., long. 50° 42′ 10″ E., is the point of a considerable backwater which appeared to extend to, and join that of Ras-ool-Grab. The entrance being shoal it was not examined.

Marafjain.

Marafjain, in lat. 24° 38′ 30″ N., long. 54° 40′ 20″ E., is the point of a backwater, with a shoal entrance.

Ras-ool-Grab.

Ras-ool-Grab, in lat. 24° 36′ 40″ N., long. 54° 38′ 50″ E., is a moderately elevated rocky headland, at one entrance of a large backwater; shoal at the entrance, but deep water within. It was on this account not examined.

Ras-ool-Luffan.

Ras-ool-Luffan, in lat. 24° 31′ 45″ N., long. 54° 34′ 10″ E., is a low point at the north-eastern entrance of the backwater that surrounds Aboothabee.

Aboothabee.

Aboothabee, in lat. 24° 29′ 21″ N., long. 54° 32′ 20″ E., is situated on a sandy island, and is the principal place of the Beniyas Tribe, and the residence of their Chief, Shaikh Tahnoon. The tribe consists of about two thousand four hundred men; but there are, of the Monasir and other tribes, near five thousand more, who acknowledge his government. These mostly reside in the interior, at several places in a district called Ruffthra. At Aboothabee the inhabitants are about twelve hundred generally, although much increased in the pearl season, consisting of people of the above tribes, and a number of Banians, who are traders and goldsmiths. There is in the town a fortified house, and a small tower. There are several more towers in different parts of the island, and two or three villages.

The inhabitants have a number of trading boats, and take a large share in the pearl fishery. These form their principal resources, as the country affords little or nothing; cattle and poultry are occasionally procurable, but the only water they have is quite salt. The anchorage is foul, and unsafe, except in southerly winds. Inshore, abreast the town, about

two hundred and fifty yards off shore, a vessel not requiring more than twelve or thirteen feet water may lie well sheltered in smooth water, but a pilot must be procured to take her in. There is another anchorage in a gap of the reef to the northward of the town; this place also requires a pilot to take you in. A ship anchoring in these roads should do so with the Ghuree or square house SE. to ESE., in five or five and a half fathoms.

The present Chief, Shaikh Tahnoon, is a fine looking man, possessing much of that open and hospitable frankness generally attributed to the Arab, and is, I think, attached to the English, both from inclination as well as interest. He is a firm ally of the Imaum of Muskat, and by far the best of the Shaikhs on this coast. His tribe, the Beniyas, is one of the principal in Arabia, and is an independent race. From Debaye to this place the coast has no fixed inhabitants, but during the fishing season temporary villages are erected near the backwaters. Numbers of the Monasir Tribe wander about, and care should be taken in landing, to prevent surprise, as they are generally at enmity with the settled tribes, and not to be trusted. Fronting Aboothabee the ground is all rocky, with several patches of reef.

General Remarks relative to the Navigation, &c. between Debaye and Aboothabee.—Between these two places the coast is low, and in many parts swampy, with a continued chain of backwaters from Gonada to Aboothabee, shoal at the entrances, but some of them deep within. This part of the coast is destitute of inhabitants, or fresh water, except some few wells, nearly salt. At times, a few straggling Bedouins wander about near the coast. During the fishing season temporary villages are erected on the coast by the fishermen. The whole coast, after passing Gebil Ali, is unsafe to approach under six fathoms, and the ground is hard rock, covered with a thin coat of sand, and so smooth that an anchor will at times hold with difficulty. After passing Ras-ool-Grab in six or seven fathoms, you may haul in towards Aboothabee, until you get into five fathoms, when do not come under that depth until you get the fort SE. by E., when anchor in any convenient depth from four and a half to six fathoms. From Gonada to Ras Ellora the coast is fronted by a reef, having from one and a half to three and a half fathoms on it, to the distance of three miles off shore in some places, but following the above directions you will be quite clear of it.

General Remarks as to the Appearance of the Coast from Ras Musseldom to Aboothabee.—From Musseldom to Shaam the coast is high and mountainous, with a little beach. In some places, at the foot of the hills, after passing Shaam, the hills begin to break off inland, and the coast becomes low and flat, with a sandy soil. Here and there, near the towns, you find a few date groves: this continues with little alteration

until you get to Gebil Ali, already described, when the coast continues flat and barren, with here and there a few rocky cliffs, until you reach Aboothabee, which is on a flat sandy island, without a shrub near it.

Gebil Stacey.

Gebil Stacey is a small island and hill, situated in Aboothabee Creek, in lat. 24° 23′ 40″ N., long. 54° 26′ 10″ E.

Jazeerat el Barany.

Northern Point is in lat. 24° 26′ 10″ N., long. 54° 26′ 40″ E. This island is low and sandy, with some groves of trees in different parts. A reef fronts it to about two and a half or three miles.

Gebil Bukschacey.

Gebil Buckschasey is a hill on the island of the same name, in lat. 24° 18′ 30″ N., long. 54° 23′ E. The island is low, and the inlet between it and el Barany has three fathoms within, but is nearly dry at the entrance at low-water.

Ras Zubbazie.

Ras Zubbazie is a low point of the main, in lat. 24° 19′ 20″ N., long. 54° 21′ 20″ E.

Ras el Chaaf.

Ras el Chaaf is a flat, elevated rocky point of the main, in lat. 24° 17′ N., and long. 54° 18′ 30″ E.

Oman Majarib.

The northern point is in lat. 24° 13′ 50″ N., long. 54° 17′ 30″ E. This island is low, and covered with mangrove trees. There are two fathoms of water in the creek round it, but no entrance.

Jazeerat Guntoor.

Jazeerat Guntoor is similar to the last; its east point is in lat. 24° 11′ 10″ N., long. 54° 14′ 25″ E.

Khore Guntoor.

The entrance to Khore Guntoor is in lat. 24° 18′ 40″ N., long. 54° 11′ E., is about one mile wide, and has near three fathoms at the entrance at high-water spring tides, which is between two reefs; within it is narrow, and has four or five fathoms water.

Gebil Sulalee.

Gebil Sulalee, on the island of the same name, is in lat. 24° 11′ 50″ N., long. 54° 9′ 50″ E. The island is generally low, except this hill, and a few mounds in different parts.

Jazeerat Billyaird.

The northern point is in lat. 24° 15′ 40″ N., long. 53° 55′ 40″ E.;

western point in lat. 24° 8′ 50′ N., long. 55° 43′ 20″ E. This island is situated on the southern side, at the upper part of Khore el Bezzim, and the northern part faces the sea. It is thirty-two miles in length, and about seventy in circumference; is formed of low sandhills, except at the eastern end, where it is more rocky, and has several groves of mangrove trees.

Rug Rug Zoikean.

This bank is in lat. 24° 48′ 40″ N., long. 53° 50′ 42″ E., the centre composed of hard sand, and broken rock; least water three and a half fathoms; shoalest point in lat. 24° 47′ 20″ N., long. 53° 52′ 45″ E.; the soundings over it irregular, from eight to three and a half fathoms.

Arlat Umbarras.

Arlat Umbarras is a low sandy isle, on the edge of the inshore reef. Its north point is in lat. 24° 25′ N., long. 53° 35′ 50″ E.

Arlat Owhale.

Arlat Owhale is another low sandy island, in lat. 24° 28′ 10″ N., long. 53° 34′ 10″ E. Its southern end is on the edge of the offshore or Walker's Reef, nearly opposite to Umbarras; the inshore channel being formed between them, having from six to eight fathoms.

Walker's Reef, or Fasht Owhale.

The inner part of this reef commences at Owhale, and runs up to the northward to lat. 24° 35′ N. nearly, and long. 53° 38′ E.; then runs nearly due east and west, its north-western point being in lat. 24° 35′ N., and long. 53° 20′ E.; its south-western point in lat. 24° 29′ 40″ N., long. 53° 19′ 30″ E. This dangerous reef is dry in many parts at low-water, but will always be seen in the day-time. To avoid it, I should recommend a vessel leaving Aboothabee to steer a course direct for Zerchoa, and in passing the reef not to come under seven fathoms, as there are six fathoms close to the edge.

East India Company's Islands.

East India Company's Islands, from Jazeerat Jehnany, southern point in lat. 24° 10′ 35″ N., long. 53° 38′ E., to Bezzim el Gurabee, the western in lat. 24° 18′ 40″ N., long. 53° 12′ 10″ E., consist of Jehnany, three others without names, and Bezzim el Gurabee. These, with Jazeerat Billyaird and the reefs, which connect the whole with each other from the northern side of Khore el Bezzim, and on the outside from the inshore channel, are low, in some parts rocky, and most of them covered with wood, but none of them contain any water.

Cape Meriton.

Cape Meriton, in lat. 24° 7′ 40″ N., long. 53° 32′ 50″ E., is a low, rocky point on the main, on the southern side of Khore el Bezzim.

Khore el Bezzim.

Khore el Bezzim is formed on the northern side by East India Company's Islands, and on the south by the mainland of Arabia, and is forty miles deep from its entrance at Bezzim el Gurabee, and from five miles at the entrance to one at the upper part wide, having soundings from nine to two fathons at the upper part. The deepest water and best channel is about one-third over from the islands, near the main. Several small patches, with one and a half and two fathoms, lay scattered about. This place is said to have been one of the resorts of the pirates, and many of their boats were said to have been here at the time of the expedition.

Ras Hadwarkah.

From Cape Meriton to Ras Hadwarkah, in lat. 24° 11′ 40″ N., long. 52° 47′ 10″ E., the coast is fronted, after quitting Khore el Bezzim, to a distance of fourteen miles, by a reef, and numerous small patches. Although there are channels between them, still, it being impossible to give a guide for avoiding the dangers, it cannot be considered safe to navigate.

Unless in case of necessity, or being in chase, no vessel should come here, in which case I can only recommend great attention to the lead and look-out, as the only guides they can have. After passing the sandy island of Aiche, in lat. 24° 17′ 30″ N., long. 53° 1′ 35″ E., when, if running for Khore el Bezzim, run in as near mid-channel, between the island of Bezzim el Gurabee and the main, as possible, keeping a sharp look-out for a small shoal patch bearing true W. five and a half miles from the body of the island. After passing it, steer boldly up the Khore, keeping near mid-channel until you near the fourth island, when haul in for it, and keep about one-fifth over from it towards the main, to clear a shoal patch on that side. After this, keep over on the island side, along the edge of the reef.

After passing this island, your soundings will be from four and a half to three fathoms, until you come to Jazeerat Billyaird, when it will not be prudent to go further, although you will carry three fathoms and two and a half near the island much further. If it is near low-water, a boat of moderate size cannot go through, but if high-water she will have six or seven feet water, and most probably get into the deep water between Bellyaird and Salaly. Supposing you to be in chase, and the chase steered through Aiche, steer well up to the north, giving Bezzim el Gurabee a berth of six miles, to avoid the patch before mentioned, looking sharp out for a bank near the centre of the channel, whose west end is in lat. 24° 22′ N., long. 53° 9′ 5″ E., and east end in lat. 24° 27′ 20″ N., long. 53° 20′ 5″ E. Between this and the bank off the island

is a channel with three and four fathoms in, but very narrow at the western end. The whole of these large reefs show quite plain. Steer between this reef and the offshore one, or Walker's Reef. The distance between in the narrowest part, close to the east end of the centre bank, is rather more than two miles, soundings from ten to five fathoms. After passing this reef you will see Arlat Owhale and Umbarras: steer to pass between them, nearest the former when you are clear of the inshore channel.

Stannus' Banks.

These form the northern boundary of the inshore channel. The north point is in lat. 24° 39′ 40″ N., long. 53° 13′ E.; the south point lat. 24° 31′ 10″ N., long. 53° 13′ 30″ E.; western point lat. 24° 32′ 30″ N., long. 53° 8′ 10″ E. There are several dry patches on these banks.

To enter the inshore channel from the north and west, steer down from Zerchoa SSW., keeping a look-out for Stannus' Banks until Arzenia bears true NW., and Dalmy W., when haul up E. ½ S. or E. by S., and the directions above will carry you through.

Island of Seer Abonaide.

The south point of the island of Seer Abonaide is in lat. 25° 12′ 20″ N., long. 54° 22′ 55″ E.; is rather high, and contains large quantities of sulphur, and has some mineral springs. You may approach this island to seven fathoms in any direction.

Island of Zerchoa.

The island of Zerchoa is in lat. (south point) 24° 51′ 35″ N., long. 53° 13′ 15″ E.; is the highest island on this side the Gulf, and is much of the same substance as Polior, viz. apparently of volcanic origin. One mile and a half due south, off the south point of the island, is a small patch, with two fathoms on it. There is no other danger near it; you may pass the island at one mile distant in any direction. It affords good anchorage under the lee, in the prevailing winds of the Gulf. It contains no water. It has a low point at the south end.

Island Jernain.

The south point of the island of Jernain is in lat. 24° 55′ 50″ N., long. 52° 59′ 30″ E. It is remarkable for three peaks on it, two being on the north end. It appears also to be of volcanic origin. There is no danger near; it affords tolerable anchorage in the prevailing winds. It has no water.

Daus Island.

The south point of Daus Island is in lat. 25° 8′ 35″ N., long. 53° 0′ 40″ E. It is a flat rocky island, moderately elevated, and, like the others, appears to be of volcanic origin. It forms a low point on the south end. There is no danger near this island; it affords anchorage in the prevailing winds. It has no water.

Arzenia Island.

The south point of Arzenia Island is in lat. 24° 46′ 20″ N., long. 52° 42′ 25″ E. It is moderately elevated, and about six and a half miles in circumference. The south point, like most of the other islands, is low, and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Good anchorage is found here under the island. It has no water.

Arzenia.

Arzenia Three Fathoms Bank. The centre of it bears true N. ¾ E., distant three miles from the body of the island, and is long and broad. It has not less than three fathoms, over a coral bottom, but the depth, from the native accounts, appears to be decreasing.

Arzenia Two Fathoms Bank bears E., distant a mile and a half from the island; is very small; least water two fathoms.

Arzenia One and a half Fathom Bank bears nearly SE., distant two and a quarter miles, and has only a fathom and a quarter or a fathom and a half on one part; it is very small.

Seer Benivas Island.

The entrance to the cove is in lat. 24° 15″ 10″ N., long. 52° 46′ 50″ E. This island is rather high, having a peak in the centre; is seventeen miles in circumference, and appears of volcanic origin. On the southern side is a small cove, with five fathoms water in it, and three fathoms at the entrance. In rounding this island, to go to the cove, which you should do on the eastern side, pass the southern side of the small sandy island of Rusheed at a distance of three quarters of a mile, and run round, not coming nearer Seer Beniyas than two and a quarter miles, or seven fathoms, until you near the small dry sandbank, or get the peak to bear about W. by S., when haul in towards the island, keeping along at about one mile distant, until you get close to the south point, which haul round about a quarter of a mile distant, and anchor under the island in five or six fathoms off shore, from two cable-lengths to a quarter of a mile. You are well sheltered here from all winds. In rounding the island, the soundings in some places are irregular. You may run down to the SSE. of this island in soundings from fourteen to four fathoms, looking sharp out for a small dry sandbank in the fair-way; but there is no outlet, and is only mentioned in case of being in chase. Between Seer Beniyas and the main are two reefs, with a channel nearly a mile wide between them, having three fathoms at low-water in it; but the tides run in it with such rapidity, and the set is so irregular, that it is unsafe to navigate.

Zaboot.

Zaboot is an island to the south-west of Seer Beniyas. Its south end is in lat. 24° 5′ 20″ N., and long. 52° 37′ E. It has a rock off the

northern end, and appears like a Buggalow under sail when at a distance. Between this and Ras Hadwarkah the coast is fronted by reefs, having a bight in them between these points, which has from seven to four fathoms in it. Two other detached banks lie to the north of Zaboot, distant five and a half miles, having narrow channels, with from three to four fathoms between them. Between these banks and Seer Beniyas the channel is so clear that you may follow a vessel into the bight in safety. The western side of Seer Beniyas may also be approached to a mile. North-west, distant six and a half miles from the rock off Zaboot, is a small patch, with two fathoms on it. With the exception of this patch, it is perfectly safe between the islands of Seer Beniyas and Dalmy and the islands of Jazeerat, the soundings being from twenty to five or six fathoms.

Gebil Barrakah.

Gebil Barrakah is a remarkable hill in lat. 24° N., long. 52° 30′ 30″ E. Is easily known from being, with the exception of a smaller hill, called Gebil Wooder, to the SSW. of it, the only high hill on this part of the coast.

Ras Assay.

Ras Assay, the most southern part of the Gulf, is in lat. 23° 57′ 35″ N., long. 52° 17′ 45″ E. It is quite low, running off swampy ground.

Ras Assellah.

Ras Assellah is a point in lat. 24° 3′ N., long. 51° 47′ E. The coast between the island of Zaboot and this runs in an easterly and westerly direction, and has numerous small detached shoal patches off the western part, and is not safe to approach nearer than seven miles after passing Ras Assay. Between it and Zaboot you may approach as near or distant from that island to any distance from four and a half to two miles, taking care not to come under five fathoms.

Island of Dalmy.

The south point of the island of Dalmy is in lat. 24° 27′ 35″ N., and long. 52° 27′ 25″ E. The island is rather high, and in the centre is a remarkably flat hill. Its south point is low, and has some wells of brackish water in it. Two miles below the south point is situated Arlaat Mussooma, a small sandy island. There is no danger off Dalmy, except between the south point and the sandy island, which you may round a mile distant to the southward, in seven fathoms. This island, like most others about this part, seems of volcanic origin. It is the next largest to Seer Beniyas of what are generally called Mandes Islands.

Island of Daeny.

The south point of the island of Daeny is in lat. 24° 58′ 15″ N., long.

52° 25′ 40″ E. This island is low, and has a reef extending off all parts except the south end, to a distance of from a mile to a mile and a half. It is most extensive to the northward: off the southern end of this island you have good shelter in a north-wester.

Island of Sherrarow.

The south point of the island of Sherrarow is in lat. 25° 2′ N., long. 52° 17′ 40″ E. It is small and rocky. Off the north side, distant one mile, is a high rock above water, having three fathoms close to it, and eight and nine between it and the island. This island affords worse shelter than any of the others in this group.

Yassaat, or Psyche's Islands.

The Yassaat or Psyche's Islands are a group of low islands, the southern ones of which are formed of alternate strata of earth and gypsum. The northern point of the group is in lat. 24° 14′ 50″ N., long. 51° 58′ 30″ E.; and the southern part is in lat. 24° 9′ 45″ N., long. 51° 58′ E. A chain of reefs commences off the northern part of the islands, and runs as far as Guffay, in lat. 24° 36′ 10″ N., long. 51° 42′ 50″ E. There is good anchorage under the lee of the islands, but in rounding them you must pass to the eastward, the reefs above mentioned blocking up the passage.

Mahamalah.

Mahamalah is a small rocky islet, in lat. 24° 7′ 35″ N., long. 51° 53′ E.

Omal Attub.

Omal Attub is a small island in lat. 24° 13′ N., long. 51° 51′ 15″ E., with several rocky islets lying off it. There is good anchorage in six or seven fathoms off it.

Neighty Island.

Neighty Island is a small rocky island, with several detached islets off it, in lat. 24° 16′ 50″ N., long. 51° 47′ 45″ E. A reef runs round the island, and the channel between it and the shore is not more than three quarters of a mile wide, with only three fathoms in some parts of it.

Gussah Elbayah.

Gussah Elbayah is a small high rock, situated close to the shore, in lat. 24° 7′ 50″ N., long. 51° 47′ E.

Ras-ool-Maechereeb.

Ras-ool-Maechereeb is a point in lat. 24° 17′ N., long. 51° 44′ 55″ E. It forms the north-eastern entrance of Dooat al Nachiah, which is five miles deep, having from three to two fathoms in it; but there are several shoal patches near the entrance.

Ras-ool-Macheieh.

Ras-ool-Macheieh, in lat. 24° 16′ 20″ N., long. 51° 41′ 30″ E., is a point running out between, and separating Dooat al Nachiah and Dooat al Guyfac.

Jazeerat al Fayayah.

Jazeerat al Fayayah is a moderately elevated island, laying off Ras-ool-Macheieh, and forming the north-eastern side to the entrance to Dooat al Guyfac. Its northern point is in lat. 24° 19′ 20 N., long. 51° 40 30″ E.

Dooat al Guyfac.

Dooat al Guyfac is seven miles deep, forming, when within, a fine cove, with from six to three fathoms water, but the entrance is so contracted, being only forty yards wide, that no one would pass it unless in case of necessity. There is not less than three fathoms in the entrance.

Ras-ool-Adrah.

Ras-ool-Adrah is the eastern point of Khore Don, in lat. 24° 22′ 30″ N., long. 51° 37′ E. It is a low rocky point, with several detached rocks off it. You may pass it one mile distant, in from four to six fathoms.

Goodwin Islands.

The Goodwin Islands consist of two low groups, the northern, or Gufay, being in lat. 24° 36′ 10″ N., long. 51° 42′ 50″ E., and the southern, or Mayamaat Entaint, in lat. 24° 28′ N., long. 51° 44′ E. These islands are low, and have no fresh water. To the southward of Mayamaat Entaint are two rocky islets, called Fridgdaat. The whole of these islands, to the northern end of Yassaat, are nearly chained together by reefs, having narrow channels in some parts, but unsafe to navigate. When passing in emergent cases, a good look-out and attention to the lead will be the best, and indeed only guides.

Machassib Island.

Machassib Island is a small, low, sandy island, in lat. 24° 39′ N., long. 51° 49′ E., surrounded by a reef running off it, nearly two miles in all directions.

Rarah, or St. Thomas' Islands.

Rarah, or St. Thomas' Islands, are a group of low rocky islands, situated in the mouth of Khore Don. The centre island is in lat. 24° 24′ N., long. 51° 34′ 50″ E. These islands are safe to approach to five or six fathoms distant in all directions.

Khore Don.

Khore Don is a wide and deep bay, being eighteen miles deep, and

thirteen wide, between Ras Aladia and Ras Boogmaise. The soundings are from eight to three fathoms, mostly over muddy ground, but there are a number of shoal patches scattered about, with only one and two fathoms on them. A good look-out and attention to the lead are the only guides in this place.

Ras Boogmaise.

Ras Boogmaise is a low rocky point, in lat. 24° 36′ 40″ N., long. 51° 30′ 50″ E. A shoal, with only two fathoms, extends for four miles off this point. There is a small and narrow channel for boats between it and the point; from five to seven fathoms will be good sounding to round it in.

Gebil Alladeid.

Gebil Alladeid is a high rocky hill, at the entrance of the Khore of the same name; it is in lat. 24° 36′ 20″ N., long. 51° 27′ 30″ E.

Khore Alladeid.

The entrance to Khore Alladeid is in lat. 24° 37′ N., long. 51° 27′ 35″ E., formed on one side by a high range of sandhills, and on the other by the high land on which Gebil Alladeid is situated. The entrance has a number of small rocky islets, and is nearly blocked up, the channel not having more than two and a half fathoms in it at high-water, besides being both narrow and intricate within. The soundings are from four to two fathoms at low-water, until you get to the upper end, seven miles from the entrance, when it opens into a large lagoon. The extremities of the lagoon are, the north part in lat. 24° 35′ 20″ N., long. 51° 21′ 55″ E., the southern part in lat. 24° 30′ 40″ N., long. 51° 20′ E. This place was used by the pirates for securing boats they took, and a fort was built at the entrance by the people of the Dooasir Tribe, but they were obliged to quit it for want of water.

Ras Allarch.

Ras Allarch, in lat. 24° 59′ N., long. 51° 37′ 40″ E., is a low point, situated near a swamp. Immediately below this commences a range of high sandhills: the whole are called by the natives Meggehaa. They extend to Khore Alladeid in one continued range.

Arlaat Dalmy.

Arlaat Dalmy is a small sandbank, in lat. 24° 42′ 30″ N., long. 51° 59′ 10″ E., situated on the edge of an extensive and dangerous reef.

Jezeerat ain Lasseit.

Jezeerat ain Lasseit is a group of small, low, rocky islands. The centre is in lat. 24° 45′ 35″ N., long. 51° 37′ 30″ E., some shoal patches lying to the southward of these islands.

NAVIGATION OF THE

Fasht Alladeid.

Fasht Alladeid is a very extensive shoal, being nearly dry in most parts. Its south point is in lat. 24° 54′ 30″ N., long. 51° 47′ 30″ E.; the northern point is in lat. 24° 54′ 30″ N., long. 51° 49′ 20″ E. This shoal shows itself distinctly, so that by keeping a good look-out there is no danger to be dreaded in the day-time, and at night I would not advise any one to keep under weigh on this part of the coast.

Fasht al Arief.

The south point of Fasht al Arief is in lat. 24° 54′ 20″ N., long. 51° 42′ E., and runs off from Ras Allarch. Between the tongue of this shoal and the shore of Meggehaa is a bight, forming a capital harbour in a north-wester, with from nine to three fathoms in it.

Jezeerat Mashuiah.

Jezeerat Mashuiah is in lat. 24° 57′ 20″ N., long. 51° 37′ 50″ E.

Ras Alladra.

From Ras Alladra to Ras Allarch the soundings are irregular, from five to eighteen and twenty fathoms, and a number of small patches, with only one and two fathoms on them, are scattered about, so that it is impossible to give directions to guide a vessel in this part. The anchorage is mostly good, and by keeping a good look-out, and paying attention to the lead, a vessel might always pass in safety during the day, but should not attempt to be under weigh during the night. The coast is as barren as it is possible to conceive, and has no fixed inhabitants. Landing, unless well armed, is unsafe, as numbers of the Monasir and other wandering tribes of Bedouins are constantly prowling about, and attack all they meet; our boats were several times attacked during the survey. There is no water in any part, except a little very brackish on Rarah Island.

Ras Ahmoolool.

Ras Ahmoolool is a low point, in lat. 25° 4′ 35″ N., long. 51° 38′ E.

Gebil al Wukra.

Gebil al Wukra is a piece of moderately elevated rocky land, in lat. 25° 8′ 5″ N., long. 51° 37′ E. At three and a half fathoms is a rocky bank, extending from lat. 25° 1′ N., long. 51° 51′ E., to lat. 25° 13′ N., long. 51° 47½′ E., least water three and a half fathoms; it is composed of coral and small rocks. It joins on to an extensive bank called Rug Muchafit, dry in patches, and extending to long. 52° 7′ 30″ E.; the latitude the same at both ends.

GULF OF PERSIA.

Ras Aboo al Mashuit.

Ras Aboo al Mashuit is a low point, in lat. 25° 15′ 10″ N., long. 51° 37′ 20″ E. The soundings off here are rather irregular, from two and three quarters to five fathoms.

Ras Boo Aboot.

Ras Boo Aboot, the SE. boundary of Al Bidder Harbour, is in lat. 25° 17′ N., long. 51° 35′ E. The reef that forms the southern side of the entrance to Al Bidder Harbour runs out two miles from this point, and continues along shore, running off about one mile, until it joins Fasht al Anief.

Jezeerat al Suffic.

Jezeerat al Suffic is a low, semicircular, sandy island, its west point being in lat. 25° 19′ 40″ N., long. 51° 35′ E. A reef runs from it in a southerly direction, and from the northern entrance to Al Bidder Harbour, in a northerly direction, it runs up as high as Ras Reccan, its distance off shore varying from one to seven miles.

Al Bidder Town.

Al Bidder Town is in lat. 25° 16′ 50″ N., long. 51° 33′ E. It is situated at the bottom of a harbour, formed by the reefs before mentioned. The entrance is only half a mile wide, having three and four fathoms water in it in mid-channel, and rather less towards the northern reef, and towards the southern two fathoms. As the shoals show themselves distinctly, to enter the harbour you must be guided by them, keeping rather nearer to the northern one. The narrow part is not more than half a mile in length. When through, steer for the town, and anchor abreast the eastern tower, in three and a half fathoms, about half a mile off shore. This place contains about four hundred Arabs of the Nahune, Dooasir, and Abookara Tribes, and is frequented by the Monasir and other wandering tribes. In the pearl season the inhabitants are augmented to about twelve hundred, it being convenient to the banks, and so completely sheltered. The people are mostly fishermen; they have one or two trading boats, and, like all other inhabitants of this coast, take a large share in the pearl fishery. They are subject to Bahrein. Cattle and poultry are procurable here, but they are very dear. Water, pretty good, can also be procured. The defences are a small Ghuree in the town, two or three towers, indifferent, and a Ghuree a mile to the north-westward of the town, on the rising ground.*

* Due east of Al Bidder, about twelve miles, is a small patch, with only a fathom and a half on it. We traversed for it one whole day, but could not hit on it; a good look-out is necessary. In the chart a dotted line shows the part within which it lies.

FROM THE EASTERN POINT OF THE EUPHRATES ALONG THE COAST OF PERSIA.

Eastern Point.

The eastern point of the Shat el Arab, or Euphrates, is in lat. 29° 57′ 50″ N., long. 48° 30′ 23″ E. It is low, and not perceptible more than six or seven miles off. It is a complete mudbank, and is gaining on the river, as it has extended nearly one mile further down during the last twelve or fifteen years. Several villages of the Chaab Arabs are situated near this point, and there are large quantities of cattle on its banks.

Inspector's Channel.

Inspector's Channel is a gut, running out of the river into Khore Gufgah, having in it a fathom and a quarter at low-water, and at high is very narrow, especially where it enters the channels. It runs parallel with the shore, commencing about a mile and a half below the

eastern point of the river. In case of necessity, a small vessel being driven into Khore Gufgah in a south-easter, and parting from her cables, might run for it at high-water, but I cannot recommend it except in case of necessity.

Meyune Sand.

Meyune Sand, commonly called Bussora Bar, is in lat. 29° 49′ 20″ N., long. 48° 35′ 57′ E. Its southern point, measured trigonometrically from the western point of the river, E. by N., distant rather more than one mile, is a small hard sandbank, with only three feet on it at low-water. Between it and the Meyune is a small channel, running into the river, with soundings nearly the same as the regular channel; but it is easily found out if you are in this channel, as you will have hard soundings on the western side, whereas in the proper channel the ground is soft to the westward on the Abdoolla Bank. Care should be taken not to approach this bank in a south-easter and flood tide. Variation 4° 55′ W. in 1827.

Abdoolla Bank.

The Abdoolla Bank, or Mahrugaate Abdalla, is a long mudbank, forming the western side of the channel into the Euphrates. It extends to lat. 29° 46′ N., long. 48° 36′ 10″ E., and is dry at low-water spring tides to within about two and a half miles of the bar. It is safe to approach in working up the river to three fathoms, or two fathoms and three quarters.

Mahrugaate Abadan.

Mahrugaate Abadan is the eastern bank forming the entrance to the river, and is composed of hard sand, except towards the southern part, where it is a mixture of hard sand and stiff clay. Its southern point is in lat. 29° 45½′ N., long. 48° 42′ 40″ E. It is not safe to approach in working up on the flood tides nearer than three and a half fathoms; or immediately you shoal from mid-channel, and find the bottom getting hard, the helm should be put down.

Khore Gufgah.

The entrance to Khore Gufgah is in lat. 29° 46′ N., long. 48° 44′ E. It is formed by the Abadan on the west, and Ali Meidan on the east; has soundings from fifteen and eighteen fathoms in the southern part to two and a half at low-water at the upper, where a narrow channel runs into the Euphrates. This is an excellent mark, coming from the eastward, for making the river. If you cross the Ali Meidan in three and a half fathoms low-water, you will cross Khore Gufgah in eight or nine fathoms, and ought to keep down to the southward a little, as this is in the parallel of the Meyune. If you cross the Ali Meidan in four or four and a half fathoms, which is the best line, you will cross Khore

Gufgah in thirteen to fifteen or sixteen fathoms, according to the time of tide, and the tail of the Abadan in four to five fathoms, when a course west, if a flood tide, will bring you on the Abdoolla Bank, two and a half or three fathoms low-water, which is a fair berth for anchoring if the tide is not favourable for entering the river, as from this you can always run into Khore Abdoolla if it comes to blow hard from the SE., at which time no pilot will cross the bar.

Ali Meidan.

Ali Meidan is an extensive flat of mud and sand, extending from lat. 29° 46′ N., long. 48° 46′ 30″ E., to lat. 29° 55′ N., long. 49° 5′ E. From the shore the soundings are from seven fathoms on the southern part to two fathoms at five miles off shore. The soundings on this flat are regular, which has got it the name of Meidan: they scarcely vary, except at the edges, in the same parallel, all over the bank. The pilots always try to cross the bank in four or five fathoms, when bound to the river.

Khore Bameshere.

The western point of Khore Bameshere is in lat. 30° N., long. 48° 38′ 50″ E.; the eastern in lat. 29° 59′ 30″ N., long. 48° 44′ 30″ E. It was formerly used by trading vessels, and was navigable a considerable way up; but is now blocked by a bund near the Haffar Canal. It runs in from the Ali Meidan, the soundings not varying more than a quarter of a fathom, until you get as high as lat. about 29° 51′ 30″ N., when they deepen to five and seven fathoms, according to the time of tide, and decrease again to three and four fathoms at low-water as you near the points.

Khore Seledge.

Khore Seledge is a small river, whose entrance is nearly blocked up. It is in lat. 29° 59′ 20″ N., long. 48° 46′ E., and runs into the Karroon.

Dorakastan.

Dorakastan is the land formed between the Bameshere and Bunda Monsure. Khore Seledge and Khore Dorakastan run through this trench, which is little more than a mudbank. The part to the eastward of Khore Dorakastan is named Bussaaf.

Khore Dorakastan.

Khore Dorakastan is a small river, running into the Karroon; it has one fathom at the entrance, at low-water, and three and four fathoms inside. Its entrance is in lat. 30° 1′ 20″ N., long. 48° 54′ 30″ E.

Khore Moosa.

The entrance to Khore Moosa, or Moses, is in lat. 29° 57′ 10″ N., long. 49° 4′ E., and runs up to the northward until it reaches Bunda Monsure,

on the western, and the Dorak river on the eastern side. The soundings are from four to eighteen fathoms. In lat. 30° 22′ 20″ N., long. 48° 58′ 45″ E., is a rocky islet, with fifteen and eighteen fathoms close to it. The water is salt, and the banks all mud, and no landing on them except at high-water.

Bunda Monsure.

Bunda Monsure is situated between Khore Moosa and the Karroon, in lat. 30° 17′ 40″ N., long. 48° 46′ 20″ E.

Entrance of the Dorak River.

The entrance of the Dorak river is in lat. 30° 21′ 10″ N., long. 48° 55′ 10″ E. The town of Dorak, the residence of the Chief of the Chaab Arabs, is situated thirty-three miles NE. from the entrance, but about forty-four by the river.

Deera Island.

Deera Island is low, with a swamp in the centre, in lat. 30° 4′ 22″ N., long. 49° 5′ 50″ E.

Bunah Island.

Bunah Island is narrow and low. The centre is in lat. 30° 7′ 48″ N., long. 49° 10′ 18″ E. It is about three and a half miles long, and has the ruins of an old fort on it.

Khore Wastah.

Khore Wastah is a deep-water gut, running up towards Deera Island, and between it and Khore Moosa.

Inside Deera and Bunah Islands there is a complete lagoon, in some parts with thirty fathoms water, in others not one, full of banks and sunken rocks; and as it can never be navigated, except by boats, no further description can be given.

The Karabah.

The Karabah is a piece of broken ground, with irregular soundings of from five to sixteen or eighteen fathoms, situated below Khore Wastah and towards the Ali Meidan. The natives say that traditions mention a city formerly standing in this place, and say the irregularity of the soundings are caused by the ruins of the buildings. I mention this as a common tradition among the natives.

Ras Tulloob.

Ras Tulloob is a point of the main near Bunah island, in lat. 30° 7′ 33 N., long. 49° 15′ 6″ E. It is low, with a few shrubs and brushwood growing near it. About three miles within it, to the northward, is the entrance of a river joining the Indian River, and where are some extensive ruins.

NAVIGATION OF THE

Fasht al Marinae.

The south point of Fasht al Marinae is in lat. 29° 56′ 50″ N., long. 49° 18′ 55″ E.

Khore Aranzal.

Khore Aranzal is a gut with one and a half and two fathoms at low-water, running between the last-mentioned shoal and the main, leading to the Bunah Island, where it suddenly deepens to seven and fourteen fathoms.

Sareema.

Sareema is a small cluster of banian trees, at the upper part of a bight, near Indian River, in lat. 30° 8′ 37″ N., long. 49° 29′ 13″ E., and forms the leading mark for boats bound to Indian River. Variation 4° 50′ W.

Entrance to Indian River.

The entrance to Indian River is in lat. 30° 4′ 15″ N., long. 49° 32′ 12″ E. It is fronted by one extensive flat, dry at low-water. The town of Indian is about thirty or thirty-five miles up the river, which winds about for several miles near the beach, so that when you have gone several miles up the river you are only a few hundred yards on the opposite side of the bank which separates the reaches.

Rasshiel Barkan.

Rasshiel Barkan is the south-western point of the flat that runs off Indian River, and parallel with the coast easterly to long. 50°, where it extends about a mile and a half off shore. It is composed of mud, and in some parts patches of sand and clay. The Ras, or south-west point, is in lat. 30° 1′ 20″ N., long. 49° 27′ 50″ E.

Funnel Hill.

Funnel Hill is a remarkable hill, on the high land of Ramus, in lat. 30° 21′ 20″ N., long. 50° 1′ 55″ E.

Dooat Dellim.

Dooat Dellim is a bight, formed at the head of the Gulf above Dellim, and affords good anchorage in a north-wester, and tolerably good in a south-easter; soundings from three to four fathoms at low-water; bottom soft mud.

Shahiel Shaw.

Shahiel Shaw is a village, with a fort, situated in lat. 30° 4′ 20″ N., long. 50° 11′ 18″ E., and now enjoys the trade with the inland parts for grain formerly centred in Dellim. There is a small creek here, which forms a harbour for the boats.

GULF OF PERSIA.

Bunda Dellim.

Bunda Dellim is in lat. 30° 1′ 50″ N., long. 50° 12′ 15″ E. It is a small village, and formerly was a place of considerable trade in grain; but since it has become a dependency of the Shaikh of Bushire, it has, from his despotic government, and the feud of the Shaikh's family, entirely fallen to decay, and the trade removed to Shahiel Shaw, which is under the Kwam Babahawn.

Ras-ool-Tumba.

Ras-ool-Tumba is a low point, in lat. 29° 55′ 14″ N., long. 50° 11′ 50″ E., forming the southern point of Dooat Dellim. A small spit runs one mile off this point.

Khore Lelataing.

Khore Lelataing is a small rivulet, one mile from Ras-ool-Tumba; it has one fathom at the entrance, and two within it.

Gebil Lelataing.

Gebil Lelataing is the point of the high land nearly abreast of Ras-ool-Tumba; lat. 29° 57′ 50″ N., long. 50° 22′ E.

Khore Abd.

Khore Abd is a small creek in lat. 29° 53′ 33″ N., long. 50° 14′ 40″ E., and has a fathom and a fathom and a half in it.

Khore Serinae.

Khore Serinae is a small rivulet, in lat. 29° 50″ 20° N., long. 50° 18′ 30″ E. It has one fathom on the bar at the entrance, and two and three inside. This place agrees better than any other with the Brazina of Nearchus. Extensive ruins lie near the entrance of this place.

Imaum Hussain.

Imaum Hussain is a remarkable mosque or tomb, near this place.

Khoee Bang.

Khoee Bang is a high mountain, and at a distance forms the mountainous cape generally set by navigators under the name of Cape Bang. It is in lat. 29° 45′ 30″ N., long. 50° 30′ E.

Sous Poshune.

Sous Poshune, the Cape Bang of the charts, is a low rocky point, in lat. 29° 37′ 8″ N., long. 50° 28′ 10″ E. About three and a half miles to the ESE. of this is situated the dry bed of a river, near which there are some old ruins.

Ka Hyder.

Ka Hyder is a small village, with a fort, in lat. 29° 37′ 8″ N., long. 50° 33′ 48″ E., and has about one hundred inhabitants, mostly weavers.

Gonava.

Gonava is a large town, with very extensive ruins near it. A river runs up near the town. It has originally been a place of great importance, as the extensive ruins show. Even now the Shaikh can bring from one thousand to twelve hundred horsemen into the field. He is dependent on the Shaikh of Bushire. There is a considerable trade with other ports in horses and grain from this place. A large mosque, situated two miles to the north of the river, is in lat. 29° 33′ 25″ N., long. 50° 36′ E.

Khore Khalata.

The entrance to Khore Khalata, or Gonava River, is in lat. 29° 31′ 40″ N., long. 50° 36′ 6″ E. It has one fathom at the entrance, and two inside at low-water.

Bundaregt.

Bundaregt is a small town in lat. 29° 24′ 20″ N., long. 50° 40′ 35″ E. Two small sandy islands point this town, forming a dry harbour for vessels drawing not more than one fathom, which enter at high-water, and lie aground on the ebb.

Khore Gassair.

Khore Gassair is rather a large rivulet. Its entrance is in lat. 29° 11′ 20″ N., long. 50° 40′ 50″ E. It has a fathom and a quarter at low-water at the entrance, and two and a half and three fathoms inside at low-water.

Khore Rohilla.

Khore Rohilla is a small river, in lat. 29° 8′ 10″ N., long. 50° 42′ 10″ E.

Khore Khodhima.

Khore Khodhima, or Old Rohilla, is an inlet, with several sandbanks inside; lat. 29° 6′ 25″ N., long. 50° 40′ 1″ E.; soundings one to three fathoms.

Ras Rohilla.

Ras Rohilla is a low sandy point, with a mound near it, in lat. 29° 4′ 30″ N., long. 50° 41′ 25″ E. From Ras Rohilla to Bushire extends a flat, with two and three fathoms water on it at high-water, and dry in parts at low. In standing along it, three and a half and four fathoms is a guide in the day, but you should not come under five fathoms in the night.

BUSHIRE.

The flagstaff of the Residency at Bushire is in lat. 29° 0′ 15″ N., long. 50° 51′ 30″ E. It is a town of considerable importance, being the

port where all the British and foreign trade with Persia centres. It is walled in, and about two miles in circumference. Its bazar is well supplied from the country with all sorts of provisions and fruits, and a number of merchants reside here, who carry on a very extensive trade; caravans arrive and depart daily. There is no water in the town that is drinkable—all is brought from places about two or three miles distant. The Shaikh or governor has, in addition to Bushire, all the places on the coast from Bunda Dellim to Halilla, under his authority, and several places fifteen or sixteen miles inland. His government is despotic in the extreme, and having four ships, besides several large Buggalows, of his own, he engrosses most of the freight, as he will not allow the merchants to ship their goods on any other vessel until his are loaded. The anchorage is in a road formed by two banks, two and a half miles off the town, having from four to two and a half fathoms at low-water, soft muddy bottom. The following directions will conduct a ship into the roads, should she not be able to obtain a pilot; but I should always recommend a pilot being obtained:—

DIRECTIONS FOR GOING INTO BUSHIRE INNER ROADS.

A ship coming from the northward, with a northerly wind, should stand along the bank extending off Rohilla Point in a line of four fathoms, until she gets the flagstaff to bear N. 77° E., shipping in the inner roads N. 41° E., or the Old House or Sand Island N. 47° E.; then haul up N. 57° E. (in doing which you will cross over hard sand), until the flagstaff bears E., Old House N. 46° E., shipping N. 39° E. (In crossing the hard sand, should a vessel decrease her water to less than two and a half fathoms, she should bear away more for the town, and haul up immediately she increases that depth.) When the above bearings are on, haul up as high as N. 19° E., carrying soundings from two and three quarters to three fathoms, until the flagstaff bears S. 45° E., Old House N. 60° E., shipping N. 62° E. You may then with the ebb tide bear away for the shipping, keeping a good look-out for the point of the reef, which is nearly dry at low-water; but should the flood be running, it would be advisable for a vessel to keep up about three quarters of a point to windward of the shipping, and bear away when the point is abreast of her.

A ship coming from the southward, with a southerly breeze, may stand along the low land in a line of three and a half or four fathoms until the flagstaff bears N. 37° E., shipping N. 12° E., House on Shaikh Shaad N. 28° E.; then bear away N. 4° E. until the flagstaff bears S. 36° E., shipping N. 52° E., Old House N. 51° E. (In standing along this course, a ship will decrease her soundings at low-water to two and a

half fathoms, then increase to four and a half fathoms, with the above bearings on.) She may then haul up for the shipping.

The marks for the shipping in the inner roads are given in case of it being too hazy to see the old house on the northern end of Shaikh Shaad Island.

Anchorage Bearings.—Flagstaff S. 16° E., house on Shaad N. 51° E., eastern part of the tower S. 25° E. Variation in 1827, 4° 12′ W.

Karrack Island.

Karrack Island is about four and a half miles long, and rather high in the centre; the fort is situated in lat. 29° 15′ 20″ N., long. 50° 18′ 50″ E. It was built by the Dutch, and is in pretty good repair. Good water is plentiful, and poultry may be procured. Pilots for Bussora are also procured at this place. It is under the Government of Bushire. The anchorage in a north-wester is good in eight fathoms; in a south-easter you are obliged to shift round into the channel between it and Korgo. Variation 4° 15′ W.

Korgo.

Korgo is a sandy island, laying in a north and south direction, separated from Karrack by a channel a mile and a quarter wide. It is two and a half miles long, and half a mile wide, and surrounded by a reef to the distance of a large half mile.

From this island to Bussora Bar the navigation is clear, taking care to be guided in approaching the banks by the several descriptions of them.

PART II.*

LEAVING BUSHIRE.

Leaving Bushire, of which the Residency flagstaff is in lat. 29° 0′ 30″ N., long. 50° 51′ 30″ E., you pass along a low coast, with soundings regular and safe, in three and a half fathoms, until you come to Ras Rushire, five miles distant.

Ras Rushire.

Ras Rushire is in lat. 28° 55′ 50″ N., long. 50° 50′ 32″ E., and is a low point, planted with date trees, with a small reef of rocks extending one mile from it, which should not be approached nearer than three and a half fathoms.

Rushire, Old Fort.

The old fort of Rushire is now in ruins, and was built by the Portuguese. It is about four and a half miles from Bushire. You may approach the shore here to within half a mile, in three and a half fathoms.

Ras Halilla.

Ras Halilla is in lat. 28° 50′ 30″ N., long. 50° 54′ E., and forms the northern point of Halilla Bay. The village of Halilla, which has a square fort, is about two-thirds of a mile from the point. Halilla Bay is situated between this and Khore Kwoire, and affords good shelter in north-westers. The best anchorage is with Halilla Point S. 79° E. true, and Ras Halilla N. 31° 21′ true, in three or three and a half fathoms at low-water, soft muddy bottom. Good water is procurable here from a well near the date grove. Between Ras Halilla and Khore Kwoire there is a small island near the shore, with two fathoms inside it, where boats not requiring more than five feet water lay sheltered. The authority of the Shaikh of Bushire ends here, and the Tangassier District commences.

Halilla Peak.

Halilla Peak is a remarkable mountain, the north part forming a peak, in lat. 28° 40′ 10″ N., long. 51° 38′ 40″ E., and is a well known landmark.

Khore Kwoire.

Khore Kwoire is a small creek, dry at the entrance at low-water, in lat. 28° 47′ 25″ N., long. 51° 4′ E.; variation in 1827, 3° 47′ W.

* Dated 5th October 1835.

Rahmah's Tower.

Rahmah's Tower is a small round tower, built by that chief, about half a mile from Khore Kwoire.

Bashee.

Bashee is a small village, in lat. 28° 39′ 10″ N., long. 51° 6′ 10″ E.

Tangassier.

Tangassier is a small town under the Asses Ears, in lat. 28° 31′ 30″ N., long. 51° 8′ 22″ E. Here the Tangassier District ends.

Asses Ears.

The Asses Ears are two small passes on the high land; they may be known from a third small peak rising by their side. They are in lat. 28° 29′ 50″ N., long. 51° 15′ E., and are a well known landmark.

Kagoor.

Kagoor is a small village, in lat. 28° 18′ 40″ N., long. 51° 17′ 30″ E.

Luir.

Luir is a small village, about one mile to the south of Kagoor.

Khore Jayhira.

Khore Jayhira is a small fresh-water river, in lat. 28° 9′ 35″ N., long. 51° 21′ 10″ E.

Ras-ool-Khan.

Ras-ool-Khan is a low sandy point, in lat. 28° 2′ 5″ N., long. 51° 22′ 30″ E., under which vessels not drawing more than twelve feet water may find shelter in a north-wester, but should be careful how they enter this bay, as there are one or two small rocky shoals, with only ten or fifteen feet water on them. This anchorage is called Bunder Khan, and from hence commences Burdistan Bank.

Ras Yabreen.

Ras Yabreen is in lat. 27° 55′ 40″ N., long. 51° 28′ 40″ E., and is a low point. Jezeerat Yabreen is separated from it by a channel with ten or twelve fathoms water in it, but has not more than five or six feet at the entrance. This island is the commencement (to the northward) of the islands and banks which form the Burdistan Reef. The islands may be approached to four and a half or five fathoms in the day, but you should not come under seven fathoms in the night.

General Remarks on the Navigation from Bushire to Jezeerat Yabreen.—Leaving Bushire, and being clear of the pilot in three and a half or four fathoms, stand down along the coast (if with a fair wind) in that depth until you pass Bushire Point, when it deepens into

five and a half fathoms. A course now S. by E. will take you fairly down to the line of ten fathoms on the Burdistan Bank, which should be crossed in this depth.

If a beating wind, you should not stand off into more than twenty-eight fathoms, and inshore at night into less than eight fathoms, unless above the Asses Ears, in which case you may stand into five or six fathoms; in the day-time, you may approach the shore to four fathoms, being to the southward of the Asses Ears. Twenty-eight fathoms off shore, to five or six fathoms inshore in the day-time, and seven or eight fathoms in the night, will be safe working, until you reach Yabreen Island.

Jezeerat Mulgassab.

Jezeerat Mulgassab is a low, narrow island, about five and a half miles long, extending from Yabreen Island, in lat. 27° 50′ 30″ N., long. 51° 32′ E. Within is a narrow channel with twelve or fourteen fathoms, but blocked up at each end. You may approach this island to five fathoms in the day, and seven in the night.

Monakeela, or Mongeller.

Monakeela, or Mongeller, is a low, sandy island, joined on to Mulgassab by a reef nearly dry at low-water. It has date trees on it, and the ruins of an old building, and is in lat. 27° 49′ 15″ N., long. 51° 33′ 10″ E.; variation 3° 40′ W. in 1827. High-water full and change 7h. 50m.; rise and fall seven feet. It may be seen about eight or nine miles from the deck of a ship of four hundred tons.

Ras Moosalyee.

Ras Moosalyee is a low point within the reefs on the main, in lat. 27° 53′ 20″ N., long. 51° 32′ 50″ E. About a mile and a half to the eastward is a small sandy island of the same name.

Mulgurram.

Mulgurram is a low point of the main, in lat. 27° 50′ 30″ N., long. 51° 38′ E. South-west a mile and a half is Jezeerat Mulgurram, a small woody island. There is a gut between it and the point, with ten fathoms in it, and there is a fathom and a half at low-water on the bank without it. In this gut the Congoon boats are laid up when dismasted for the season.

Gebil Dering, or Hummocks of Kenn.

Gebil Dering, or the Hummocks of Kenn, form a well known landmark, in lat. 28° 3′ 55″ N., long. 51° 47′ 27″ E. (the centre hummock). When the centre hummock bears N. 26° W. true, you are clear of the reef or foul ground, and may stand in on that line to five fathoms.

NAVIGATION OF THE

Funnel Hill.

Funnel Hill is a knob on the range of high land near the coast, in lat. 27° 51′ N., long. 51° 47′ 51″ E. It is useful as a mark for anchoring under the lee of the reef in a north-wester, and also for a clearing mark.

Burdistan Reef, or Foul Ground.

Burdistan Reef, or Foul Ground, extends from Monakeela to long. 51° 52′ 30″ E. It also extends to the south as far as lat. 27° 41′ N., and is dry in many parts at low-water. It is formed of hard sand and rocks, and is dangerous to approach in the night under ten fathoms, as you shoal quickly. Within that depth, the gap mentioned by McClure is very small, and may have filled up since his time. In a north-wester, if you wish to anchor, you should do so under the tail of the reef, with the following bearings, where you will lay sheltered:—centre hummock of Kenn, N. 26° W., or a little open to the eastward of Funnel Hill; Square Tower Knob in the deep gap of high land, N. 10° W., Battoonah Tower, near the beach, N. 3° E. true bearing, in five fathoms; or, if you like, you may run further in on the bearing of the latter; but this is the best place to weigh from in case of a south-easter coming on, as you may run out SW. or W. by S. from it until you deepen your water, by crossing the bank.

Square Tower Knob.

Square Tower Knob is a gap of high land of a zigzag form, and is in lat. 27° 59′ 10″ N., long. 51° 50′ E.

Battoonah Tower.

Battoonah Tower is a small Martello tower, at the village of the same name. It is in lat. 27° 49′ 30″ N., long. 58° 53′ 35″ E.

Sugar-loaf.

Sugar-loaf is a detached conical hill, on the main, in lat. 27° 50′ 28″ N., long. 51° 59′ 10″ E.

Ras Burdistan.

Ras Burdistan is an elevated bluff point, in lat. 27° 49′ 30″ N., long. 52° 2′ 5″ E.

Congoon.

Congoon, in lat. 27° 49′ 20″ N., long. 52° 8′ 45″ E., is a town situated in a deep bay near Cape Burdistan. Its inhabitants are Mahomedans, Arabs of the Beni Hussan, Beni Khalid, Albuya, Albusnarif, Albuyareh, Alyia, Beni Ahmood, Abadaly, Kasheanaria, and Nussoor Tribes, and its present Shaikh's name is Jubarra. The number of inhabitants is about fourteen hundred. The whole country along the coast from Cape Burdistan to Aseeloo is under this place.

GULF OF PERSIA.

Several of the finest Buggalows in the Gulf belong to this port, and they carry on a very extensive trade, principally as carriers to Bombay and the Malabar Coast, and to most of the ports in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The bay is perfectly sheltered from north-westerly winds, by Cape Burdistan, and the reefs off it, and partially from south-easters by Ras-ool-Mara. The best anchorage is with the north-western tower of the town NE. by compass, and Burdistan fort and the Sugar-loaf or conical hill nearly in one N. 57° W., in four or four and a quarter fathoms. Supplies of indifferent cattle are procurable, and excellent water. Rugged Peak, over Congoon, is in lat. 27° 57′ 12″ N., long. 51° 59′ 5″ E.

Ras-ool-Mara.

Ras-ool-Mara is a low, sandy point, with date trees on it, distant one mile and two-thirds from the town, and forms the south-east point of the bay, in lat. 27° 46′ 56″ N., long. 52° 10′ 15″ E.

Mahaloo.

Mahaloo is a small village in lat. 27° 44′ 40″ N., long. 52° 14′ 20″ E. It contains about one hundred inhabitants, of the Joasmee Tribe.

Jaynaat.

Jaynaat is a small town in lat. 27° 42′ 40″ N., long. 52° 16′ 55″ E., contains about five hundred men of the Bootambee Tribe, has several trading boats belonging to it, and has tolerably good anchorage off it, in ten fathoms, in a north-wester. A small reef of rocks, forming a boat harbour, extends off this town.

Gebil Perai.

Gebil Perai, or Barn Hill, is in lat. 27° 46′ 33″ N., long. 52° 20′ 35′ E. It is a remarkable barn-shaped hill, well known to all who frequent the Gulf.

Ras Laswaet.

Ras Laswaet is a projecting point of the land, in lat. 27° 41′ 28″ N., long. 52° 18′ 20″ E. It is safe to approach to four fathoms, about two hundred yards off shore.

Ras Anktor.

Ras Anktor, in lat. 27° 40′ 20″ N., long. 52° 20′ E., is a low point. Between it and Ras Laswaet is formed a small bay, where boats anchor.

Shillan.

Shillan is a small deserted village, in lat. 27° 39′ 59″ N., long. 52° 14′ 20″ E.

Taurie.

Taurie, in lat. 27° 38′ 52″ N., long. 52° 16′ 40″ E., is a small town,

situated in a bay, affording excellent shelter in a north-wester, and indifferently good in south-easters. It is inhabited by about three hundred and fifty Arabs of the Nussoor Tribe; affords a few supplies, and has excellent water. To the NW. of the town are very extensive ruins, said to have been a Portuguese town: if so, it must have been one of importance, from the appearance of the ruins. In many parts the rock has been excavated for residences in the hot season, and the pass in the hills appears to have been fortified in a manner much beyond the abilities of the natives, at least of the present day. Wells have been also sunk to the depth of forty or fifty fathoms, through the rock. Very high up on the hills reservoirs in ruins are very numerous. On the whole, it has all the appearance of having been a large and flourishing town. Several trading boats of various sizes belong to Taurie.

Barak.

Barak is a small town, situated about three miles to the SSE. of Taurie, and contains about two hundred inhabitants, of the Nussoor Tribe.

Nakle Taky.

Nakle Taky, in lat. 27° 29′ 48″ N., long. 52° 32′ 21″ E., is a small village, with a Ghuree, dependent on Aseeloo. It contains about seventy people, of the Nussoor Tribe.

Aseeloo, or Assaloo.

Aseeloo, in lat. 27° 27′ 42″ N., long. 52° 33′ 45″ E., is one of the principal towns on the coast. It is situated at the NW. entrance of the Bay of Aseeloo; is nearly a mile in length, and contains about nine hundred men, of the Al Aram and Bosamut Tribes;—the latter, about four hundred in number, emigrated to this place from Bahrein about three years back. They have a number of trading vessels, and take a share in the pearl fishery. The only export is tobacco, brought down from the interior. The town is fronted by a reef, about one thousand yards off shore, within which is a basin with one and a half and two fathoms water, where their boats lay. The anchorage before the town is good in a south-easter, but a very heavy sea rolls in in a north-wester. About two miles and a half up the bay from the town, with Aseeloo Notch bearing N. 12° to N. 15° W., in three and a half or four fathoms, you lie pretty well sheltered. Supplies of fresh provisions and water are procurable. The ruins of a Portuguese town, with two fortified hills belonging to it, are situated near this town.

Aseeloo or Assaloo Notch.

Aseeloo Notch is a remarkable hill in the high land nearly over the town. The extreme point of the fall* is in lat. 27° 33′ 6″ N., long. 52° 42′ 30″ E. This landmark is so well known to navigators as to require no further description. A pass into the interior winds round near it.

* Query 'hill'?

Aseeloo, or Nabend Bay.

Aseeloo, or Nabend Bay, is formed by Nakle Taky and Aseeloo on one side, and Cape Nabend on the other. It is five miles wide, and rather more in depth. Several villages are situated round it. The depth of water is from eleven to two and a half fathoms. In the middle is a rocky bank, with three and a half fathoms least water on it. In towards the bank, that runs off the shore all round to the distance of one thousand yards, the ground is generally clay or mud, but in the middle of the bay hard sand, with patches of rock. There is no danger whatever within it, or at the entrance. The shore abreast of Nakle Taky and Aseeloo should not be approached under seven fathoms. After the Notch bears N., you may keep in any depth to three and a half fathoms, and with the Notch from N. 10° to N. 15° W. is the best anchorage for a ship in a north-wester, from three to four fathoms, mud. In a south-easter you are sheltered in all parts of the bay.

Nakle Haghel.

Nakle Haghel is a small village, with a tower, in lat. 27° 23′ 18″ N., long. 52° 43′ 15″ E. It is subject to the Shaikh of Congoon, and contains one hundred and fifty of the Beni Malah Tribe. Several small villages within this, and a short distance from the shores of the bay, are subject to Congoon, and contain altogether about nine hundred or one thousand men, of the Beni Mullak and Beni Tamine Tribes.

Nabend Town.

Nabend Town is situated on the southern side of the bay, in lat. 27° 23′ 27″ N., long. 52° 41′ 50″ E. It is a small town, dependent on Aseeloo, and contains about two hundred and forty men, of the Al Aram and Al Bakalif Tribes. It has a few small trading boats; cattle, poultry, and good water are procurable.

Ruffar Village.

Ruffar village is situated on the south side of the bay, near Cape Nabend, in lat. 27° 33′ 36″ N., long. 52° 40′ 45″ E., and contains about sixty men, of the Al Aram Tribe.

Ras Nabend, or Cape Nabon.

Ras Nabend or Cape Nabon, in lat. 27° 22′ 52″ N., long. 52° 39′ 39″ E., is a bold, projecting point, and forms the southern point of the bay. The rocky bank does not extend more than eight hundred yards off it, and even on that there is from three to two fathoms, close to the cape. A ship running into the bay should round it in about seven fathoms in

a south-easter, but not under nine in a north-wester, as a heavy sea drives right on for it.

A Remarkable Single Tree.

A remarkable single tree, on the higher land over Cape Nabon, is in lat. 27° 20′ 52″ N., long. 52° 41′ 27″ E.

Cape Nabon to Shewer.

From Cape Nabon to Shewer anchorage in lat. 27° 6′ N., long. 53° 2′ 12″ E., the coast is steep, having in some parts twenty fathoms within less than a quarter of a mile of the beach, and affords no place for anchorage until you reach the place above mentioned, when you can lay well sheltered in a north-wester, but quite exposed in a south-easter. The coast all along the port is one continued chain of rocky cliffs, with here and there a small sandy bay of fifty or sixty yards in length.

Shewer Bay.

Shewer Bay is a small bay, sheltered by a projecting point from north-westerly winds, but quite exposed to south-easters. The best anchorage is about eight fathoms, the Point NW. by W., off shore half a mile. Shewer village, in lat. 27° 4′ 10″ N., long. 53° 9′ 30″ E., is a small village, containing about one hundred men, of the Abualank Tribe, and has a few fishing-boats. Good anchorage in a north-wester will be found to the NW. of the town, in seven or eight fathoms.

Shewer to Bunda Upsaataan.

From Shewer to Bunda Upsaataan, in lat. 26° 59′ N., long. 53° 17′ 17″ E., there is no town or village. Ships may anchor at every four or five miles between these places, sheltered from north-westers. Bunda Upsaataan is a deep bight, and affords good shelter in a north-wester, in four and a half or five fathoms, and in a south-easter the water is quite smooth, the wind blowing over the land. In this bay is a small town, called Tamba.

Nakheeloo.

Nakheeloo is a town situated on a point, and has about eight hundred inhabitants, of the Aboosemate Tribe. It has several trading boats belonging to it. The Shaikh is independent, except of the Persian Government. It is in lat. 26° 52′ 13″ N., long. 53° 22′ 32″ E.

Busheab, or Shaikh Shaab Island.

Busheab, or Shaikh Shaab Island (the village of Sazal, the north-east end, in lat. 26° 48′ 7″ N., long. 53° 15′ 20″ E.), is twelve nautical miles long, and two and a half broad. It has nine villages, contains four hundred and twenty-five men, of the Aboosemate Tribe, and is subject to Nakheeloo. The principal village is Geeroot, near the south-east

end. The outer parts of the island are rocky, and loose stones, except at the western end, which contains good soil. The centre is a valley, with good soil, and cultivated. The inhabitants are civil, but great cheats. Good water, and some few supplies, are procurable. The anchorage off the east end is well sheltered from north-westers, and that at the north-east part from both north-westers and south-easters; but the ground is bad, and it will always be prudent to lay with a long scope of cable out.

Shitwar, or Chitwar.

Shitwar, or Chitwar, is a small island, separated from Busheab by a narrow channel, having three or four fathoms in it. The passage is about one-third over from Shitwar, but as the spit from Busheab runs some distance out past the island, it is not considered safe, unless to persons who have been through it before, as the reef does not always show, and the soundings have little or no change until you are upon it. The west point of Shitwar is in lat. 26° 47′ 19″ N., long. 53° 16′ 54″ E.

Straits of Busheab.

The Straits of Busheab are formed by the islands of Busheab and Shitwar and the main. They are nearly nine miles wide at the western part, and five and a half between the spit off the north-east of Busheab and Nakheeloo, its narrowest part; they are fourteen miles in length, and have soundings from thirty-two to five fathoms; in mid-channel the soundings are from thirty-two to sixteen fathoms. The soundings at the distance of one mile from the shore are quite regular, and in no part is there danger outside of five fathoms, which is outside the small bank that runs along the side of Busheab. On the tail of the spit running off the north-east end of Busheab there are four fathoms water, and it shoals gradually on it, until you near the shore to two-thirds of a mile, when it shoals to two fathoms. No other danger exists in this fine channel, which until this time has been little known to Europeans.

Jezzar.

Jezzar is a considerable village, containing about two hundred men, of the Albubalal Tribe, and is subject to Nakheeloo. It is in lat. 26° 50′ N., long. 53° 26′ 45″ E.

Island of Inderabia.

The village on the north side of the island of Inderabia is in lat. 26° 41′ 49″ N., long. 53° 31″ 18″ E. The island is low, and about ten miles in circumference. It has about one hundred inhabitants, of the Abadaly Tribe, and is subject to Cheroo.

Strait of Inderabia.

The Strait of Inderabia is formed by the island and the main. It has

regular soundings all over until you approach the reef of Ras-ool-Cheroo, when you suddenly shoal from seventeen to ten, five, and four fathoms, under which depth a vessel should not go. There is no danger outside five fathoms towards the island, or four fathoms on the spit, the channel between these having from twenty-two to seven fathoms. The narrowest part is between the island and Cheroo Reef, being there only one mile wide. A course one-third over from the island, in passing Ras-ool-Cheroo, will be found the best.

Ras-ool-Cheroo.

Ras-ool-Cheroo, in lat. 26° 41′ 31″ N., long. 53° 36′ 38″ E., is a long, low, projecting sandy point, and forms the Bay of Cheroo. A sandy reef runs off from it in a WSW. direction, with soundings of from one and a half to five fathoms on it; but there is no danger on it in or outside three and a half fathoms, as it shoals after you are on it gradually to that depth. Outside of six fathoms the water suddenly deepens to ten, thirteen, and seventeen fathoms.

Cheroo.

Cheroo village is in lat. 26° 42′ 15″ N., long. 53° 46′ 2″ E. It is situated at the bottom of a bay, formed by the Ras or Cape of the same name. It contains about one hundred and fifty men, of the Abadaly Tribe; the Shaikh resides at another village inland. It was formerly, as well as Inderabia, subject to Nakheeloo, but threw off the yoke about eight months since. It is the best anchorage in a north-wester in the Gulf, and affords tolerable supplies and water. It has a few trading boats.

Mornington's Shoal, or Sumburo.

Mornington's Shoal, or Sumburo, is in lat. 26° 32′ 43″ N., long. 53° 46′ 2″ E. It has not less than six fathoms on it, and deepens gradually into twenty-two. It is about one mile long, and rather more than half a mile broad, composed of sand and coral rock.

Jella Abade.

Jella Abade is a small village, with several towers on the hill over it, in lat. 26° 42′ 39″ N., long. 53° 46′ 30″ E. It is inhabited by about three hundred men, of the Beni Ahmaade Tribe, has a few boats, and affords small quantities of cattle and poultry. It has good water, and is well sheltered from north-westers.

Ghes, or Kenn.

The north-east part of Ghes, or Kenn, is in lat. 26° 33′ 1″ N., long. 53° 54′ 45″ E. It is subject to Charrak, and inhabited by about one hundred men, of the Al Ali Tribe. It is well wooded, and from the sea has the prettiest appearance of any island on this side the Gulf. It

has three villages: one on the north-east side, called Daee, is exactly one mile west of our latitude and longitude station. The island has plenty of good water, and many of the wells are near the beach. The fleet composing the expedition against the pirates in 1820 watered here, and it was found fully competent to supply a much larger demand. The soil is good, but in consequence of there having been no rain the last season, there is at this time little verdure. Barley and vegetables are cultivated, and off the island abundance of very fine fish is caught. The island is twenty-one miles in circumference, and safe to approach to eight fathoms all round. A reef projects off the island nearly all round, having from five to one and a half fathoms water. On the outer edge you have eight fathoms, soft ground, and immediately shoal to five fathoms, so that no vessel ought to come nearer than eight fathoms. It extends furthest off the west end, the outer part being one mile off shore; at no other part does it extend beyond half a mile, and the soundings are regular towards it. The variation at this place was 3° 40′ W. (February 5th, 1827.)

Charrak Hill.

Charrak Hill, in lat. 26° 38′ 7″ N., long. 54° 9′ 54″ E. (a small hillock on the centre), is a remarkable round hill, situated within the range of hills nearest the coast, and is a well known landmark.

Channel between Kenn and the Main.

The channel between Kenn and the Main is seven miles wide, in its narrowest part, with soundings of from thirty-six to five fathoms. In working through it, ten fathoms towards the island, and fourteen or fifteen fathoms towards the main, will be good guides in the night; in the day you may stand in close to the shore on the main, and to seven or eight fathoms towards the island. There is no danger on the main but a small spit near Gella Abade, which does not extend above three quarters of a mile off shore.

Tawoona.

Tawoona, in lat. 26° 42′ 15″ N., long. 54° 15′ E., is a small town at the entrance of Charrak Bay, situated round the fort, which is built on a rock near the beach, and is inhabited by about one hundred and eighty men, of the Beni Baphar Tribe. It has a few trading boats, and was, during the time the pirates were in power, in alliance with them.

Charrak.

Charrak, in lat. 26° 42′ 52″ N., long. 54° 11′ 16″ E., is situated at the bottom of the bay of the same name. It is a place of some trade, and has six Buggalows, from sixty to one hundred and twenty tons, and twenty smaller trading vessels, belonging to it. It contains about nine

hundred men, of the Al Ali Tribe. About three hundred and sixty of these are fighting men; the remainder fishermen and traders. Supplies can be procured here, as well as pretty good water. These people being of the same tribe as the pirates of Amulgavine, were closely connected with them during the time they were in force.

Djrd.

Djrd, in lat. 26° 39′ 15″ N., long. 54° 25′ 40″ E., is a small village on the Charrak side of Cape Djrd or Certes, and contains one hundred men, of the Al Ali Tribe. It has a few small trading boats, but the people are principally fishermen.

Ras-ool-Djrd, or Cape Certes.

Ras-ool-Djrd, or Cape Certes, in lat. 26° 35′ 52″ N., long. 54° 26′ 6′ E., is a high projecting headland, when viewed at a distance, but when close terminates rather abruptly in a low point. It forms the south-eastern point of Charrak Bay, and the western point of Mogoo Bay. A reef runs off this point rather more than three-quarters of a mile. A ship, in rounding it, should not come under five fathoms.

Charrak Bay.

Charrak Bay is about four miles deep, and formed by Ras-ool-Djrd on one part, and Ras Tawoona on the other. The soundings are from twelve to three fathoms to a mile off the shore: under that distance, except near Charrak town, the ground is foul, and some small patches of rocks lay scattered about.

Mogoo.

Mogoo, in lat. 26° 35′ 9″ N., long. 54° 25′ 34″ E., is the western town in the bay of the same name, situated nearest to Ras-ool-Djrd. It is small, and inhabited by about two hundred and sixty men, of the Joasmee Tribe. They have a few trading boats, but live principally by fishing, and the pearl fishery, in which they are employed as divers.

Duan.

Duan is in lat. 26° 34′ 35″ N., long. 54° 37′ E. It is at the bottom of Mogoo Bay, inhabited by about a hundred and forty men, of the Al Ali Tribe, chiefly fishermen and cultivators.

Ras-ool-Ettee.

Ras-ool-Ettee is the fall towards the sea of the high land over Ras Bostana, and what is generally set by navigators for the latter. The whole of the high land generally called Cape Bostana or Bestian is called by the natives Gebil-ool-Ettee. On the high land a copper mine, said to have been worked by the Portuguese, is said still to exist.

Ras Bostana.

Ras Bostana is a low point, in lat. 26° 28′ 30″ N., long. 54° 40′ E., forming the south-east point of Mogoo Bay. It is safe to round at a distance of three quarters of a mile, in six or seven fathoms.

Mogoo Bay.

Mogoo Bay, formed by Ras-ool-Djrd on the western side, and Ras Bostana on the south-east, is a deep bay, with soundings from nine to three fathoms, and has good anchorage in north-westers abreast the town of Mogoo, in four fathoms, with Ras-ool-Djrd bearing about W. ½ N.

Bostana.

Bostana is a small village, in lat. 26° 29′ 52″ N., long. 54° 35′ 44″ E. A few supplies may be obtained here. It contains a hundred men, of the Manzeek Tribe, principally employed in fishing.

Polior Shoal.

The centre, or shoalest part of Polior Shoal, is in lat. 26° 26′ 5″ N., long. 54° 37′ 15″ E. It is distant from the low point of Ras Bostana three miles, and from the north point of Polior Island seven miles. A line carried from the centre of Polior to the low point of Ras Bostana passes over the two and a quarter fathom patch. The shoal is composed of sand and rocks, and is six miles long, and two miles broad, extending in a westerly, south-easterly, and northerly direction. The channel on either side is safe, but for large ships that next to the island is the best, and they should not come under sixteen fathoms towards the shoal at night. The inshore channel has from seven to eleven fathoms in it, regular soundings.

Polior Island.

The north point of Polior Island is in lat. 26° 20′ 30″ N., long. 54° 36′ E., the south point in lat. 26° 15′ 30″ N., long. 54° 35′ 15″ E. The island is apparently of volcanic origin, and has no water. A rocky patch extends a mile off the north-east end, with soundings of from seven and eight fathoms to one fathom. On the south-eastern side you may anchor close to the shore, sheltered from a north-wester, but it would be unsafe in the event of a sudden change of wind to the south-east, as the anchorage is so close to the shore that there would be very great risk of the vessel being thrown on the rocks.

Nobeuze, or Nobfleure.

The centre of Nobeuze, or Nobfleure, is in lat. 26° 11′ 30″ N., long. 54° 30′ 40″ E. It is a small island, with a high lump hill on its centre. It is surrounded by a reef, having from one and a half to

seven fathoms on it. Outside the reef you may anchor in sixteen or twenty fathoms; it should not be approached nearer than twenty-five fathoms, unless you intend to anchor, and in the day-time.

Surde, or Surdy.

The south-east point of Surde or Surdy is in lat. 25° 56′ N., long. 54° 38′ 40″ E. It is an island formed something the same as most in the Gulf, being composed of coarse rocks and sand, with very little soil. A mile and a quarter to the westward of the south-east point are the ruins of a town, and nearly in a line to the northward, on the opposite side of the island, are the ruins of another town, and a mosque; there are also wells of fresh water on the north-western part of the island. This island, it is said, had once near a thousand inhabitants, but was depopulated by the pirates. There is anchorage nearly all round the island, but the ground is rocky, and bad for holding; the best is to the southward. The island is surrounded by a reef, extending two-thirds of a mile off shore. The island is about four miles long, and two and a quarter broad.

Bostana to Shinas.

From Bostana to Shinas the land is low, and safe to approach to about one mile, in six or seven fathoms.

Shinas.

Shinas, in lat. 26° 32′ N., long. 54° 49′ 20″ E., is a small town, subject to Lingah, and contains about one hundred and seventy men, of the Alfarrish Tribe, principally employed as fishermen. A few supplies are obtainable here.

Yeshska.

Yeshska is a small town, situated close to the cape of the same name. It is subject to Lingah, and contains about sixty men, of the Alfarrish Tribe. It is in lat. 26° 33′ N., long. 53° 30′ E.*

Lingah.

Lingah, in lat. 26° 32′ 50″ N., long. 54° 59′ 10″ E., is one of the most considerable towns on this coast, and has a considerable trade with most parts of Arabia. It sends Buggalows and other vessels to India, and takes a very large share in the pearl fishery. It contains about seven hundred men of the Joasmee Tribe, of the original people of the Allieny Tribe about three hundred, and two hundred and fifty of the Alfarrish Tribe. It sends thirty boats to the pearl fishery, and employs all those belonging to the opposite coast from Ras-ool-Khyma to Shargah. It imports and exports annually to the amount of near two lakhs of dollars in pearls, and about one-third that amount in grain, dried fruits, and tobacco. The amount of the customs for the

* Query, 54° 30′ E. ?

last year was thirty-one thousand dollars. The duties are about five per cent. on most articles imported or exported. The imports are articles of Indian produce, dates, and grain. Supplies are procurable here. The people are mostly Wahabees, and the Shaikh is of the Joasmee Tribe, and nearly related to Sultan bin Suggur, the chief of the tribe, and were always connected with the pirates. The anchorage, abreast the town, in six fathoms, is well sheltered in a north-wester, but a chopping sea comes in in a south-easter. There is a basin, dry inside at low-water, where most of their boats lay up. They are not bigoted, and the Shaikh appeared a very intelligent man. The place is much increasing as a trading port.

Koong.

Koong is in lat. 26° 34′ 40″ N., long. 55° 1′ 30″ E. It is now in ruins, but was formerly a flourishing place. The Portuguese had a factory here when in power in the Gulf. Good water is easily procurable. Here you lay near the shore in six fathoms.

Bunder Mullim.

Bunder Mullim is in lat. 26° 38′ 20″ N., long. 55° 9′ 20″ E. It is a small town, under Ras Showly, and has a trade in salt. It has about three hundred inhabitants. The bank on the Persian side, forming the channel into Bassadore, begins to shoal off this place.

Little Tomb.

The centre of the Little Tomb is in lat. 26° 14′ 50″ N., long. 55° 16′ E. It is moderately elevated, is about a mile and a half in length, and has irregular soundings from twenty-eight to five fathoms. There is no danger near it.

Great Tomb.

The north point of the Great Tomb is in lat. 26° 16′ 28″ N., long. 55° 24′ E. The island is of an irregular triangle, the three sides being about two and a half miles each. The island is well stocked with antelopes, and there is good water on it. A banian tree stands in about the centre of the southern side. The anchorage is pretty good to the south-east and west, but on the northern part a spit runs off about three quarters of a mile, otherwise that part is steep. To the channel between it and two and a half fathoms, on the Bassadore flat, is seven and a quarter miles, but the safe channel is not more than six and a half, as the bank shoals very suddenly at this part.

A Small Shoal.

A small shoal patch, with six fathoms on it, bears nearly N. from the Little Tomb, distant eleven miles, in lat. 26° 25′ 30″ N., long. 55° 15′ 40″ E.

Bomosa.

The Peak or Saddle of Bomosa is in lat. 25° 55′ N., long. 55° 8′ 50″ E. This island is low, except the remarkable saddle peak, and some small hummocks. It is surrounded by a reef near a mile off, and indifferent anchorage may be found under it.

Bassadore.

The Point of Bassadore is in lat. 26° 39′ 10″ N., long. 55° 22′ E. It is the north-western point of Kishm Island, and bears N. 17° 20′ W. from the south-west point of the island, and from the Great Tomb N. 4° W. true bearing. The variation of the compass was 3° 41′ in 1827. This place was once a flourishing Portuguese settlement, and the ruins of the town are still in existence. In 1821, the force stationed in the Gulf for keeping down the pirate tribes was removed to this place from Sallack, and was withdrawn in 1823; since when it has been the head quarters of the Indian Naval Squadron in the Gulf. They have a tolerable hospital and store-houses, and some houses occupied occasionally by the commanders of the vessels stationed there. There is a small bazar, and middling supplies. The place is the most healthy on the island of Kishm, but far from being a desirable station.

To go into Bassadore from the southward with a fair wind, after the Great Tomb bears SSE. ½ E., steer over the flat NW. by N. to NNW., if in a large ship; and while the Tomb is in sight, keep it SSE. until Bassadore Point bears NE. ½ E.; then steer, keeping it a little open on the starboard bow. If you deepen to eight or nine fathoms, edge over to the northern bank until you begin to shoal again, keeping a good look-out for the beacon on the point of the dry part of the southern bank, and distant about thirteen hundred yards from the Point. You may round this at any distance from a cable-length to a quarter of a mile, when haul in for the anchorage abreast of the hospital, or a little above it, in seven fathoms. You should be careful to be ready to anchor immediately you are across the gut, which has twelve to sixteen fathoms in, and is immediately without the anchoring ground.

In crossing the flat from the Great Tomb, there is a remarkable notch in the high land of the Persian Coast, which, if seen, is an excellent mark, by keeping it N. by W. ½ W. by compass, until Bassadore Point bears NE. ½ E., when proceed as above.

If coming from the southward, with a strong south-easter, cross the flat close, as above directed, being careful not to come under three fathoms until you get Bassadore Point NE., and the highest hummock E. by N., when haul your wind, and stand to the northward until the Point bears about E. by N., and you shoal to five fathoms on the north

bank, when work between it and eight or nine on the south side, until round the beacon, when anchor as before directed.

To sail into Bassadore from the northward, after passing Lingah with a fair wind, steer about E. by N. to ENE., until Bassadore Point is seen, when steer for it, attending to the directions given above. When coming from the southward, the soundings in the channel are from eight to three and a half fathoms, until you approach Bassadore, when they deepen as before described.

There is another passage along the island of Kishm, and within the shoal part of the Bassadore flat, by keeping along shore in four to six fathoms until the large hummock bears N. 73° E., true bearing, and Bassadore Point N. 12° E. true, when steer across the bank W. by N., or W. by N. ½ N., until you deepen over it, or the notch on the Persian Coast bears N. by W. ½ W., when proceed as above directed. I would not recommend this channel except in cases of chase, or other necessity, unless to a person well acquainted with it.

Clarence Straits.

Leaving Bassadore to proceed through Clarence Straits, weigh, if you have a fair wind, at slack water, and steer about N. by E. until you shoal into about five fathoms on the northern bank, when keep along about E. in five to six fathoms, on the edge of that bank, until you get the date grove at Drakoon to bear true S. 26° E. This carries you safely past Goree, a shoal of hard sand, on which there is not more in some parts than a fathom and a half. After passing this you may steer along the Kishm shore at a distance of a little more than half a mile, until Lucy's Peak, on the island of Kishm, bears S. 44° E. true bearing, when you are off the entrance of the narrow straits or Khore Goran, when, if going through them, steer towards the mosque, keeping it a little open on your starboard bow. The soundings between the banks until you enter the jungle are five to seven fathoms. You must now be guided by your distance from the shore, keeping most on the larboard shore until you pass the second opening or channel on that side; then keep rather nearest the starboard shore, or near to mid-channel, until you open into the main channel beyond Inderabia Fort, on the Kishm shore.

To proceed through the main strait, or Khore Manaffee, you should keep rather towards the larboard bank, in soundings of from six to eight fathoms, until you pass a dry sandy islet off the islands fronting Kammeer; then run along the island at a distance of a quarter of a mile, in soundings of from seven to ten fathoms, until you get to the end of it, when you will see the fort of Inderabia on Kishm, bearing true S. 47° E.; then steer for the extreme point of the island of Kishm, keeping in soundings of from six to fifteen fathoms. When you have

closed to the Kishm shore, steer about E. by S. ½ S., until off the village of Peypusht, attending particularly to your soundings, and not coming under six fathoms. You may now steer along the Kishm shore in soundings of from six to twelve or thirteen fathoms, at a distance of a large quarter of a mile, until you come to the village of Durgaum. You must now steer out NE. by E. ½ E. to NE. by E.: this will carry you out of the straits, in soundings of from six to eleven fathoms.

Mosha.

Mosha is a village opposite Bassadore, with a few inhabitants, mostly fishermen and wood-cutters. From this to the commencement of the jungles the coast is uninhabited. The jungles begin about thirteen miles above this place, and continue on the Persian side to about lat. 26° 57′ 30″ N., long. 55° 47′ E.

Kammeer.

Kammeer is in lat. 26° 56′ 40″ N., long. 55° 40′ 20″ E., and belongs to the Imaum of Muskat. It has large mines of sulphur, and very large quantities are annually exported.

An old Mosque.

An old mosque stands in lat. 27° 40′ N., long. 56° 9′ E. In this old building were found written up the names of many persons, supposed to be of the old English factory, some of them dated as far back as 1727.

Sesoor.

Sesoor is a small village, with a town, in lat. 27° 9′ N., long. 56° 16′ E. It has about one hundred inhabitants, mostly fishermen.

Bunder Abbas.

Bunder Abbas is in lat. 27° 10′ 35″ N., long. 56° 18′ 48″ E. It was once a town of great trade and importance, but has much fallen off: it still has a considerable trade, the amount of customs averaging eight to ten thousand German crowns. Tobacco and dried fruits from Persia are exported; English piece goods and China and India goods to the amount of two or three lakhs of rupees are the imports. These things find their way into the interior of Persia by this route, since the disturbances at Bushire.

This place is said to be increasing in trade. There are very extensive ruins of the old English factory, which must have been a very superior building; there are the ruins of two block houses in front of it. The old Dutch factory is now the palace of the Imaum of Muskat, who farms the place from the Persian Government. It has a fluctuating population of about four or five thousand people, mostly Arabs and Persians, but there are a few Banians and Armenians settled here.

Ormus.

Ormus was an island formerly the grand emporium of the Portuguese commerce and power in the Gulf of Persia and Coast of Arabia. The fort, built by the Portuguese, is in lat. 27° 5′ 55″ N., long. 56° 29′ 5″ E. It is a barren rocky island, covered with salt, except the north-east part, which is low and sandy. It has no water, except what is saved in reservoirs during the rains. There are a number of these reservoirs in good repair, and the ruins of some hundreds, which show what the place has been. The old Portuguese lighthouse is still standing, though fast falling to decay. Large quantities of salt are exported from this island to all parts of the Gulf, and Coasts of Arabia; the Imaum of Muskat, to whom it belongs, keeps a garrison of about one hundred men in the fort. There are about four hundred inhabitants, mostly employed in the salt trade, and as fishermen; they are strict Mahomedans. There is good anchorage to the eastward of the fort in a north-wester, and to the westward in a south-easter.

Island of Kishm.

The island of Kishm (Jazeerat Towile of the Arabs, Jazeerat Dras of the Persians, and the Oaracta of Arrian) was visited by Nearchus in his voyage from the Indus to the Euphrates. Arrian states that at that time it produced abundance of corn, vines, and fruit of all descriptions. The Greeks, with their usual superstition, stated the tomb of the first monarch of the island, named Erythras, was then in existence, and from which they named the Gulf the Erythrian Sea. The island is fifty-four miles long, and thirty-two wide in the broadest part, and nine in the narrowest. Before the pirates became so powerful, it had about seventy small towns and villages, and a population of about twenty thousand inhabitants. A very great part of these were weavers; others cultivated the soil; and others were fishermen. Most of these were destroyed, or obliged to seek shelter elsewhere, during the time the pirates were in power: many are now returning; but the island will never be what it is said to have been again. It belongs to the Imaum of Muskat.

Goree.

Goree is a small village, producing a few dates, vegetables, and other supplies, about five miles from Bassadore.

Drakoon.

Drakoon is a similar village, about a mile and three quarters above Goree.

Point Nakoona.

Point Nakoona is a small projecting point, about a mile past Drakoon.

KONNASEER.

Konnaseer is a small village, inhabited by a few families of fishermen, and wood-cutters, about three quarters of a mile above Point Nakoona.

TURSOO.

Tursoo is a large village, producing dates, vegetables, and a few supplies, a mile and a quarter from Konnaseer.

CHANNOO.

Channoo is a small village, about three and a half miles further up the channel. The people, about seventy in number, are weavers and wood-cutters.

LUCY'S PEAK.

Lucy's Peak is a remarkable peak about two miles inland, and five and a quarter from the village of Channoo.

GORAM.

Goram is a small village, said to have formerly been a Portuguese station, at the entrance of the straits of the same name; it may be known by an old mosque. There are some reservoirs, and after rain there is plenty of good water here.

LUFT.

Luft is a fortified village or town on the side of a hill, at the eastern entrance of Khore Goram. It had several towers and a wall down one side the hill, besides a Ghuree. Colonel Smith and Captain Wainright, in 1809, despising their enemy, thought to carry it at once by escalade, but they were beaten off with considerable loss, and the men obliged to lay on the beach, not being able to embark them for the enemy's fire. The *Fury* and other cruisers were now brought in, and with the gunboats battered the place, when, after some time, it surrendered. Luft now contains only about two hundred inhabitants, has a few boats, and is the residence of the principal Shaikh on the island. It is in lat. 26° 53′ N., long. 55° 51′ 10″ E.

Remarks on the Navigation, &c. from Goram to Luft.—The whole of the centre, between Kishm and the Persian Coast, is full of small jungle islands, some having narrow channels, with six and eight fathoms water, between them. Up these the wood boats go, and this place supplies about three-fourths of the Gulf with firewood.

INDERABIA.

Inderabia fort is about two miles from Luft, and belongs to the Imaum of Muskat.

Inderabia Point is about a mile and a quarter from the fort, and is

the northern point of the Luft and Goram Channel. After passing this point three miles is a mosque, and an old ruined house.

PEYPUSHT.

Peypusht is a small village, nearly a mile inland, where some cattle and poultry may be obtained. It is six and a half miles from the mosque.

ZANOBEE.

Zanobee is a village, where cattle and poultry may be procured. It contains about one hundred inhabitants. It is about two and a half miles from Peypusht, and nearly a mile and a half inland.

DURGAUM.

Durgaum is a fishing village, on the beach, six and a half miles from Zanobee; it has about one hundred and twenty families, very poor.

KISHM.

The north point of the island of Kishm is in lat. 26° 59′ 30′ N., long. 56° 14′ E. Off it are two islets, and here is a place where vessels of three or four hundred tons might, in case of necessity, be hauled on shore to repair.

TOWN OF KISHM.

The town of Kishm is in lat. 26° 57′ 10′ N., long. 56° 18′ 50″ E. It is the principal town on the island, and contains about two thousand inhabitants. It has little trade, but is frequented by the trading vessels passing up and down the Gulf. Most of its inhabitants are sailors and fishermen: the former employ themselves on board the vessels belonging to Muskat, and other parts of the Gulf. A number of villages in various parts of the island are under the government of the Shaikh of this place. It was here, during the panic consequent on Captain Thompson's failure at Beni Boo Ali, the troops were removed, and were perched on a rock, where I have known a thermometer to burst at 160° when suspended to a tent rope. After five or six officers, and half the men, had died, they were removed to Sallack. The anchorage is good in a north-wester, but a chopping sea comes in with a south-easter; a bank runs in front of the town.

ISLAND OF LARRACK.

The island of Larrack is in lat. 26° 53′ 30″ N., long. 54° 25′ 10″ E. The fort is on the north side; the island has water on it, and is barren. Good anchorage may be found under it in a north-wester or south-easter.

BUNDER SHUSA.

Bunder Shusa is a small bay, twelve miles from the point off Kishm

town. To the westward it is fronted by two or three rocky islets, on the largest of which is a reservoir for water. Inside there is a fathom and a half and two fathoms water at low tide; native vessels take shelter here in blowing weather. This I consider to be Nearchus' second anchorage on the island of Oaracta, on the ninety-third day from the Indus. The village of Shusa, where a few cattle and poultry may be procured, is two miles further to the westward.

Messaim.

Messaim is five and a half miles further WSW., and is of a similar description to Shusa.

Ras Khargoo.

Ras Khargoo is opposite to Angaum, and forms the eastern point of the entrance into Angaum, round a rocky spit, with from three and a half fathoms to a fathom and a half. It runs about half a mile off it.

Angaum.

Angaum is a rocky island, similar to most in the Gulf. It is five miles long, in a SSW. ½ W. direction, and two and a half miles broad. It has several wells of water in it,—the best is in a valley, about a quarter of a mile distant NNW. from the south-east point of the island; there are some reservoirs near the old mosque, which are generally full in the rainy season. The island is uninhabited, but had a town near the old mosque until destroyed by the pirates. There is excellent anchorage near the old mosque, which is in lat. 26° 41′ N., long. 55° 55′ 52″ E.; variation 3° 37′ W. in 1828. Wild goats are found on this island.

Angaum Sound.

Angaum Sound is formed by the islands of Angaum and Kishm, and the channel at the south-east entrance is two-thirds of a mile wide. To enter and sail through this channel, steer in about mid-channel, with soundings from six to twelve fathoms, until you get Ras Khargoo NE. by E. ½ E., when keep most towards Angaum, steering towards the mosque point, which round at a distance of a quarter of a mile, having good soundings close to it. After rounding the mosque, keep in mid-channel, and steer through when the mosque on Angaum bears S. 32° W. true. There is a hard bank, with three fathoms on it, three-fourths over the channel towards Kishm, to work through. Do not approach the Angaum shore at the entrance nearer than one-third of a mile, in five fathoms, or the Kishm shore under five fathoms, until you get Ras Khargoo ENE., when you may work to a quarter of a mile of either shore, until past the mosque point, when you ought not to come nearer than three quarters of a mile to Angaum or Kishm. The sound

at this part is three miles wide, clear working ground, and four and a half from shore to shore.

Ras Sallack.

Ras Sallack is a low rocky point, in lat. 26° 41′ 15″ N., long. 55° 48′ 30″ E. It is safe to approach to five fathoms.

Sallack Village.

Sallack Village is two and a half miles to the westward of the cape, and has good water. The troops were removed from Kishm to this place, and after a few days to Bassadore, the anchorage being too much exposed for the shipping. Cattle, poultry, and fish are procurable, also a few vegetables in the cold season.

Ras Tarkaom.

Ras Tarkaom village is in lat. 26° 38′ 30″ N., long. 55° 38′ 10″ E. It is a small point and fishing village; off this begins the bank commonly called Bassadore Flat.

Ras Kharroon.

Ras Kharroon is in lat. 26° 34′ 10″ N., long. 55° 28′ E. You may pass it for the inner channel to Bassadore. Half a mile from here are several salt hills, and boats load with salt for the Arabian Coast.

Ras Drusterkoon.

Ras Drusterkoon is in lat. 26° 32′ 45″ N., long. 55° 24′ 30″ E. It is the south-western point of Kishm. A bank, dry at low-water, commences running off from this point to Bassadore Point, between which and the southern bank of the channel into Bassadore is a narrow channel, with soundings from three to ten fathoms at low-water, except about two and a half miles from Bassadore Point, when it contracts to about three hundred yards wide, with a fathom and a half and two fathoms in it.

CENTRE OF THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THE PEARL BANKS.

The centre of the Gulf towards its head is clear of dangers, except such as have been already described with the coast and islands, with soundings varying from nine to twenty-six fathoms above the parallel of 28°.

Biddulph's Group.

Biddulph's Group are called so from Captain Biddulph, of Her Majesty's sloop *Hesper*, being the first person who visited and made any remarks on them; they are three in number, as follow.

Hargose.

Hargose is a small, sandy, and rocky island, surrounded by a reef of rocks. It is at high-water not more than two hundred yards over. The anchorage near it is bad, being hard rock and sand. It is in lat. 27° 55′ 30″ N., long. 49° 44′ E.

El Kraing.

El Kraing is about three quarters of a mile long, and, like Hargose, surrounded by a reef, extending off all except the south end, two and a half miles. Under the southern end is pretty good anchorage in eight fathoms, low-water, and you may catch good fish at this place. It is in lat. 27° 42′ 10″ N., long. 49° 51′ 10″ E.; variation 4° 55′ W. in 1825.

El Krong.

El Krong is similar to the last; but within the reef, off, and surrounding it, is a basin or boat harbour, in which the pearl fishing-boats take shelter in bad weather. It is in lat. 27° 38′ 10″ N., long. 49° 51′ 10″ E. Between this island and El Kraing is a safe channel, having ten fathoms in it.

ZAZARINE, OR FARSEE.

Zazarine, or Farsee, is a small island, composed of sand and rock. It is half a mile over, and is surrounded by a reef a mile off shore all round it; it has bad anchorage in fifteen fathoms, mud. The island abounds in fish, and is frequented by turtle. It is in lat. 27° 58′ 40″ N., long. 50° 8′ 10″ E.

KEYN, OR ARABEE.

Keyn, or Arabee, is in lat. 27° 46′ N., long. 50° 9′ 20″ E. It is similar in every respect to Zazarine, and has bad anchorage in eighteen fathoms.

JENNEE.

Jennee is a small sandy island, similar to the others, and surrounded by a reef, having soundings round it from thirteen to seven fathoms; the anchorage bad. It is in lat. 27° 20′ 30″ N., long. 49° 50′ 15″ E.

YEREDEL.

Yeredel is rather smaller than Jennee, and the reef not quite so extensive, with similar soundings; and is in lat. 27° 10′ 30″ N., long. 49° 53′ 10″ E.

ROCKY BANK.

A rocky bank, having barely one fathom water on it, bears from El Krong W. 17° S., twelve and a half miles, in lat. 27° 34′ 20″ N., long. 49° 36′ 20″ E., in its north-eastern part. It extends WSW. five and a half miles, and has eight fathoms close to it, sand and mud, on its northern side.

NEARLY EAST OF EL KRON.

Nearly east of El Kron, distant eight or nine miles, is a small patch, with only five fathoms on it.

Remarks.—From lat. 27° 39′ N., long. 49° 24′ E., to the island of El Kron, northerly to the Boosafaa or Durable Shoal, to the south-east enclosing the islands of Yeredel, Jennee, and the Mullamael Shoals, is full of patches and shoals, and should not be attempted to be navigated at night, nor yet in the day, without a pilot, unless well acquainted with the place.

ROCKY KNOLL.

Rocky Knoll is very small, and nearly dry, in lat. 26° 59′ 30″ N., long. 49° 56′ 30″ E.; soundings ten and seven fathoms close to it.

THREE SMALL PATCHES.

Three small patches extend from lat. 27° 13′ N., long. 50° E., in a south-west direction, nine miles.

A SHOAL.

A shoal, the shoalest part of which has two and a half fathoms on it, lies in lat. 27° 8′ N., long. 50° 9′ 30″ E. It is three miles long, in a north-east direction.

MULLAMAEL SHOAL.

The shoalest part of Mallamael Shoal, two and a quarter fathoms, is in lat. 26° 59′ N., long. 50° 16′ 40″ E. This shoal is oblong, and has soundings in the other parts from three to seventeen fathoms, very irregular.

BOOSAFAA, OR DURABLE SHOAL.

The northern part of Boosafaa or Durable Shoal is in lat. 26° 59′ N., long. 50° 24′ 20″ E., and extends six miles S. 30° E. true. It has barely one fathom on it at low-water. In approching it from the northward, the soundings shoal suddenly after twenty fathoms. The ship *Durable*, Guthrie, Master, was lost here in 1817, which was the first of the shoal's existence being known to Europeans.

EPHERAH PEARL BANK.

Epherah Pearl Bank is a bank of rocks, and considered one of the richest of the pearl banks. It has sixteen fathoms water to the northward, and ten to the southward. On the bank, the soundings are irregular, from four to eight fathoms. The centre of the bank is in lat. 26° 50′ N., long. 50° 37′ 30″ E. It is about five miles over from north to south, and about ten miles from east to west.

FASHT SURRAH.

Fasht Surrah is in lat. 26° 40′ N., long. 50° 36′ E., to lat. 26° 36′ N.,

long. 50° 23′ E. Its widest part is two and a half miles over, and soundings two to four fathoms. It is composed of rocks and sand.

FASHT EL NOWAH.

The centre of the dry part of Fasht el Nowah is in lat. 26° 32′ 10″ N., long. 50° 19′.30″ E. It extends N. by W. and S. by E. five miles, its widest part east and west being three and a half miles. It is more than half dry, and the other part has one to two fathoms on it. It fronts Kateef Bay, and there is a channel with four and five fathoms water between it and the Fasht el Yarron, or Teignmouth Shoal.

ROCKY BANK.

The centre of a rocky bank, with soundings from nine to ten fathoms, and eighteen to the northward and fifteen to the southward, is in lat. 26° 53′ 50″ N., long. 50° 49′ E. It has no danger.

ROCKY BANK.

Another rocky bank, with over-falls from six to twenty fathoms on its centre, lies in lat. 26° 54′ N., long. 51° E. It extends to E. by N. and W. by S. about six miles each way.

OVERFALL BANK.

Overfall Bank is a rocky bank, extending from lat. 26° 48′ N., long. 51° 8′ E., to lat. 26° 36′ N., long. 51° 45′ E., and has soundings of from nine to twenty fathoms on it, rocky bottom.

THE PEARL BANK.

The Pearl Bank commences at the island of El Kron, and continues, varying in breadth, to abreast of the town of Shargah. Its widest part is among what are called Mandes Islands, and the narrowest off Jazeerat Boo Ali. The richest fishing grounds are what are usually termed the Bahrein Banks: they extend from lat. 27° N., long. 50° E., to the eastern end of Overfall Bank. The Overfall Bank is one of the richest, but is only fished in very fine weather, being deep water, and far off shore; next to it is the Epherah Bank, where some of the most valuable pearls have been found. About three thousand boats are at times out on the banks, and each boat contains from five to fourteen men. As the banks are free for all, so all the maritime people of the Gulf take a share in the fishery; and it is an enlivening scene to see the boats at anchor, and sailing about—all employed. The whole of the Pearl Bank is composed of broken corally rock and sand; in a few places you find a patch of mud. The soundings are in most parts irregular, from twenty-two to four fathoms.

Remarks.—The centre of the Gulf, off the Pearl Bank, is clear of danger, with soundings, over a bottom of mud, from twenty at the upper part to forty and fifty fathoms through most of the other parts, to eighty fathoms off the Quoins. At the entrance the Gulf abounds with all kinds of fish, which are cheaply purchased from the boats.

INHABITANTS OF THE GULF OF PERSIA.

The inhabitants on the Arabian side are Mahomedans of all sects, Wahabee, Soonee, and Sheea. In most of the ports are to be found Banian merchants, also Jews and Armenians. The trade of the Gulf is extensive, and most of those maritime places which have not the means or a demand among themselves are the carriers for the other places. Some of the finest of the Buggalows trading from the Gulf to India belong to these places. At the time the pirates were in power, there were not more than one hundred and twenty Buggalows and Buteels belonging to the Gulf of above seventy tons: three-fourths of these belonged to Grane, Bahrein, and Muskat.

Since a regular force has been kept in the Gulf to keep the pirates down, they have increased to near six hundred; and the trade with India, particularly with the Malabar Coast and Bombay, has become very considerable. The Arabs take off every year a large part of the rice grown in Malabar, and large quantities of timber, for which they pay in dates or hard cash, but mostly the latter. I may add here, that though the pirates are kept down, they are not suppressed, and if opportunity offered they would soon be up again. They possess some of the finest vessels in the Gulf. One thing—the surveys of the Gulf will in future times prevent their escape among the islands and shoals, as they did before, while the Officers of the Indian Navy, from constantly navigating the Gulf, will be able to follow them wherever they go.

WINDS AND CURRENTS.

At the head of the Gulf, during the months of November, December, January, and part of March, the winds blow alternately from north-west and south-east, but with no regularity, as during those periods when it blows hard the wind will be in opposite directions within a very short distance. During these strong breezes, which seldom last beyond four days in the north-westers, the air is clear, cold, and bracing; in the south-easters the air is generally moist, and rainy. When the winds are

light the weather is generally hazy. From the middle of March to September, the winds are mostly from the north-west, sometimes blowing very hard. Southerly winds seldom blow after March. You have also occasionally land and sea-breezes. From the middle of May to the end of June the wind called the grand Shamall blows: this is a continued north-west wind, and at times blowing with great fury, in hard gusts,—at other times light. It must have much altered since McClure's time, who speaks of ships being unable to show sail above their courses to it at all parts above Bushire.

The tides are quite regular at Bushire—it is high-water at full and change at 7h. 50m.; at Karrack 9h. 20m., at Dillum 10h. 20m., half way between that and the bar off Khore Mooza at 11h. 10m., and at Bussora Bar at 12h. 10m. The same remarks apply from the island of Kenn or Ghes up to Bushire, so far as regards the winds, with the exception that they are much lighter, except in the winter months, when they blow hard, and often in heavy squalls. Except inshore, the tides here are more irregular, being much influenced by the winds from Kenn down to the Quoins. The winds hang in those months most to the eastward and westward, when blowing strong from the north-west and south-east above, taking the direction of the coast, and near the entrance are frequently at north-east and south-west. Strong easterly breezes occasionally blow in the hot season, and the land winds, particularly on the Arabian Coast, are hot and blasting.

At the head of the Gulf the thermometer ranges from 48° to about 76° in the cold months, and from 85° to 110° in the hot; at the lower part the range in the hot weather is much the same, and from 54° to 78° in the cold.

At the entrance of the Gulf, and outside of it from Muskat to the Quoins, the tides and currents are variable and uncertain (except on the Persian Coast, where there is a regular tide), and depend much upon the winds. When calm, or light winds blow near the entrance of the Gulf, the influence of the tide is felt across the whole from coast to coast.

PRODUCE.

Until the unsettled state of Turkish Arabia and Persia, and the recent ravages of the plague, a brisk trade was carried on in the Gulf, in silk, dried fruits, gums, dates, and horses, from Bushire in Persia; the same, with copper and many other similar articles, from Bussora, to a very large amount; to these may be added pearls and specie, to the amount of sixty or eighty lakhs of rupees annually. For this the owners took British manufactures; China produce; rice and timber from Malabar;

indigo, rice, sugar, British piece goods, and country chintz from Bengal and the Coromandel Coast; and though I have not now sufficiently correct data, I believe at one time the exports from British India to the Gulf were little short of eighty or ninety lakhs of rupees. As the place gets settled, this trade will revive. About fifteen hundred to two thousand five hundred African slaves are brought into the Gulf every year by the way of Muskat, besides which I believe two or three hundred girls are brought from the Malabar Coast, Kutch, and even Bombay—at least I have frequently been told so by Arabs and others. A great portion of these are children.

Fruits are in their seasons very plentiful at the head of the Gulf, particularly on the banks of the Euphrates, and at Bushire: they consist of nectarines, peaches, apricots, apples, pears, grapes of various sorts, plums, melons, quinces, and many others; carrots, turnips, occasionally cabbages, beet, and various sallads, are also to be had in season; onions, cucumbers, and the usual native vegetables. The meat on the Arabian Coast is mostly good; on the Persian Coast only occasionally so, and it is also dear. The poultry at the head of the Gulf is very large and fine; low down very indifferent. Fish in all parts plentiful, and excellent.

1.17
The character and status of Sultan b. Saqr, October 1819–February 1820

32 Bushire February 11th 1820.

To
Captain W. Bruce
Resident at
Sir Bushire

I am directed by the Honble the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your Dispatch dated the 27th of October in reply to Mr Acting Chief Secretary Bruce's letter of the 31st of July

2d. The attention of the Governor in Council has been attracted to that part of Communication which has reference to Sultan Bin Saggur & how you represent to the Chief of Rasel Khyma who was last expedition attacked the place and bears a character of being a much more sanguinary character than the present rulers of Rasel Khyma

3. As the information derivable from the records of the Bombay Government is at variance with that statement, and as it is of importance that the Governor in Council should

Bushire February 11th 1820

[illegible] the most accurate intelligence in respect to the Character of the different persons in the Gulfs and of Sultan Bin Suggur in particular, you will be pleased to explain the grounds on which your Statement may be forwarded.

4 By the records of this Government it would appear that previous to the period of the Joasmee expedition, the authority of Sultan Bin Suggur had been superseded in the Sea principality of which Rasel Khyma is the Chief Sea Port by the Cabobee Chief, who has appointed his own Agents throughout the Joasmee Country; that the Joasmee Chief having been invited to Lingah was detained and imprisoned by the Cabobee Chief, he contrived to effect his escape and finding his way to Muscat, embarked at Mocha, and proceeding to Muscat made overtures to the Imaum and to sought his Highness's protection the Imaum took him to Sharjah and placed him over the Joasmee tribes at that place, the Shark accordingly living at Lingah; and it would appear also that the Imaum has subsequently made repeated attempts to restore Sultan Suggur to his hereditary possessions which he has hitherto failed to accomplish.

5 Hence it does not appear that Sultan Suggur has for these last two years at least exercised any Controul over the Joasmee at Rasel Khyma, whence the pirates must have been Carried on by those placed in authority at that Port by the Cabobee Chief whose interest it must of Course be to exclude the legitimate Chief from

34 Bushire February 11th 1820

his prospects & prevents the Chiefs of Rasel Khyma from entering into any engagement with him,

6. the Governor in Council is desirous of being furnished with information of the grounds on which you state that Sultan Suggur bears a character of being a much more Sanguinary Minded than the present Rulers of Rasel Khyma, and as he would appear not to have abandoned the object of recovering his antient patrimony, and would seem also to be supported by the Beni Yas Arabs and by other tribes probably whose power ought not to be lightly regarded, you are desired to ascertain and report whether the unpopularity of this Chief among his own tribe arises out of any repugnance to his personal Character or been instigated by those who are at present in authority at Rasel Khyma,

7 A Copy of this letter has been transmitted to Major General Sir Williams Grant Keir to whom you will also furnish a Copy of your reply

I have the Honor to be
Sir
Your Most Obedient Humble
Servant
Signed J. Bruce

Bombay Castle
4th December 1819

Transcription of previous document

Bushire February 14th 1820

To:

Captain W. Bruce
Resident at
Bushire

Sir

I am directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 27th of October in reply to Mr Acting Chief Secretary Newnham's letter of the 30th of July.

2. The attention of the Governor in Council has been attracted to that part of communication which has relation to Sultan Bin Suggur whom you represent as the Chief (of Rasel Khyma) when our last expedition attacked the place and bears a character of being a much more sanguinary monster than the present rulers of Rasel Khyma.

3. As the information derivable from the records of the Bombay Government is at variance with that statement, and as it is of importance that the Governor in Council should possess the most accurate intelligence in respect to the character of the different powers in the Gulph and of Sultan Bin Suggur in particular, you will be pleased to explain the grounds on which your statement may be forwarded.

4. By the records of this Government it would appear that, prior to the period of the former expedition, the authority of Sultan Bin Suggur had been superseded in the sea principallity of which Rassel Khyma is the chief sea port by the Wahabee chief, who has appointed his own officers throughout the Juassmo country; that the Joasmoo chief having been invited to Deriah was detained and imprisoned by the Wahabee chief. He contrived to effect his escape and finding his way to Yemen, embarked at Mocha and proceeding to Muscat made overtures to the Imaum and besought His Highness's protection. The Imaum took him to Shargah and placed him over the Joassme tribes at that place, the Shaik occasionally living at Lingah, and it would appear also that the Imaum has subsequently made repeated attempts to restore Sultan Suggur to his hereditary possessions which he has hitherto failed to accomplish.

Bushire February 14th 1820

5. Hence it does not appear that Sultan Suggur has for these last two years at least, exercised any control over the Joassmees at Rassel Khyma, whence the piracies must have been carried out by those placed in authority at that port by the Wahabee chief whose interest it must of course be to exclude the legitimate Shaik from his possessions, and prevent the Chiefs of Rassel Khyma from entering into any engagement with him.

6. The Governor in Council is desirous of being furnished with information of the grounds on which you state that Sultan Suggur "bears a character of being a much more sanguinary monster than the present Rulers of Rassel Khyma", and as he would appear not to have abandoned the object of recovering his ancient patrimony, and would seem also to be supported by the Beni Yas Arabs and by other tribes probably whose power ought not to be lightly regarded, you are desired to ascertain and report whether the unpopularity of this Chief among his own tribe arises out of any repugnance to his personal character or been instigated by those who are at present in authority at Rassel Khyma.

7. A copy of this letter has been transmitted to Major General Sir William Grant Keir to whom you will also furnish a copy of your reply.

I have the honour to be Sir
Your Most Obedient Humble Servant
Signed F. Warden

Bombay Castle
4th December 1819

436

Bombay Castle 8th March 1820

Francis Warden Esqre
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Sir,

The Government Commands me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th December in reply to my address of the 27th October last, & has directed me to receive this morning and to communicate in writing to the Honble Board such information as I possess regarding the Character of Sultan Sugger, as called for in their

437

Bombay Castle 8th March 1820

their present Commands, on their attention has been attracted to that part of my communication which has reference to Sultan Sugger whom I represented as Chief of Ras-al-Khyma previous to our last expedition against the place & described his Character as being a much more Sanguinary & Monster than the present Rulers of Ras-al-Khyma: as the information derivable from the Government records is at variance with that Statement & as it is of importance that the Governor in Council should possess the most accurate intelligence in respect to the Character of the different powers in the Gulf & of Sultan Sugger in particular I will be prepared to explain the grounds my Statement may be founded.

Further by the Records of Government it would appear that prior to the period of the former Expedition the authority of Sultan Sugger

438

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

Sugger had been superceded in the Sea principality of which Ras-ul-Khyma is the Chief Sea Port, by the Wahabee Chief, who had appointed his own Officers throughout the Joasmee Country, that the Joasmee Chief having been invited to Dusk was detained and imprisoned by the Wahabee Chief, he contrived to effect his escape, and finding his way to Yemen embarked at Mocha, & proceeding to Muscat, made Overtures to the Imaum and besought his Highness's protection.

The Imaum took him to Shagur & placed him over the Joasmee Tribes at that place, the Chief occasionally living at Lingua, and it would appear also, that the Imaum has subsequently made attempts to restore Sultan Sugger to his hereditary possessions which he has hitherto failed to accomplish. Hence it does not appear that Sultan Sugger has for these ten

439

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

Ten years at least exercised any Control on the Joasmees at Ras-ul-Khyma, whence the piracies must have been carried on by those placed in authority at that Port by the Wahabee Chief, such interest it must of course be to exclude the legitimate Chief from his possessions, & "prevent "the Chief of Ras-ul-Khyma from entering into "any engagements with him."

The Governor in Council is desirous of being furnished with information of the grounds on which it is stated that Sultan Sugger "bears a Character of being a much more Sanguinary Monster than the present Rulers of Ras-ul-"Khyma" and as he would appear not to have abandoned the object of recovering his ancient patrimony and would seem also to be supported by the Beni Yas Arabs and by other Tribes probably whose power ought not to be slightly regarded

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

regarded. — I am desired to ascertain and report whether the unpopularity of this Chief among his own tribes arises out of any repugnance to his personal Character, or been instigated by those who are at present in authority at Ras-ul-Khyma.

A Copy of this letter has been transmitted to Major General Sir Wm. Grant Keir K.C.B. &c. &c. from whom I will also furnish a Copy of my reply.

I am compliance I have the honor to acquaint you for the information of the Hon'ble The Governor in Council, that the Character stated by me of Sultan Sugger has been derived principally from the different Chieftains in the Gulf with whom I have had opportunities of conversing many of them closely connected to him by ties of Blood and marriage, His Highness the Imaum has also in a great measure

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

confirmed this opinion, and his only motives in assisting Sultan Sugger, has been with a view of sweakening the power of Ras-ul-Khyma, nor avowed His Highness if he had succeeded in getting possession of that place, have left it in charge of Sultan Sugger without a Garrison of his own, from the too well known want of faith of the latter, this is so notorious that his best friends and nearest connections are obliged to allow its foremost of the acts of plunder &c. such he has committed against the different Ports of the Gulf, have been done at the time of his being on the best footing with them, indeed it is from the little reliance to be placed on his word that his own tribe rejects him, as he is certainly the legitimate Heir to the Chieftainship of the Joasmees, while Hyfan Ben Rahma the present avowed Head & half Cousin to Sultan Sugger

442

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

Sugger returns the Chiefships, altho' he is on the female side born from an Abissinian Slave and which amongst the Arab Tribes is always looked upon in a very inferior light) merely because a confidence can be placed in him —

Both attempts in which the Imaum of Muscat made to place Sultan Sugger in possession of Ras-el-Khyma, were frustrated by the Caller's own intrigues, the first one after his return from Yeman [illegible] was present at in the Female along with H. M. Ship Hesper Captain Bidulph. He accompanied His Highness's Fleet to Ras-el-Khima where we left him, waiting to be joined by Sultan Sugger with a large force, as he supposed; but which proved to be nothing, as the party which he made His Highness believe were in his interest at Ras-el-Khymah and which would declare for him, refused to do so, not from any influence of

443

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

of the Wahabee's Chief Officers over them, but more from the character he bore, — as they had found that more reliance was to be placed in Hassan bin Rama & the other Chiefs, His Highness has since that period more or less assisted Sultan Sugger with a view of keeping up the division in the Tribe and this in some degree making it less powerful —

The Wahabee Chiefs Power was never very great at Ras-el-Khyma, nor could he depose any of its Chiefs — The only Officers kept by him there, was a Mullah or Chief Priest and an Officer to receive his fifth of plunder &c, and this last situation he was under the necessity of making over to Hassan bin Ali Jainage [illegible] Chief of Rumps and Jayah from the great reluctance with which the Chiefs received the Officers he put for this purpose, and to which could he have forced upon them

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

them he would have done so, indeed the Wahabee power was more nominal over Ras-ul-Khyma than otherwise, as Abdella bin Saood, was obliged from policy to allow the Chiefs an annual supply of Dates from Katiff, nearly equal to the amount of the fifths paid in his treasury.

Sultan Suggers power was paramount at Ras-ul-Khyma, at the time of the last Expedition. He never had any very great sway, nor indeed have the Chiefs since had, over the other Trade Ports, indeed frequent disputes and petty wars used to take place between them, each Port has ever been ruled by its own Chief, without allowing the Ras-ul-Khyma Chiefs to participate in any way, but the fifth for the Wahabee, which was remitted to Rastan bin Ali, as long as he resided there, & afterwards to Zayah on his removing. Boats from all the Ports cruized together, when the

445

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

the plunder was equally shared. Sultan Suggur while Chief received paying the fifths to the Wahabee and indeed endeavoured to resist the Wahabee Officers visiting Ras-ul-Khyma, it was this which induced that Chief to invite him up to Doriah, under a promise of agreeing to his wishes and furnishing him with a force to compel the other Chiefs to submit to his authority, which coming to the notice of the other Chiefs, they agreed to exclude him from Ras-ul-Khyma, and which they have ever since done, the Wahabee Chief imprisoned him, after his arrival at Doriah, from which he escaped as stated by Government. Sultan Suggers private Character I have learnt in a great measure from the man who employed for the release of Mrs Taylor, just previous to the Expedition in 1809/10, this man had resided many years under his authority, and in a manner

lived

446

Bombay Castle ..... 8th March 1820

lived with him as he was closely connected with him by marriage, his name was Sultan Bin Sudeirja, for he is now dead. He stated that the Tribe would be glad to receive Sultan Suggers as their Chief, and contribute to his support to the best of their means, on condition that he would abide by Hassan bin Ramia and the other Chiefs suggestions, and to this he has invariably agreed. Sultan Suggers not having committed acts of Piracy as often as the Chiefs of Ras-ul-Khyma has arose more from the want of means, than inclination, indeed he has never allowed any opportunity to pass him of committing plunder, when it has occurred. He captured a large Bugalah while laying off Linguah under British Colours with a valuable Cargo on board in 1815 at a time he openly corresponded with me in the most friendly terms, and it was under the idea that

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

Challenger, from the Sultan Sugger demanding restitution for the Bugalah and Cargo, then in possession at that time in the Gulf was that a Expedition would follow as soon as our Reports should reach the Presidency under this idea the Sultan Sugger sent a Man of War to Bushire to endeavour to come to some accommodation &c. regarding the Bugalah, and the intercession of the Shaikh of Bushire, the agents for the Bugalah agreed to receive a stipulated Sum payable by instalments at this like his general conduct whenever a bloodshed, for on the Shaikh of Bushire residing he him on the Subject sometime after accusing him for having placed him in a very unpleasant situation in the affair. He very coolly replied that he never intended to abide by the promise of his Vakeel, and that it was merely a measure for the moment, under the impression that

Bombay Castle ... 8th March 1820

that we intended to send up an Expedition to the Gulph. Indeed he had the impidence to send me a letter on the Subject during while I was at Ras-al-Khyma last month, I returned with a view of preventing me from giving Sir William Grant Keir, a true account of his Charactes; indeed the bearer of the letter brought a verbal Message to that effect.

I shall be most happy to find that my opinion of Sultan Sugger & the other Pirate Chiefs may prove to be erroneous, by their abiding by their engagements they have entered into, and that we may not have occasion to regret ere long the very great confidence we have placed in them. If the opinions of the peaceable community and Chiefs of the Gulf are deserving of notice, it bears hard on it that we shall.

I have now the honor to acquaint the Honble Board that I arrived here in His Majesty's Ship

150

Bombay Castle ..... 8th March 1820

Ship Curlew this Morning and shall avail there-
-turn of Major General Sir Wm Grant Keir, who
Presidency has gone on to Bushma in H.C.S. Ship
Liverpool, and is to be back here in a few days.

I have &c
(Signed) Wm Bruce
Secy

H.C.S. Ship Curlew
at anchor off the
Island of Kishm
14th Feby 1820

Transcription of previous document

Bombay Castle 8th March 1820

Francis Warden Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Sir,

The Government commands under date 4th December in reply to my address of the 27th October last, I had the honor to receive this morning and lose no time in giving the Honble Board such information as I possess regarding the character of Sultan Sugger, as called for in their present commands, as their attention has been attracted to that part of my communication which has relation to Sultan Sugger whom I represent "as Chief "(of Ras-ul-Khyma) when our past expedition attacked the place "and bears a character of being a much more sanguinary monster "than the present rulers of Ras-ul-Khyma", as the information derivable from the Government records is at variance with that statement and as it is of importance that the Governor in Council should possess the most accurate intelligence in respect to the character of the different powers in the Gulf, and Sultan Sugger in particular.

I will be pleased to explain the grounds my statement may be founded.

Further by the Records of Government it would appear that prior to the period of the former expedition the authority of Sultan Sugger had been superceded in the sea principality of which Ras-ul-Khyma is the Chief Sea Port by the Wahabee Chief, who had appointed his own officers, throughout the Joassmee country that the Joassmee chief having been invited to Deriah was detained and imprisoned by the Wahabee Chief, he contrived to effect his escape, and finding his way to Yeman embarked at Mocha, and proceeding to Muscat, made overtures to the Imaum and besought his Highness's protection.

The Imaum took him to Shagur and placed him over the Joassmee tribes at that place, the Shaik occasionally living at Lingua and it would appear also, that the Imaum has subsequently made attempts to restore Sultan Sugger to his hereditary possessions which he has hitherto failed to accomplish. Hence it does not appear that Sultan Sugger has for these ten years at least exercised any control on the Joassmees at Ras-ul-Khyma; whence the piracies must have been carried on by those placed in authority at that Port by the Wahabee Chief whose interest it

must of course be to exclude the legitimate Shaik from his possessions, and prevent the Chief of Ras-ul-Khyma from entering into any engagements with him."

The Governor in Council is desirous of being furnished with information of the grounds on which I state that Sultan Sugger "bears a character of being a much more sanguinary monster than the "present rulers of Ras-ul-Khyma", and as he would appear not to have abandoned the object of recovering his ancient patrimony and would seem also to be supported by the Beniyass Arabs and by other tribes, probably whose power ought not to be lightly regarded, I am desired to ascertain and report whether the unpopularity of this Chief among his own tribes arises out of any repugnance to his personal character, or been instigated by those who are at present in authority at Ras-ul-Khyma.

A copy of this letter has been transmitted to Major General Sir W. Grant Keir K.M.G. to whom I will also furnish a copy of my reply.

In compliance I have the honor to acquaint you for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council, that the character stated by me of Sultan Sugger has been derived principally from the different chieftains in the Gulf with whom I have had opportunities of conversing, many of them closely connected to him by ties of blood and marriage. His Highness the Imaum has also in a great measure confirmed this opinion, and his only motives in assisting Sultan Sugger has been with a view of weakening the power of Ras-ul-Khyma, nor would His Highness if he had succeeded in getting possession of that place, have left it in charge of Sultan Sugger without a garrison of his own from the too well known want of faith of the latter, this is so notorious that his best friends and nearest connections are obliged to allow it for most of the acts of plunder which he has committed against the different Ports of the Gulf, have been done at the time of his being on the best footing with them, indeed it is from the little reliance to be placed on his word that his own tribe rejects him, as he is certainly the legitimate heir to the Chieftainship of the Joassmees, while Hassan Ben Rahma the present avowed head and half cousin to Sultan Sugger retains the Chiefship, although he is on the female side born from an Abasinian slave (and which amongst the Arab tribes is always looked upon in a very inferior light) merely because a confidence can be placed in him.

Both attempts which the Imaum of Muscat made to place Sultan Sugger in possession of Ras-el Khyma were frustrated by the latter's own intrigues, the first one after his return from I was present at Bidulph in the Ternate along with H.M. Ship Hesper Captain Bidulph We accompanied His Highness's fleet to Ras-ul-Khima where we left him, waiting to be joined by Sultan Sugger with a large force, as he supposed, but which proved to be nothing, as the party which he made His Highness believe were in his interest at Ras-ul-Khymah, and which would declare for him, refused to do so, not from any influence of Wahabee's Chief Officers over them, but more from the character he bore, as they had found that more reliance was to be placed in Hassan ben Rama and the other Chiefs, His Highness has since that period more or less assisted Sultan Sugger with a view of keeping up the division in the tribe and this in some degree making it less powerful.

The Wahabee Chief's power was never very great at Ras-el-Khyma, nor could he depose any of its chiefs. The only officers kept by him there, was a Mullah or Chief Priest, and an officer to receive his fifth of plunder &c. and this last situation he was under the necessity of making over to Hassan ben Ali Fainage (the late Chief of Rumps and Zayah) from the great reluctance with which the Chiefs received the officers he put for this purpose, and which could he have forced upon them he would have done so, indeed the Wahabee power was more nominal over Ras-ul-Khyma than otherwise as Abdella ben Saood, was obliged from policy to allow the Chiefs an annual supply of dates from Katife, nearly equal to the amount of the fifths paid in his treasury.

Sultan Sugger's power was paramount at Ras-ul-Khyma, at the time of the last expedition. He never had any very great sway, nor indeed have the Chiefs since had, over the other pirate ports, indeed frequent disputes and petty wars used to take place between them, each Port has ever been ruled by its own Chief without allowing the Rasul- Khyma Chiefs to participate in any way, but the fifth for the Wahabee, which was remitted to Hassan ben Ali, as long as he resided there and afterwards to Zayah on his removing. Boats from all the ports cruized together when the plunder was equally shared. Sultan

Sugger while Chief resisted paying the fifths to the Wahabee and indeed endeavoured to resist the Wahabee officers residing at Ras-ul-Khyma. It was this which induced that Chief to invite him up to Deriah, under a promise of agreeing to his wishes and furnishing him with a force to compel the other Ports to submit to his authority which coming to the notice of the other Chiefs, they agreed to exclude him from Ras-ul-Khyma, and which they have ever since done, the Wahabee Chief imprisoned him after his arrival at Deriah from which he escaped as stated by Government. Sultan Sugger's private character I have learnt in a great measure from the man who I employed for the release of Mrs Taylor, just previous to the expedition in 1809/10, this man had resided many years under his authority, and in a manner lived with him as he was closely connected with him by marriage. His name was Sultan Bunderigee, for he is now dead. He stated that the tribe would be glad to receive Sultan Sugger as their Chief, and contributed his support to the best of their means, on condition that he would abide by Hassan ben Rama's and the other Chief's suggestions, but to this he has invariably refused. Sultan Sugger's not having committed acts of piracy as often as the Chiefs of Ras-ul-Khyma has arose more from the want of means, than inclination, indeed he has never allowed any opportunity to pass him of committing plunder, when it has occurred. He captured a large Bugalah while laying off Linguah under British colours with a valuable cargo on board in 1815 at a time he openly corresponded with me in the most friendly terms, and it was under the idea that Linguah was a friendly port. The Bugalah had put in for water and was in the act of watering at the time. Sultan Sugger's people boarded and instantly made sail on her. After taking her over to Sharga he disputed about the division of property with the people who he had employed, a party from the Soodan tribe living with him at Sharga. The dispute became warm, when he put the torch to the vessel and burnt her. After this he wrote me a long letter endeavouring to excuse his conduct, saying he wished to recover the vessel from the Soodan Arabs with a view of sending her up to Bushire. At this very time Linguah was under his authority, indeed the present Shaik of Linguah, Shaik Md. ben Quiazeab, is a first cousin of Sultan Suggers.

In 1816 when I visited Ras-ul-Khyma with Captain Bridges of H.M. Ship Challenger, I wrote Sultan Sugger demanding restitution for the Bugalah and cargo. The impression at that time in the Gulf was that an Expedition would follow as soon as our reports should reach the Residency. Under this idea Sultan Sugger sent a man up to Bushire to endeavour to come to some accommodation regarding the Bugalah, and through the intercession of the Shaiks of Bushire, the agents for the Bugalah agreed to receive a stipulated sum, payable by instalments. This like his general conduct he never abided by, for on the Shaik of Bushire writing to him on the subject some time after accusing him for having placed him in a very unpleasant situation in the affair, he very early replied that he never intended to abide by the promise of his Vakeel, and that it was merely a measure for the moment, under the impression that we intended to send up an Expedition to the Gulph. Indeed he had the impudence to send me a letter on the subject again while I was at Ras-ul-Khyma last month, no doubt with a view of preventing me from giving Sir William Grant Keir a true account of his character, indeed the bearer of the letter brought a verbal message to that effect.

I shall be most happy to find that my opinion of Sultan Sugger and the other pirate chiefs may prove to be erroneous, by their abiding by their engagements they have entered into and that we may not have occasion to regret for long the very great confidence we have placed in them. If the opinions of the peaceable community and Chiefs of the Gulf are deserving of notice, it bears hard on it that we shall.

I have now the honor to acquaint the Honble Board that I arrived here in His Majesty's Ship Curlew this morning and shall await the return of Major General Sir Wm Grant Keir, who I understand has gone on to Kishma in H.M's Ship Liverpool, and is to be back here in a few days.

I have &c.
(Signed) Wm Bruce
Rest.

H.M.'s Ship Curlew
at anchor off the
Island of Khen
14th Febry 1820

1.18
An account of Sharjah, August 1820







No. 16. Bushire December 31st 1820.

[illegible] reception of the entrance of the Creek about [illegible] below the Town, At first there were some [illegible] appearance of jealousy and mistrust manifested [illegible] the Arabs on the occasion of our Mission to their Port, [illegible] the Shaikh did not make his appearance we were [illegible] in manner that he was absent in the Country, [illegible] were otherwise evident that some anxiety and [illegible] existed with the real object of our Visit.

This However was soon dispelled by [illegible] appearance that we had no hostile Views: and on [illegible] being urged for a personal interview with the Chief [illegible] was informed that he would arrive and meet me in the after- [illegible] noon. Shortly after words Shaik Serdhan Came down, [illegible] we had a long Conference with him of a most satisfactory [illegible] nature in the Course of which every friendly assurance was [illegible] expressed on both sides. He received many marks of politeness [illegible] and respect from the Shaikh and we were all treated with great [illegible] hospitality and attention. A Royal Salute which was [illegible] fired at 1 P.M. with 12 G. by the 2 Cruizers in honor of our [illegible] Sovereigns Birth day, was also returned by the Arabs on shore [illegible] kindly as a Compliment to that occasion. In the Course [illegible] of conversation the Shaikh informed me that the Donkey, the mules [illegible] and the Camels which had been left at Rasulkhyma [illegible] from whence we evacuated the place had by directions been [illegible] taken Care of until he knew the pleasure of the English Authorities [illegible] Bushire as to their disposal. He had strictly forbidden [illegible] any person from Surbang in settling on the Site of Rasulkhyma [illegible] and I have every pleasure [illegible] stated that the [illegible]



Bushire December 31st 1820. 16

[illegible] the most evident wish to Cultivate and [illegible] [illegible] friendship and alliance with the English Authorities and [illegible] [illegible] most respectfully to assure us in presenting his Nephew [illegible] [illegible] during the present period of the Year. He inquired [illegible] respectfully at our departure from Rasulkhyma as to [illegible] [illegible] permanence there. encouraged and hoped the Natives should [illegible] tranquility. and afforded a sincere protection on his North [illegible] boundary. He was accordingly desirous that Shaikh [illegible] strongly to your Notice the present unsettled and [illegible] situation of this Territory, which he said was open to [illegible] for being without Forts. he had not sufficient means of [illegible] Self against his jealous Neighbours. and he should very much [illegible] to obtain our Representation to limit their Forts within [illegible] the one at Rasulkhyma and the other at Lingah. the former [illegible] being near his North Eastern Boundary. and the latter to [illegible] protect him with South west, from the encroachments of the [illegible] Joasmi Tribes at Lingah with whom he appears to be on [illegible] hostility. and on that account he has erected a Watch House [illegible] or Tower, with a Gun of your Presents on it to Guard the [illegible] Sandy Peninsula to the westward of the Town. — The [illegible] the only perceptible difference at this Place since the Expedition [illegible] was there. On the Creek besides the small fishing Boats [illegible] there were the following Vessels.

Baggalows	of the 2nd Class	Two
Trankeys	of the 2d Class	Two
Bagarahs	of large size	Two
		and Boats.

on the 11th Instant I have received from the Chief [illegible] of Shargo an answer to the letter which I sent to Shargo with

118 Bushire December 31st 1820

also a Separate letter addressed to the authorities with the Coast subject to him, and Two intelligent Arabs, I accepted and Coasted along shore to the North Eastward.

At the Towns "Corroni" "Margoroni" and "Ligorno" we could perceive no alteration whatever any thing appears to remain in the same state, such as Expectation left them — at the first of these places we found Two Trankeys of the 2d Class lying in the Creek, and the latter place is uninhabited

at Lyah or the Port of Ramee there were no Boats of any description and I could see no people on shore at that place from the Ship.

On the evening of the 16th I anchored at Rasulkhyma where I under our precautions I Landed with Seamen Colliemen and fully inspected the Coasts, and surrounded the Towns of the Town in search which we found exactly in the same state as when our progress guided it.

The Inhabitants with Shaikh Sultan Bin Ramee were residing in the Date Groves according to Sultans Bin Saggurs custom Abroad, and the Peninsula or Isle of the Town was without a single resident or Habitations. the only Boats here were Fishing Boats were the Two Trankeys which I Landed on the day of anchorage and Two Bagarahs Apparently Pearl Boats. It may be satisfactory to know that those Two Towns which at a distance appeared to be — are found on a near inspection to be shattered Ruins, the Fortifications of the works utterly useless and

Rasulkhyma Lat. 25.48. N Long. 56.10. E

Bushire December 31st 1820 119

The two Arabs which I accepted from Shaikh [illegible] recommended him: and are Continued in the Service [illegible] by which I learned from the [illegible] no doubt but he would have received us with cordiality had them suspected to have [illegible] about, but [illegible] no object. I did not think it advisable to detain [illegible] under such Circumstances; nor to [illegible] to go inside the Creeks.

on the 20th I again Coasted back to Lingah and on the 21st I came off near to shore to speak with a Native Boat of the Shaikh, they were received with the usual marks of attention and Cordiality at the two Towns in Town. we then learnt that the Town of Margoroni had been deserted altogether the same as at Ramee, and the Inhabitants together with their Shaikh were residing at Sharjah under Sultan Bin Saggur in number about four or five hundred.

The Population of Sharjah as far as I could learn by my short visit could not be more or less than 4 or 5 thousand Inhabitants and they seem to be an industrious people, [illegible] from all parts of the adjoining Coast and Country — the People in the Town might amount to about 2000 persons [illegible] I do not think they or the Bombay [illegible] part of the Men doubtless have been accustomed to a [illegible] and piratical life in Conjunction with their Shaikh Rasulkhyma. Besides this Population [illegible] here were [illegible] understood several Tribes of Bedouins with



Transcription of previous document

To C. J. Maillard Esquire, Senr Officer and Acting
Political Agent, Deristan.

Sir

Having taken the H.C.C. Mercury under my orders I sailed in Company on the 9th and arrived at Shargah on the evening of the 11th inst. where we perceived the Peacified Flag was flying. We had no sooner anchored than two of the Principal Inhabitants were sent on board the Antelope to pay their respects and in the name of the Chief to offer their services. Having forwarded by their men the letter which I was charged with to Shaik Sooltan Bin Suggur I landed early the next morning in company with Lieut. Collinson and some other officers and was received with much courtesy and attention by Sallee Bin Suggur (Brother to the Shaik) attended by the Ministers and some others in a tent pitched expressly for our reception at the entrance of the Creek about a mile below the Town. At first there were some appearances of jealousy and mistrust manifested by the Arabs on the occasion of our Mission to their Ports and as the Shaik did not make his appearance we were told as an excuse that he was absent in the Country and it was otherwise evident that some anxiety and suspicion existed as to the real object of our visit. This however was soon dissipated by my assurances that we had no hostile views, and on my request being urged for a personal intereview with the Chief I was informed that he would arrive and meet me in the afternoon. Shortly afterwards Shaik Sooltan came down and we had a long conference with him of a most satisfactory nature in the course of which most friendly assurance was expressed on both sides. I received many marks of politeness and respect from the Shaik and we were all treated with great hospitality and attention. A Royal Salute which was fired at 1 p.m. on the 12th by the 2 cruizers in honor of our Sovereign's Birthday was also returned by the Arabs on shore distinctly as a compliment to that occasion. In the course of discussion

the Shaik informed me that the Trankey, the water casks and the camels which had been left at RassulKhyma by us when we vacated the place had by directions been taken care of until he knew the pleasure of the English Authorities at Deristan as to their disposal. He had strictly prohibited any person from building or settling on the site of RassulKhyma until he knew our pleasure therein. He stated that it was his most ardent wish to cultivate and maintain the strictest friendship and alliance with the English Authorities and that (he) should be most happy to assist us in preventing his Neighbours from disturbing the present peace of the Gulf. He expressed great regret at our departure from RassulKhyma and as much as our presence there overawed and kept the various Arab Tribes in tranquility and afforded a secure protection on his North Eastern boundary. He was exceedingly anxious that I should bring strongly to your notice the present exposed and insecure situation of his Territory which he said was open to invasion for being without Forts he had not sufficient means of defence left against his jealous Neighbours and he seemed very urgent to obtain our permission to build two Forts on his frontiers, the one at
RassulKhyma and the other at Sharga, the former being near the North Eastern boundary and the latter to protect him on the South West from the incursions of the Benee Yass Tribes at Debaye with whom he appears to be in hostility and on that account he has erected a Watch House or Tower with a sort of open railing in front across the sandy peninsula to the northward of the town. This was the only perceptible difference at this place since the Expedition was there.

In the Creek besides the small fishing boats there were the following vessels:

Buggalows	of the 2nd Class	Two
Trankeys	of the 2nd Class	Two
Bugerahs	or large sized) Pearl Boat)	Six

On the 14th instant having received from the Chief of Sharga an answer to the letter which I was charged with also a sercular

letter addressed to the authorities on the Coast subject to him and two intelligent Arabs I weighed and coasted alongshore to the North Eastward.

At the Towns "Emaun", "Margavine" and "Jezerut ul-Humra" we could perceive no alteration whatever every thing appears to remain in the same state which the Expedition left them. At the first of these places we observed two Trankeys of the 2nd Class lying in the Creek and the latter place is uninhabited.

At Zyah or the Port of Rams there were no boats of any description and I could see no people on shore at that place from the ship.

On the evening of the 16th I anchored at RassulKhyma where under our precaution I landed with Lieut Collinson and fully inspected the Creek and examined the Ruins of the Town in every part which we found exactly in the same state as when our garrison quitted it. The Wahabees with Shaik Hussan Bin Rama were residing in the Date Groves according to Sultan Bin Suggur's information, and the Peninsula or site of the Town was without a single resident or habitation. The only boats here besides fishing boats were the two Trankeys which were abandoned on the day of embarkation and two Bugarahs apparently Pearl Boats. It may be satisfactory to know that those two Towers which at a distance appeared standing entire we found on examination to be shattered and broken portions of the works utterly useless and inoperable.

The two Arabs which I brought from Shargah landed and remained here and we continued in the roads several days in the hope of receiving some communication from Shaik Hussan Bin Rama and by what I learned from the fishermen I have no doubt that he would have received us with curtesy if it had been necessary to have paid him a visit but as this was no object I did not think it advisable to solicit an interview under such circumstances, nor to permit my boats to go inside the Creek.

On the 20th I again coasted back to Shargah and on the 21st sent some officers on shore to pay my respects and take leave of the Shaik. They were received with the usual marks of

attention and cordiality at his own House in the Town. We now learnt that the Towers of Margavine had been deserted altogether (the same as ul-Humra) and the inhabitants together with the Shaik now resided at Shargah under Sultan Bin Suggur in number about four or five hundred.

The population of Shargah as far as I could learn (or my short visit enabled me to form an opinion) are mostly Wahabees and they seem to be an indolent and unsettled people collected from all parts of the adjoining Coast and Country. The people in the Town might amount to about 2000 persons in all but I do not think they exceed that number. Most of the men doubtless have been accustomed to a lawless and predatory life in common with their neighbours at RassulKhyma. Besides this population in the Town there were I understand several Tribes of Beddowins in the country which were subject to the constraint and at the call of the Shaik of Shaqer. The habits of these people being temperate and frugal their wants are but few. Their present means of subsistence seemed chiefly derived from the dates which their groves produce. Milk and fish which latter they are abundantly supplied with from the Bank bordering their Coasts. They have some cattle and poultry which appear to be kept chiefly for the sake of their produce.

I yesterday left Shargah and crossed the Gulf with the Mercury in Company and have arrived here this morning.

I have the honor to be Sir
Your most obedient Servant
(Signed Thos. Tanner Lt. Comdr.

H.C.C. Antelope
Anger Sound Deristan
August 23rd 1820
(Signed) C. J. Maillard
Acting Political Agent

1.19
The British Resident's report on his tour of the coast, February 1823

CHAPTER XXXVI.

AFFAIRS OF THE PERSIAN GULF: LIEUTENANT MACLEOD'S REPORT, 1823.

297. The following report of Lieutenant Macleod, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, is frequently quoted, and is perhaps the most exhaustive and interesting account of the state of Arab Tribes about the close of the first quarter of the 19th century (No. 8, dated 27th February 1823):—

I have the honour to report my proceedings during my visit to the Arabian ports of the Gulf for which I left Bassadore on the 12th January 1823.

2. On reaching Ramz I found that the Sheikh of that place who signed the treaty with Sir Williams Grant Keir has been deposed through the influence of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur and succeeded by a young man named Mahomed bin Abdul Rahman, whose father had formerly been Sheikh, until superseded by the late Sheikh Hussain bin Ali, who is now at Sharga. The young man excused himself from visiting me on board the ship, but sent his head man to whom I fully explained the purposes of my visit, and the arrangements which were to be made as directed in my instructions. He expressed his master's determination to abide by the treaty, and his readiness to comply with any measures which we might think fit to adopt in fulfilment of its engagement.

Sheikh of Ramz.

3. Ras-ul-Khima is entirely subject to Sultan bin Suggur, whose brother Sheikh Mahomed has been placed by him in charge of the Government. The former Sheikh Hossain bin Rama also resides there. The inhabitants, who have returned to the place, have established themselves on the beach, on the east side of the black-water, opposite to the former town, the whole of which remains in ruins, and deserted. The new town consists of good many huts built of reeds, with only one or two houses of mud. The creek still serves as a harbour for their boats.

Ras-ul-Khima.

4. As the Sheikh's people were very anxious to impress us with the idea that the whole coast from Ramas to Sharga was entirely subject to Sultan bin Suggur, I thought it necessary to explain that although this might be the case, yet that each Chief, whether dependent or otherwise, must hold himself answerable for the vessels belonging to his own port.

5. After visiting the town and receiving every assurance of the most friendly disposition, on the part of Sultan bin Suggur and his brother, I returned on board and proceeded to Jezirat-ul-Humra.

6. Sheikh Quezeeb bin Ahmed or Jezirat-ul-Humra is dead and has been succeeded by Sheikh Muhzim bin 'Abdul Rahman Suggu: the Sheikh himself was absent at Mascat, but his son Mahomed bin Muhzim came on board. He acknowledged most fully the general obligation of the treaty, but seemed very ignorant of its particular conditions, since he admitted that although he had two boats in trading voyages, neither of them had either pass or colours; and he seemed quite unconscious of the impropriety of this neglect, or the danger to which his vessels were exposed. On my explaining the purpose of my visit, he promised faithfully to abide by his engagements, and furnished both of his vessels for registry. He acknowledged generally the supremacy of Sultan bin Suggur, but declared that he considered himself fully amenable to us for all his actions in respect to his treaty with the English Government.

Jezirat-ul-Humra.

7. The Sheikh of Umal Guwyun, Abdulla bin Rashed, is the same who signed the treaty. He brought a copy of it with him, and assured me that he would not fail to abide by it; he acknowledged the supremacy of Sultan bin Suggur, in the same manner as the Sheikh of Jezirat-ul-Humra, and at the same time asserted his own responsibility for the vessels of his port.

8. On approaching Ejman, which is the next port, I received a message from the Sheikh Rashid bin Humid entreating my interference to protect him from the attacks of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur, who he alleged had collected the tribe of Beniyas to assist in overpowering him. Next day the Sheikh himself came off, and repeated to me in the most earnest manner his complaints of the aggressions of Sultan. He represented that his only offence was his alliance with the Imam of Mascat, who is at enmity with Sultan, that he had never been in any shape subject to that Chief, and never would submit to his authority; that Sultan had committed various acts of aggressions against him even at sea, which his regard for the treaty with us alone prevented him from retaliating upon him.

9. I told him although it was our anxious wish to prevent hostilities, yet that we could not desire any one to refrain from defending himself when attacked, that we had nothing to do with their quarrel, so long as they did not disturb the peace of the sea, but that such

was the risk that these disorders would lead to the revival of piracy, that I would enquire into the subject, and endeavour to induce Sultan bin Suggur to desist, if I found him the aggressor; and that at all events I should use every effort to put a stop to aggressions at sea if possible. The Sheikh promised to abide strictly by all our arrangements in respect to the treaty, and returned to the shore.

Sultan bin Suggur.

10. I was anxious to see as much of Sultan Suggur as possible, and therefore proceeded to land at once at Sharga, accompanied by Captain Faithfull and the other Commanders of the cruizers. The Sheikh received us very well, gave us a house and a tent, and supplied us with everything we required during our stay of two days on shore.

11. This Chief is certainly by far the most powerful and ablest of all the Sheikhs from Ramss to Bahrein. He entered at great length on the subject of the treaty, and urged strongly his supremacy over all the other Chiefs of the coast, which he alleged had been confirmed by Sir William Grant Keir by a special agreement which he produced. This paper proved to be the preliminary treaty, by which the Sultan engaged to deliver up the towns, guns and vessels at the port of Sharga, Imam, Umal Guwyn and their dependencies. As the Sheikh quoted this as a confirmation by our Government of his rights over all those ports, and of his obligation of responsibility for their conduct and observance of the treaty, I told him that it did not appear to me to confer or confirm any right whatever, but merely to acknowledge the state of things as it stood at the time of the agreement.

12. He next adduced, in proof of his positive rights over the ports, and particularly in justification of his present proceedings against Rashid bin Humid, a letter from the Chiefs, said to be a duplicate of one addressed by them to the Hon'ble the Governor last year, in answer I presume to a printed circular to the parties to the treaty which was transmitted to Kishm from the office of Country Correspondence on the 24th July 1821. I cannot discover whether this letter ever was actually sent to Bombay or not; and Colonel Kennett does not seem to have been aware of its contents; but the duplicate which I examined had every appearance of authenticity and bore the seals of the Chiefs. I have the honour to enclose a copy and translation of it for the information of Government.

13. I informed him that we did not in any way deny his right over any one who was himself willing to obey him and would consider him as the superior of all who acknowledged him, that we had nothing to do with his dispute for supremacy, but must in such cases look to every one to answer for himself, and that particularly, as far as regarded the stipulation respecting vessels, it was indispensable that each Sheikh, whether subordinate or not, should himself be held responsible for his own port, since references to him on these points would be most inconvenient, and could not be admitted, although they might be acquiesced, and promised to give instructions accordingly.

14. Sultan bin Suggur expressed great anxiety to be allowed to erect some defences towards the land side of the town to repel the Bedouins, who he said took advantage of the defenceless state of the place to come and attack it during the pearl fishing season, when all the men are at sea, and no one left but the women and children. He said he had no wish to erect any work towards the sea, or within gun shot of the shore, and that although he had surrendered his guns and towers to be destroyed by Sir William Grant Keir, yet he had not bound himself not to erect other defences. I told him that under the orders of Government I did not feel myself at liberty to authorize his erecting any works so near the beach as he desired, but that further inland he might build what he pleased, that it was true there was no express stipulation in the treaty against rebuilding their fortifications, but that it was the evident intention and spirit of our proceedings and agreements to prevent it, and that I believed the Sheikhs had themselves acknowledged this right on our part. I however promised to represent the case to Government and obtain orders.

15. The Sheikh next stated that the Imam of Mascat and he were already at hostilities on land, and asked how he was to act in the event of the Imam's attacking his vessels. I replied that I hoped the Imam would not commit any aggression, that I would advise His Highness not to endanger the tranquillity of the Gulf by such proceedings, and that if the Imam should take any of his vessels which were peaceably trading under our Register, I would remonstrate with His Highness and endeavour, if possible, to procure redress. That although we had no right to interfere in their quarrels or wars, or even to prevent them from prosecuting just hostilities at sea, and still less to forbid any one to defend himself from aggression, provided those hostilities did not lead to piracy, yet that we could not in any way countenance them, and must strongly dissuade all parties from them. I explained that our Registers were granted for purposes of peace, not of war, and would not protect any suspicious vessels, and that as in such cases it was hardly possible for our cruizers to distinguish between vessels intended for lawful war and those whose intentions were piratical, armed boats would often be inevitably exposed to suspicion and even danger, and at any rate to the risk of trouble and detention.

16. On my enquiring respecting his quarrel with Rashid bin Humid Sultan denied all his accusations and complained loudly against him, that after submitting, and solemnly acknowledging his supremacy, he had now thrown off his allegiance, and was stirring up all his enemies against him in concert with the Imam of Mascat; that Rashid had always been most hostile to the English as well as to himself. He declared that he had no intentions against him further than to bring him back to his former engagements which he had broken, and asserted his right to do so according to the paper which I had seen. Under this

circumstance I could only repeat my former interferences to avoid extremities, and compromise the dispute, which I fear will be of little avail.

17. During a very long discussion on the subject of the treaty generally, the Sultan quoted the last clause of the tenth article of the treaty, as binding us to protect vessels sailing under its stipulation; and to recover any which might be captured from the parties of the treaty by others. I replied that I did not consider the obligation as going quite so far, but that I would interfere, as far as I could, to prevent unlawful molestation from power which were not parties to the treaty, and that I would obtain further instructions from Government for my guidance on this head.

18. The Sheikh concluded by assurance of his friendly disposition towards the British Government, his entire acquiescence in the present arrangements, and his determination to abide by the treaty, and by any directions we might give respecting its fulfilment.

19. I have been rather particular in detailing my communication with this Chief; because it not only shows the views which he took of the subject, but those which formed the basis of my communication generally with all the other Chiefs, in addition to the points adverted to in my instructions. Sheikh Sultan was, however the only one who seemed capable of entering fully into the subject, the rest are very inferior in every respect.

20. The Chiefs of Dubey and Abuthabi, who were at a short distance inland from Sharga, both visited me at that place: I did not therefore think it necessary to proceed myself to their ports.

21. These Sheikhs are both of the Beni Yas tribe, of whom Sheikh Thanun of Abuthabi is the superior. Sheikh Zaid bin Seyf of Dubey is the same who signed the treaty, to which both promised entire compliance. Sheikh Thanun has fully established his power to the exclusion of his father Sheikh Shakbut, and his brother Sheikh Mahomed; the former is said to have submitted to his son, the latter is with another branch of the tribe in the interior.

22. On my enquiring respecting Sonidan bin Zal, who is particularly mentioned in Colonel Rennett's letter to you of the 6th ultimo, No. 42, Sheikh Thanun stated that he was his subject, and was somewhere amongst the islands between that place and Abuthabi; that he has got no fixed place of abode; but that he would be answerable for his conduct, and would, if I pleased, recall him either to Abu'habi or Dubey and fix him there under his own eye. I thought that this would be a very desirable arrangement under the suspicious circumstances of this person, and as the proposal was publicly made in the presence of Sultan bin Suggur and the Sheikh of Dubey, I requested Sheikh Thanun to write to Sonidan, and gave him also at his desire a letter to that Chief desiring him to obey the orders of his Sheikh, in addition to which I took a duplicate of Thanun's letter for Sonidan, in case I should fall in with him, but in this hope I was disappointed.

23. At Sharga Captain Faithfull completed his arrangements for the stationing of the cruizing vessels, and the renewal of the registry. As they are entirely consonant to the suggestions offered in my letter to him of the 10th July, and have doubtless been reported by him to the Superintendent of Marine, it is not necessary that I should trouble Government with the detail in this place. I have however to solicit the sanction of Government for the occassional hire of native boats by the cruizer, which the senior officer deems necessary for landing at times and places when the ship's boats could not land, and also for avoiding the risk of the ship's boats being left on shore, when the ships themselves are blown to sea.

Bidaa.

24. We then proceeded through the islands to Bidaa, which we found is subject to Bahrein, and governed by a Sheikh named Buhur bin Intran of the tribe of Abu-o-ainee, all the other Sheikhs having quitted the place. The people seemed to know very little of the conditions of the treaty, and had neither flag nor register, excepting for one boat, which had been procured through the Sheikh of Bahrein. However, they furnished lists of the rest of their boats for registry, and promised to abide by the treaty, which I explained; but as they are entirely subject to Bahrein, I did not think it necessary to enter very minutely on the subject.

Bahrein.

25. On the 27th of January we reached Bahrein and landed at the town of Manama; we had two interviews with Sheikh Abdula bin Ahmed, who, though the younger brother, is the manager of all affairs; we also visited the elder brother Sheikh Sulciman at Ruffa where he resides. We stayed several days and were treated with hospitality.

26. In addition to these points of my instructions which were particularly referred to Bahrein, I fully explained to Sheikh Abdulla bin Ahmed the arrangements that had been made for cruizing off the pirate ports, that the conduct of himself and his subjects had been such as to render such measures of precaution unnecessary in regard to his ports, but that one ship would occasionally visit the island; and that an officer would be sent for the purpose of revising the registers, and would bring them to me or the senior officer for signature. I called his attention to the necessity of observing the strictest conformity to the orders of the treaty, as well at Bahrein as at his other subordinate ports, and particularly at Bidaa, where its conditions did not seem to be known. He promised that they should be most carefully observed, wherever his power extended, adding that Bidaa was the only port from which trading vessels sailed.

27. My chief difficulty was respecting the dispute with Rama bin Jabir and I am sorry to say that my endeavours to effect an adjustment have hitherto been of no avail. This affair however will form the subject of a future letter.

Rama bin Jabir.

28. The Sheikh informed me that a Battile belonging to one of his subjects had been captured by His Majesty's ship *Sophia* in consequence of having seized a boat from Bushire in Bussora river, on account of a claim which the owner of the Battile had against the Sheikh of Bushire. He declared his entire disavowal and disapprobation of the act and justified himself by saying that he had expressly warned the owner of the boat not to retaliate on any Bushire vessels which he might meet with. I informed him that until I was made fully acquainted with the circumstances, I could not judge of the merits of the case, but that every Sheikh must be answerable for the acts of his subjects, and that if he could not punish them, we must. The Sheikh assented to this, promised to punish the offenders and expressed much anxiety in endeavouring to excuse himself from blame. It was not until my return to this place that I found the Battile had been carried to Bombay, under circumstances which I have already explained to Government.

29. The Sheikh made great complaints against the Imaum of Mascat, who he said had not only violated his engagements with him, but had abetted Rama bin Jaber in his unprovoked aggression on his people, although it was only at the Imaum's entreaty that he had admitted that Chief, who was the ancient enemy of his family, to terms of peace. He at the same time professed the utmost contempt for the Imaum as well as for the Sheikh of Bushire, and the Persians in general as enemies; and declared that the Utubis were both able and willing to revenge themselves on the whole of them, but for their peaceable engagements with us.

30. Observing that the Sheikh seemed to consider the adoption of the pacificated flag as implying a nearer and more dependent relation with our Government than it really does, I took occasion to explain to him that it was the Arab, not the British flag; but those tribes who were parties to the treaty with us had agreed to distinguish themselves by wearing round the red flag a border of white, which is alone emblematic of peace, in token of their relinquishment of piracy.

31. Both the Sheikhs were profuse in their assurances of attachment to our Government and promised to abide by their amicable engagements; indeed, the whole of the Sheikhs of the coasts professed their determination to avoid every act which would be an infringement of their present friendship with the English. I made small presents to them all, with which they seemed gratified.

32. On our voyage back to Bushire, I took the opportunity of violent and continued contrary winds to visit Congoon, and reached this place on the 10th February.

33. Having thus detailed my proceedings in execution of the orders of Government, I beg leave to offer for your consideration some further particulars respecting the state of the Gulf, and the condition of its Chiefs.

General state of the Gulf.

34. The most prominent character in the Gulf is Sultan bin Suggur. As this Chief has hitherto been generally branded with the stamp of almost every crime which can disgrace human nature, it would be presumption in me on so very short experience to hold out any hopes at variance with the sentiments which I believe all the British authorities in the Gulf have from time to time expressed of him. Yet from personal enquiry on the spot, and from other sources of information, *I am strongly inclined to suspect that his offences against us may have been somewhat exaggerated*, whatever his conduct in other respects, may have been. He is a turbulent and ambitious man, and was driven to desperation, partly by the effects of his own misconduct, and partly by the power of his enemies. A rooted enmity has always existed between this family and that of the Imaum of Mascat, who himself bears the most rancorous hatred towards him. Sultan bin Suggur has opposed the Imaum's views, both by sea and land, and His Highness, through whose representations our opinion of him may probably have in some measure been found, has naturally depicted his character in the blackst colours.

Sultan bin Suggur.

35. I am not prepared to offer a history of the life of this Chief, far less to excuse his actions, but I may remark generally, that as far as my information goes, I believe that he was an exile during the principal period of the Wahabi power, and that although he was the Chief of Rasul Khyma in 1809, yet he was afterwards represented as the particular friend of the English when all the rest of the pirates had joined against us, that I think his alleged treachery towards, Imaum of Mascat, if true, may perhaps be palliated by the conduct of His Highness to him, since there is reason to suspect that the Imaum only espoused his cause in order to make him subservient to his own views in Rassel Khyma; and I have heard that some of the distinct acts of piracy on English vessels which have lately been charged to Sultan bin Suggur, were not committed at his instigation, although he may have been obliged to wink at their commission by his dependants.

36. The Imaum of Mascat probably possesses great wealth, but he is extremely weak from the military point of view. Sultan bin Suggur, on the other hand, is at the head of a most powerful and warlike tribe, which have nothing of their own to lose, but everything to gain in a contest with these weak neighbours. The Imaum fears Sultan bin Suggur because he is conscious that he is weaker than him, and has much more to lose; whilst the reverse is the case with Sultan bin Suggur.

37. It is therefore of importance both for the interest of His Highness himself, and for the safety of the Gulf, that he should, if possible, a friend with this Chief, but such are the effects of an ancient feud, inflamed by more recent personal animosities, on both sides that it is not to be expected they will refrain from hostilities; and I fear His Highness was inclined to foment dissension amongst the tribes against the Sultan.

38. Sheikh Rashid bin Humid of Ejman is, as noticed in the 8th paragraph of this letter, at war with Sultan bin Suggur. The ostensible cause is a quarrel between two branches of Beni Nara tribe, one of which is subject to Rashid bin Humid, and the other disputes his authority, and is supported by Sultan bin Suggur and the Jawasmis; while the Imaum assists Rashid. I suspect however that the real cause is that Rashid, who was a notorious pirate, and the friend of Rama bin Jabir, after acknowledging the supremacy of Sultan bin Suggur, has lately disclaimed it; and is either encouraged, or was originally instigated, by the Imaum of Mascat.

39. Sultan bin Suggur is, as I have before observed, recognized as the superior from Ramss to Sharga excepting at Ejman. This supremacy is of a very indefinite description and is in fact little more than nominal, since Sultan bin Suggur has certainly very little direct authority over them, and is unable to control their actions; indeed I doubt if the power of any Sheikh was absolute even in his own tribe. The Chiefs are elected by their own tribes, but Sultan bin Suggur seems to have some power in influencing their choice, although he could not impose a Sheikh upon them against their will; they seem in fact to be independent in respect to their own tribes, but acknowledge a general allegiance to Sultan as the head of a superior tribe. They all declared themselves responsible to us for the observance of the treaty in so far as regarded their own ports, and yet on the paper which I have submitted, they acknowledge an entire dependence on Sultan bin Suggur, who has accordingly been in the habit of procuring all their passes, and in fact of transacting everything for them with Colonel Kennett. I cannot doubt the authority of this document because I compared the seal with those affixed to Sir William Keir treaty; but it seemed to be of little avail, since one of the Chiefs had already denied it, and the rest seem to be only even nominally bound to it; and I never even heard of its existence until I reached Sharga.

40. Sultan bin Suggur is ambitious of reducing the tribes to complete and absolute subjection and to be considered answerable for the whole of the coast. It is impossible for us to recognize his authority any further than it is obeyed by the other Chiefs, nor can we lend the influence of our name in any way to aid his views; at the same time we cannot directly interfere to prevent him from recovering that authority which he considers his birthright.

41. *Although I apprehend much danger to the peace of the Gulf from the effects of Sultan's ambition, yet if his power were firmly established, I don't think it would be a matter of regret* to us; since if he were well disposed, he would prevent the rest from molesting us, and if not, it were better to have one head to look to than a number of independent pirates to contend with; his supremacy would prevent hostilities amongst the dependent tribes, who would otherwise be quarrelling and committing piracies among themselves; and supposing the worst possible case, that he employed the whole power of the coast in piracy, the evil would be still not greater than the individual piracy of each Chief; and the remedy would be easier, since this very power would make him more tangible, give him more to lose, and therefore more to dread from our vengeance; whilst it would enable us more easily, by the punishment of the head, to reduce the members to subjection. In the opposite case the advantages of his power are magnified.

42. I do not think that the Sultan is worse than any of the rest of the Chiefs; as is at all events not worse disposed to us; and I am not without hopes that he may yet by his future conduct prove himself worthy of a better character than he has hitherto borne; but I cannot regard him without considerable anxiety when thinking of the effects which may result from his abilities, his power and ambition.

43. I am at a loss what to suggest in respect to his request to be allowed to erect lines towards the land; it would be certainly better than he should not, but at the same time the reasons he pleads are specious and natural, and I am not certain that the work he proposes would at all strengthen the place, or protect its shipping, against the attacks from the sea which is the quarter from which operations ought to be carried on; a wall on the land side only, open to the town, and so constructed as not to defend by its flanks the approach by the creek, or a long shore, would be much less mischievous than the strong houses of the Sheikh.

44. Sultan bin Suggur possesses a great many fine vessels, probably at least thirty, capable of containing from fifty to one hundred men. He is building a large bughla of about 120 tons, for the purpose, it is said, of trading to India. The other Chiefs have very few boats, beyond those employed for fishing, probably none of them has more than three or four. I shall however reserve a more particular account of the naval strength of the Jawassimis, until I shall have received the Registers from the senior officer of the Marine. I may however remark that Sultan bin Suggur must, I think, have contrived to secrete almost all his boats at the time of the last expedition, since it is scarcely possible that so many large vessels could have been built by him in so short a time as three years.

45. The next in importance is the Chief of Abuthabi, Sheikh Tahnun. This person appears to be the principal Chief of the Beniyas tribe, and the Chief of Duby is subordinate to

Chief of Abuthabi.

him ; *they acknowledge the general supremacy of the Imaum of Mascat*, but are at present in alliance with Sultan bin Suggur.

46. You are already aware that Sheikh Shakbut, the former Chief of Abuthabi, was expelled by the Imaum of Mascat, about two years ago, and his son Tahnun set up in his stead. Sheikh Mahomed, the brother of Tahnun, fled to Bidaa, and engaged the services of a Chief named Sonidan bin Zaal; the struggle led to disorders which have already been explained by Colonel Kennett, and which through the interference of the Imaum of Mascat been put a stop to. Through his influence it would appear that the parties have so far been reconciled, that Sonidan bin Zaal has desisted from his depredations, and Sheikh Mahomed has left Bidaa and retired to the protection of another branch of the tribe in the interior.

Sonidan bin Zaal.

47. Sonidan bin Zaal is Sheikh of the Muhasiba branch of the Beniyas tribe. He is a wandering Chief, and has no fixed place of abode, but was considered the subject and friend of the Sheikh of Abuthabi, until the accession of Tahnun, when he espoused the cause of Sheikh Mahomed against that Chief. He gained his livelihood by fishing and piracy, and latterly resided chiefly at Bidaa. In November 1823 he proceeded to Mascat, where he received some present from the Imaum ; and since his return he has I hear gone to establish himself in the Island of Sur Beni Yas which is the southernmost of the groupe lately discovered, and is described by Captain Grubb in his report of the 19th September 1821. He is accompanied by his friend and relation Sheikh Nuhai man ; they have nearly a thousand men at their command and possess one fine batille and about fifty fishing boats.

48. These particulars respecting Sonidan I did not learn till after my arrival at Bidaa and Bahrein ; otherwise I should have made a point of finding him out. I am also informed that it is very doubtful whether he will obey Sheikh Tahnun's order, and that he is a very dangerous unsettled character, ready to join in any disorders that may occur. It is extremely desirable that a person of this description should either be succeeded (*sic*) to dependence on his lawful Chief if indeed he does own allegiance to any one, or that he should be obliged to fix himself in some tangible place of abode, and leave off his present roving life.

49. I intend to write to Sheikh Tahnun, that if Sonidan submits to his authority, it is well ; if not, that we should not object to his reducing him by force, provided he really owes him allegiance, but that if he remains quietly at Sur Beni Yas, and does not disturb the peace of the sea, it is better to allow him to settle there ; and that we cannot interfere further than to see that he obeys all the articles of the treaty, to which I consider him in any event a party to a certain degree, since he has been furnished with a Register for his boat by Colonel Kennett ; but that if he commits any act of piracy we will assist to destroy him.

50. I shall at the same time request Captain Faithfull as soon as possible to send a cruiser to find Sonidan, to whom I shall write to the same effect as to Tahnun, recommending him at the same time to submit to Tahnun, and warning him ; that in any event his renewal of disorders at sea will draw down our vengeance on him ; that if, on the other hand, he chose to live in peace at Beni Yas we will not molest him ; but that if he does not settle somewhere, I shall be under the necessity of withdrawing his Register, since we cannot admit to the lawful rights of the treaty, a Chief who persists in leading a wandering life on the high seas, and acts in the suspicious manner which he has done.

51. I have also written to the Imaum of Mascat on the subject, and shall be guided by the answers I receive, whether to admit Sonidan formally as a party to the treaty or not; should he commit any fit disorders I shall be possibly obliged to recommend an attack on him.

52. The Sheikh of Abuthabi and Duby profess to be very well disposed to our Government: they both seem to be more of pastoral and military habits than the other chiefs of the coast ; the former possesses a great many boats, but the latter very few. They were both employed with their people a few miles inland from Sharga, according to their own account, in tending their flocks, and guarding them against the attacks of the Bedouins and others who were instigated by Rashid bin Humid to plunder them ; but I suspect they were actively aiding Sultan bin Suggur against that Chief.

53. I don't think that any danger is to be apprehended from the Uttubi, unless their quarrel with Rama bin Jabir and the wars of the Persians and the Imaum of Mascat on Bahrein should lead to disorders in that quarter. The authority, however, of the Sheikh does not appear to be so absolute as might be expected, and is borne with much reluctance by the inhabitants of the islands. In fact I am doubtful whether the Sheikh has it in his power to restrain entirely the inclination of his subjects to revenge themselves for the injuries they may receive from their enemies.

54. Sheik Abdulla bin Ahmed and nearly all the Uttubis reside on the smaller island of his brother ; Sheikh Suleiman is a very old man and has retired to spend the remainder of his days at a small fort called Ruffa on the Island of Bahrein, about eight miles from the town of Manam, where his son Khallifa exercises the principal control, but there appears to be some divisions of authority amongst several sons and servants of the Sheikh.

55. Persia has renewed its attempts against this island, at least I understand that Mirza Bankir Auhu has proceeded to Mascat to invite Imaum to a conference with Zukee Khan at Bunder Abass, to arrange operations for a joint attack on Bahrein, and also that letters have been forwarded to Sultan bin Suggur, requesting his co-operation, and offering him the naval command of the expedition. It is not probable that a coalition of this description will take place,

but the Imaum may perhaps consent, and Rama bin Janbir together with the Sheikh of Bushire will always be ready to co-operate. If the expedition should actually be undertaken it will inevitably lead to a renewal of disorders to a certain extent.

56. *The provision respecting slaves is* the only remaining article of the treaty on which it is necessary to report, and it is with much hesitation that I venture upon this subject. That the traffic continues to a considerable degree cannot be doubted, since there is an open slave market both at Mascat and at Bahrein, and also I believe in the Persian ports, but I was deterred from holding any personal communication with the Chiefs on this point by a doubt that has occurred to me in regard to the precise meaning of the article of the treaty, which I cannot find explaining in any instructions from Government.

57. The words are the " carrying off of slaves, men, women and children, from the coast of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature." Now it strikes me that this sentence may be understood to forbid only the carrying off of men, women and children as slaves, and the transporting them in vessels *when so carried off*, although the words will also bear the more comprehensive sense of forbidding the carrying off of slaves and also the transporting of slaves, however procured, in vessels ; but even this most extended acceptation cannot be construed in the forbidding the purchase of slaves and the transport of them over-land unless indeed the last clause, which provides that the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature, embraces everything.

58. I am informed that the Arabic sentence bears the same meaning as the English one, and may be interpreted to forbid only the *making of slaves* and the transporting in vessels of slaves so made, not the purchase or the transport of them if purchased ; but that it will also bear the more extended signification.

59. I am unable positively to say in what sense the words are understood by the parties to this treaty, and my uncertainty of the views of Government prevented me from putting the question directly ; but when I consider the practice of all Mahomedan nations, the positive refusal of the Imaum of Muscat to relinquish their traffic, and particularly the tenor of Captain Morseby's negotiations with His Highness, I cannot suppose that the Arab Chiefs hold themselves bound by the treaty not to purchase slaves in the market at Mascat or any other place, and to carry to sell them to their neighbours where they see that our ally the Imaum continues to pursue the traffic in spite of our remonstrances and probably brings them for sale to these ports.

60. But in whatever sense the words of the treaty may be understood by the other party, I am convinced that our utmost endeavours to abolish the slave trade amongst the parties to the treaty will be ineffectual, as long as the other powers of the Gulf persist in it. We may perhaps put a stop to the carrying off of slaves, but their purchase and transport we never can prevent. The slaves will be disguised and concealed in a thousand ways, so that it will be impossible for us to detect them, and I doubt whether more harm than good might not be done to the cause of humanity, by stopping boats and searching them for slaves, because it would in all cases occasion such disgust and offence as would involve a great risk of renewal of hostilities.

61. I do not believe that any of the parties to the treaty do carry off slaves, all those they possess being purchased at Mascat and other places, but at all events it would be difficult even in the former case to detect them, in the latter next to impossible, and with all our efforts we shall find it impossible to put a stop to a traffic which is sanctioned by their religion and by immemorable custom, unless it were relinquished by the common consent of the whole of the Chiefs of the Gulf.

62. Convinced as I am of the inefficacy of this article of the treaty, which has not yet been acted upon, and of the danger of attempting to carry it into effect, I am compelled with much reluctance to recommend that it should not be enforced except in very glaring cases, or at least that its sense should be considered as confined to the carrying off of slaves, and not including their purchase or transport.

63. It is gratifying to humanity to know that slaves are not only extremely well treated and protected by their Arab masters, but that they even enjoy a very considerable degree of power and influence ; I remarked that they were everywhere the stoutest and well fed men, and that they seemed happy and comfortable. I must not however omit to mention an exception which occurred at Bahrein, where two slaves sought refuge on board the *Sernate* from the cruelty, as they said, of their masters ; they were not however received, and we had no means of ascertaining the merits of the case. Much as it is to be desired that this horrid traffic should be abandoned throughout the world, we must I fear confess that the cruel treatment of slaves has been the reproach rather of English than of Eastern nations.

64. I am not prepared to offer any further suggestions on the execution of the other articles of the treaty, beyond those submitted in my letter of the 10th January. It will be hardly possible to get the Chiefs to be very regular with their papers, but when the first *Registry* has been completed, I do not anticipate much difficulty. There is however one point on which I beg leave to solicit the instructions of Government, which is the extent to which we are to interfere to *prevent aggression by Chiefs who are not parties to the treaty, on vessels bearing our Registers*. You will perceive from the 17th paragraph of my letter that Sultan bin Suggur construes the latter part of the X article of the Treaty into an engagement of protection

on our part. The Sheikh of Bahrein was also anxious to establish a similar meaning. The words are "and if any shall attack them (*viz.*, the vessels of the friendly Arabs engaged in trade) the British Government shall take notice of it."

65. The undertaking which I gave of the general spirit of the treaty and of our policy in this point is that if applied to by the parties to the treaty, in respect to any aggressions at sea by any other Power *not authorized by open war*, I ought to remonstrate with the aggressor and endeavour to procure redress if possible. In all such matters connected with the Persian side of the Gulf, I must of course conduct the remonstrance through the Government of Fars as directed in the 18th paragraph of my instructions. In cases of open war it will be impossible to interfere, but it is of such importance to encourage a spirit of traffic against the Arab tribes by all the protection which we can give them that it is very desirable to prevent, as far as we can, any lawless aggression from powers who are not parties to the treaty.

66. It is I think to be feared that the Chiefs on the Persian side of the Gulf will be at least as likely to commit piracies as those of the Arabian shores, they are nearly independent of Persia, and I do not find that any of them have yet adopted the flag of that kingdom, although long since ordered to do so. It will be necessary for our cruiser to pay frequent visits to this side of the Gulf.

67. Rama bin Jabir is said to be strongly inclined to renew his old practices, and to have made open rejoicings when he heard of the removal of our troops from Kishm. He is now old and blind, but retains all the violence of his youth, and there is much to fear, from his lawless disposition, and his animosity to the Uttubis in particular. His sons are said fortunately to be of a different temper.

68. I have not been able to make any arrangements for establishing a channel of communication at the pirate ports; it would however, I think, be *very desirable to have a native Agent with Sultan bin Suggur;* and I shall endeavour to procure a person for the purpose; perhaps our Agent at Kattif might with advantage be transferred to Sharga. In the meantime the man whom I propose sending to Mogu will be very useful, because he will be able to give information of the proceedings of the Arabs, both on this side of the Gulf and also on the pirate coast, through the channel of Lingua, which is near Mogu, and is subject to a near relation of Sultan bin Suggur, who has constant communications with Sharga.

69. It is difficult to say what may be the effect of the removal of the troops from Kishm: their presence was certainly of the utmost use in preserving tranquillity, but the naval arrangements which Government has directed have convinced the Chiefs that we do not mean to withdraw our control, and will I hope prove efficacious. The force however is hardly sufficient when the description of vessels is considered. Of five cruizers now in the Gulf three are stationed off the pirate coast, and one is detained at Bussora. *The Depôt at Mascat is* more distant than could be wished, since it requires on an average nearly twenty days for a vessel to proceed thither and return to her post; I am informed none of the vessels carry more than a few weeks' supplies. The scarcity of fresh water and the prevailing winds in the Gulf present such difficulties that I do not believe there is any other port of which we could more conveniently avail ourselves. The only remedy that suggests itself is the employment of a larger vessel which could convey supplies for the cruizers. But these are points on which I am not qualified to judge.

70. The ships employed on the survey have uniformly received the greatest assistance from the whole of the Arab tribes, from Cape Musseldom to Bahrein. I beg leave to suggest that the cruizers employed in the Gulf should be furnished with copies of the survey on their leaving Bombay.

71. There are many other points in my instructions on which I am directed to report, but I have not at this early period had it in my power to collect any further information which I can venture to submit to the attention of Government. I hope at a future period to be enabled to offer a full account of the piratical tribes.

72. I may in the meantime state that I understand the Jawassmis procure all their materials for building as well as their *warlike stores from Mascat, Bahrein and Persian ports in the lower part of the Gulf. The timber is all Indian teak, the arms are chiefly of Persian manufacture, but of the latter articles their prizes furnish them with an abundant supply* from all quarters. *They possess no articles of export;* since their pearls are generally purchased by merchants on the spot, and the produce of their country is not even sufficient for their maintenance. Their only employment is catching fish, diving for pearls and importing dates and other necessaries of life which they purchase with the price of their pearls. These dates are chiefly brought from Bahrein and Bussora; gum and cloth from Mascat and the Persian ports. *They appear to be very poor*, and I should fear that they can never find much employment in commerce unless in carrying for others, but I believe they at one time pursued a very extensive trade, and it is to be hoped their resources may again improve.

73. Although there is now no remnant of the Wahabi power on the coast, yet the tenets of that sect are still said to be cherished by a great number of the inhabitants.

74. In conclusion I beg leave to express my opinion that the Arab Chiefs have at present every disposition to respect their relations with us, and although I am not sanguine enough to expect entire tranquillity, yet I think that as long as they are treated with conciliation, they

will not molest our vessels, even if they should relapse into piracy against the neighbours in the Gulf. We ought to encourage them as much as possible to embark in trade, and endeavour to bring them to more peaceful habits by affording them all the protection in our power, and at the same time asserting our right to maintain the peace of the sea. But their poverty, their habits of piracy and the feuds which seem inherent in the Arab tribes, are such obstacles, that we cannot expect any sudden or entire reform, nor can we look to any other motive but the dread of our power for keeping them true to their engagements.

75. Our great object, I think, is to keep down hostilities at sea if possible, and to prevent quarrels amongst themselves from leading to a renewal of disorders; at the same time we must not interfere too far, and must observe great caution to avoid giving offence. Much may be done by persevering in the system of steady control, which Government has adopted. Some directions will however be required to guard against disgusting the Sheikh by too much interference, and we must bear in mind that any incautious or harsh acts on our part, which may tend to exasperate them, will again embroil with these desperate and lawless tribes.

76. The feud between Imaum of Mascat and Sultan bin Suggur is perhaps as much to be dreaded as the ambition of the latter Chief or the quarrels amongst the tribes themselves. His Highness is accused of encouraging disorderly characters, besides Rashid bin Humid, but I hope my suspicion on the head may prove unfounded, and I have the highest opinion of the Imaum's general character and conduct. He might, I think, be warned against the danger of involving himself in a war with Sultan bin Suggur by which he can gain nothing and is almost certain of losing a great deal, besides being the means of involving the Gulf in the renewal of disorders and piracy.

77. I intend, if possible, to pay a visit to Muskat about the month of November next, with the view of communicating with His Highness in person, and afterwards to revisit the whole of the Arabian ports, in order that I may be able to judge of the effects of the present system, and inform myself more fully than I could possibly do on my first visit, regarding every particular connection with the affairs of the Gulf.

78. I have derived much valuable assistance and information from Captain Faithfull, whose opinion entirely coincides with those I have now laid before you.

1.20
General report on the state of affairs in the Gulf, 1825



The Sheikh of Shellife becomes a Party to the Treaty with the other Tribes

It gives us much satisfaction to report that the Resident in the Gulph has been enabled to prevail on the Sheikh of Rattiffe, a Port on the Arabian Coast of some importance and considerable trade, to become a Party to the Treaty entered into with the other Tribes - The accession of this Chieftain to the Treaty excludes under formal engagement the Piratical System from almost every Tribe on the Sea Coast between Sraine and the frontier of the Muscat Territories -

Pol.l Consul. 1825.
9th March N.49
13. April. N.41
20. April N.348
35
8. June. N.70.
Vide 8.1/

Lieutenant Colonel Stannus

Lieut.t Colonel Stannus in his letter of the 16th March (para. 9) states that the old Town of

Vol. 2345

of Rasul Khyma still remains in the
State of dilapidation, in which it was
left by our Troops, the Inhabitants
having entirely abandoned it & raised
temporary huts on the opposite side of
the Creek; but that it was probable
it would soon be rebuilt as Soultan
ben Suggur found himself at liberty
to erect fortifications for its defence.
Our proceedings on this question were
reported in our despatch of 14th
January 1824 (paras: 45 & 48). —
11 Lieutenant Colonel
Hannus adds that the population
was said to be rapidly increasing
and date plantations spreading in
proportion. The people appeared
cheerful & contented and were

employed to a considerable extent in
the Fisheries – Numerous Boats were
building for the trade of the Gulph
& habits of peace & industry were
every where supplanting the lawless
& predatory pursuits which formerly
characterized the Arabs of that
neighbourhood. –

Soultan Bin Suggur 12
Plans the ceremonial
of the people of Linga
& the new Town of
Rasul Khyma.

P.C. Consul: 1824.
8th September Fol: 3980

In a subsequent
letter of June, Lieutenant Colonel
Hannus reported that Soultan
ben Suggur was engaged in a plan
to remove a large portion of the
population of Linga to occupy
the new Town of Rasul Khyma,
contrary to the wish of Sheikh
Mahomed ben Khazeg of that
place, & without any regard to



the inclinations of the people themselves
whom he considered his subjects, in con-
-sequence of their having formerly
emigrated from the districts under
his authority. Against this measure
the Resident remonstrated as not
only likely to give umbrage to the
Persian Government, but excite a
general & well grounded dissatis-
-faction along the Coast. He approved
of this communication on the part
of the Resident at the same time he
informed him that no obstruction
should be given to Sheikh Nasir
suppose drawing off the Inhabitants
of Linga by persuasion—
[...]

[...]
70 The President w
his letter of the 28th April reported
another act of violence committed
on a Debaya Batilla which was

Pol. Consul: 1824
26. May to 2635

employed on Commercial specula-
tions & having anchored off Ham-
leh was attacked by the orders of
Mahomed Bein Shakhboot & many
of the Crew put to death, but by
a subsequent letter the report was
contradicted. We shall nevertheless
advert to the correspondence which
took place on the subject as ex-
planatory of the policy which
guides our Proceedings in that
quarter—

71 Lieut. Colonel
Hannus explained that Mahom-
bin Shakhboot had for some time
past been at War with his broth-
Sheikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee
who was in strict alliance with
the

579

the Sheikh of Debaye, and it was to
be presumed that the perpetrators
of the act in question, might have
considered themselves justified in
seizing the property of the Enemies
of their Chief, but they could not have
been ignorant that they rendered them-
selves liable to punishment by the
murder of the Crew, which was of
itself sufficient to constitute piracy
by the express stipulations of the Treaty.
This circumstance alone The President
thought would fully warrant our
interference on the occasion, but there
were still more powerful reasons
why a prompt and severe atonement
should be exacted for this breach
of the public peace, which under
regard

rigorous measures were adopted, there
-ed to become the immediate fore-
-runner of greater excesses- Sheikh
Mahomed, the instigator of this
violence was in open rebellion
against the established head of the
Government and it would be im
-possible to recognize his right to
act offensively against any of the
allied Tribes, without holding forth
encouragement to all persons of
lawless and enterprizing character
who in the hope of similar forbear
-rance on our part, would speedily
withdraw from the controul of
their respective Chieftains, and
consider themselves privileged, under
the pretence of lawful War, to per
-petrate

perpetrate every species of irregularity
72 The part of the
Coast where this outrage was committed
was dependant on the Government
of Bahrain; and the Resident deemed
it his duty, to represent to the Sheikh
of Bahrain the serious nature of the
crime, and the necessity of bringing the
guilty to immediate punishment:
but having some reasons to apprehend
that the authority which he possessed
over Dawrieh and the districts on
the continent was little more than
nominal, Colonel Stannus considered
it advisable to add that he should
be ready to afford him the assistance
of our Squadron if he entertained any
doubts of his ability to chastise the
offenders

turbulent subject without our
interference

73 In reply to this
communication we made known to
Lieutenant Colonel Stannus that
though fully sensible of the necessity
of prompt measures for the pur-
=pose of suppressing Piracy and of
maintaining the impression of our
power, on which the continuance
of the present tranquillity depends
we were of opinion that it would
have been desirable before offering
the aid of the Cruizers in coercing
the Arabs of Rameleh to have made
farther enquiry as to the circum-
=stances of the attack on the boat
from Debay &c as to the relations

between

between the different parties interested
in that affair. –

74 It appeared from
former correspondence that Mahomed
bin Shakhboot was Chief of Aboothabee
& was expelled about 4 Years ago by
the Imaum of Muscat, who claims
the Sovereignty over the place and
who gave the Government of it to
Tahnoon the Younger brother of
Mahomed. It was not known
whether Mahomed or his father
Shakboot acknowledged the Sove-
=reignty of the Imaum of Muscat
or if they did so whether they further
admitted his right to remove the Chief
the contrary might be presumed from
the fact that Mahomed, first

Corresponde

conjunction with his father, and
latterly by himself had carried on
a constant War against Tahnoon
ever since his expulsion from
Aboothebee.-

75 This War, throu
attended on both sides with instan
of barbarity like that reported b
the Resident had as yet been con
-fined to the rival Chiefs and the
allies, and had not hitherto
appeared likely to degenerate int
indiscriminate plunder and
piracy.-

76 In these circum
-stances the case appeared to com
under the description of feuds
among their Arab Chiefs which

were declared in former instructions
[illegible] to afford no ground
for the interference of the British
Government.- It was true that Shak
-med was not in possession of a
Government but he had never
abandoned his claim & if we were
to permit no man to prosecute
the recovery of his alledged rights by
force it would be incumbent on
us to investigate all pretensions &
to enforce them when well founde
a course of proceeding which would
involve us in many disputes &
probably sooner or later place us
in opposition to the Imaum and
other Chiefs with whom we were
most desirous of maintaining friend

77 After adverting to
former Correspondence in elucidation
of the views of Government on this
head We observed that if it should
appear that Mahomed ben Shakh
ceasing to confine himself to his
quarrel with Tahnoon had attack
=ed the Chief of Debye for the sake
of plunder alone, he must be consi
=dered as a pirate & acted against
as such, but if it should appear
that the Chief of Debye had so
far supported Tahnoon as to
render himself in any degree a
party in his dispute with Mah
the case was not one in which
we should interfere.

78 In these instruc
tions

instructions we did not overlook the
fact of the murder of the people
belonging to the boats by Mahomed,
that act would certainly be an
infraction of the 8th Article of the
Treaty (supposing Mahomed to
have acceded to the Treaty) & would
therefore justify our proceeding to
all the lengths threatened in that
engagement, but we observed that
although that article should always
be insisted on to a certain extent, for
the purpose of discouraging so in=
=human a practice, and though
the neglect of it would form a
serious aggravation of any infrac=
=tion of the essential Articles which
relate to Piracy- Yet in the present

state of Arab civilization it would
by no means be politic to go to war
with every party to the treaty who
might put his prisoners to death
& in the case of Mahomed, it would
be great partiality to turn our arms
against him for an offence which
we had overlooked in the instance
of his rival Jahnoon –

79 Adverting to the
Resident's representation that the
Arabs of Hawelah were little
more than nominally dependant
on the Shaikhs of Bahreen it appear
-ed to us to be very important to
ascertain that the sovereignty thus
imperfectly exercised was in con
-testable as point of right as the
Sheikhs

Sheikhs might otherwise avail
themselves of our power to enforce
their own doubtful pretensions
to authority over a tribe in the
actual enjoyment of independance.

80 The Resident in
his letter of the 18th May stated
that this act of violence proved
on further enquiry to be altogether
groundless as far at least as re-
-garding the place where the transac
-tion was described as having occur
-red. The Sheikh of Hawelah was
then at Bahreen and unequivo-
-cally disavowed all knowledge
of the circumstance and his state-
-ment had since been confirmed
by the Officers in Command of
the

Bl & Consul: 1824
23 June Vol: 2855



the Surveying Ships. The Report ha
been communicated to the Residen
by his Agent established at Shaja
who must have been imposed upo
by some designing Persons.—

1.21
Joint attack on Bahrain by Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat and Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi, August–December 1828

8

Translation of a Letter from Nasser the Agent at Bahrein to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 16 Nov 1878

AC. I beg to acquaint you that I have already sent three Letters via Katar by one of which I enclosed a Com[n] rec[d] from Muscat by the return Dhow. These Letters will convey to you the full particulars of every thing that has taken place.

On the 27th the Imam's Fleet arrived off the coast of Sitra on the 27 October and a small Vessel belonging to Sheik Isa was driven on shore by the violence of the wind was seized by the Bin Ruwarah Tribe and two men of mine persons returned. On that day Lieut Loch effected but much scattered by a severe gale. On the 31st the whole of the Fleet entered Bahrein and cast anchor off Sitra outside the Mor. of Killa. Sheik Khulefa bin Sherliman immediately proceeded with a body of Troops and took post opposite H.M. Consuls. while another party under the command of Abdulla bin Ahmed bin Khalifah proceeded to Muharrak. On the 3rd day he marched by the Bahrein Chief orders. from that place and took up a position near Hoorah to the Eastward of Muharrak. In four days the Chiefs of the Imams opened the Mor of Killa and two Grabs with 10 Buglers entered. On the 22nd Nov[r] Ally Reis a Commander of one of the Imams Buglers landed at Muharrag in his own boat bringing a letter from the chief of Killa. Sheikh Isa bin Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed. This chief whose name is above mentioned is said to have arrived. The Merchants of the Com[n] seem to have been much influenced by a report from both sides and desirous of preventing the effusion of Blood. he was anxious that arrangements should be made to avoid this. No written answer was returned to this but a verbal reply that they felt the evil that might arise but not with them but with those who had commenced it. [illegible] to Lieut Loch Dhow". and do not let it happen. On the 5th Lieut Loch detached two Grabs and two Buglers towards Killa. the place where the Imams anchor. and near which the large vessels belonging to Sheik Abdullah were stationed. as soon as they perceived the Grabs they swept by wind of the Bahrein Fleet and cast anchor on the Mor of Killa. the same day. two Grabs with a number of Buglers and smaller vessels left the vicinity of Killa and placed themselves opposite the Fort of Sitra. the troops landed on the night and took possession of it. On the 9th Nov[r] one of the Grabs opened a fire upon the Fort of Hallah which was returned the Buglers of

Bombay Gleaner which had accompanied the Troops, then commenced firing upon the Town of Muscat from Mazgoon. but being out of Shot she came nearer, and fired one Gun which struck the Town but only killed one man. - after this she ceased her Cannonade. - This day was the beginning and ending of the fighting - after 12 o'clock a number of Bombay Troops from the Ships, under Jaffier and Rang Rey. - At this time Khalik Abdulla with Khalik Khaleefa and the other Chiefs with their forces, came on Mazgoon: as soon as Rajo heard of the landing they left the Town and took up a position opposite the Imaums Troops were not all landed when the a fire of Musketoons was given - both sides and the two bodies had nearly reached each other when Khalik Abdulla Cavalry charged Imaums men and compelling them to give way, broke and defeated them. having done this they began to cut them up. - H.H. had not landed from his Boat when he perceived his troops routed upon which he returned - The reports in the daily states that they had thrown them 500 Killed but the correct number is only 200 - a great number however were drowned whose bodies have been floating up. and a very large quantity of Arms have been recovered from the water - In short the Imaum was defeated while the Bahrein Troops only lost four men and four Horses. Killed and one Horse carried away. - The instant the defeat took place. the Imaums Ships weighed and proceeded to Boorhumah where they anchored having landed a part of their Troops and a Boy by which they returned. then were immediately taken possession of by Abdullah Bin Ahmed's men who got the Boys off on the 11th and carried her into Muscharray. - on the night of the 8th the Imaum people continued to set fire to the Grab which was still on shore. but the Bahrein Chief carried off every thing that was not burnt: Her Copper stores Ammunition and eight pieces of Cannon. It is quite certain that great numbers of drowned people have been floating up. many of whom had on no mound. It is said that more than 500 were killed and drowned - some Reports mention that Shaikh Salmon is Killed; others that he is still alive: The two Grabs and Baglah that were anchored off Mazgoon weighed and joined H.H. Fleet on the 11th - This day the 16th Nov: the Imaums Ships are still anchored near Boorhumah - on the night of the 9th two Boats from the Imaums Ships from Muscharray with one of them a few Men ally boarded a dhow and after

Imaum. and the letter shown belonging to Bin Muscharay from whom they brought 2 Letters to Seyd Abdool Jellil. the purport of which was that he should go to Abdoolla bin Ahmed and see if he could not make peace with the Imaum on which case he should Muscharay join with him and form a negociation - The Bahrein Chief on reading said that he could know nothing of the letter from Bin Muscharay. but that if the Imaum would write him only the affair might be settled. I think if the Imaum was to ask that a person should be sent from Muscat a Mediator that Shaikh Abdoollah is inclined for peace - after the Imaum had retreated the Shaikh sent and destroyed the Fort of Salatah which Imaum H.H. Troops had greatly injured besides cutting down many date Trees. - It is said that 1000 Weapons have been recovered from the sea. - and that Shaikh Abdoollah has written to the Sheikh of Bushire and to you also. -

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a letter from Assoo the Agent at Bahrein to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 16 Nov 1828

AC I beg to acquaint you that I have already sent these letters via Kateef to your address in one of which I enclosed a communication from Muscat by that route. These letters will convey to you the full particulars of every thing that has taken place.

His Highness the Imam's fleet arrived off the coast of Guttur on the 27 October and a small boat belonging to Luft being driven on shore by the violence of the wind was seized by the Boo Guwarah tribe and her crew of nine persons detained. On that same day Sued Saed's ships appeared but much scattered by a severe gale. On the 31 ult. the whole of the fleet entered Bahrein and cast anchor off Sutra outside the Khor of Killa. Shaikh Khuleefa bin Sooliman immediately proceeded with a body of troops and took post opposite H.H. vessels while another party under the command of Abdoolla bin Ahmed's son was sent to support him. On the 3rd day he marched by the Bahrein Chief's orders from that place and took up a position near Horah to the eastward of Manamah. In four days the ships of the Imam ( ) the Khor of Killa and two Grabs with 11 Buglas entered. On the 4th inst. Ally Naim a commander of one of the Imam's Buglas landed at Muharag in his own boat bringing a letter from the Chief of Mukla Shuhur for Shaik Abdoollah bin Ahmed. This chief whose name is Abdoolrub is said to have arrived - the purport of the communication seems to have been that influenced by a regard for both sides and desirous of preventing the effusion of blood he was anxious that arrangements should be made to avoid this - no written answer was returned to this but a verbal reply that the blame for all the evil that might arise did not rest with them but with those who had commenced it, adding "if you wish to land do so and do what is proper".

On the 5 Sued Saed detached two Grabs and two Buglas towards Killa the place where the cruizers anchor and near which the large vessels belonging to Shaikh Abdoolla were stationed. As soon as they perceived the Grabs they weighed by order of the Bahrein shaikh and cast anchor on the Khor of Fasht. The same day two Grabs with a number of Buglas and smaller vessels left the vicinity of Killa and having placed themselves opposite the Fort of Sutra the troops landed in the night and took possession of it. On the 9 inst. one of the Grabs opened fire upon the Fort of Hallah which was returned. The Bugla of Bushire ( ) had accompanied the Grabs then commenced firing upon the Town of Manama from Muzrasa but being out of shot she came nearer and fired one ball which reached the town but injured no one - after this she ceased her cannonade. This day was the beginning and ending of the fighting. After 12 o'clock a number of

boats commenced landing troops from the vessels near Jaffir and Kuz Kuz. At this time Shaik Abdoola and Shaik Khuleefa with the other chiefs and their forces were in Manama. As soon as they heard of the landing they left the town and took up a position opposite. The Imam's troops were not all landed when a fire of matchlocks was opened on both sides and the two bodies had nearly reached each other when Shaik Abdoolah's cavalry charged Saed Sued's men and compelling them to give way broke and defeated them. Having done this they began to cut them up. H.H. had not landed from his boat when he perceived his troops routed upon which he returned. The reports in the city state that they had more than 500 killed but the correct number is only 200. A great number however were drowned whose bodies have been floating up and a very large quantity of arms have been recovered from the water. In short the Imam was defeated while the Bahrein Troops only lost four men and four horses killed and one horse carried away. The instant the defeat took place the Imam's ships weighed and proceeded to Boorhumah where they anchored leaving behind a grab of two masts and a Bugla which had stranded. These were immediately taken possession of by Abdoollah bin Ahmed's men who got the Bugla off on the 11th and carried her into Muharrag. On the night of the 15th the Imam's people continued to set fire to the grab which was still on shore but the Bahrein chief carried off everything that was not burnt, her copper, stores, ammunition and eight pieces of cannon.

It is quite certain that great numbers of drowned people have been picked up many of whom had no wound. It is said that more than 500 men were killed and drowned. Some reports mention that Shaikh Tahnoon is killed others that he is still alive. The two grabs and Buglas that were anchored off Mazoola weighed and joined H.H. fleet on the 11th. This day the 16th Nov. the Imam's vessels are still anchored near Boorhumah. On the night of the 6 two men landed from the Imam's ships in Muharrag, one of them a free man Ally bin Saud a dependant of the Imam and the other a slave belonging to Bin Mushary from whom they brought a letter to Sued Abdool Julleel the purport of which was that he should go to Abdoolla bin Ahmed and see if he had any wish to make peace with the Imam in which case he (bin Mushary) could land and open a negotiation. The Bahrein Chief in reply said he could have nothing to do with a letter from Bin Mushary but that if the Imam would write himself the affair might be settled. I think if the Imam was to ask that or send a person as a mediator that Shaik Abdoollah is inclined for peace.

After the Imam had retreated the Shaik sent and destroyed the fort of Sutra which however H.H. troops had greatly injured besides cutting down many date trees. I hear that 1000 weapons have been recovered from the sea and that Shaik Abdoollah has written to the Shaik of Bushire and to you.

29

Translation of a Letter from the Agent at Bushire to Major Wilson dated 28th Nov 1828

At. With respect to the news of Saeed bin Saeed and the People of Bahrein I beg to acquaint you that before this the Authorities residing on Kharg under Sheik Shakbut bin Jiyyan sent a Boat to Bahrein to ascertain how affairs were going on there. On the 22 Nov this boat returned. The

30

following are the particulars of the said proceedings against Bahrein as gotten from the Seamen and a letter addressed to Sheik Shakbut bin Jiyyan from the Chief of that place. It appears that on the arrival of the Fleet and Troops off Bahrein and their Saloon off the Khor of Kille they attempted to enter it, but were unable in consequence of the Authorities having blocked it up with stones some time previously the Fleet remained here 6 days until the Baniyas and other maritime People had removed the stones when the entered with their boats and Fleet and landing a portion of the Troops took possession of the Fort of Muttra on the 4th Inst. & H continued there 5 days without being molested in any way by the Authorities. On the 5th he intended to attack Manama. The right wing was Commanded by Saeed bin Saeed with the people of Muscat and the left by Saloom with the Baniyas. Before however the two bodies met a party of the Bahrein horsemen and Matchlock men attacked & H Troops and the Baniyas and a number immediately fled towards towards the shore to embark in their boats. The horsemen pursued and speared them. Sheik Abdullah to the left of Saeed bin Saeed the 350 Matchlock men and one Gunboat manned by Negroes were principally embarked people and unable to swim. The boats of the Baniyas were in shore and when some came near them to embark they took their arms and threw the Negroes over board and forced them into the sea. Saeed bin Saeed was wounded in the side of the foot as he was swimming off, which was done by one of the Baniyas Sticks throwing away his gun in the water. After swimming a long way he met a Grab of Bahrein of the Authorities taken with a Present to his Highness by which he left & landed Rey. received the Boats. Of the Fleet a two Masted Vessel a Baggalo and three Boats were destroyed. & H having committed the Ships and the Boats to open a fire upon the Town the day of the Defeat on attempting to land but Rey & the remainder could not get off in any way. Rey therefore burnt the Ship and left the Bay [illegible] Nearly all the Troops got their arms. After the Battle had subsided and Shakbut's people had ceased the

31

Mr Murray and Captain [illegible] sailed out of the Khor of Killa [illegible] and [illegible] of Joasmi Bin Rashmah and desired Sahoon to return the Imaum who had [illegible] The Bomjara had taken the day of the dispatch accordingly returned to Bushehr, to Sunday and 2 days more. - Yesterday I sent a letter to the Boat for Muscat which I had dispatched on the 26th Sahoon Khamees also arrived and reported H H departure for Muscat on the 21 with his Fleet and Sahoon arrival at Abothabee. The Bomjara have lost 50 or 70 men besides the wounded. H H sent his letters by Sahoon bin Khamees one for Shaik Sultan and one for his brother Salid I am however ignorant of their purport which I will communicate as soon as I can find it out. Shaik Sultan is now in Ras el Khymah and Shaik Salid in Kongah - You must excuse this letter as it is written at night but for writing I could send your information of all the news at length like this communication I sent original and duplicate. -

Enclosure in above.

A letter from Agha to the Agent requesting him to forward a letter to Muscat together with his reply thereto.

Translation of a letter from Mirza Ali Akbar Bonjeer Agent at Bangah dated 4th Sept 1828.

After Compliments I have the honor to inform you that on the 1st Inst a man belonging to Shaik Sahoon arrived here and presented himself at the Residency at Bahrein and reported that after the departure of

by the Imaum H H directed his Fleet to unite and proceed to the Khor of Killa to forfeit him Cubmah where he remained a day to consult and advise upon future measures with regard to the departure of Bahrein. While on this place he received a letter from Muscat informing him that Mombasa was in a distracted state and begging him either to proceed in person or send an army with the utmost possible speed. This intelligence greatly alarmed and he determined upon instantly returning to Muscat without attempting to make any arrangement or settlement with his enemies. To this however Shaik Sahoon refused to consent as the whole of the subsistence of the Bomjaras depends upon Bahrein and if they were cut off from keeping up an intercourse with that place it would lead to ruin them. It was therefore settled that one of the Imaums principal men should proceed to Shaik Abdulla and endeavour to make peace between them upon the condition that the Bahrein Chief should continue the payment of the annual sum formerly given. The agents on the part of the Imaum were Abdoolla bin Mushary and Ally bin Saood and those on the side of the Bahrein Shaik were Abdul Rahman bin Rashid and another Imaum. They all met in a place called Heed. They were however unable to come to any adjustment and H H the Imaum sailed away with his Fleet on the 21 Nov 1828 on his return to Muscat. At the same time Shaik Sahoon returned to Abothabee with his People on his arrival he learnt that his territories had been plundered by Shaik Rashid bin Khamees Father the Ameens. Upon which he dispatched orders to the Bedouins under his control to assemble together at appointed places and direct that none of the Subjects of Bahrein should be permitted to leave the place for either trading or fishing - I mentioned in a former letter my intention of proceeding to Debaye to deliver your letter for Shaik Sahoon but being attended by the Ophthalmia



Transcription of previous document

Translation of a letter from the Agent at Shargah to Major Wilson dated 28 Nov 1828.

A.C. With respect to the news of Sued Saed and the people of Bahrein I beg to aquaint you that before this the Uttoobees residing in Shargah under Shaik Sooltan bin Suggur sent a boat to Bahrein to ascertain how affairs were going on there. On the 22 Nov this boat returned. The following are the particulars of Sued Saed's proceedings against Bahrein as gathered from the sailors and a letter addressed to Shaik Saleh bin Suggur from the Chief of that place. It appears that on the arrival of the fleet and forces of H. H. and Shaik Tahnoon off the Khor of Killa they attempted to enter it, but were unable in consequence of the Uttoobees had blocked it up with stones sometime previously. The Imam remained there 6 days until the Buniyas and other Maritime People had removed the stones when he entered with his boats and fleet and landing a portion of his troops took possession of the Fort of Suttra on the 4th inst. H. H. continued there 5 days without being molested in any way by the Uttoobees. On the 7th he intended to attack Manama. The right wing was commanded by Sued Saed with the people of Muscat and the left by Tahnoon with the Buniyas. Before however the two bodies met a part of the Bahrain Horsemen and Matchlock men attacked H. H. troops and the Buniyas and a number immediately fled towards the shore to embark in their boats. The Horsemen pursued and aprised them. Shaik Abdoolla states the loss of Sued Saed to be 350 killed and an unknown number drowned, for they were principally inland people and unable to swim. The boats of the Buniyas were onshore and whoever came near them to embark they took their arms and struck them over the heads and forced them into the sea. Sued Saed was wounded in the sole of the foot as he was swimming off which was done by one of the Buniyas Tribe throwing away his spear in the water. After swimming a long way God sent a man of Batina of the Matariah tribe with a plank to his

assistance by which he kept up until they reached the boats. Of his Fleet a two masted vessel a Bugla and three boats were destroyed, H.H. having permitted the ship and a Bugla to open fire upon the Troops. The day of the defeat on attempting to sail out they both ran aground and could not be got off in any way. They therefore burnt the Brig and left the Bugla. Nearly all the troops lost their arms. After the Imam had collected such of his people as had escaped the drowning and slaughter, and sailing out of the Khor of Killa, he anchored off Joosub Boo Rahmah and desired Tahnoon to return the arms which the Buniyas had taken the day of the defeat. He accordingly restored 70 Matchlocks, 60 swords and 20 daggers. Assoo sent me a letter on the boat for Muscat which I have despatched. On the 26th Salmin Khumees arrived and reported H.H. departure for Muscat on the 21 with his Fleet and Tahnoon's arrival at Aboothabee. The Buniyas have lost 50 or 70 men besides the wounded. H.H. sent two letters by Salmin bin Khumees one for Shaik Sooltan and one for his brother Salih. I am however ignorant of their purports which I will communicate as soon as I can find it out. Shaik Sooltan is now in Ras el Khymah and Shaik Salih in Shargah. You must excuse this letter as it is written at night but God willing I will send you information of all the events at length like this communication both original and duplicate.

Translation of a letter from Moollah Houssein Agent at Shargah dated 4 Decr 1828

AC I have the honor to inform you that on the 1 inst a man belonging to Shaik Tahnoon's troops who was present during the whole affair at Bahrein arrived here and reported that after the defeat sustained by the Imam H.H. directed his Fleet to weigh and proceed from the Khor of Killa to Juseeb bin Ruhmah where he remained a day to consult and advise upon future measures with regard to the capture of Bahrein. While in this place he received a letter from Muscat informing him

that Mombassa was in a disturbed state and begging him either to proceed in person or to send an army with the utmost possible speed. This intelligence gave H.H. much concern and he determined upon instantly returning to Muscat without attempting to make any arrangements or settlement with his men. To this however Shaik Tahnoon would not consent as the whole of the subsistence of the Beniyas depends upon Bahrein and if they were cut off from keeping up an intercourse with that place it would lead to their ruin. It was therefore settled that one of the Imam's principal men should proceed to Shaik Abdoolla and endeavour to make peace between them upon the condition that the Bahrein Chief should continue the payment of the annual sum formerly given. The Agents on the part of the Imam were Abdoolla bin Mushary and Ally bin Saood and those on the side of the Bahrein Shaik were Abdool Rahman bin Rashid and another man. They all met in a place called Hud. They were however unable to come to any adjustment and H.H. the Imam sailed away with his Fleet on 21 Nov 1828 on his return to Muscat. At the same time Shaik Tahnoon returned to Aboothabee with his People. On his arrival he learned that his territories had been plundered by Shaik Rashid bin Humeed's tribe the Unaeems. Upon which he despatched orders to the Beduins under his control to assemble together at appointed places and directed that none of the inhabitants of Debaye should be permitted to leave the place for either trading or fishing.

I mentioned in a former letter my intention of proceeding to Debaye to deliver your letter for Shaik Tahnoon but being attacked by the opthalmia I was unable to go. I therefore sent it with a few lines to Khaleefa bin Dumeethan with a request for it to be forwarded as speedily as possible. His answer I now enclose. In a former report I stated that Sulmin bin Nassir had commenced rebuilding the ruined Fort of Derah in spite of the remonstrance made by Khuleefa bin Dumeethan. Upon Tahnoon's arrival at Aboothabee he desisted and I rather

think will proceed himself to Aboothabee. After the receipt of the Imam's letter sent by Sulmin bin Khumees to Sooltan bin Suggur the latter prepared a communication to Shaik Abdoollah bin Ahmed and sent it to his brother Salih with instructions to despatch a boat with it to Bahrein which he did on the 30th ult. The general report is that the Imam has permitted Shaik Sooltan to negotiate a peace between himself and the Chief of Bahrein. I reported before that Rashid bin Humud and Ahmed bin Suroor Boo Shamis had requested Sooltan to visit Zuet in order to endeavour to make up their quarrel. He accordingly proceeded there but failing to arrange matters returned. On the 30 ult. Ally bin Ahmed a cousin of Rashid bin Humud arrived at Ras el'Khymah with an application to bin Suggur for assistance and support which the Shaik could not afford. Ally bin Ahmed remained till the 3 inst. but being unable to obtain the desired help took his departure for Zuet.
The greatest confusion is produced by the Beduins going about in parties of 10 and plundering all they meet whether friend or foe. Udwee and Mooslim bin Rashid's crew are still in confinement. I send my letters now in duplicate in consequence of the stormy season they are liable to be lost. Enclosed are the copies of the letters I have sent.

1.22
Hostilities between Sultan b. Saqr and Bani Yas: agreement defining boundaries negotiated by Shaikh of Lingah, February–June 1829

80

Translation of a letter from Shaikh Soultan bin Suggur to Major Wilson dated 19 Feb 1819

After Compliments I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter by the Capt: from Bahrein which I answered on the instant with respect to the wilful aggressions of the Beniyas upon my own territories and lately also, the repeated injuries they have done us, as is unreasonably known: we have therefore determined to oppose them in the manner they have threatened us. God willing no system shall be wanting on my part to carry on hostilities after the strictest customs of acknowledged war. but I cannot help surmising that there has been some circumstance cause for the conduct of the Beniyas: and perhaps he may assist the Beniyas when I rise up against them and not consent to it: and invite him to join them in their hostilities and enmity towards us. If this should be the case, I cannot submit to be degraded and shall become the enemy of any one who intends to attack or injure me.

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a letter from Shaikh Sooltan bin Suggur to Major Wilson dated 19 Feb 1829

AC Have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter by the Capt. from Bahrein which I answered on the instant. With respect to the wilful aggressions of the Beniyas upon our territories and subjects, the repeated injuries they have done us universally known, we have therefore determined to oppose them in the manner they have treated us. God willing no exertion shall be wanting on my part to carry on hostilities after the strictest customs of acknowledged war, but I cannot help surmising that there has been some exciting cause for the conduct of the Beniyas and perhaps he may assist the Beniyas when I rise up against them and not consent to it and will therefore join them in their hostilities and enmity towards us. If this should be the case, I cannot submit to be degraded and shall become the enemy of any one who intends to attack or injure me.

39

ANNEX B, No. 3

Moollah Hussein, Agent at Sharjah to Major Wilson, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, June 17, 1829.

[Bahrain Archives, Book 58, pp. 159-65]

Translation of a Letter from Moollah Hussein the Agent at Shargah to Major Wilson dated 17' June 1829. [p. 159].

A.C. I beg to acquaint you that Shaik Abdoolla bin Ahmad on his way up returning to Bahrein anchored off Shinas Lingah, and having learnt that one of Shaik Sooltan bin Suggur's Birghas' under the command of Abraham bin Rahmah was at Lingah[1] he sent for that person and had a conversation with him respecting the engagement which had been entered into with Shaik Sooltan bin Suggur to visit him in Ras el Khymah which the Bahrein chief excused himself from fulfilling saying that God willing he would so after his arrival at Bahrein—Abraham bin Rahmah says that Shaik Abdullah has taken a Bugla belonging to Sued Mahomed the chief of Sofar, on her way from Bombay with a cargo for Bussorah and Bushire—Shaik Abdoolla seized this vessel by violence and force after killing Sued Mahomed. On his way up to Bahrein he fell in with the Imams ships of Koh Mabaruk, which followed him firing their guns.—Shaik Abdoolla finding himself pressed by their fire, transhipped the cargo of the captured[2] Bugla such as guns sails & &. and then sunk her by knocking a hole thro' her bottom: About 11 days ago Shaik Tahnoon sent a Man of the Beni Jittel tribe to Shargah to enquire and spy what was doing there. On his return he reported that Shaik Sooltan was collecting a very large force of Bedwins and Citizens and was preparing his vessels for an expedition against Aboothabee. In consequence of this information Shaik Tahnoon left a man named Sooltan bin Majed with 100 Men in Debaye and sending for Salmin bin Nasir the chief of Deruh gave him orders to rebuild his Towers and put the place in a state of defence he then took his departure for Aboothabee for the purpose of gathering and preparing the [p. 160]. Benyas Tribe for War. In my former letter I mentioned that the Imam had written to Shaik Mah[d] bin Fazul requesting him to make up matters between Sooltan and Tahnoon and that Shaik Sooltan had sent over Abraham bin Rahmah to Lingah to by[*sic*] the chief of that place to assist him against the Beniyas, Shaik Mahomed accordingly embarked 300 Men on board his 3 Buglas and proceeded over in person to Shargah. On his arrival there Shaikhs Sooltan felt his pride and consequence greatly increased and immediately sent to [*illegible*] Ras al Khymah, Jazirat al Humra. Amulgavin and Ajman. Heer and Fusht with orders for his subjects in those places to collect at Shargah with the people of which place they formed altogether a body of about 4500 Men. Shaik Sooltan rendered confident by such numbers proposed marching on Aboothabee and assaulting it at once. To this however Mahomed bin Fazul would not agree telling him that he had come over for the purpose of making peace and that he was about to despatch a letter by boat to Shaik Tahnoon and would see what answer was returned in order that they might know whether the Beniyas Shaik was inclined for peace or war. The Bugarah was accordingly sent 6 days ago with a letter for Shaik Tahnoon—In the meantime Shaik Sooltan arranged with Shaik Mahomed bin Fazul that they should endeavour to entice Salmin bin Nasir the Chief of Deruh together with his tribe to forsake Tahnoon and cement himself with Bin Suggur and that in the event of his refusing to do so that they should proceed against him with their army and expel him from Deruh by force. Accordingly on the 12' June the Shaik of Lingah embarked on board his Bugla and anchoring off Deruh sent word to Salmin bin Nasir that he wished to see him. The answer to this message was brought by a man named Jubbur bin Majed to whom Shaik Mahomed stated his wish that Salmin bin Nasir should give up his connexion with Shaik Tahnoon and his followers and join Shaik Sooltan. Jubbur bin Majid accordingly returned on shore after promising to bring back his chiefs reply to this proposition—Salmin bin Nasir however on hearing what it was refused to consent and the Lingah Shaik after waiting in vain for Jubbur's return sailed the next day for Shargah. Shaik Sooltan finding that he had not succeeded hoisted the Standards of War on the 15[h] and accompanied by the chiefs of

(1) *was at Lingah* interlined.
(2) *captured* interlined.

40

Lingah[1] Jaziret ul Humra Amulgavine Ajman Heer Fusht &. &. on their respective vessels proceeded off Deruh which Salih bin Suggur marching[2] with 2000 men composed of Shargah people and Bedwins surrounded on the land side[3]. When the Deruh men saw the large Force brought against them and that they were cut off on all sides Salmin bin Nasir sent to Shaik Mahomed bin Fazul to promise him an Interview with Shaik Sooltan bin Suggur and arrange matters between them and also that he would forbid any of the attacking force entering into the place lest the Inhabitants should suffer. Shaik Mahomed finally intimated that he was willing to leave Deruh and reside along with his Tribe at either
[p. 161]. Lingah or Shinas.—To these proposals Shaik Mahomed bin Fazul consented and granted what he desired. He then took him to Shaik Sooltan and reconciled them and afterwards landed with all his Men close to Deruh to prevent any of the Troops entering it—In the meantime Salmin bin Nasir prepared his boats and they embarked all their property intending to take up their residence in Lingah.—The Bani Mohair determined to proceed to Fusht and the remaining Inhabitants of Deruh to spread themselves over the different places. Yesterday the boat dispatched to Aboothabee by Shaik Mahomed bin Fazul returned with an answer to which he instantly sent off a reply. What this correspondence is about I do not know as they are at Deruh while I am in Shargah but it is said that Shaik Sooltan demands that Tahnoon and his Tribe should give up Debaye to the family of Huza as he does not like his dwelling there and looks upon himself as greatly increased in power and dignity in consequence of the large force with which he is surrounded.—The people of Aboothabee besides are suffering much and are in great distress from the scarcity of provisions such as dates rice &c &c the former being two dollars per Bag and the latter the same being hardly procurable for that sum. I mentioned before that Shaik Sooltan had forbidden all intercourse with the above named place as well as Debaye and when any one wishes to go he prevents them. Everybody has therefore ceased proceeding to the Beniyas capital thru' fear of the Ras el Khymah people. Shaik Tahnoon however will not give up Debaye without fighting even if all the Beniyas were to perish and Shaik Sooltan, Shaik Salih and Rashid bin Humeed with the other Shaiks[4] have now proceeded to the Khor of Debaye. His force consists of about 4500 Men and every day a fire of place between the two parties. Shaik Mahomed bin Fycel is still at Deruh and has embarked Salmin bin Nasir with his followers, he is awaiting the arrival of Shaik Tahnoon at Debaye to learn what he is going to do.

(1) *Lingah* interlined.
(2) *proceeding* struck through, *marching* interlined.
(3) This was written originally as "and Bedwins by land surrounded the place".
(4) *with the other Shaiks* interlined.

161

B. S. dated the 29th 20th June 1819
I beg to acquaint you that when Shaik Tahnoon received Mahomed bin Fazul's letter he embarked along with Shaik Rashid in 18 boats and landed again in a Khor called Ugnadee a place between Aboothabee and Debaye proceeded to Debaye by land and reached there on the 18th. He immediately intimated his presence to Shaik Mahomed bin Fazul who sent word back, that he should not come near him in order to effect a



Transcription of previous document

P.S. dated the 20th June 1829

I beg to acquaint you that when Shaik Tahnoon received Mahomed bin Fazul's letter he embarked along with Shakhbut in 18 boats and landing again in a Khor called Ugnada[5] a place between Aboothabee and Debaye proceeded to the latter[6] by land and arrived there on the 18th. He immediately intimated his presence to Shaik Mahomed bin Fazel who sent word back that this object was to meet him in order to effect a reconciliation between him and Shaik Sooltan bin Suggur. Tahnoon accordingly departed for Deruh with about 100 followers and was received by the Lingah Shaik attended by 200 Men. After some discussion and conversation the latter consented to Tahnoons proposals and Tahnoon agreed to his. Shaik Mahomed then proceeded to Shaik Sooltan and he agreed to ratify what had been arranged. Accordingly after prayers on the 19th Ins[t] Shaik Tahnoon accompanied by Shakboot and 150 Men left Debaye for the neighbourhood of Deruh—and at the same time the Lingah Shaik took Shaik Sooltan and 400 Men to meet him. In the interview they made peace, entered into mutual engagements and became one in state property—Their boundaries were[7] fixed and their territories and people[8] defined—From Rumss[9] to[10] Deruh belonging to Shaik Sooltan and from Debaye to Bidda to Shaik Tahnoon—Deruh was to be completely destroyed and no longer to retain that name. All the date groves and boats &. &. belonging to the Family of Huza were not to be interfered with in any way by Shaik Tahnoon and their owners were to be permitted to reside in Shargah.—That if any individual of Tahnoons tribe committed any act of robbery &. &. in Sooltans territories he should give notice to the Beniyas Shaik and if punishment were not inflicted in 15 days Sooltan was to exact retribution himself. This condition was[1] equally binding on Shaik Sooltan—Whatever had taken place between the tribes in the way of plundering and putting to death was to be mutually passed over—and the friends and enemies of the one were to be the friends and enemies of the other but without reference to Sued Saed.—Shaik Mahomed bin Fazul has proceeded over to Lingah with the Soodan Tribe—Shaik Sooltan had this day completely destroyed the Fort and Towers of Deruh not leaving one stone upon another and has dismissed his army to their respective places of abode. He has returned to Shargah—Rashid bin Humeed to Ajman and Shaik Tahnoon to Debaye.

[*Explanatory Note.*—Bidda is on the east of the Qatar peninsula, and it follows that, in 1829, the territory of Abu Dhabi was recognized as extending along the coast, so as to include the Khaur al-'Udaid.]

(5) Ghanadah.
(6) *Debaye* struck through, *the latter* interlined.
(7) *were* followed by an illegible word, which has been struck through.
(8) *and people* interlined.
(9) Rimth.
(10) *to* followed by *Ras al Khyma*, which has been struck through.

1.23
Assassination of Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi by his brothers Khalifah and Sultan, April 1833

No 214 of 33

Bombay Castle 17th July 1833. Political Board &c.

From the Resident in the Persian Gulf

1214. dated the 4th June 1833 with enclosures –

Sir,

I have the honor to transmit a translation of a letter from the Government Agent at Muscat containing further particulars of the proceedings of the Wahabees in that quarter and giving a detailed account of the Murder of Shaikh Tahnoon the Chief of the powerful tribe of the Beniyas. –

2. The letter of the Wahabee Agent therein noticed, refers to the proceedings reported by me under date the 20th April last It is of a very intemperate nature but not professing to have been written under any express authority may perhaps be deemed deserving of little attention — A draught of my instructions to the Government Agent is herewith enclosed and the terms of the Reply which I have dictated to him, may

No 2141

Bombay Castle 17th July 1833. Political Annexe

I should meet with the Concurrence of the Right Honble the Governor in Council. For the future it is a question for consideration whether the Wahabee Representative would not be the proper authority to address in the event of the occurrence of any similar demand for investigation from the Arab States in that neighbourhood. —

3rd The Sheikh of the Bennas is a Chief of Superior talent and a powerful Commander, one of the worst characters of the Persians — His death is therefore generally to be regretted. Considering the inveterate feuds existing between the above tribes, no material change in their relative positions may however perhaps be the result. —

I have the honor to be &c &c
(Signed) Jno A. Blane —
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Bushire Residency
4th June 1833 —

Translation of the substance of a Letter from Mohodad Nasjum the Sheikh of Shuqra to the Resident in the Persian Gulf — Dated 9th Zeel qaeda or 22nd of May 1833. —

Abdool Azeez the Wahabee Agent arrived at Ras el Khyma the Ends of last Month and on learning from the Shuqra people that their place was blockaded by the British Ships wrote me the Note enclosed in my last Letter — Some bin Afeesan is busily engaged

No 2141 Encl. 2

Bombay Castle 17th July 1833. Political Annexe 20

in the affair of the Port of Bayunee — His Agents are travelling over all parts of Oman Collecting the Zukat — Every person professing to pray that is immediately attached — All the Chiefs in those parts have been Summoned to Bayunee to hold a grand Consultation upon certain Affairs they are no longer subject to the same Authority over their Lands as formerly — The name and title of Shaik indeed remains but the Power is entirely in the hands of the Wahabee — They now begin to perceive and to resent but have no means of liberating themselves from the yoke imposed on them — The Programme of a Sitting existing Palace at the Bayunee enemies the Wahabees the Commissioner of Oman to consist in a Bugla for Emeritus Agreeably to a Letter lately received from Jamal Aldeen inviting Sheikh Sultan to send an Agent to renew friendly relations and to see how Affairs stood between them and the Prince. — It is represented that for a certain sum of Money the Joasmee Chief is to seize upon and deliver up Sheikh Sultans Vessels now in Koweit to Jamal Aldeen. Sheikh Nasjem arrived at Rasel Khyma on the 25th Zeel qaeda this appeared to induce the Joasmees to afford him an attack on Bushire but having no funds whatever of course this declined. — The night of his departure his Boat took fire and exploding burnt him severely. —

No. 214 of 33

Bombay Castle 17th July 1833 Political Dept

I now beg to report the particulars of an event which has lately taken place in Abusthubee. The Governor of that place Shaik Tahnoon has a number of brothers some of whom he invited at three to reside in the Capital but they should intrigue against his life and authority at last in conjunction with the contrivance of his father Shaik Shakbut he permitted two by name Khalifa and Sooltan to live in Abusthubee but on their arrival no distinct or even casual mark of distinction was shewn them Shaik Tahnoon discovered they were in league with one of the principal men of the Tribe to Murder him upon which he threw them both into prison. The surviving Officials the Benyas or who became alarmed lest he should serve others in the same way they therefore secretly entered into a Conspiracy with the Shaiks two Brothers to put him to death accordingly Shaik Khalifa having loaded a pistol with two Balls concealed it under his Clothes and taking an opportunity when Tahnoon was off his guard he shot him in the side and Sooltan immediately despatched him with his dagger. Shaik Shakbut the Father at first made great Lamentations but at length persuaded the Benyas to acknowledge Khalifa as their Chief. A Messenger was immediately despatched to Omer his Agent to acquaint him with the death of Tahnoon and to procure submission and the payment of the Zuckat &c

No. 214 of 33

Bombay Castle 17th July 1833. Political Dept

For consequence the Resident sent off a Communication to Shaik Sultan to inform him that the Benyas were under his protection and he would allow no aggression to be made upon them. Khalifa has appointed another Governor to Debaye. Several of his brothers Sultan are now the Chiefs of the Benyas under the superintendence of Omer. Father Shaikhbut two of the Resident Agent have returned to Absothubee with Sealed Instructions to be shewn for the purpose of collecting the Zuckat &c of Shaik Tahnoon is murder and encouragement for the people of Bedoul as neither he Shaik himself could have been able to reduce his tribe to complete subjection. The present rulers will not be able to maintain their despotic and firm Authority maintained by Tahnoon over his subjects nor will they be able to destroy them from premeditated acts like the last.

A true translation
Signed J. Kennedy
Assistant to the Resident

A true Copy
Signed D. A. Blane.
Assistant in the Persian Secy

Transcription of previous document

From the Resident in the Persian Gulf

dated the 4th June 1833 with enclosures

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose a translation of a letter from the Government Agent at Sharga containing further particulars of the proceedings of the Wahabees in that quarter and giving a detailed account of the murder of Shaik Tahnoon the chief of the powerful tribe of the "Beniyas".

2nd The letter of the Wahabee Agent therein noticed, refers to the proceedings reported by me under date the 20th April last. It is of a very intemparate nature but not professing to have been written under any express authority may perhaps be dismissed, deserving of little attention. A draft of my instructions to the Government Agent is herewith enclosed and the tone of the reply which I have dictated to him may I trust meet with the concurrence of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council. For the future it is a matter for consideration whether the Wahabee representative would not be the proper authority to address in the event of the recurrence of any similar demand for satisfaction from the Arab tribes in that neighbourhood.

3rd The Shaik of the Beniyas was a Chief of superior talent and a powerful counterprize of the restless habits of the Joasmees. His death is therefore greatly to be regretted considering the inveterate feuds existing between the above tribes, no material change in their relative position may however perhaps be the result.

I have the honor to be Sir

Signed D. A. Blane

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Bushire Residency
4th June 1833

Translation of the substance of a letter from Moollah Houssein the Agent of Sharga to the Resident in the Persian Gulf
Dated 29th Zil Quada or 22nd May 1833.

AC Abdool Azeez the Wahabee Agent arrived at Rasel Khyma the end of last month and in learning from the Sharga people that their place was blockaded by the British ships wrote me the note enclosed in my last letter. Omar bin Afeesan is busily engaged

in the repair of the Fort of Brymee. His Agents are travelling over all ports of Oman collecting the Zakat. Every person refusing to pay this is immediately attacked. All the Shaiks in these parts have been summoned to Brymee to hold a grand consultation upon certain affairs. They no longer possess the same authority over their tribes as formerly. The name and title of Shaik indeed remains but the power is entirely in the hands of the Wahabee. This they now begin to perceive and to resent but have no means of liberating themselves from the yoke imposed on them. The possession of a strong central place like Brymee ensures the Wahabees the command of Oman to start in a Bugla for Bushire. Agreeably to a letter lately received from Jamal Khan inviting Sheikh Sultan to send an Agent to renew friendly relations and to see how affairs stood between him and the Prince. It is reported that for a certain sum of money the Joasmee chief is to seize upon and deliver up Shaik Nasir's Vessels (now in Kowit) to Jamal Khan. Sheikh Hossen arrived at Rassel Khyma on the 26 Zil Quada his object was to induce the Joasmees to assist him in an attack on Bushire but having no funds whatever of course they declined. The night of his departure his boat took fire and exploding burnt him severely.

I now beg to report the particulars of an event which has lately taken place in Aboothabee. The Governor of that place Shaik Tahnoon has a number of brothers none of whom he would allow to reside in the capital lest they should intrigue against his life and authority. At last in compliance with the entreaties of his father Shackboot he permitted two by name Khalifa and Sooltan to live in Aboothabee taking care however that they exercised no authority or even carried arms. A short time since however Shaik Tahnoon discovered they were in league with one of the principal men of the tribe to murder him upon which he threw the latter into prison. This proceeding offended the Beniyas, who became alarmed lest he should serve others in the same way. They therefore secretly entered into a conspiracy with the Shaik's two brothers to put him to death. Accordingly Shaik Khaleefa having loaded a pistol with two balls concealed it under his clothes and taking an opportunity when Tahnoon was off his guard he shot him in the side and Sooltan immediately despatched him with his dagger. Shaik Shakboot the father at first made great lamentations but at length persuaded the Beniyas to acknowledge Khaleefa as their chief. A messenger was immediately despatched to Omar bin Afeesan to acquaint him with the death of Tahnoon and to proper submission and the payment of the Zakat.

In consequence the Wahabee sent off a communication to Shaikh Sooltan to inform him that the Beniyas were under his protection and he would allow no aggression to be made upon them. Khaleefa has appointed another Governor to Debaye. He and his brother Sultan are now the chiefs of the Beniyas under the superintendence of their father Shackboot. Two of the Wahabee agents have returned to Aboothabee with Saeed bin Dumeethan for the purpose of collecting the Zakat. The death of Shaik Tahnoon is highly advantageous for the people of Nedgd as while he lived they would never have been able to reduce his tribe to complete submission. The present rulers will not be able to maintain the despotic and firm authority maintained by Tahnoon over his subjects nor will they be able to restrain them from piratical acts like he did.

(True translation)

Signed S. Hennell

Assistant to the Resident

(True Copy)

Signed D. A. Blane

Resident in the Persian Gulf

1.24
Emigration of Al Bu Falasah to Dubai, 1833



Bombay Castle 11th December 1833 Political Cons. 44



Extract of a translation of a letter from the Agent at Bunder
to the Resident dated 17th Rabeea ool Awul or 5th September 1833.

It appears that after the death of Sheik
Tahnoon of Aboothabee, his two brothers Mujid and Sultan
assumed the Government, but by their haughty oppressive
and arbitrary proceedings they soon disgusted the Bunjas
and a conspiracy was formed by some of the principal
Inhabitants which they communicated to a nephew of
the late Sheik Tahnoon who was arranged with to [illegible]

Bombay Castle 11th December 1833. Political Cons. 5

to death and be appointed Sheikh in his room. This undutiful
however betrayed the plot to Khuleefa Bin Shaekh Boot who rushed
within the Fort and seized the principal persons concerned
of whom he put three to death, viz. Sultan Bin Mujeel,
Mahomed Bin Summun and Mahomed Bin Ufeer. He likewise
seized Sultan's two Secretaries and was about to kill them
which threw the people of Bunder Bee into such a ferment
that combined with his Brother Sultan entreaties he
consented to spare their lives. One of them Beni Ugar however
was deaths stripped of his property and left the with the
Sultans sent away in a Buggarah which has since reached
Lingah. The other merchant was set at liberty with an
intimation that the first appearance of a suspicious matter
would be the signal for his death & confiscation of his
property. These proceedings have
created the greatest possible discontent in Abusthabee, most
of the inhabitants of which place are preparing to leave.
Two Branches of the Benijas called the Alloo Fulasum and
Bunneet consist of about 800 persons, the larger part of whom
at the time of this occurrence, were on the Pearl Banks
of whom I consist of 80 Ships and about 150 fishermen with
remaining in Abusthabee agreed with Beni Ugar the Sultans
Resident to leave that place the first opportunity

Bombay Castle 11th December 1833. Political Cons.

they embarked a few days since in 13 Boats and proceeded to
Debaye by sea, which they marched by Land leaving previously
summoned the rest of the Tribe to meet them there from
the Pearl Banks. The Governor of Debaye at first refused to
give up the place to them and they proceeded to Khaw
near Shargah carrying off with them about 300 Camels
belonging to Abusthabee Tribe. Soon after they were
joined by 60 Boats from the Pearl Banks and Debaye
was subsequently given up to them. Sheikh Sultan
has just arrived at Shargah and ——— ———
——— has agreed to grant Beni Ugar with a large
force in an attack upon Abusthabee.—

/True extract & translation/
/Signed/ J. C. Bennett
Offg. Assistant to the Resident.

Transcription of previous document

Extract of a translation of a letter from the Agent at Shargah to the Resident dated 17th Rubeea-ool Sanee or 5 September 1833

It appears that after the death of Sheik Tahnoon of Aboothabee, his two brothers Majid and Sultan assumed the Government, but by their haughty oppressions and arbitrary proceedings they soon disgusted the Beniyas and a conspiracy was formed by some of the principal members, which they communicated to a nephew of Sheik Shackboot who, it was arranged, was to put Khuleefa to death and be appointed Sheik in his room. This individual however betrayed the plot to Khuleefa bin Shackboot who retired within the fort and seized the principal persons concerned, of these he put three to death, viz Sultan bin Majid, Mahomed bin Jumeen and Mahomed Mulusee. He likewise took up two merchants and was about to kill them which threw the people of Aboothabee into such a ferment that combined with his brother Sultan's entreaties he consented to spare their lives. One of them Beni Syar, however, was beaten, stripped of his property and together with his relations sent away in a Bugarah, which has since reached Lingah. The other merchant was set at liberty with an intimation that the least appearance of a suspicious nature would be the signal for his death and confiscation of his property. These proceedings have created the greatest possible discontent in Aboothabee, most of the inhabitants of which place are preparing to leave. Two branches of the Beniyas called the Aboo Fulasaa and Rumesit consist of about 800 persons, the larger part of whom at the time of this occurrence, were on the pearl banks. Of those present six chiefs and about 150 followers who were remaining in Aboothabee agreed with Ben Syar the banished merchant to leave that place the first opportunity; accordingly they embarked a few days since in 13 boats and proceeded to Debaye by sea, while 40 marched by land having previously summoned the rest of the tribe to meet them there from the pearl banks. The Governor of Debaye at first refused to give up the place to them and they proceeded to Khor near Shargah carrying off with them about 500 camels belonging to Shackboot's family. Soon after they were joined by 60 boats, from the pearl banks and Debaye was subsequently given up to them. Shaik Sultan has just arrived at Shargah and has agreed to assist Beni Syar with a large force in an attack upon Aboothabee.

(True extract of a translation)
(Signed) S. Hennell
Assistant to the Resident

1.25
Bani Yas/Qasimi war, 1833–1834

689

Internal affairs of the Pirate Coast, 1820-35.

Position in 1821.

Even before the evacuation of Rās-al-Khaimah by the British forces Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar had stepped into the place of principal authority among the Qawāsim. Hasan-bin-Rahmah of Rās-al-Khaimah had then already become subservient to him; and the aged Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams, who clung to his Wahhābi ideas and was apparently supported by Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazirat-al-Hamra, could make no head against his influence.

Position in 1823.

At the time when, in January 1823, Lieutenant McLeod's visit to the Pirate Coast first laid bare to view the internal politics of the country, the influence and power of the Shaikh of Shārjah greatly exceeded those of any other chief, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, his chief competitor, not excepted. Sultān-bin-Saqar had now deported the old Shaikh of Rams to Shārjah, replacing him by Muhammad-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, the son of a former Shaikh; his own brother Muhammad he had placed over Rās-al-Khaimah town, which now occupied a site on the mainland opposite to the peninsula; the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, owned him for his liege-lord; and on the coast northwards of Shārjah the only chief who considered himself independent was Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān. This last obstacle in the way of his complete supremacy Sultān-bin-Saqar was extremely anxious to remove, and, as evidence of his rights over 'Ajmān, he referred the Resident to the preliminary agreement made between himself and General Sir W. Grant Keir in 1820, which expressly covered 'Ajmān; but the force of the argument as proving the perma-

nent subordination of 'Ajmān was not admitted, and the Shaikh was further informed that the British Government took no interest in his claims to suzerainty over other chiefs.

Lieutenant McLeod, dissenting from the current view that the ruling Shaikh of Shārjah was little better than a monster in human shape, described him at this time as a turbulent and ambitious man, but superior in ability, as well as in most other respects, to his neighbours. The establishment of Shaikh Sultān's power over the whole Pirate Coast might, he reported, possibly be advantageous to Government; but it should be understood that, as no Shaikh was absolute even in his own tribe, so the hegemony of Shārjah over the other principalities would be nominal at the best; and the Resident foresaw trouble from the rancorous hatred of its ruler for Saiyid Sa'īd of Masqat.

The principality of Dibai, still governed by Zāid-bin-Saif, the uncle of the Shaikh, was at this time dependent on that of Abu Dhabi, of which the ruler was Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt; and both of these states, which were military and pastoral rather than maritime in their condition, generally inclined to alliance with Masqat.

The Qawāsim, whose extreme poverty and fewness of resources were now for the first time set in a clear light, still built their boats entirely of Indian teak; their warlike stores were obtained from Bahrain, from the Persian ports of the lower Gulf, and from Masqat; and their arms, mostly taken from prizes, were commonly of Persian manufacture. None of the chiefs possessed more than three or four boats except Sultān-bin-Saqar who had at least 30 fine vessels, each capable of containing 50 to 100 men; and it was strongly suspected that most of these were over three years old and had been hidden away by the Shaikh, instead of being surrendered, at the time of the British expedition.

Continued ascendancy of the Shaikh of Shārjah, 1823-32.

Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazirat-al-Hamra was now dead; in 1824 his successor was removed by Sultān-bin-Saqar to make way for a more pliant representative in the person of one Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah; and about the same time the Shaikh of 'Ajmān also bowed to the inevitable and acknowledged the overlordship of Shārjah. In 1825 Shaikh Sultān, having acquired influence at Dibai by his own marriage with the sister of the young Shaikh, was scheming to obtain actual possession of that place, the nearness of which to his capital would be a serious danger in case of its falling under inimical influences. In 1832 however, Sultān-bin-Saqar, made aware by experience of the disadvantages of being held responsible for the behaviour of minor chiefs, formally resigned his pretensions to suzerainty over 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain; and in

1833 he sustained a serious reverse at Abu Dhabi which cannot but have lowered his prestige.

Meanwhile, in 1828, the town of Rās-al-Khaimah had begun to rise once more on its original site, the ruins of the old town serving as quarries of material for the new; the wall across the isthmus on the landward side of the town had already been restored; and a square tower had been built on a mound which marked the place of a former principal fortification.

Hostilities between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi, 1825-31.

It is unnecessary here to do more than refer to the acts of war between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi which took place in 1825 in connection with the Baraimi-Dairah quarrel, and which have already been mentioned above.

In February 1829 Sultān-bin-Saqar, irritated by a constant coalition against himself between the Saiyid of Masqat and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, took advantage of the failure of the joint expedition of those two powers against Bahrain to declare war against Abu Dhabi; and very soon, by means of a blockade, he succeeded in reducing to severe straits the principal and only town belonging to his rival. The prospect of exclusion from the approaching pearl fishery was however equally disagreeable to both sides; and in June 1829, by the mediation of Muhammad-bin-Qadhīb, Shaikh of Lingeh, peace was arranged on condition that neither party should interfere any more with the subjects or dependents of the other.

In 1831 trouble was renewed in consequence of the curious imbroglio, already described, which resulted in 1831 from the operations of Saiyid Sa'īd of Masqat against Sohār. The Shaikh of 'Ajmān, on his return from Sohār, found that his town had been plundered and the flocks of his subjects raided by Bani Yās and Manāsīr despatched by Shaikh Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt; and war against Abu Dhabi was immediately declared on his part and on that of the Shaikh of Shārjah. A peace was shortly patched up by the Shaikh of Lingeh, no doubt with the object of postponing matters until the end of the pearl season; but in September it was broken by subjects of Shārjah, who attacked two pearl boats of the Bani Yās near Bahrain, an act to which the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi immediately replied by seizing 14 vessels of the Qawāsim that happened to call at his port for provisions. A partial adjustment of claims now took place, but in December 1831 the situation was again strained; no further serious operations however took place.

Determined but ineffectual efforts of Shārjah

In 1833, encouraged by a split among the Bani Yās and the secession of the Āl Bū Falāsah section and others from Abu Dhabi to Dibai, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar resolved on a supreme attempt to

692

to crush Abu Dhabi, 1833-34.

overthrow, once for all, the power of his hated rival the Bani Yās Shaikh.

All Shārjah subjects having been hurriedly recalled from the pearl banks in the height of the diving season, much to their discontent, a naval expedition against Abu Dhabi was prepared without delay; it consisted of 22 boats carrying 520 Qawāsim, under the command of Shaikhs Sultān-bin-Saqar and Hasan-bin-Rahmah, and of 80 boats manned by 700 of the Āl Bū Falāsah and other refugees at Dibai. On the afternoon of the 10th September 1833 the Qawāsim and their allies landed at a point about four miles from Abu Dhabi, which town they expected to find almost deserted and to capture without difficulty on the morrow; but the Shaikhs of the Bani Yās had received sufficient notice of the intended attack to collect a large number of their own tribe and of Manāsīr Bedouins; and, when the sun rose, the invaders discovered that they were surrounded by a vastly superior force. Seized by panic they fled to their vessels; but most of these, left high and dry by the tide, were not available for escape. Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar himself was nearly drowned by the sinking of a small boat, in which he had put to sea along with four of his slaves. The losses of the Qawāsim on this occasion amounted to 30 men killed, including a brother of the Shaikh of Lingeh; and six of their vessels, one a Batīl, were taken. Of the Bani Yās allies 15 were killed, and 235 were taken prisoners and compelled to return to their homes at Abu Dhabi, while of the 80 boats contributed by the Bani Yās dissidents no less than 60 were captured.

The Shaikh of Shārjah did not, however, abandon his enterprise, but by means of alliances with the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Lingeh got together a fresh fleet, which sailed from Dibai on the 9th of November 1833. Having arrived before Abu Dhabi, Sultān-bin-Saqar during three days endeavoured to take the place by direct naval attack; but his attempts were defeated by a large mixed garrison of townsmen and Bedouins, whose fire from six or seven large vessels moored by iron chains to the shore was very effective and even damaged the Baghlah of Shaikh Sultān himself. A blockade was accordingly substituted on the part of the Qawāsim, by which the defenders of the town soon found themselves reduced to serious straits; and the departure of Saiyid Sa'id from Masqat to his African possessions destroyed, about the same time, their last hope of assistance from without. To add to the troubles of the besieged, thirty of their boats were captured by the Qawāsim at some distance from Abu Dhabi; ten of their men were

693

killed in an engagement with the people of Dibai; and a caravan of 50 camels bringing dates from Baraimi to Abu Dhabi was intercepted by the enemy.

The garrison, however, did not lose heart, but under cover of night sent three large vessels carrying 500 men to sea; these were pursued by a detachment of 20 sail from the blockading fleet, but were not overtaken. The first exploit of the escaped vessels was the capture of an 'Ajmān Baqārah near Bustānch; out of the crew of eight men, seven were put to death. They then attacked a Masqat Baghlah, killed five of her crew, and plundered her of a quantity of dates, Rs. 3,000 in cash and all her guns,—a piratical proceeding for which they afterwards voluntarily accounted to the Masqat authorities without the intervention of the British Resident. After this, a pursuing Qāsimi squadron coming in sight, they made sail for home and regained Abu Dhabi in safety.

Meanwhile Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt of Abu Dhabi had succeeded in inflicting deterrent punishment on the Ghafalah and other Bedouin tribes who had assisted the people of Dibai in cutting off his supplies by land, and the discomforts endured by the crews of the blockading fleet were hardly less than those which the inhabitants of the beleaguered town suffered; for the provisions and water of the fleet had to be obtained from Lingeh and Rās-al-Khaimah, and each individual on board was required to make the arrangements for his own supply. Finally, in 1834, a peace was arranged through the Shaikh of Lingeh, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi restoring all the vessels which he had captured since the beginning of the war and the Shaikh of Shārjah withdrawing his blockade.

The peace was not of long duration. A foray in Qāsimi territory by Manāsīr Bedouins, dependent on Abu Dhabi, led to retaliation by the seizure upon the pearl banks of ten Bani Yās boats, together with their crews of 80 men and pearls to the value of Rs. 4,000. This rupture having obliged the Shaikhs to withdraw their subjects from the banks, a penalty severely felt by both, Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi was persuaded to send his father Shaikh Shakhbūt as an envoy to Shārjah with proposals of peace, and a stable treaty was at length arranged. In regard to the Bani Yās domiciled at Dibai it was settled that they should henceforward be regarded as subjects of Shārjah.

The exhausting war which we have just described, perhaps the most persistently waged of any that ever occurred between Shaikhs of the Pirate Coast, had undoubtedly an excellent effect in preparing the way for the conclusion of the first Maritime Truce in 1835.

Bombay Castle 11th December 1833. Political Cons. 4

Substance of a letter from the Resident at Sharjah to the Address
dated 2d. Surmadee and received on 15th September 1833.—

No

In a former letter I reported the departure
of Bin Ateer and the Tribes of Abbo Dulasa and Bunnee
from Shinas leaving all their effects behind and

Bombay Castle 11 December 1833. Political Cons. 5

they had obtained possession of the Fort of Debaye. On the 3
Instant the Chiefs of this above Tribes had an interview with
Sheik Sultan, when they engaged to support them with all their forces in an attack upon Abu
Thabee, nothing affording them so much satisfaction as their
dependance on the Benyas and the prospect of destroying
the enemies, means afforded by themselves. He accordingly
dispatched two Boats to recal his people from the Pearl
Banks and addressed some orders to all the disposed Arabs
in Read they make to meet them in Sharjah. The Chief
however are detained and remonstrated with them against their
unprovoked proceedings and the injury he was inflicting upon
his people in withdrawing them from the Pearl Banks
before the season was half over, and suggesting the probability
of their involving themselves with the English and that Nahyan
advised them strongly to let the Benyas destroy one
another without their interference. The Seamee Chief pressed upon
pressed upon with this idea that under present circumstances
he had only to land with a few men near Abu Thabee to
ensure the capture of that place, refused to attend to these
circumstances. On the 3d Instant the Tribes of Abbo Dulasa
and Bunnee to the number of 900 men in 80 boats



Bombay Castle 11th December 1833. Political Cons.

Sheikh Sultan bin Saggur with 50 men in Sheikh Bin Saeed's Buggarah, Rayshain bin Rahmah with 90 followers in his Sabul and 20 Boats with 1100 men from Abargah, all sail for Abookhabee in this joint conviction that the place was deserted and would be taken without trouble, this threaten ed attack however kept them afloat during the dispute between Sheikh Sultan and Khuleefa and a force of 3500 men of the Benyas and Manasir Tribes were assembled in Abookhabee. On the afternoon of the 16th Sheikh Sultan's forces landed in Khor Hassan about two miles from the Benyas Capital, where they determined to spend the night and march to Abookhabee next morning. When however they were astonished to find themselves attacked by a much superior force well supported by cavalry and hand grenades. This unexpected occurrence inspired such a panic that they broke at the first discharge of fire arms and fled to their boats, the greater portion of which however were upon dry land owing to the ebb tide. Sheikh Sultan & four of his slaves got into a small Buggarah which took with them and he had a narrow escape from drowning. The loss sustained by them amounted to 30 men including the brother of the Sheikh of Ajman



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Bombay Castle 11th December 1833. Political Cons. do.

Sabul and 5 Boats belonging to the Seasmees were taken. The allies lost 60 boats and 15 men killed. Besides 235 men who returned to Abookhabee where their families had been left. Sheikh Sultan is now making great preparations and collecting troops from the Persian Coast with the intention of blockading Abookhabee and cutting off all supplies of provisions. All the subjects have returned from the Pirate Fishing Grounds but remain here, prevented by ill winds from going to sea and are now preparing to accompany Sheikh Sultan in the expedition against the Benyas.

I have translation
I Signed J. Bennett
Assistant to the Resident
I have Copies
I Signed Lt. A. Blane

Transcription of previous document

Substance of a letter from the Agent at Shargah to the Resident dated 2nd Jumadu ool uwwul or 15 September 1833

AC

In a former letter I reported the departure of Beni Syar and the tribes of Aboo Fulasa and Rumshat from Aboothabee leaving all their effects behind and that they had obtained possession of the fort of Debaye. On the 3 instant the chiefs of the above tribes had an interview with Sheik Sultan ben Suggur in Shargah in which he engaged to support them with all his forces in an attack upon Aboothabee, nothing affording him so much satisfaction as these dissensions in the Beniyas and the prospect of destroying his enemies by means afforded by themselves. He accordingly despatched two boats to recal his subjects from the pearl banks and likewise sent orders for all the disposal men in Rasul Khymah to meet him in Shargah. The chiefs however in Shargah remonstrated with him against these measures pointing out the injury he was inflicting upon his people in withdrawing them from the pearl banks before the season was half over and suggesting the probability of his involving himself with the English and the Wahabees, advised him strongly to let the Beniyas destroy one another without his interference. The Joasmee chief however puffed up with the idea that under present circumstances he had only to land with a few men near Aboothabee to ensure the capture of that place, refused to attend to these circumstances. On the 8th instant the tribes of Aboo Fulasa and Rumshat to the number of 900 men and 80 boats, Shaikh Sultan ben Suggur with 50 men in Sheik Houssain's Bugarah, Hussain ben Rahmah with 70 followers in his bateel and 20 boats with 400 men from Shargah, set sail for Aboothabee in the full conviction that the place was deserted and would be taken without trouble. This threatened attack however had the effect of settling the disputes between Shackboot Sultan and Khulufa and a force of 3,500 men of the Beniyas and Monasir tribes was assembled in Aboothabee. On the afternoon of the 10th Sheik Sultan's forces landed in Khor Lufan about four miles from the Beniyas' capital, where they determined to pass the night and march to Aboothabee next morning. At sun rise however,

they were astonished to find themselves attacked by a much superior force supported by cavalry and camelmen. This unexpected occurrence inspired such a panic that they broke at the first discharge of fire arms and fled to their boats, the greater portion of which however were upon dry land owing to the ebb-tide. Sheik Sultan with four of his slaves got into a small bugarah which sunk with them and he had a narrow escape from drowning. The loss sustained by him amounted to 30 men including the brother of the Shaikh of Lingah, a batéel and 5 boats belonging to the Joasmees were taken. His allies lost 60 boats and 15 men killed besides 235 men who returned to Aboothabee where their families had been left. Sheik Sultan is now making great preparations and collecting troops from the Persian Coast with the intention of blockading Aboothabee and cutting off all supplies of provisions. All his subjects have returned from the pearl fishing. Rashid ben Humeed having been prevented by illness from going to Muscat is now preparing to support Sheik Sultan in his expedition against the Beniyas.

(True translation)

(Signed) S. Hennell

Assistant to the Resident

(True copies)

(Signed) D. A. Blane

Resident in the Persian Gulf

32 A collision has taken place between the Government and Beniyas tribes in the course of which two instances of aggression supposed to partake of the piratical character took place, one the plunder of a Hyderabadee Bugla reported to have originated in an attempt on the part of her owners to break through the Blockade established by the Joasmees and their allies, and the other an attack on a Bugla belonging to Muscat by the Beniyas. The Resident addressed

(X) Aggression of the Joasmees and the Beniyas tribes on the S.E. coast of Persia. Two cases of piracies.

Col. Consult. 1st. 1834 April 3rd No. 827 & 28.

out to them the impropriety of such acts under any circumstances.

Col. Consult. 1834. 33 In April following Mr. Blane reported the termination of hostilities between these tribes, and submitted explanation from Sultan bin Suggur Chief of Ras-ul-Khyma and the Sheikhs of Aboothabee explaining the two instances of aggression with reference to the plunder of the Hyderabadee Bugla. Sultan bin Suggur declared that neither his people nor any of those concerned in the blockade were guilty of committing any oppression upon the Bugla in question, that it was utterly impossible for an act of piracy to be perpetrated even on a small Boat by his dependents without the occurrence becoming known to him, and that upon the strictest enquiries no trace of the occurrence had come to light.

Vy 7th No 1312.

34. The Chief of Aboothabee stated that the Seizure of the Bugla belonging to Muscat was entirely owing to mistake, she having been taken for one of the Li[illegible]

fleet, that nothing however was taken from her beyond a few stores, and that she was set at liberty immediately the error was discovered and the plundered property restored.

35. In the Month of September 1834 hostilities were renewed, the immediate cause of the rupture would appear to have been a successful predatory inroad made into the Joasmee territories by the Manasirs a Tribe connected with Mushabee. In consequence of this aggression the Boo Ali Tribe in Debaye hastily fitted out several Vessels which surprised the Bunniyas Boats fishing on the Pearl Banks and captured ten Bugarahs carrying altogether about 80 Men and Pearls to the amount of 4000 Crowns. This exploit was the signal for all the Joasmee Boats to leave the Pearl Fishery to avoid the Retaliation of the Bunniyas Chiefs who immediately despatched several Vessels in Reprisals, but in consequence of the retreat of his enemies with little success.

Renewal of hostilities between the Joasmees & Bunniyas.

Pol. Consultn 1834. Nov. 26th No. 3739.

Peace concluded &c. between the Joasmee & the Bunniyas Chiefs.

Pol. Consultn 1834. Dec. 3d. No. 3799.

36. This war from the time when it occurred was particularly to be regretted as the contending parties were necessarily obliged to withdraw their respective subjects from the Pearl Banks and as the produce of the annual Pearl Fishery forms the Chief source of the subsistence of the maritime Arabs of this Gulf, great distress is produced when the state of affairs is such as to prevent their availing themselves of the almost only means they possess of gaining a livelihood.

37. It is therefore with the most satisfaction that we find from our last advices that peace has been restored. Sheik Khaleefah appears moved by the earnest representations of his dependants, despatched his Father Shaik Saeed to Dhargah, where he was met by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur and the terms of a peace were established as follows.

That in future the two Tribes should not go to war unless on full and sufficient grounds that the Coast from Debaye to Jezeerah



Transcription of previous document

32 A collision has taken place between the Joasmee and Beniyas tribes in the course of which two instances of aggression supposed to partake of the piratical character, took place, one the plunder of a Hyderabadee Bugla reported to have originated in an attempt on the part of her owner to break through the blockade established by the Joasmees and their allies, and the other an attack on a Bugla belonging to Muscat by Sultan bin Suggur. The Resident addressed the Sheiks of the above tribes, and pointed out to them the impropriety of such acts under any circumstances.

33 In April following Mr Blane reported the termination of hostilities between these tribes, and submitted explanations from Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Rasul Khyma, and the Chiefs of Aboothabee, explaining the two instances of aggression with reference to the plunder of the Hyderabadee Bugla. Sultan bin Suggur declared that neither his people nor any of those concerned in the blockade were guilty of committing any aggression upon the Bugla in question, that it was utterly impossible for an act of piracy to be perpetrated even on a small boat by his dependents without the occurrence becoming known to him, and that upon the strictest enquiries no trace of the occurrence had come to light.

34. The Chief of Aboothabee stated that the seizure of the Bugla belonging to Muscat was entirely owing to mistake, she having been taken for one of the enemies' fleet, that nothing however was taken from her beyond a few dates, and that she was set at liberty immediately the error was discovered and the plundered property restored.

35. In the month of September 1834 hostilities were renewed, the immediate cause of the rupture would appear to have been a successful predatory inroad made into the Joasmee territories by the Monasirs, a tribe connected with Aboothabee. In consequence of this aggression the Boo-Filasa tribe in Debaye hastily fitted out several vessels which surprised the Beniyas boats fishing on the pearl banks and captured ten Bugarahs carrying altogether about 80 men and pearls to the amount of 4000 Crowns. This exploit was the signal for all the Joasmee boats to leave the pearl fishery to avoid the retaliation of the Beniyas Chief, who immediately despatched several vessels to make reprisals, but in consequence of the timely retreat of his enemies with little if any success.

36. This warfare at the time when it occurred was particularly to be regretted as the contending parties were necessarily obliged to withdraw their respective subjects from the pearl banks and as the produce of the annual pearl fishery forms the chief source of the subsistence of the maritime Arabs of this Gulf, great distress is produced when the state of affairs is such as to prevent their availing themselves of the almost only means they possess of gaining a livelihood.

37. It is therefore with much satisfaction that we find from our last advices that peace has been restored. Sheik Khaleefa it appears moved by the earnest representations of his dependants despatched his father Shakboot to Shargah, where he was met by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur and the terms of a peace were established as follows -

That in future the two tribes should not go to war unless on full and sufficient grounds, that the coast from Debaye to Inja together with the Bedouin tribes of the al Alee Khwater. Ull Ziah and Ihwuhla should be subject to the Joasmee Chief, and that the Beniyas residing in Debaya should be in future under his authority. On the return of Sheik Shakboot to Aboothabee, Sheik Sultan sent a confidential Agent to that place for the purpose of receiving the confirmation of the Beniyas Chief to the Articles agreed on by his father. On the receipt of the notification Sheik Sultan issued a proclamation permitting all his subjects to proceed to the pearl banks and otherwise follow their usual avocations at sea. The same was likewise done by Sheik Khaleefa and both parties are now peaceably carrying on the pearl fishery.

The origins of territorial dispute

1.26
Historical sketch of the Wahhabis, 1795–1853

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

WAHABEE TRIBE OF ARABS;

FROM THE YEAR 1795 TO THE YEAR 1818.

PREPARED BY

MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,

MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

WITH

CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,

FROM THE YEAR 1819 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNELL;

FROM 1832 TO AUGUST 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

WAHABEES.

THIS sect was founded about the year 1615, by an Arab of the name of Shaikh Mahomed, the son of Abdool Wahab, whose name they have taken. Shaikh Mahomed connected himself, in the attempt to reform the religion of his country, with Ebin Saood, the Prince of Deriah, the capital of the province of Nujd. Through the efforts of the saint, and the aid of the temporal power of Ebin Saood, and his son and successor Abdool Azeez, the religion of the Wahabees was established all over the peninsula of Arabia. The leading principle of the sect is to destroy and plunder all who differ from them; and those Mahomedans who do not adopt their creed were represented as far less entitled to mercy than either Jews or Christians. The first mention made of this in the Bombay records is in the year 1787.

2. Abdool Wahab, the Shaikh, inhabited the Desert about eight days' journey westward of the town of Kateef, on the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf.

3. Urged by the tenets of their religion, they had long threatened to destroy all those who acknowledged and followed the religious precepts of the Prophet. The Montific, Beni Khalid, and Anisa Arabs collected in that year a large force, under the command of Shaikh Tweney, of the first-mentioned tribe, and proceeded on an expedition against the Wahabees; it was not attended, however, with any advantage.

4. The Wahabee Shaikh had before 1795, in prosecution of his ambitious views, taken Lahsa, annihilated the power of the Beni Khalid Arabs, and threatened Bussora. The fears of the Turkish Government of Bagdad were excited by these events.

A. D. 1797.

5. An Arab force was detached by the Pacha against the Wahabees, under the command of Shaikh Tweney, who, having been killed in an action on the 3rd July, led to the failure of the expedition. Preparations were however made by the Pacha for the prosecution of the war during the course of the winter.

WAHABEES.

6. It was not, however, until the following year, that the Kia Pacha proceeded with a large army on an expedition against Lahsa and Deriah, the principal towns belonging to the Wahabees; and with the view also of observing the conduct of several Arab Tribes inhabiting the country between Bussora and the south-eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, the predatory incursions of the Wahabee Arabs having extended to the banks of the Euphrates, and the vicinity of Hilla, situated on that river, fifty miles from Bagdad.

A. D. 1798.

7. On the Pacha's arrival at Moghil, on the 2nd of December, great preparations were made by the Musleem for co-operating in the expedition, in which the Bussora, Grane, and Montific Arabs were to join. Bussora was at this time threatened by the Imaum of Muskat, on account of some ancient claims on the Pacha of Bagdad; and to enable him to execute his hostile intentions, the Imaum had negotiated a peace with his formidable enemy, Suggur bin Rashid, the Joasmee Chief.

8. The Pacha of Bagdad remonstrated against the conduct of the Imaum to our Resident, through whose mediation a satisfactory accommodation took place between the Pacha, the Imaum, and the Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma.

9. The Turkish troops having proceeded against the Wahabees, a battle was on the eve of being fought, when Abdool Azeez, the son of the Wahabee Shaikh, who commanded the Wahabee force, heard of the death of his father; an event which threw his troops into the greatest consternation, and drove him to the extremity of submitting to proposals of peace, which was ultimately concluded, when the Turkish army returned to Bagdad.

A. D. 1799.

10. Abdool Azeez, having succeeded his father as Shaikh of the Wahabees, now threatened to invade Oman. Syud Sultan proceeded to Julfar (Ras-ool-Khyma), where he joined Shaikh Suggur, the Joasmee Chief, with the view of opposing the attack, which was, however, arrested by a peace concluded between the Wahabees and the Imaum.

A. D. 1800.

11. The influence of Abdool Azeez in the following year was established over the Uttoobee Arabs. On the conquest of Bahrein by the Imaum, the Uttoobee Shaikhs quitted the island, and proceeded with their followers to Zobara, and solicited the protection of the Wahabee Shaikh, who encouraged them to settle at that place, for the purpose of employing them against Bahrein, in the recovery of which he assisted the Uttoobees in the beginning of 1802.

A. D. 1801.

WAHABEES.

12. The Wahabee troops again appeared near Oman, having compelled the wild Arabs in the vicinity to join them. They had at this period reduced to nominal submission the whole coast from Bussora river to Deba, which is the boundary between the Muskat and Joasmee territories, and, if allowed to strengthen themselves in their acquisitions, they would, it was apprehended, commence the same depredations by sea as they were prosecuting on shore. A conviction of this danger had united the mercantile powers in the Gulf against the sect.

A. D. 1802.

13. The measures which the Wahabee Chief was actively prosecuting for the extension of his power and possessions, and the propagation of his doctrines, derived considerable support from the success of an expedition against Kerbelah, which he attacked on the 21st of April, pillaged the whole of it (the Mehallah or division of Abbas alone excepted), and plundered the Tomb of Hossein, slaying in the course of the day, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants. This event, which made a deep impression on the minds of the Turks, Arabs, and Persians, was attributed to the guilty negligence of the Turkish Government, in failing to keep the Tomb of Hossein in a proper state of defence.

14. Unable to check their progress, the Imaum in 1803 acceded to a truce of three years, with the Wahabee, who had succeeded in converting, or rendering tributary to his power, the Arabs who inhabited the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf.

A. D. 1803.

15. This truce left the Wahabee Chief at liberty to prosecute his ambitious views of aggrandisement, which were next directed to the reduction of Medina and Mecca. The latter he soon reduced, having however previously attacked and taken Taif, which he converted from a fertile region to an absolute desert. He next invested Jedda, which having reduced to great distress, the Imaum succeeded in purchasing a truce for the sum of one lakh and forty thousand dollars. On the fall of Mecca and Yamboo, the extensive adjoining country submitted to the Wahabee, who was now in possession of nearly the whole sea coast on the western frontier of Arabia.

16. Returning from his victorious career in that quarter of Arabia, Abdool Azeez prepared, notwithstanding the three years' truce he had entered into with the Imaum, for the invasion of Oman by land and sea,—a detachment of his troops had already entered the province, and advanced within two days' journey of Burka, the summer residence of the Imaum of Muskat. Captain Seton observed on this occasion, that if the Wahabee reduced Oman, all Arabia must submit to his power, and the whole coast would become a nest of pirates, who would extend

WAHABEES.

their depredations to India; of which there was some danger, as the Imaum had disgusted all his commanders, and stood alone.

17. The conquest of Oman was probably arrested by the murder of the Wahabee Shaikh early in the month of November, in his capital at Deriah, whilst at his evening prayers, in a public place of worship, surrounded by his own immediate adherents, by a religious fanatic, who was immediately killed by them.

18. Saood, the son of Abdool Azeez, succeeded his father as the head of the Wahabee Tribe.

A. D. 1804-05.

19. On the death of Syud Sultan, the Imaum of Muskat, which occurred in the latter end of 1804, the influence of the Wahabees prevailed over Muskat, and we find Saood interfering between the competitors for the government, but throwing the weight of his power in the scale in favour of Beder.

20. In the month of April 1806 Saood took the field, with about fifty thousand men. He first plundered the Dufeeh, and then the Anisa, and proceeded to Meshid Ali, on which he made an unsuccessful attack, and afterwards upon Semowka, from which he was also repulsed, with severe loss.

A. D. 1806.

21. In the following month, Bussora was thrown into the greatest consternation, by the appearance of the Wahabees near Zobeer, only a few miles from the gates of the town. Fortunately the Desert was at the time overflowed to its very walls, and Saood's troops, being in great distress, and having a number of wounded with them, no attempt was made against the place.

22. The Persian and Turkish Governments relaxing in their efforts to check the rise of the Wahabee power, the Imaum of Muskat having lost the influence which Syud Sultan had established over its dependent Shaikhs, and become entirely friendless, and the British deeming it a wiser policy to observe a strict neutrality as far as regarded the views of that sect, its preponderance was completely established in the year 1808, in Oman.

A. D. 1807-08.

By attacking the weaker singly, and compelling them to join his standard against their neighbours, the Wahabee gradually increased his power to a height which enabled him to overawe the greater States. The revenues of the upper part of Oman were paid to Saood, and it was only by a degrading submission that the Imaum prevented their inroads into the low country; he had appointed his own officers in the districts of the principality of Seer, and compelled the Joasmee Chief to abandon his country.

WAHABEES.

23. It was under the influence of that ascendancy that the Joasmees extended their cruises to India, and in the month of April 1808 they first made their appearance in these seas, to the northward of Bombay. The Wahabees had long contemplated that object. Saood had established a new power, the Zahib Tribe, in the tract of country from Musseldom to Ramse, and had greatly added to his strength by taking from the Joasmees the two strong forts of Feguera and Bithnay. Their Shaikh, Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, who was the Chief of Ramse also, was called to Deriah.

A. D. 1808-09.

24. Hussein bin Ali having been conciliated to the support of the Wahabee, was appointed his vicegerent in the Seer principality, with authority to compel the heads of the Joasmees residing at Lingah and Ras-ool-Khyma to send their vessels to sea in conjunction with those from Ramse, and to cruise in the service of the Wahabee Shaikh against all vessels, without exception, appearing in the Gulf, reserving one-fifth as his share of the pirated property, the remainder being divided among the captors. This systematic plan of piracy created such a degree of fear of the power of the Wahabees among all the tribes of Arabs within the scope of it, that whatever might be their inclinations, they must either join Hussein bin Ali or expose themselves to the cruelty and vengeance of Saood. No dependence could under such circumstances be in prudence placed on the assurances of a pacific disposition given by any Arab inhabiting the shores of the Persian Gulf, for they were no longer free agents, and the exertion of power on the part of the British Government in India could alone give a full and effectual security to vessels in future visiting the ports of Bushire and Bussora.

25. Nor could any dependence whatever be placed at this period in the Government of Muskat, since, however much it was against the interests of the Imaum, it was apprehended that he also would be obliged to join in the general piracy, unless the British Government relieved Muskat from the pressure of all that side of Arabia employed by the Wahabees to reduce that seaport. Agents whom the Imaum had deputed to Deriah, to claim the restitution of Shinas and other forts taken from the Vali of Sohar, were ill received by Saood, and were detained until the Imaum ordered his vessels against Bussora, or gave proof of his attachment to the Mussulman cause by sending a predatory expedition to India, and threatening to visit Muskat in person on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca.

26. The common danger that threatened Oman, and the oppressions of the Wahabees, led to the manifestation of a disposition in the several Shaikhs to unite in a confederacy against Saood. They anxiously looked, however, to the British Government for assistance, to enable

WAHABEES.

them to recover the places on the sea shore near Musseldom dismembered from Sohar, which would reduce the defence of the country to one point, the passage across the isthmus. It was important to obtain that object before the return of Saood from Mecca; and it would give the Omanees sufficient time to unite and assemble for their general defence, encourage them to advance to meet the enemy, as they would be secured from attacks in their rear, whilst Saood's return might be delayed by a feint demonstration of an intention of attacking Bussora;—the active co-operation of the Arab States could be depended upon, and would render success certain and easy; but if the spirit of resistance which had displayed itself was allowed to be stifled by the unresisted power of the Wahabees, the trade of the two Gulfs must be annihilated, and that on the Malabar Coast, Kutch, Sind, and Guzerat exposed to constant depredations from a desperate and fanatic enemy.

27. The expedition to the Gulf, which was determined upon as well for the relief of Muskat as for the suppression of the Joasmees, was conducted with a degree of caution and of forbearance towards the Wahabee Chief which rendered its results efficacious but for a short period. Notwithstanding it was indisputable that the Joasmee Arabs were under the control of Wahabee officers, and compelled to engage in piratical depredations, "all operations by land were to be avoided, otherwise than might be momentarily necessary for the more effectual destruction of the pirate vessels in their harbours; and in any case Captain Seton was to be careful to make it in due time fully known to the Wahabee, and the officers of his Government, that it was our sincere wish to continue at all times on terms of friendship with him and with the other States of Arabia (which were all in subjection to the Wahabee), desiring only to provide for the security of the general commerce of the seas, and of the Gulf of Persia in particular, so long and so unjustifiably interrupted by the Joasmees, in breach, also, of a positive treaty concluded with their chief in 1806*; the motives and objects of our interposition involving no views of aggrandisement on our part, but being altogether limited to the repression of maritime depredations (such as is equally condemned by the professors of every religion), and the just support of our ally the Imaum of Muskat cannot reasonably give offence to any other State or Government."

28. Before the armament sailed from Bombay, the confederacy that was forming against the Wahabees was brought to some degree of maturity, for we find the Imaum preparing an expedition on a large scale, which was to be

A. D. 1809-10.

* The chief had abandoned the country, disclaiming all countenance to a concern in the attack of the *Sylph* cruiser in 1809, and professing a desire to maintain the treaty in question. The Joasmees were at this time under Hussein bin Ali, the Wahabee vicegerent.

WAHABEES.

joined by four thousand men from Bushire. Their avowed object was the attack of Khor Hassan, and the destruction of its Chief, Jillama. Another of its objects was stated to be against Hussein bin Ali, the Wahabee vicegerent in the Joasmee country, the malcontent Joasmees having invited the Imaum to make the attempt, which they had engaged to support. The Uttoobees and Persians co-operated in this expedition, which terminated without accomplishing anything.

29. No notice appears to have been taken by the Wahabee Shaikh of our attack on Ras-oól-Khyma. In the month of April, however, information was received of his troops being in the vicinity of Muskat, plundering the territories, attacking the possessions, and destroying the date plantations of the Imaum. They had taken post at Swadee Mooal, about forty miles from Burka, where they maintained an obstinate conflict with the Imaum's troops for thirteen days, and had afterwards proceeded to the attack of Ismaylee, in the defence of which it was acknowledged His Highness lost two hundred of his troops. The Imaum solicited the aid of the British Government, which was declined, with the view of not giving ground of offence to the Wahabees.

30. We have now to notice the events which led to the downfall of the Wahabees, which was as rapid as their ascent, by the successful progress of the Turkish troops under Mahomed Ali Pacha.

A. D. 1811-12.

31. After entering Jedda and Mecca without opposition, Abdoolla the son of Saood, who was the governor of the latter city, abandoned it with the whole of his troops, on the approach of the Turkish force. Mahomed Ali sent a detachment against Taif, the only place that remained in the hands of the Wahabees, whose power over that part of Arabia was thus early completely annihilated.

32. The successful progress of the Turkish troops led the Wahabee Chief to collect his adherents, and to concentrate his forces: with that view he withdrew their garrisons from Zobara, Kateef, Lahsa, Khor Hassan, and Khutter.

33. At about this period Rahmah bin Jaubir, the Shaikh of Khor Hassan, having entered into a connection with the Wahabees, took, in conjunction with that power, possession of Zobara, from the Uttoobees, who were also obliged to surrender the island of Bahrein to the same political ascendancy. Abdoolla bin Oofeysan was appointed the Wahabee Vukeel over those places, exclusive of the districts of Kateef and Khutter. The Uttoobees remained in charge of the administration of affairs, but were obliged to pay tribute to Abdoolla on account of the Wahabees.

34. The reverse of fortune which the Wahabees experienced led to overtures which were made by the chief to the different powers in the

WAHABEES.

Gulf. He deputed an envoy (Ibrahim bin Abdoolla Kureem) to the Governor of Fars, with the view of conciliating his friendship, and to prevail on the Persian Government to postpone the march of a force it meditated against the Wahabees, which had alarmed Abdoolla bin Saood. The mission was well received; the Persian Government, in fact, did not possess the means requisite for attacking the Wahabees, as her ports on the coast were at this time more under the influence of the chief of that sect than her own. Whilst, therefore, it was politic in Persia not to disclose its own weakness, it was equally so in Saood to use every means to prevent the chance of an attack from the Persian side of the Gulf, which the reverses he had experienced rendered him very ill able to resist.

35. On Abdool Kureem's return from Shiraz, he waited on Mr. Bruce, and communicated the anxiety of his master to form a connection with the British Government of mutual amity and friendship, such as might be beneficial to both States, and that the ports of each nation might be open to each other, and a free and unmolested trade be carried on by their subjects. These overtures having been submitted to Bengal, the Supreme Government deemed it inexpedient to negotiate any treaty, or to form any intimate connection with the Wahabee Chieftain, but considered it politic to maintain a friendly intercourse with him, and to endeavour, by a cordial and conciliatory conduct, to confirm the amicable disposition which he professed to entertain towards the British Government.

36. The power of Saood was however still very considerable; for independently of the predominance of his influence on the Persian side of the Gulf, the whole of the sea coast on the Arabian shore was subject to him, except the island of Bahrein, which had been recovered by the Uttoobees, and the port of Grane. To the southward, his influence extended to Cape Musseldom on the sea coast, and in the interior joined the Muskat territories, where, again, his power was acknowledged to the southward of Ras-ool-Gate. Kateef, his principal seaport, was twelve days' march from Deriah.

A. D. 1813-14.

37. The Wahabee Chief was also negotiating a peace with Muskat, but, as the Imaum wrote to Mr. Bruce, "nothing has taken place between us, as the Agent wished the Imaum to enter into engagements which were inconsistent, nor could His Highness enter into his views as long as Ras-ool-Khyma remained the obstacle between them."

38. Saood died on the 10th of April 1814, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Abdoolla bin Saood, who, after making the necessary arrangements incident to the death of his father, proceeded on an expedition against the Nujd Arabs, who had in a great measure thrown off the Wahabee yoke.

WAHABEES.

39. Remonstrances having been made to the Chiefs of the Wahabees and of Ras-ool-Khyma for some captures made by the Joasmees, Hussein bin Mahomed bin Gaith arrived at Bushire, as the Agent of the Joasmee Chief, Hussein bin Rahmah, and with letters from the Wahabee Shaikh, disapproving of the conduct of the former, and of his tribe, and binding himself to compel Hussein bin Rahmah to deliver up such property as we could prove they had captured.

40. Ibrahim Pacha, prosecuting the advantages he had obtained over the Wahabees, again defeated them at Manwiah, seven stages from the capital of Deriah. Abdoolla bin Saood retreated to Bundah, in the district of Kassime, four stages from Deriah. Following up this success, Ibrahim Pacha invested and reduced the Wahabee capital on the 10th of September, destroyed the fortifications, towers, and plantations of date trees, and removed the inhabitants to Lahsa, which he intended to establish as the seat of government.

A. D. 1818.

41. Abdoolla bin Saood was made a prisoner on this occasion, and sent off, with five others, under an escort, to be delivered over to the viceroy, Mahomed Ali Pacha. The Wahabee Shaikh's family were to be sent to Medina, until the orders of the Porte should be received. Kateef, the principal seaport belonging to the Wahabees, next surrendered to the Turkish troops, and Ibrahim Pacha's army having been recruited by considerable reinforcements from Egypt, he detached a force against Beriami, bordering on the province of Oman, which was formerly subject to the Turkish Government; and was preparing to attack Ras-ool-Khyma and the pirate ports, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Shaikh of Bahrein, offering whatever vessels might be requisite for the transport of troops against those places.

42. Thus rose and fell—it is to be hoped never to rise again—the extraordinary sect of the Wahabees, under whose protection and encouragement maritime depredations were carried on in the Gulf, and in the Indian seas, with a degree of success, audacity, and barbarity, which has been surpassed only by the atrocities of the Algerines in Europe.

WAHABEES.

CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING, FROM 1820 TO 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNELL.

Mr. Warden's account of this once powerful sect concludes by describing their complete overthrow in 1818, when Ibrahim Pacha captured their capital, Deriah, by a general storm, and sent away their chief as a prisoner to Egypt. Nothing further appears to have been heard regarding the Wahabees till 1820, when a report was made to the Government that one of their chiefs, who had been taken prisoner in 1818, had effected his escape into the Desert, and, collecting a considerable number of Arabs together, had taken possession of the State of Deriah. In consequence, the Chiefs of the Beni Khalid, who had been established by Ibrahim Pacha in Lahsa and Kateef, marched against him with a large force, and compelled him to surrender himself and followers.

A. D. 1820.

In 1822 Mahomed Ali Pacha stationed a body of 700 horse, under one of his officers, in the fort of Arrizah, and at the same time directed them to rebuild the fort and works of Deriah, for the purpose of being garrisoned by a Turkish force. Shortly afterwards 100 Turkish cavalry, stationed at Riaz, were surprised and cut up by the Bedouins in the neighbourhood.

A. D. 1822.

The Wahabees appear to have remained quiet until the beginning of the year 1824, when a large body of men was collected under the command of Shaikh Toorkey bin Abdoolla oos Saood, who proceeded against the Turkish provinces to the westward, but was foiled in his attempt by Ahmed Pacha, the Governor of Mecca, and forced to retreat, with considerable loss. Nothing daunted by this repulse, the Wahabees soon after made another attempt, in which they were successful.

A. D. 1824.

From this period, the power and resources of this sect appear to have gradually advanced, and shortly after, their Chief, Toorkey bin Abdoolla, commonly known by the name of Toorkey bin Saood, opened a correspondence with all the Shaikhs on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, inviting them to renew the relations which had subsisted between them prior to the overthrow of the Wahabees by Ibrahim Pacha. On the occasion of an interview, about the end of 1825, with the British Resident in the Gulf of Persia, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur made a dexterous attempt to ascertain the light in which his connection with the now rising sect would be viewed by the British Government, particularly with reference to the injury which might arise to the

WAHABEES.

Imaum from his so doing. (The policy which the British Government determined to observe towards the Wahabees is detailed at greater length under the head of "Joasmees," 1825.)

A. D. 1824 to 1830.

From 1824 to 1830 the proceedings of this sect appear to have been confined to carrying on hostilities against the Beni Khalid family, under Shaikh Mahomed and Shaikh Majid, of the Al Arrasen Tribe. The capital of the dominions of these chiefs was called Lahsa, and they also possessed the seaport of Kateef, upon the mainland, opposite to Bahrein. In this warfare neither party gained any decisive advantage until the beginning of 1830, when the Beni Khalid Shaikh advanced with a large army into Nujd. Upon receiving intelligence of this movement, Fysul, the son of Toorkey bin Saood, the Wahabee Chief, marched with a considerable force from Riaz to meet them. Unfortunately for the cause of the Beni Khalid, Shaikh Majid, the only leader of any talent they possessed, was suddenly taken ill, and died shortly afterwards. Shaikh Mahomed, the remaining brother, conscious, apparently, of his own incapacity to command in the field, readily gave his consent to the nomination of his nephew, Bargheshee, as the successor of the deceased chief. The new leader did not immediately commence operations, but after a short time advanced in such a manner as to compel the Wahabee army to fall back. Encouraged by his first attempt, he followed them closely, but, unfortunately, left his original post (a place called Duberah, from whence he drew his supplies of water) unprotected. This improvidence being reported to Shaikh Toorkey bin Saood, he left Riaz on the night of the 23rd March 1830, with a force consisting of 1,200 horse and foot, and keeping to the left, he succeeded in turning the flank of the enemy, and getting possession of Duberah, thus cutting off the Beni Khalid from their water, and placing them between his son's army and his own. In this situation they remained for one day, but the next morning a simultaneous attack being made upon them, both in front and rear, by the two Wahabee Chiefs, they were entirely defeated, and the rout was so complete that the whole of the horses, camels, and cattle of the Beni Khalid Shaikhs, together with all the tents, baggage, women, and children fell into the hands of the victors. It was currently reported and believed at that time that 100,000 camels, and nearly a million head of cattle, were among the fruits of this victory. Shaikh Mahomed fled with a few horsemen to Lahsa, where he was soon afterwards joined by Bargheshee. The success of the Wahabee Chief was however so decisive that the greater portion of the Bedouins of the Beni Khalid Tribe made their peace with the victor by a timely submission. Shortly afterwards, Shaikh Toorkey moved upon Lahsa, which fell into his hands without resistance, and a party having been sent on to Kateef, that place immediately surrendered. Having thus succeeded in expelling the Beni Khalid Shaikhs from their hereditary dominions, the Wahabee Shaikh set about consolidating his new conquests, and, by friendly letters and presents, endeavoured to conciliate the good will of all the chiefs of any consequence in his neighbourhood. The report of his success was received with much joy by the greater portion of the Joasmees, who anticipated a renewal of their former profitable practices of piracy through the restoration of the Wahabee ascendancy. The chief of that sect, however, was much more enlightened than his predecessors, and his proceedings were evidently dictated by rules of policy, instead of being guided by the burning zeal for the propagation of the Wahabee faith which had characterised all former leaders.

WAHABEES.

A. D. 1831.

So far from interfering in the religious observances of the individuals residing in the places lately fallen into his power, he issued a proclamation, intimating that pilgrims, whether Soonees or Sheeas, were at liberty to proceed through Nujd to Mecca and Medina, and that he himself would guarantee their safety. The only article of the former strict tenets of the Wahabees, the observance of which he thought proper to insist upon, was that tobacco should not be smoked openly in the streets. It is likewise related, that when urged by Shaikh Rashid of Ejman to give him permission to cruise against all the enemies of the Wahabee faith, he peremptorily refused, saying that it was for authorising such proceedings that his father had been visited by the indignation of Heaven, and that at all events the English being masters of the sea, he was not able to contend with such a powerful nation. Shaikh Toorkey, in making the rapid progress above detailed, gave out that he acted as a free and independent chieftain; but this was not really the case, as he still continued to pay a small annual tribute to Mahomed Ali, Pacha of Egypt, and took measures to represent his proceedings to that ruler in so favourable a light as to obtain his approval to them. After placing garrisons in all the towers and strongholds he had taken, Shaikh Toorkey returned to his capital, Deriah, and, with the exception of some feeble and unsuccessful demonstrations that were made against him by Mahomed bin Arrareer, the surviving Chief of the Beni Khalid Tribe, remained in quiet possession of his new conquest, which he governed with great prudence and justice, taking from them only the Zukat or tithes, and by his vigorous measures putting a complete stop to the system of robbery and plunder, as well as the internal disputes of the different tribes, which had characterised the rule of the Beni Khalid Shaikhs.

The acquisition of Lahsa and Kateef appears to have produced a greater effect than Shaikh Toorkey could have ventured to anticipate, for His Highness the Imaum, desirous of obtaining the aid of so powerful an ally in the promotion of his schemes upon Bahrein, sent off

messengers to Riaz, with large presents, and not only acknowledged the supremacy of the Nujd Chief, but is said likewise to have intimated his readiness to pay the Zukat. The Wahabee Shaikh, however, appears to have availed himself of the desire of His Highness to obtain the island of Bahrein, for the advancement of his own views, as he forthwith laid before Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed the alternative of war or submission; the latter was preferred, and agreeably to an arrangement concluded at Riaz by a relation of the Uttoobee Shaikh, that chief was to be taken under the protection of Toorkey bin Saood, on acknowledging his supremacy, and paying an annual tribute. Thus the whole of the Arabian Coast, from Ras-ool-Hud to Grane, with the exception of Aboothabee (the capital of Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot), became tributary to the Wahabees.

About the middle of the year 1831, a communication was made to the Governor of Bombay by the Wahabee Chief, through Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, expressive of his desire to be upon the same intimate footing as that formerly existing between the British Government and his ancestor Saood. To this a reply in general but friendly terms was transmitted, through the Resident in the Persian Gulf.

At the present time (December 1831) reports are very current that serious disturbances have broken out in Nujd, owing to the intrigues of a relative of the Wahabee Chief, named Musharee, who, having joined the Kahtan and other tribes in the interior, which have hitherto refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Shaikh Toorkey, is now said to be preparing to commence hostilities.

The Beni Khalid and Amayir* Tribes, in consequence of these rumours, were encouraged to make a simultaneous attack upon Kateef and Lahsa, but have been repulsed, and compelled to retreat, and will probably soon be visited by the indignation of the power they have so imprudently provoked.

FURTHER CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING, FROM 1832 TO 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

The members of this powerful tribe, or collection of tribes, following the Wahabee tenets, were in the latter end of 1831, as mentioned in Captain Hennell's Sketches, divided amongst themselves, owing to the intrigues of one Musharee, a relative of their lawful head, Toorkey bin

* A small tribe, under Shaikh Durbash, dependent upon the Beni Khalid, occupying an island between Kateef and Grane.

Saood, who, having joined the Kahtan, and other tribes in the interior, had with them refused to acknowledge his supremacy, and was preparing to establish his position by force of arms. The Beni Khalid and Amayir Tribes, in consequence of these rumours, had been encouraged to attack Kateef and Lahsa, but had met with a repulse.

Hostilities continued to be prosecuted, and early in 1832 the Amayir* seized a boat belonging to Bahrein, lying off Kateef, laden with dates for the latter place. Of thirty Kateef people on board, they killed twelve, and took the remainder prisoners, with a view to their ransom. After plundering the boat of all property belonging to Kateef, they permitted it to depart, without offering molestation to the Bahrein men either in person or property.

The affairs of Nujd about this time, owing to internal dissensions, became in a most unsettled state, and the power of Toorkey bin Saood, the Wahabee, threatened so rapidly to decline, that the Governor of Kateef sought the protection of the Chief of Bahrein, and offered to transfer his allegiance; but this temporary diminution of his authority, occasioned by the opposition of his relative and competitor, Musharee, who claimed a prior right by descent, and stated himself to have escaped from confinement in Egypt, quickly gave way to the superior energy of his character.

A. D. 1833.

The Zukat or tribute of five per cent. began to be exacted, and his influence to be completely established over the inhabitants of the coast; but, unlike his predecessors, he opposed himself to the wishes of the Joasmees, and other lawless tribes, desirous of his sanction for the renewal of piracy, which they supposed would have ensued on the revival of his power; whereas they found, that instead of reaping the profits of old times, arising from plunder, Shaikh Toorkey was inclined to take from them a portion even of the little they had.

The measures adopted in urging the demands against the Joasmees, now virtually Wahabee dependents, for the restitution of the property (or its value) plundered from a vessel belonging to a British subject, by some men of Khan (three of whom had taken refuge at Aboothabee),

* This tribe was described to consist of about 400 families, separated into the two divisions of Bedouins and fishermen. The latter, who were at war with Kateef, occupied the small island of Jinnah, a few miles to the north of Bahrein. They were the weaker of the two divisions, not exceeding 100 families, but had associated with themselves about an equal number of the Sooedan and Duwad Arabs. Their feud with the people of Kateef originated in a quarrel regarding the discontinuance of certain payments formerly exacted by the Beni Amayir. Several on both sides were killed; but those who fell on the side of the latter being of greater rank, a claim was made on their behalf for the balance of the price of blood. Both parties appealed to Toorkey bin Saood, the Wahabee Chief, who recommended them to make peace; but in consequence of the high demands of the Beni Amayir, this was not effected, and another engagement took place, in which Shaikh Abbasee, their chief, was killed, and the whole tribe took up the feud to revenge his death.

WAHABEES.

threatened to give umbrage to Toorkey, and elicited a most intemperate letter from his Agent, Abdool Azeez, to the British Agent at Shargah. As the former wrote without any authority, no direct notice was taken of his communication; but the latter was instructed, in reply, to explain, that previous to the adoption of coercive measures, a whole year had been consumed in negotiation, without success, and no interference volunteered on his part for the promotion of the ends of justice; and, further, to use other arguments, importing the evident existence of our right to demand redress. Abdool Azeez returned for answer that Toorkey bin Saood was now the only authority on the continent of Arabia, and that both citizens and Bedouins, maritime as well as inland tribes, having all acknowledged his supremacy, he was in fact the ruler of the country, including Haajar, Oman, and the coast from Jaalan to Kateef, and that therefore, on the occurrence of any piracy, it should be reported to the Wahabee Chief, or, in the event of his being at too great a distance, to his Agent at Brymee.

The blockade of Kateef and Ajeer by the Bahrein party caused the greatest annoyance and distress to the people of those places under the authority and protection of the Wahabee Chief, who now called in the assistance of the Joasmees of Ras-ool-Khyma and Lingah. His violent death, however, at this time, by the hand of his nephew, Musharee, led to the suspension of offensive operations, and introduced into the affairs of the Wahabee Tribe such confusion and discord as to counteract the operation of any ambitious views of late entertained by the murdered chief, and for a time at least to leave the maritime tribes in the same relative position as heretofore. There was every reason for supposing that this violent and daring act had been instigated by Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who had kept up a correspondence with the murderer, and who received the news of the death of the Wahabee Chief with the firing of guns, and other demonstrations of joy.

A. D. 1834.

Musharee was not permitted long to survive his victim, whose son, Fysul, immediately quitting Kateef and its neighbourhood, which he had been defending against the attacks of the Bahrein forces, marched against him, and laid siege to the fort of Koot, in which he had taken refuge. Treachery on the part of the adherents soon placed Fysul in possession of the fort, when he avenged the murder of his father by putting Musharee, with twenty others, to the sword.

About the middle of the year 1835 arrived at Muskat, from Mecca, a person by name Abdoolla bin Musharee, at one time a very respectable merchant of Bahrein, bearing letters from Ahmed Pacha to the Imaum of Muskat, Abdoolla bin Ahmed the Uttoobee Chief, and Fysul bin Toorkey the Wahabee

A. D. 1835.

WAHABEES.

ruler, intimating to them that he had been pleased to give him the grant of Kateef at a stated revenue, from twenty to twenty-four thousand dollars, and directing that he might be permitted to take possession of and keep the territory committed to his charge, without molestation. By the Imaum he was received and treated with much courtesy, and furnished with a Buteel and provisions to convey him to Kateef, and letters to Fysul bin Toorkey and Abdoolla bin Ahmed, represented to be of a conciliatory and peaceful tenor.

On hearing of the arrival of this personage at Kateef, and the receipt of the several letters of which he was the bearer, Ameer Fysul immediately marched a body of troops into that place, in order to support the assertion of his superior right over, and determination to keep it, as well as the surrounding district, now so unceremoniously farmed away by the Pacha of Mecca.

Abdoolla bin Musharee did not await the arrival of the Wahabee troops, who took possession of Kateef, and subsequently attempted, but without success, to capture Tirhoot, the place already mentioned as having fallen into the hands of the Uttoobees during the confusion which ensued on the violent death of the late Wahabee Chief, and while his son, the present chief, was engaged in establishing his right to succeed to his authority, against the pretensions of his father's murderer, Musharee.

The mission of Bin Musharee was supposed (and the subsequent arrival of his sons with letters of recommendation, procured from the Government of Bombay, and the correspondence he was keeping up with the Imaum, and the Pacha of Mecca, appeared to identify him with the late events) to have been not unconnected with the design of Ahmed Pacha to engage the Wahabee Chief in operations towards the north-east, whilst he was prosecuting his conquest in the south-west quarter of the Arabian peninsula, and with the wish of the Imaum to see his ancient enemy, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein, engaged in renewed hostilities with so powerful an opponent as the Chief of the Wahabees, whose attention he was also interested in drawing in a direction opposite to his own territories.

The preponderating influence of Mahomed Ali Pacha on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula began now to afford a salutary check upon the encroachments of the Wahabee sect towards the coast of the Persian Gulf. He summoned Shaikh Fysul to meet Ibrahim or Hussein Pacha, and afford his co-operation against the Aseer tribe, who had hitherto successfully frustrated their attempts to reduce it to subjection; but this chief declining compliance, on the plea of sickness, sent his brother with some horses, &c. as a present, and to apologise for him. It was reported that a very large Egyptian force was at this time collected at Medina.

A. D. 1836.

WAHABEES.

The Wahabée Agent at Brymee, at the suggestion of his master, endeavoured, but without success, to secure the maritime assistance of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and the coast tribes against Bahrein, the former replying, to the requisition for the use of his ships of war, that he was not at liberty to employ his vessels on such enterprises without the previous knowledge and sanction of the English Government. Circumstances, however, shortly after inducing the Bahrein Chief to make overtures of peace and submission, and the proffer of a small annual tribute, Ameer Fysul, mindful of the encroachments of the Egyptians on the western, was fain to receive them, and thus creditably rid himself of an active and indefatigable enemy on the eastern side of the Arabian peninsula.

It soon became evident that the fears entertained by him, in consequence of the proceedings of the Egyptian ruler, were not destitute of foundation.

The object of the latter, to establish a ruler in Nujd more compliant to his views, and more devoted to his interests, by whose means would be easily effected the subjection of the Bedouins to the south-west, to whom, on the contrary, the present ruler was supposed to have granted aid in their hitherto successful resistance to the progress of the Egyptian arms, was indicated in the open support he now afforded, in the shape of a body of troops, to the pretender Khalid bin Saood,* who early in this year set up pretensions to the chief authority over Nujd, and was preparing to establish them by the sword.

A. D. 1837.

Ameer Fysul lost no time in making every exertion to meet this new and serious contingency, which he further endeavoured, but now too late, to avert, by despatching messengers with most submissive letters to Mahomed Ali Pacha, with a view to induce him to withdraw his support and assistance from Shaikh Khalid.

This pretender successively captured Gusseem and Deriah; and at length, meeting the forces of his rival near Riaz, defeated them in the open field. Fysul, compelled to retreat, fell back upon Riaz, but found the fort already in the hands of some of the adherents of the victorious usurper. Thus the province of Nujd fell virtually into the hands of Ameer Khalid, for Lahsa and Kateef only awaited his approach in force to tender their submission.

Little doubt could be entertained that he was a mere puppet in the hands of the Egyptians, who were of course to reap the benefits of his success, obtained through their assistance. These auxiliaries, or rather principals in disguise, consisted only of from 1,000 to 1,500 horse and

* Saood was great-grandfather to both Fysul and Khalid.

WAHABEES.

500 foot, with 12 guns and 4 mortars; but such was the terror inspired by the Pacha's name, that nothing like determined resistance appears to have been offered, although Fysul stood generally high with the Bedouins of Nujd.

This effectual subversion of the authority of Fysul, and approach of the Egyptians, created great alarm in the mind of the Uttoobee Chief, who had apparently just grounds for supposing that their ulterior objects were not, as at first conjectured, directed towards any part of the Turkish territories, but to the conquest of Bahrein, in which their aid and co-operation had been secured, it was reported, by the Imaum, in a secret agreement, whereby it was stipulated that he should be maintained in possession of the island, and of the districts of Lahsa and Kateef, and in return pay an annual tribute of 300,000 crowns.

Korshid Pacha now arrived with a reinforcement of regular troops, and commenced his march upon Riaz, Lahsa, and Kateef. He used every means to conciliate the Arab Tribes, and despatched emissaries to Bahrein for the purpose of procuring grain, provisions, and necessaries for his force, against its arrival. An attempt at treachery, on the other hand, amongst the Amayir Tribe at Lahsa, having been discovered, it was severely dealt with by Ameer bin Oofeysan, Ameer Fysul's General, who put to death three of their chief people.

A. D. 1838.

Ameer Fysul was shortly after compelled to fly to Dillum, which was immediately besieged by three bodies of troops, under the respective commandants of Ameer Khalid, Korshid Pacha, and the Shaikh of the Moojariba Arabs, and, being very hardly pressed, to deliver himself up. Lahsa and Kateef thereon surrendered, and the Wahabee General, Omer bin Oofeysan, took refuge in Bahrein.

Fysul was sent a prisoner to Egypt in December 1838, and his successor Khalid, the Egyptian tool, called upon the Uttoobees to resume the payment of the annual tribute which had formerly been exacted by Toorkey. The Egyptian General now threw off his disguise as the auxiliary of Khalid, openly declared Nujd a possession of his master, and avowed his intention to improve and extend his conquests.

On the defeat and surrender of Ameer Fysul, Korshid Pacha, with the whole of the regulars and artillery, which, including the irregular Mughribee and horsemen, amounted to about 3,000, fixed his head quarters at Sulimeah (distant from two hundred to two hundred and fifty miles from the coast), garrisoned Lahsa with 300 irregulars, as also Kateef, Sohat, and Ajeer, and only awaited the arrival of reinforcements to carry into effect his meditated attack upon Bahrein. With this view, he expected the co-operation of four armed vessels from the Red Sea, with a supply of arms and ammunition. Emissaries were

WAHABEES.

despatched to Koweit, Mohumrah, and other places, for the purpose of collecting grain and provisions.

Strong remonstrances, however, with His Highness Mahomed Ali Pacha, from the British Ministry at home, as well as those of the British authority in the Gulf with Korshid Pacha, had the effect of inducing the Egyptian Government to postpone, and eventually actually abandon, the fulfilment of its plans of aggrandisement.

A. D. 1839.

Syud bin Mootluk, who during the lifetime of Ameer Toorkey resided at Brymee, as his Naib or deputy, and who possessed great personal influence among the Arabian Tribes, as also a perfect knowledge of their various and conflicting interests, having been removed by Fysul bin Toorkey, the now deposed Wahabee Chief, joined the Egyptian commander, and was by him despatched to Ras-ool-Khyma, to persuade the chiefs on the Coast of Oman to acknowledge the authority of Mahomed Ali in reality, but ostensibly that of his tool Khalid, the now nominal head of the Wahabee sect. This individual contrived, by a mixture of threats and promises, to persuade the Joasmee Chief to unite with him in requiring the Beni Naeem, who had lately got possession of Brymee, to surrender it to the Nujdees; but these nobly replied that they would rather bury themselves in its ruins than give it up, and lost no time in applying to the Beniyas Chief, as also Syud Humood bin Azan of Sohar, for support to meet the common enemy. This call was immediately responded to by the latter, who instantly sent his brother Ghes, with two hundred men, to reinforce the garrison of Brymee.

The perseverance and resolution displayed by the Agents of Mahomed Ali Pacha in forwarding his schemes of conquest, and the constant success which had hitherto attended the progress of his General, began to exercise a powerful influence over the tribes in this quarter,—an influence which nothing less than a positive assurance of protection from the British Government against his further encroachments could suffice to counteract. A protest in form was therefore entered by the British authorities, against the agreement between the Bahrein Shaikh and the Egyptian Agent, as having been formed in direct opposition to the assurances given by His Highness Mahomed Ali to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and the several Maritime Chieftains of Oman were invited to certify in writing their determination to cultivate more sedulously their relations with the British Government, to abide by its wishes and instructions, and to resist to the last extremity all attempts of Korshid Pacha to subjugate them.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur was called to account for his extraordinary and vacillating conduct with reference to Syud bin Mootluk. He in reply urged that he had been earnest in his promises, but that his

WAHABEES.

arrangements had been thwarted and overturned by the treacherous conduct of the Beniyas Chief, who had entered into a close and intimate correspondence with the Egyptian Agent, and had offered him an asylum in his fort in case of his expulsion from Shargah; in corroboration of which statement he produced a letter from Shaikh Khaleefa to the address of that individual, alluding to the little assistance afforded him by the Joasmees during the four months he had resided on their coasts, and pledging himself to support him with the whole of the resources of the Beniyas, whether by land or by sea, whenever called upon. He was informed that Shaikh Khaleefa had subsequently pledged himself in writing to drop all further connection with Korshid Pacha or his agents, and that therefore his objections were removed. Upon this he requested to be furnished with a document, requiring him to demand the immediate departure of Syud bin Mootluk, which was accordingly supplied; and it was at the same time intimated to the Egyptian Agent, that Humood bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdoolla, the Chiefs of Naeem in Brymee, having with their tribes been taken under the protection of the British Government, he would consequently be held responsible for any injury he might inflict upon them. He was moreover called upon, under the assurances of His Highness Mahomed Ali Pacha, to quit the Arabian Coast, and return to his immediate superior, Korshid Pacha.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur further agreed to enter into no correspondence or engagements with Mahomed Ali or his dependents, or any foreign power, without the knowledge and permission of the British Government, and to consider its enemies as his enemies: he was, in return, to be furnished with warlike munitions in the event of his being attacked from any quarter, on consideration of his compliance with the wishes of the British Government.

The application of the Beni Naeem Shaikhs to be placed under British protection was favourably received. They were encouraged to stand firm in their resolve to maintain their independence; and it was determined to send an Agent to reside at Brymee, and to furnish them with ammunition, if necessary.

The local Government of Muskat was also called upon to unite in the views and policy of the British Government, and to afford every aid and support to the inhabitants of Brymee.

To keep up or recover the semblance of the character under which the Egyptians first entered Nujd, and as a blind to their designs of further aggrandisement, Ameer Khalid was invested with a dress of honour, and proclaimed ruler of the province of Nujd.

Syud bin Mootluk, on receiving the Resident's protest, and hearing of the measures which had been adopted by him with reference to the

inhabitants of the coast and of Brymee, at length evacuated Oman, and, embarking from Shargah, proceeded to Ajeer, having been previously personally assured by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur that if he returned to Oman in force he would join him, and place all his resources at his disposal. His removal from Oman proved a severe blow to the Egyptian influence, and broke up the combination rapidly forming in his favour. On his voyage from Shargah, having landed on the island of Kenn, on the Persian Coast, he forcibly carried off four hundred sheep, and other property,—a gross and wanton aggression upon the subjects of a friendly power, which was duly brought to the notice of Mahomed Ali Pacha, and led, among other causes, to its being subsequently intimated to the Shaikh of Kateef, the Egypto-Wahabee seaport, that any expedition against Oman or the territories of the Imaum would be opposed by the British squadron in the Gulf.

A portion of the Naeem Tribe (a branch of that which had so openly resisted the encroachment of Korshid Pacha and his Agents at Brymee), residing on the Guttur Coast, having refused to pay the Zukat or tribute, when called upon through Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein, Mahomed Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Lahsa, despatched a party of regulars, assisted by some of the Mookazeebah Arabs, to ravage their pasture lands and date groves. Before this foray could be effectually made, the expedition was compelled to retreat, in consequence of the murder of Mahomed Effendi, its originator, by some Arabs, in the suburbs of Lahsa.

A Gooncha (belonging to Koweit) reached Kateef from Hodeida, in the Red Sea, in November 1839, laden with ammunition and military stores for the use of the Egyptian forces in Nujd. The Agents on board did not fail to spread all sorts of extravagant reports regarding a fleet of some eighteen or twenty vessels, laden with troops and warlike stores, being about to follow.

A. D. 1840.

The remonstrances of the Home Government began now, however, to have full effect; moreover, the quarrels and dissensions amongst the Egyptian Agents themselves, and the jealousy lately imbibed by Mahomed Ali Pacha of his General, Korshid, tended very much to weaken their power and influence, which were threatened by, among other disaffected tribes, that of Ejman, numbering upwards of four thousand men, whose chief had lately succeeded in effecting his escape from Lahsa, where he had been treacherously seized and confined by the Pacha's orders. Communications between the different towns and districts began to be seriously interrupted, and the supplies for the Egyptian forces at Thurmidah, the head quarters, needed escorts of considerable numbers of horse and foot to ensure their safety. Syud bin Mootluk was distrusted, and sent

under surveillance to Riaz. A movement by Khalid into the districts, attended by the Egyptian cavalry, for the purpose of confirming his authority, and receiving the allegiance of the various unsettled tribes, indicated an intention on the part of his allies to evacuate Nujd, and their desire, by putting him forward in a more prominent position of outward authority than he had hitherto enjoyed, to check the growing disaffections previous to his being left at the head of affairs.

Just as the blockade of Kateef, Sohat, and Ajeer, held by the Egyptian troops, began seriously to be contemplated by the British Government, intelligence was received (May 1840) that Lahsa had been evacuated, and that the main body of the Egyptian troops had actually left Nujd; which being corroborated by the declaration shortly before made by Mahomed Ali Pacha, the Egyptian ruler, to Her Majesty's Consul General at Cairo, and subsequently in a measure confirmed by the despatch of a vessel to those ports, which were now found to be in the hands of Arabs, adherents of Ameer Khalid, although the Egyptian Agent still continued to exercise the actual authority and control, rendered the adoption of this measure unnecessary. The grossly oppressive and extortionate conduct of the Pacha and his Agent further afforded a plausible reason for the belief that the Egyptians no longer contemplated the permanent occupation of Central Arabia.

As a sacrifice to the memory of his deputy, Mahomed Effendi, who was shot while Governor of Lahsa, Korshid Pacha's last act, previous to his departure, was to put to death Burgeish, the Chief of the Ali Humeed. It was evidently intended, that on Nujd being made over to the charge of Ameer Khalid, that chief should nevertheless continue to act under the authority of the Egyptian Agent whom it was intended to establish at Medina, a post whence he could exercise a general superintendence over the country of the Hujeeb Arabs and Central Arabia; but the moral influence of the usurper among the various tribes, which under the most favourable circumstances had ever been very trifling, was now entirely lost: despised, disliked, and deprived of the support of his patrons, he had very shortly his hands fully occupied with the intrigues which were set on foot to dispossess him of his illegal power.

At the period of the evacuation of Lahsa and Ajeer, one Mooshrif arrived at Bahrein, despatched probably by the inhabitants of those places, to invite Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa (the grandson of Soleyman, the brother of Abdoolla bin Ahmed) to come over and claim those districts, when they would throw off their allegiance to Ameer Khalid.

A. D. 1841.

The spirit of disaffection now developing itself in Central Arabia was in no slight degree promoted and encouraged by the current report of Ameer Fysul having effected his liberation from Cairo, and commenced his journey to Medina,

as well as by the news of the reverse sustained by the Egyptians in Syria, and the consequent reduction of Mahomed Ali Pacha's authority within its legitimate limits.

Syud bin Mootluk nevertheless continued to address letters to the Chief of Oman, announcing his march into that province; but these intimations (the excitement they at first caused having worn off, from their having been so often made, and having as often proved without foundation) produced little effect.

There was indeed little probability, under existing circumstances, of Ameer Khalid actually making any attempt on the province of Oman: it was however decided by the British Government, that in the event of the expedition being undertaken, it should be met with as much active resistance as his means afforded of arraying against it.

It now appeared that the Sublime Porte advanced their claims to authority over Nujd; and certain it is, that having received some presents from Ameer Khalid, that Government appointed him Wulee of that province.

His submission was of course hollow enough, having been in all probability prompted by Korshid Pacha, to be disavowed whenever it might meet the views of the Egyptians.

He addressed a very friendly letter to the British Native Agent at Bahrein, expressing an earnest desire to renew the amicable and cordial relations which formerly subsisted between his late father, Saood, and the British Government; hinting that he had wished before to open the correspondence, but had been prevented by Mahomed Ali Pacha.

On his arrival at Lahsa, in October 1841, notwithstanding these professions, he prepared a force, destined (as announced by the Native Agent at Bahrein) for the invasion of Oman, and the siege of Brymee, and to be commanded by the notorious Syud bin Mootluk. The British Government having provided for this contingency in its instructions that the Resident should endeavour to obtain accurate information of Ameer Khalid's movements, and, if he were preparing for the invasion of Oman, should warn him of the opposition of the British Government, and require him to desist from the undertaking, and good grounds existing for the belief that the expedition was now really in contemplation, it was deemed expedient and advisable by him to despatch a British officer to wait upon the Ameer in his camp at Lahsa (distant seventy miles from the coast), with written and verbal communications, indicative of the views of the British Government: to which he replied that he had not sent, nor entertained any intention of sending, Syud bin Mootluk into Oman; and supposing him to have been so disposed, it subsequently turned out that he really had not the power; and this was the more

fortunate, as the Maritime Arabian Chiefs, although outwardly professing their determination to maintain their own independence, were known to be secretly carrying on intrigues and correspondence with him, and as the irregular proceedings of the Brymee Chiefs, in foraying the districts of Syud Humood bin Azan of Sohar, must have greatly diminished, if not altogether destroyed, the prospect of any co-operation on the part of the latter in the event of an attack upon Nujd.

A very short time sufficed to show how little able was the titular chief, when deprived of the support of his Egyptian allies, to maintain even his own position.

Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, the son of Mahomed, the younger brother of Saood, father of Khalid, entertaining pretensions to the sovereignty of Nujd, and finding himself suspected by Khalid, had fled to Koweit, where he remained some time, secretly supported by Toorkey Heezanee, a Chief of Khurij. He returned in September of this year, and took possession of Zoomah, where, under certain pretences, he seized and executed an inhabitant named Zaghur, confiscating his property, to the amount of 8,000 dollars. He then took successively Syah and Munfoohad (one or two marches from Riaz), in which latter place, by the execution of a wealthy inhabitant, he secured his property, amounting to 4,000 dollars. With these means at his disposal, he satisfied the immediate wants of his followers, said to consist of one thousand men; besides which the tribes of Graymigah, Soohool, and Toorkey Ahrance, well disposed towards him, could furnish fifteen hundred more. Three other tribes, the Ali Moorah, Ejman, and Soobaya, numbering about three thousand men, although said to have openly promised their support to his opponent, would, it was supposed, either remain neutral in the approaching conflict, or side with Abdoolla.

In December 1841 he threatened Riaz, the major part of whose inhabitants were said to be in his favour. Khalid was represented as having in his service about eight hundred Egyptian troops, one half cavalry the other infantry, mostly irregular, indifferently armed and mounted, and somewhat discontented, in consequence of not receiving their arrears of pay, now due for a whole year. These were looked on with much jealousy and disfavour by the Arab Chieftains, who, when Khalid was left in authority over Nujd, had expressed their dislike to the strangers, and stipulated for their dismissal, in return for their own friendship and support,—a measure to which he at the time acceded, but its execution he had been led to defer, in consequence of the revolt of Abdoolla bin Sooneyan. In addition to the Egyptian troops, he could too, it was reported, depend on the assistance of three thousand men from the Anisa, Muhtari, and Beni Hajir tribes. There was no artillery on either side, unless a few honey-combed and badly mounted

WAHABEES.

guns, in the possession of Ameer Khalid at Hoofoof, Kateef, &c. deserved the name.

On Abdoolla's approach to Riaz, the army of Ameer Khalid advanced to oppose him: a skirmish ensued, and the former sustained a defeat; but on the same day, the leading inhabitants of the city secretly invited him to repair with his adherents to the south gate at dusk, when they would be prepared to act in concert with him. Abdoolla accepted the invitation, and effecting an entrance within the walls, was proclaimed ruler of Nujd. His first act was to put to death three of the leaders of the opposing army,—sparing, however, the life of Omer bin Oofeysan, a resolute man, and one on whom entire dependence had been placed by Ameer Khalid.

On its becoming known at Lahsa that Riaz had fallen into the hands of Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, its inhabitants secretly wrote to him, tendering submission, while Ameer Khalid, doubting their loyalty, assembled the head men, and a second time pledged himself to disband his mercenary troops. He nevertheless despatched to them orders to repair to him in haste and secrecy at Kateef. His stay, however, at this latter place, was not of very long duration: the inhabitants conspired with his own traitorous generals against him, and he was compelled, after dismissing his western or Egyptian troops, to take refuge with Moobaruk (son of the Bahrein Chief, Abdoolla bin Ahmed), the Governor of Demaum, who came out to meet and offer him asylum.

His hopes in this quarter of recovering power were now entirely destroyed, and he shortly left Bahrein for Koweit, with the design of proceeding thence to Gusseem, a town three days' journey from Medina, where he believed himself to possess some staunch adherents.

Moobaruk bin Abdoolla made a diversion in favour of his guest upon Lahsa and Ajeer, but his success was only partial and temporary, his troops being compelled to retreat on the approach of those of Abdoolla bin Sooneyan.

A. D. 1842.

Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, in February 1842 fully acknowledged Wahabee ruler, desired to extend his authority and influence over the tribes of Oman, with whose chiefs he commenced a correspondence by letter, intimating his intention of sending Syud bin Mootluk as his Agent to them, and inviting them cordially to unite with and afford him every aid and assistance.

The originals of these letters, with the exception of that to the address of Khaleefa bin Shakboot, the Beniyas Chief (who alleged his right to keep, and denied that of the British authority to ask it of him), were procured by the Acting Resident, Colonel Robertson, who thereon addressed a letter of remonstrance to the Wahabee ruler, explaining the ill effects which had hitherto resulted from the establishment of Wahabee

WAHABEES.

tenets among the pirate chieftains, which had led to their chastisement by the British Government; deprecating his present attempts to bring them again under Wahabee authority and influence, as calculated to recall to their minds the deeds of other times, when they were similarly stimulated by his predecessors, and to arouse the savage propensities of those who were now quietly settling down into peaceable natives, and thereby to draw down upon them the just vengeance of the British Government.

Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, in reply, declared his intention to co-operate with the British Government to check piracy; that he had promulgated the same to the people of Oman, whom he called his subjects, and to others of other countries, enjoining them to abstain from inflicting injuries upon others, and, with regard to the sea, to act in the very manner pointed out,—professions which, rated at their true value, were probably worth nothing; but, whether sincere or faithless, were a matter of little moment, his authority being by no means confirmed, and his views, therefore, liable to any change, as his fame and influence increased or diminished.

The Brymee Shaikhs claimed, in their public answers to the ruler of Nujd, a species of connection with the British Government, which, although not absolutely subsisting, was possibly adduced in the hope that, if Abdoolla bin Sooneyan were ignorant of the truth, he might be deterred from interfering in their concerns from fear of the supposed alliance. There were those among them, however, who courted the good will and friendship of the new Wahabee ruler, and desired to tender their submission to him; and the contents of their letters, secretly despatched, were supposed to be of a very opposite tenor to that above alluded to.

The heavy exactions levied upon the inhabitants of Kateef and other places under his authority, by Ameer Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, rendered him for a time unpopular. Some of the Bedouin Tribes still refused to make their allegiance, and a faint effort on the part of his rival, the deposed usurper Khalid, at Gusseem, to recover his lost position, instigated and encouraged, it was reported, by emissaries from the Turkish Government, threatened at one instant to jeopardise his newly acquired authority.

A. D. 1843.

This danger was no sooner averted than, in March 1843, news of Ameer Fysul's arrival at Gusseem were received; and although he still continued to keep up a correspondence with the Oman Chiefs, Abdoolla bin Sooneyan's attention was evidently too much taken up in his own affairs to admit of his entertaining any designs immediately opposed to the policy of the British Government on the Arabian Coast.

WAHABEES.

The report of the re-appearance in June 1843 of the legitimate ruler, Ameer Fysul, in Nujd, proved correct. His march to the southward and eastward was attended with undisturbed success, and Abdoolla bin Sooneyan very shortly found himself invested with a few followers in the citadel of Riaz (which place itself had fallen into the hands of his opponent), and compelled to surrender at discretion.

Khalid, the first usurper, was still at Medina, and refused Fysul's invitation to join him. The latter had now, however, nothing to fear from this quondam antagonist, whose assumption and loss of power had been coeval with the occupation and evacuation of Nujd by the Egyptian troops, upon whose support he had been dependent, having at no time carried with him the good will and hearts of the inhabitants.

Ameer Fysul sent a messenger, in July 1843, with letters to the maritime and inland Shaikhs of Oman, intimating his intention of sending an army under Syud bin Mootluk, on the termination of the hot weather, for the purpose of bringing that province under his authority. These communications were generally favourably received by the former, Muktoom of Debaye being the only Shaikh who exhibited a disinclination. Of the latter, the Chiefs of Brymee, Humood bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdoolla, addressed letters in November 1843 to the Resident, stating their belief in the earnestness of the Wahabee ruler's intimation, and requesting the aid and support of the British Government in order to repel the invaders. They were informed, in reply, that the communications formerly entered into with them by the British Government had reference solely to the advance of the Egyptian troops, and the connection subsisting between His Highness Mahomed Ali Pacha with Nujd; but that these circumstances being now altogether changed, and the impending danger removed, by the departure of the troops under Korshid Pacha from that province, it was the intention of the British Government to withdraw from all interference in the internal affairs of Arabia.

At this very time, too, the Resident received a communication from the Ameer himself, expressive of a desire for the renewal of the amicable relations which existed between his father Toorkey and the British Government. These sentiments of friendship were duly responded to, and the sole object of the British Government in this quarter being the suppression of plunder and bloodshed on the seas, and the security of all well disposed inhabitants of the shores of the Gulf, in the prosecution of their several employments, represented to and impressed upon him,—views which he had equally declared to be entertained by himself. The knowledge that a friendly intercourse was kept up between the English authorities and the ruler of Nujd could not fail to make a favourable and beneficial impression upon the minds of the Maritime Arabs.

WAHABEES.

In December 1843 he made an attempt to mediate a reconciliation between the Bahrein ex-Chief and his grand nephew, Mahomed bin Khaleefa; but his good offices being refused by the former, who declined coming to any friendly arrangement with his successful rival, he determined upon supporting the latter. The fort of Demaum, held by the ex-chief's sons, continued therefore under blockade at sea, and the Wahabee Chief promised to send a force to invest it by land, and check the proceedings of certain tribes opposed to his re-establishment in authority, and who in the meanwhile had espoused the cause of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and continued to supply the garrison with such necessaries as it required.

This long promised land force at length made its appearance, its march having been delayed in order to carry into effect the chastisement its leader was called upon to inflict upon those tribes who had hitherto refused to acknowledge him, and who had, further, been concerned in the plunder of Persian pilgrims, and other robberies.

Demaum fell, and was immediately taken possession of by Ameer Fysul, who has since maintained a garrison there, with a view to appropriating the revenues, to the prejudice of the lawful owner, Busheer bin Rahmah; who, having joined the coalition in the hope of ultimately recovering his patrimony in the event of success,—its restoration having been, indeed, guaranteed to him in such case by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa,—is of course much disappointed.

Ameer Fysul having gained the object for which he engaged in the war, viz. the cession of Demaum, would appear inclined to permit the contending parties to prolong or terminate the struggle without any further interference on his part, provided he were not alienated from the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and induced to take part with the ex-chief, by the former's being so blind to his own interests as to persist in neglecting to fulfil his engagement for the payment of the annual tribute.

CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

The Wahabee proceedings are so fully detailed in the Sketches of Muskat, the Beniyas, and the Uttoobees, that it does not appear necessary to do more than run over as briefly as possible the chief acts of the Ameer, and the parties His Highness deputed to Brymee, Kateef, and the ports on the shores of Arabia.

A. D. 1845.

Early in the year 1845 Syud bin Mootluk arrived from Nujd in the vicinity of Brymee. The force that accompanied him was by no means considerable, and he seems accordingly to have been somewhat mistrustful as to the reception he would meet with from the people of the tribes through whose territories he had to pass on his journey; for we find him sending messengers and spies in advance of his troops, to feel the way before him, and to report on the state of feeling generally manifested towards him. These precautions, however, proved scarcely necessary, for the holders of the Brymee forts hastened to tender their submission when they heard of his approach; the maritime chiefs proceeded to wait upon him; the Naeem, Zowalim, and Shuanil Tribes joined him, and delivered over such forts as he required;—in short, one and all appeared to vie with each other as to who should welcome him most, and afford him the greatest support.

Speedily availing himself of so favourable a moment, now that he stood high in the favour of all, Syud bin Mootluk sent forth demands upon the Muskat and Sohar Governments for the payment of tribute. Syud Soweynee and Syud Humood bin Azan, the chief authorities of these places, cordially uniting, held a joint consultation regarding the course it would be best to pursue, and, finally, it was agreed between them that the Sohar Chief should satisfy the demands of the Wahabees at once, lest his territories, which lay in such close proximity to Brymee, should be doomed to invasion; but that Syud Soweynee should declare his determination to make a reference to his father, Syud Saeed, at Zanzibar, ere disbursing a farthing.

The above are the terms that were proffered, and the Wahabee Lieutenant professed himself willing to agree to them. By what motive he was subsequently prompted is not known, but scarcely had he accepted the above conditions than he sent word to Syud Humood

bin Azan, telling him plainly that the tribute originally required at his hands was too small in amount, and directing him to pay an additional sum; and when objections were raised, he hastened to ravage his territories, seizing upon the fort of Mujees, and ruthlessly butchering the whole of the garrison within it. Syud Humood made preparations for resistance, but guided and influenced by the advice of the elders of his tribe, rather than witness the horrid scenes of bloodshed and slaughter that must inevitably have followed, had he with his poor resources dared to encounter the powerful Wahabee, he made good the tribute demanded.

This breach of faith was quickly succeeded by another.

In June 1845, before an answer had been received by His Excellency Syud Soweynee from his father, the Imaum, pending the arrival of which Syud bin Mootluk had pledged himself to refrain from hostilities, he (Syud bin Mootluk) summoned the heads of the tribes to flock to his standard, with their forces, and declared his intention to march upon Muskat as early as possible.

A large army was speedily collected, and fears were entertained by the Resident lest an attack should really be made upon His Highness' dominions.

A strong naval demonstration was accordingly made off the Batinah Coast, and letters were addressed by Major Hennell to the Wahabee Ameer, as well as to his Lieutenant in Brymee, exhorting the former to restrain his representative in Oman from such faithless proceedings, and desiring the latter to desist from hostilities until he was possessed of further advices from his superior, the Ameer. These measures proved successful, and were, moreover, responded to in a satisfactory manner by the Wahabee. The storm blew over. His Excellency Syud Soweynee engaged, in the name of his father, to disburse annually the sum of 5,000 crowns as tribute to the Ameer; adding thereunto on the present occasion the sum of 2,000 crowns, by way of a present to Syud bin Mootluk. Peace was concluded, and the Wahabee forces, after restoring the fort of Mujees, so unlawfully taken, withdrew from the Sohar territories.

The welcome accorded to Syud bin Mootluk, when first he arrived at Brymee, that bade fair to be so lasting and firm, did not prove of long duration.

His proud and arrogant behaviour quickly alienated the affections of all the tribes in Oman. Chief after chief conceived a hatred against him, and ranged themselves in opposition to his cause. Of the maritime chiefs, one alone (the Chief of Amulgavine) remained staunch to his side.

The Shaikh of the Naeem, a powerful clan, and Syud Humood bin

WAHABEES.

Azan, united together, and were shortly joined by the Muttowas, for the purpose of withstanding the oppression of one they styled an invader. The roads from Brymee to Nujd were infested with robbers, opposed to his ascendancy,—so much infested, indeed, that not a messenger of his could pass but was beaten; not a fraction of treasure could be sent to the Ameer in Nujd;—yet, notwithstanding the manifold proofs of the disgust that was growing towards him, he issued orders for the assemblage of a large force at Brymee, on the termination of the fast, for the purpose of either seizing upon the fort of Zeit, in the vicinity of Ejman, or of covering the erection of a stronghold on a spot where fresh water abounds, about seven miles inland, by means of which he would be enabled to hold the maritime Shaikhs of the coast more completely in check than was the case at present.

This design the whole of the Joasmee Chiefs, excepting Abdoolla bin Rashid of Amulgavine, were determined to oppose. In the meanwhile Syud bin Mootluk, having failed in his intrigues to gain possession of the strong fort of Zenich, belonging to the Boo Kheriban branch of the Naeem Tribe, one of the most productive and flourishing spots in that quarter, exhibited such evident intention of making himself master of it, even by force, that Shaikh Ahmed bin Ali, having, through the mediation of the Chief of the Beni Ghafir, effected a reconciliation with those members of the Al Boo Khamis branch with whom he had been upon unfriendly terms, and been assured of their support in the event of actual hostilities, at once decided that he would defend his possessions at all risks and hazards. The Shaikhs of Debaye and Shargah, finding the hands of the Wahabee Agent thus effectually tied for the present, have contented themselves with detaining two men from each pearl boat, to guard against a surprise, and have permitted the remainder to proceed to the banks.

Towards the close of the year, so strong was the party in league against Syud bin Mootluk, so precarious did he feel his position to be,—for reports had reached the Ameer that he was appropriating to himself a considerable portion of the treasure he had collected,—that he meditated proceeding in person to Nujd, to wait upon his master, and try to dispel from his mind all credence in the evil reports so freely circulated against him. A day had even been fixed for his departure from Brymee, when the unexpected arrival of messengers with letters from the Ameer —"confirming him in his position, but desiring him to send without delay any ready money he might have in his possession"—led to the sudden abandonment of the plan, and the despatch of a considerable sum to Nujd, through the medium of Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan, who, as well as his father, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, having been favoured with flattering communications from the Ameer by the same

WAHABEES.

opportunity, hastened to provide a vessel for the transmission of the treasure.

The year 1845 is also remarkable for the hostilities that arose between Abdoolla bin Saeed, the Wahabee Governor of the port of Kateef, and the Shaikhs of Bahrein. The cause of the quarrel and the proceedings of either party have been so fully detailed in the Sketch of the Uttoobees that to repeat them here were idle and profitless; suffice it to say, therefore, that dissensions continued to rage until the month of August 1847, when matters were brought to a peaceable settlement, the Ameer pledging himself in no way to assist Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the ex-Chief of Bahrein, in his efforts to recover his position as chief of the island, and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa engaging to pay the Wahabee the sum of 4,000 dollars.

A. D. 1847.

In the ensuing year, the Wahabee prestige received a severe check from the Shaikh of the Beniyas, who contrived to reduce the forts of Brymee, to defeat and discomfit a Nujdee force sent specially against him, and so completely to paralyse the efforts of Syud bin Mootluk to recover his lost authority in Oman, that he drove him to seek refuge at Shargah, and there to remain until forces could be collected by the Joasmee and his allies to give him assistance. These troops were speedily assembled, and towards the close of the year the combined armies of Shaikh Sultan, Muktoom bin Butye, and Humeed bin Rashid, set out from Shargah with Syud bin Mootluk, and the remnant of the Nujdees, to attack Shaikh Syud at Brymee. Affairs, however, through the mediation of an envoy deputed by the Sherreeff of Mecca, to compose the differences that had arisen, precluded the necessity for a recourse to active hostilities. Peace was concluded, and the Wahabee commander reinstated in his position at Brymee.

A. D. 1848.

In the following year Ameer Fysul appears to have entertained the design of reducing the island of Bahrein to submission to his own authority. From a reference to the Sketch of the Uttoobees will be gathered how the Ameer came to the neighbourhood of the island in person; how His Highness induced the inhabitants of the Guttur Coast to forsake the Uttoobees, and come over to the side of the Nujdees; how the sons of the ex-chief suddenly equipped a fleet from the Persian Coast, and, after attacking and forcing their way through the line of Uttoobee vessels blockading the port of Kateef, succeeded in joining the Wahabees; how Shaikh Mahomed was on the point of being compelled to succumb to the overwhelming force in league against him; and, finally, how the timely arrival off the island of our ships of war, blasting the hopes and ambitious designs of both

A. D. 1849.

the Wahabees and the refugees from Kenn, matters were peaceably settled (July 1851), and the integrity of the island of Bahrein was preserved.

There remains but to notice the fear and trepidation caused in the minds of the Muskat authorities by the approach of a Nujdee force, under the command of no less a person than a son (Abdoolla bin Fysul) of the Ameer himself.

A. D. 1852.

Full and ample particulars connected with the affair,—the steps adopted by Abdoolla bin Fysul, and the result of those steps; the proceedings of the Resident to oppose the ambitious designs of the Wahabee, and the success that attended those proceedings,—these have all been so fully detailed in the Muskat narrative, that I will conclude by saying that the invasion of the Batinah districts, at one time contemplated, was abandoned, and matters were brought to a settlement, in 1853, by His Excellency Syud Soweynee agreeing to pay an exorbitant amount of tribute to the Ameer annually, and a treaty offensive and defensive being entered into between the Wahabee and Muskat authorities, in the name of their respective superiors, the Ameer of Nujd and the Imaum of Muskat.

A. D. 1853.

1.27
Wahhabi surrender of Buraimi, May 1819

138

A.

To the Right Honourable Sir E. Nepean, Bart.,
President and Governor in Council.

Right Honourable Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you that after a most tedious passage of twenty-four days the Honorable Company's Cruiser "Thetis" anchored in the cove of Muscat on the evening of 7th May. H. M.'s Ship "Curlew," commanded by Captain Walpole, which sailed from Bombay ten days subsequent to our departure, arrived here early on the following morning, and I had the honour to pay my first visit to His Highness the Imam, accompanied by Captain Walpole and Lieutenant Tanner, when your letter to His Highness's address was presented by me. His Highness received the communication with apparent satisfaction, and expressed the high sense he entertains of the friendly alliance and good understanding which has uniformly existed between the Honorable Company's Government and his family, and from which he has received such constant support. As it was necessary to afford His Highness leisure to peruse your letter, our conversation was of course directed to other topics; indeed His Highness's Minister Sheikh Ali-bin-Fazel, who was the person deputed by the Imam to receive me, and arrange the interview, stated that he had been directed to intimate to me the wishes of the Imam on this particular occasion. The Minister and His Highness's brother, Seyud Salim, were the only persons present on the part of the Imam, who introduced each of them in their respective situations.

His Highness communicated to Captain Walpole the information received at Muscat of the return of twelve Joassmee vessels, which had been traced as far as Bab-ul-Mandul. It appears that of the seventeen vessels which sailed from Ras-ul-Khima, twelve have been spoken with off Fuzeerah, a small harbour situated between Khor-Chelha and Khor-Fekhan, a place lately taken possession of by the Joassmee pirates, and where these twelve

139

boats had touched about four days ago to obtain information. Their cruise has been attended with very little advantage, as they are reported to have captured only two small boats belonging to Socrota, and the value of which must be very trifling.

This information induced Captain Walpole to determine on joining the Imam's vessels cruising off Cape Mussendom, and His Highness having addressed letters to the Commanders of those vessels, the "Curlew" put to sea on the evening of the 8th instant.

His Highness's Minister called on me on the evening of 8th, and entered into a long discussion on the subject of the intended expedition, which I soon discovered was introduced as a prelude to inquiries which he had been directed to make as to the purpose of my mission to the Turkish camp, and although he endeavoured to conceal both his anxiety and curiosity, it was evident that his mind, or possibly his master's mind, was not altogether at rest on this point. I assured him that the British Government was extremely anxious to witness a good understanding between the Turkish general and His Highness the Imam; that the friendly intercourse which has subsisted between His Highness Mahomed Ali Pacha and the British Government may be considered as the best security for the foundation of the friendship, which I trusted would be more closely cemented between the Imam and His Excellency Ibrahim Pacha, whose exertions and perseverance in exterminating the Wahabees have justly entitled him to our praise; and the success which has hitherto attended the arms of Ibrahim Pacha must, no doubt, have materially affected the political state of this country, and conduced to the safety and tranquillity of His Highness the Imam's dominions, as well as to the advancement of the general happiness and security of the neighbouring states. That His Excellency Ibrahim Pacha was of course aware of the friendly relations existing between the British Government and His Highness the Imam; therefore on that head it was unnecessary to enter into a discussion on points which in all reasonable expectation never could arise. I requested

140

him to convey to the Imam these my sentiments and opinions on this subject, and to solicit an interview on the following day, which he promised to effect.

On the morning of the 9th the Minister again called on me, and again agitated the subject introduced yesterday. I offered every argument that could possibly tend to convince him how unnecessary such surmises must eventually prove. He then communicated the intelligence he had received on the evening of 8th, subsequent to his visit to me, that the Fort of Brimee (situated in the interior, about two days' march from Rus-ul-Khima, and an equal distance from Shargeh) had been surrendered to an officer of the Imam's, who had been deputed to offer conditions and terms to Buttal Wahabee. This chief had been induced to withdraw from the interests of his former associates, who were inclined to effect his removal, and possibly his death. Under these circumstances he conceived it prudent to effect a reconciliation with the Imam, who has promised him protection, and finding himself pressed on the one hand by Sultan-bin Suggar and Rushud-bin-Humeed, who were originally joined in league with the Rus-ul-Khima Joassmees, but at the present moment, as the Minister states, separated in their interests. Buttal followed the more prudent measure of surrendering to the Imam, and the chiefs of the district of Brimee have sworn allegiance to the Imam, whose officers now retain possession of the place; Sultan-bin-Suggar of Shargeh and his associate Rushud-bin-Humeed of Ajmaan, wish to induce the Imam to deliver over Brimee to Suggar, who says he will retain it for the Imam, with whom they are at present inclined to court an apparent friendship. I offered some remarks on the danger of His Highness being deluded by false appearances, and recommended the Minister to be cautious in advising a temporary reconciliation by which those enemies to society may screen themselves at the moment they expect to be visited with the punishment they deserve.

I proposed to accompany the Minister agreeably to the arrangement of yesterday, but he excused himself for the present,

141

and said it would be better to defer till evening our visit to the Imam, who was at present sitting in public, where such matters could not be fitly discussed; that the Imam expected the arrival of the Brimee chief on the morning of the 10th; would wish to defer till then our second interview. To this proposal I objected, as I wished to convey to His Highness the expectations entertained by the British Government of his cordial support in the ensuing expedition, which formed the subject of my mission to Muscat, but that I of course would attend on the morning of the 10th. The Minister promised to arrange an interview in the evening, but on his arrival, about five o'clock, I found him inclined to enter upon some other topics not at all connected with the object of my visit to Muscat, and that he was still inclined to defer to some distant period the explanation which I required. I therefore urged the necessity of adhering to the promise made in the forenoon, on which he departed, and I was shortly after summoned to attend the Imam. The subject of the conference I shall minutely detail.

On the evening of the 9th I obtained an interview with His Highness, on which occasion he was attended by his Minister Sheikh Alie-bin-Fazell, and Goolah Anandass, the accredited Broker of the Honorable Company, was present. His Highness shortly after my arrival remarked that in the letter which I had presented to him, he observed that it was intended I should proceed to Deriah to the camp of His Excellency Ibrahim Pacha, to concert with that General; also on the intended expedition; to which I replied in the affirmative. His Highness said that he had occasion to write to Ibrahim Pacha respecting Bahrein, but that as he had not received an answer he presumed that it was necessary in all cases to await a reply from or reference to His Highness Muhumud Alie Pacha, as Ibrahim Pacha could not act in those matters without orders; that the delay would certainly exceed the period fixed for the sailing of the expedition, and he wished to know whether the expedition would be deferred till my return, which even from Deriah could not possibly be expected, as he surmised, previous to the period alluded to. I

142

replied that no delay whatever should be imputed to me, as I should exert my utmost diligence; that if Ibrahim Pacha coincided in our views, I conceived it would be unnecessary to refer to Muhumud Alie Pacha; that I entertained little doubt on these two points, and that the expedition, as has been stated to him, is now in preparation, therefore would of course be in readiness to proceed; however, that it was not at all likely that my not returning would interfere in the arrangements. His Highness repeatedly endeavoured to impress on my mind the impossibility of accomplishing my journey in time to convey an answer; after which he inquired of me if I had heard of the conduct of Ibrahim Pacha toward the Arabs at Deriah, or elsewhere, intimating that cruelties had been committed by that General. Of this accusation I declared my ignorance, and His Highness replied that on my arrival there I would be better informed. I used every argument to remove from the mind of the Imam any unfavorable impression he may entertain of Ibrahim Pacha, by drawing his attention to the conduct of Muhumud Alie Pacha in Egypt, and to the good understanding existing between the British Government and His Highness, and repeated all the arguments that I had adduced in the two conferences with his Minister on this subject. He asked me if it was possible to effect the object without the interference of strangers, or without calling for the assistance of the Turkish army. I replied that if it were possible I should be happy to pay attention and deference to his opinions if he would do me the favour to communicate them, and that I should even convey them to my Government; but however I conceived it my duty to draw his attention to the communication he had made to Captain Taylor. It may appear inconsistent that at one period he should have proposed to offer his own vessels in aid of the Pacha's views, and now entertain any difficulty as to the policy of joining us in conjunction with the Turkish army, as this proposal from himself was the most particular inducement to expect his most cordial assistance, particularly as he had led Captain Taylor to suppose that he did not labour under any apprehension from the views of the Pacha towards himself.

143

I therefore trusted that his mind was perfectly at rest on this point, and concluded with these remarks, which had been communicated in the morning to his Minister.

The expedition contemplated at the present crisis is intended to consist of nearly four times the number of troops, and of a much more formidable naval equipment than that which His Highness had the pleasure to witness on a former occasion, therefore the assistance to be afforded us in the completion of our view must of course be on an equally enlarged and extensive scale; the benefits resulting from such combined efforts on so efficient and general a plan must be self-evident, and it is probable that His Highness will gain more direct advantage from these effects than any chief or power concerned.

His Highness must be perfectly aware that the British Government does not contemplate either increase of territory or revenues by the subjection of the Wahabees or the Joassmee pirates; our Government is stimulated most particularly by a desire to avenge the insults and injuries offered to the peaceable inhabitants of neighbouring states in terms of amity with us, from the connection with whom by trade and intercourse, our subjects certainly derive mercantile influence and profit; as far as relates individually to ourselves we have it in our power to protect our own trade by our ships of war; our policy is not limited to our own private view, and we expect that all powers in amity with us, whose locality enables them to afford assistance, will come forward, and enter in the subjugation of the pirate tribes, affording every possible assistance.

The letter addressed to His Highness and delivered to him by Captain Taylor most fully explains the feelings which actuate the British Government with respect to our intentions towards himself, and of our sincere desire to witness a friendly understanding between His Highness and Ibrahim Pacha.

I next brought to his recollection the benefits which had resulted from Ibrahim Pacha's perseverance in the war against the Wahabees, and the policy of availing ourselves of his proximity to completely effect the purpose proposed. I brought forward an argument adduced by His Highness himself, as to

144

the possibility of the Turkish army being removed, and argued the bad policy of procrastination. After some consideration His Highness distinctly replied to me that he had long since determined on one point, to which he should strictly adhere; for although he acknowledged the truth of many of my arguments, he had determined not to allow his troops to associate on shore in concert with the Turkish army, as the consequences may be fatal to him; and further that he could not compel his troops to obey such orders; but that he would give a general assurance of support and assistance whenever the expedition should arrive; that he would accompany the expedition himself, and embark five thousand troops to act in concert and associate with the British, effecting any purpose in conjunction with our troops which the capacity of his army would admit of; but that it must be expressly understood that if the Turkish army acted in the interior he could not be called upon to associate his troops with them; that if the Turkish army should not be called upon he would endeavour to procure a sufficient force to act in the interior; also that at the present moment he could not enter into particulars, but would defer till to-morrow the future deliberations; however, that His Highness's objection to associate with Ibrahim Pacha's army on shore precluded him from committing to writing any part of those assurances; and in reply to a question which I urged with delicacy, but with reference to the capture of Ras-ul-Khima on the former occasion, His Highness declared his incapacity to retain it, if it was even offered to him, alleging the expense attendant on this measure as an insurmountable barrier. His Highness having expressed his acknowledgment of the delicacy observed on my part in offering my opinions and arguments to his consideration, I withdrew, on his appointing the following day for a second conference.

On the morning of the 10th I had the pleasure to receive a communication from the Minister, that His Highness had fully reconsidered the remarks which I had the pleasure to offer for his consideration on the foregoing evening, and that at or before eleven he would be happy to accompany me to the presence of the Imam.

145

I accordingly met the Minister, and after some general remarks he said that all difficulties would be easily removed; we therefore proceeded to the Imam's Palace. We found His Highness and his brother seated with him. After a little hesitation the Imam said he would enter into any particulars that were considered necessary. We therefore entered upon the state of the Joassmees as they now exist.

His Highness represented their power to be on the decline since the overthrow of the Wahabee chief, and which has given rise to the want of confidence in the different chiefs towards each other, or rather the conviction of the determination of each to advance his own interests at the expense of his neighbour's. This state of things he conceives to be very favourable; the want of a leader of talents and the present confined and cramped state of the Joassmees since the overthrow of the Wahabees may probably breed dissension among them. Very few of those who escaped from Deriah have joined the Joassmees; he does not estimate the number at more than three hundred. The following estimate of the whole force of the Joassmees, as they now exist, he had collected from the very best authority, and considers it as authentic:—

					Foot.
	Joined from the remains of the Wahabee force say				300
1.	Bukha, contains only				20
2.	Shaam				150 to 200
3.	Rums				200
4.	Ras-ul-Khima, large boats 25, small 75, and				3,000
5.	Humrah, all joined at Ras-ul-Khima.				
6.	Oomul Goweyn, large boats	1	small 30		400
7.	Ajmaan	,, 4	,, 35		1,000
8.	Fusht, with				
9.	Shargeh, and	,, 12	,, 150		1,280
10.	Aboo Heyle				
11.	Dubyee	,, 4	,, 100		800
		,, 46	,, 390		7,200

Boo Dubyee (Khyram Bineeyas), large 5, small 300, 3,000 foot.

146

This last port can scarcely be considered as a pirate port, having been long disunited from Ras-ul-Khima.

To the east of Cape Mussendom is the small bay of Fugeerah, which serves as a look-out port on this side for boats coming up the Gulf. As before remarked in the 2nd paragraph of this letter, from Fugeerah or from Dubah an Arab Causid can pass the mountains to Rus-ul-Khima in fourteen hours; the road from Dubah is passable for foot and horse, and even for small guns, and the journey can be effected in two days.

The present disposition of the Shargeh chief may probably induce him, as well as the chief of Ajmaan, to remain disunited from the chief of Rus-ul-Khima pending the hostilities. His Highness has therefore declared his intention to use his endeavours to effect this object, although he recommends the whole to meet with the same fate that may attend Rus-ul-Khima.

I then proposed to His Highness that we should take into consideration the measures to be adopted in the offensive operations. After some circumlocution and argument, His Highness agreed to the following arrangements, which he requested me to commit to writing, and to transmit to your Honourable Board, in reply to that part of my instructions touching the nature and extent of the assistance he may be able to afford in the reduction of the piratical port.

With a view to preventing the fugitive Joassmees of Rus-ul-Khima from entering into Oman, His Highness intends to post a sufficient number of men in the passes of the mountains, pending the operations against Rus-ul-Khima, should the services of those men not be required in consequence of the arrival of the Pacha's army; but if that event does not take place His Highness will be prepared to co-operate by land with a force of seven thousand foot, one hundred and thirty cavalry, and fifteen hundred camels, to proceed by the passes above Rus-ul-Khima, and invest that place; he himself will accompany the expedition in a ship of war, and take with him at least one thousand men to be landed and to act in

147

conjunction with the British force, it being understood, that if Ibrahim Pacha's force acts by land the Imam's force will all proceed by sea, except that part required for the purpose already stated of guarding the passes into Oman; the necessary precautions will of course be taken to prevent the Arab and Turkish soldiery being employed in conjunction with each other, and their camps shall be at all times separate.

The next assistance to be afforded on his part appeared to be the supply of boats to assist in the disembarkation of troops, baggage, &c. Unfortunately the number of the description required for that purpose is much diminished within these few years. His Highness stated that he could not promise a greater number than seventy, but if possible he would increase the number to one hundred, each capable of conveying from thirty to fifty men.

With respect to water and firewood His Highness stated that a sufficiency of each should be supplied at His Highness's expense, but that cattle and such other supplies as were necessary would be procured more readily by our own Commissary, who would pay only the regulated price, His Highness exerting his influence to prevent over-charge.

His Highness consents to employ two of his ships for the conveyance of stores, or in whatever way they may be best applied, agreeable to the wishes of the British Government, at whose disposal two ships will be placed, whenever the Right Honourable the Governor in Council may intimate his wishes on that subject to His Highness.

His Highness will continue to keep up a correspondence with the Government of Bombay on all subjects connected with the advancement of the preparations for the expedition, and will forward every information that he may obtain relative to any alterations that may take place in the force or numbers of the Joassmee pirates, so that the Government may at all times be perfectly acquainted with the actual state of their power.

His Highness concluded with a general assurance of support and assistance, and stated that any measures adopted by the British

148

Government should meet with his warmest support; that independent of the particulars here enumerated, he would be happy to forward the views of Government by attending to any arrangements that might have been omitted in the foregoing outline.

I have every reason to imagine that His Highness will use his best efforts to complete the arrangements so as to enable him to fulfil the engagements and assurances which I have now the honor to transmit to your Honourable Board, and I trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous in offering my opinion on the motives which I imagine induced the Imam to hesitate at the first interview. It is very obvious that the introduction of Ibrahim Pacha's force and the proximity of the scene of action to the boundary of His Highness's territory, are two subjects which give rise to feelings of jealousy and suspicion in the mind of the Imam, particularly when it is recollected that the Pacha's views towards obtaining possession of Bahrein have become public, and that he has not satisfied the Imam's inquiries on that subject. The Imam therefore in the first instance appears to have had in view the possibility of inducing me to give up the idea of proceeding to Deriah, first arguing the distance and delay, next the possibility of effecting the overthrow of the Joassmees without the assistance of the Pacha. Not having carried this point, he next assayed to obtain a pledge from me on the part of the British Government. To this I invariably replied by repeating that part of the letter addressed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to His Highness, and on no occasion did I exceed the limits of the assurances conveyed in that address.

As it is probable I shall touch at Muscat on my return to Bombay at a period when it will be necessary to observe whether these preparations are in a state of forwardness, I trust I shall then be favored with directions for the guidance of my conduct under the following circumstances. First, should Ibrahim Pacha decline to move any part of his army to so great a distance from Deriah or Lahissa, what further assistance to the accomplishment of the views of the British Government would be required on the part of the Imam of Muscat? Secondly, should Ibrahim Pacha

149

accept the proposals offered to him, what assurances may I feel myself at liberty to make to the Imam of Muscat in order to set his mind at rest, and to suppress the doubts which he appears to entertain of the Pacha's views?

From the information I have collected here from other sources I do not imagine that the Imam has underrated the forces of the Joassmees, neither can I learn from any authority on which I could depend, that the Arabs of the interior will come forward to assist the Joassmees of Rus-ul Khima; if they were inclined to join their former associates the number of men they could bring into the field would not exceed three thousand, and if the Brimee chief and his associates can be depended upon, even that number would be considerably diminished. It appears that the Imam's force amounts to twenty thousand foot-men, distributed throughout the villages and along the coast; but although every Arab is a soldier and armed, it is not to be supposed that the army is disposable; of the twenty thousand foot it is probable ten thousand may be collected at one point, and of his cavalry not more than one hundred and thirty, or one hundred and fifty.

I shall not presume to offer an opinion on the qualifications of His Highness's army, as they have been already brought to the notice of your Honourable Board by officers who have had a better opportunity of forming an opinion on that subject, during the former expedition.

I have been this day honoured by the receipt of His Highness's amended letter, in which he has been pleased to authenticate the assurances and promises of assistance communicated by His Highness's desire in this despatch, and I trust that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council (to whose address His Highness's despatch is addressed, in reply to that with which I had the honour to be entrusted) will be pleased to approve of the result of my endeavours to promote the views of Government.

I have the honour to acquaint you that I have availed myself of the very able advice and extensive information communicated to me by Captain Lock, R. N. I have in consequence determined

150

to proceed in the first instance to Bushire, with a view to obtaining correct information respecting the harbour of Kutteef, and the route to Deriah, where I hope I may have the good fortune to find His Excellency Ibrahim Pacha's camp situated. The reports in circulation here do not promise an easy access to Deriah, but of this I shall be able to speak with more certainty after my arrival at Bushire.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Muscat, 15th May 1819.

1.28
Uprising of Na'im at Buraimi against Sa'id b. Sultan of Muscat; mediation of Sultan b. Saqr, 1820




Read the following letter from
Proceedings dated 9th Feby 1821 Lieutenant Colonel Warren to the Chief
Secretary dated Kishm 4th Janry with enclosure
Sir
Agreeably to the determination

announced in my letter of the 29th Ultimo,
I sailed that evening and arrived at
this place on the 2d instant, having
been fortunate enough to meet the
Semiramis Transport, the day before our
own passage to Bombay, with 300 of
the 1st Regiment on board. Finding
that she had been taken up
for the trip only to Dellistaw
and back again, I was under the
necessity of entering into a new
engagement with her, and with
the advice of the Commander of
the Cruizer, I was on board of
the Psyche, I agreed on the part
of Government, to hire the Vessel
for two months certain at Rupees
1600 per month commencing on the 1st
instant

instant, and to be paid at the
same rate for such time as her services
might be required, afterwards an arrangement
which I trust the Government will approve
of. The Vessel has since returned here
and is now taking on board the
remainder of the 1/2 and 1/11 Regiments
in all 300 men, fit for immediate
service, sicks and drills &c remaining here.

On my arrival here I found that
the removal of the settlement from Dellistaw
had just been completed, with the exception
some materials for the construction of huts
sheds &c, which the Honble Company's Ships
were still employed in bringing round,
and a most excellent defensive position
has been taken up by the Detachment
immediately above the watering Place

commanding both that and the Landing Place about a mile and a quarter from the Town.

Having made every arrangement for the security of the Garrison to be left here, I shall send again this afternoon on my return to Muscat, and the Anne will follow in a few days, with the details already mentioned, on board, which I have for the present placed under the orders of Captain Thompson who will join me hereafter as interpreter to the Force and Political assistant.

The only vessels I found here were the discovery, the Teignmouth and Nassau. The former I have not thought it necessary to disturb in her business of the survey, the second

I

183

I have placed at the disposal of the Commissary General Lieutenant Colonel Barker, who has been detained here a long while, owing to the late occurrences, and the latter I have recommended to be left at Rostaq for the additional security of the Garrison, though I have at present only the Psyche for the purpose of the expedition, I intend on my return to Muscat, to apply to the Commander send one of his frigates to relieve her in case His Highness shall not require her for any other duty. in order that I may have the benefit of her services also in keeping the Transports together when they are and keeping up my communication

Veteran



Muscat. The Imaum and Senate are at Bushire; and H.M.S. Curlew, I am given to understand, is shortly expected back from Bushire.

In reference to my letter of the 29th Ultimo, it does not appear on further enquiry, that the attack upon Braimee was a consequence of the late expedition against Boo Ali. On the contrary, it appears that the people amongst whom that fort is situated, the Sangcars, have never been reconciled to the Imams authority, the head body of these being of the Wahabee persuasion and they have made several unsuccessful attempts to drive the Imaums

Garrison



180

Garrison out of the Fort, since H.M. Highness joined for Bussora of which was about twenty months ago. There is no doubt however, that the late disaster has encouraged the hopes of the Malcontents; and that some of the Joasmees did go to their assistance, joined by the Sheikh of Aboomuseer; which was evasively disposed / but this latter was confirmation / that some of the Joasmees had also gone to join Boo Ali, Captain Thompson had in consequence as I mentioned in my former letter, deemed it advisable to caution the Sheikhs on the opposite Coast that any hostilities against the Imaum, arising out



of the late occurrences in Jallan
this Country of the Bro Ale would
be considered as a breach of the
Peace with us. The Imaums cause
and ours being the same on that
particular occasion. To this Sultan
Bin Sugger in reply admitted,
that he was aware that there
were a few of the Joasmees up
in the Country of the Nayeem,
under the Shaikh of Ajmaun
over whom, however it was well
known that he (Been Suggar)
had very little influence and the
last spark of Control, but that
he would immediately set out for
that Country, and use his exertions
to bring back any of the Joasmees
that



that might be there.

Reports of his return
to Shargeh have been received here
but no communication to that effect
has yet arrived from himself. Howeve
in consequence of the reports respecting
the aid furnished the Bro Ale,
though by no means confirmed, I
have deemed it prudent to be
explicit with this Chief, and to
have it intimated to him, that
as it would be impossible for us
to find out which of the various
petty tribes on his Coast committe
aggressions on us, we must make
him responsible for the whole
and as he has many boats
just now, (to the number of

it is said, on various commercial
grounds, there is every reason
to suppose that the intimation
will have the desired effect, at
least, as long as our operations in
Jahlaum are confined to land; at
all events, his apprehensions for
the safety of his own boats will
lead him to use his exertions to
avert a war with us just now,
a result which he has been told
will be the consequence of any
aid afforded the Bou Ali or any
further annoyance to the Imaum
resulting from the late affair
with that people, and with
the view of endeavouring to rid
the Imaum of this annoyance

in

189

in order that his whole re-
sources may be disposable for
the operations to the Southward,
Ben Saggur has been invited
to stay to bring about a peace
between the Naycem and the
Imaum, as will be seen by the
accompanying translation of
Captain Thompsons letter to him,
written by my directions; an event
however, of which I am not
very sanguine, though it would
be very desirable; as I am given
to understand that the Country
to the Northward of Muscat
produces the greatest number of
Camels and other supplies, which
we shall most want, but which



we shall find a difficulty in
Hammy, if any reverse should
occur to the Imaums arms in that
quarter, supplies of that description
being furnished by the Chiefs as
one condition of their tenure, and
not to be procured by us in any
other way. As I mentioned however
in my last letter, the Imaum —
himself has no apprehension for
his fort. The Padering though small
is represented as a strong one —
and he places great dependance
on his Garrison. It is to be hoped
that his confidence is well —
founded. The position is a most
important one commanding the
Chief passes from the Sea District

and



191

and was chosen as his head —
quarters by the Celebrated Vakeel
Wahabee Chieftain Moorbuck Mootra
some years ago, when the Wahabees
had possession of almost all this
part of the Country. Should the
Imaum lose it now, it would
open the Door to the incursions
of the Joasmees, should the —
latter being debarred of their former
occupation by Sea, became formidable
by land, but without these ad-
it is not likely the Joasmees
will ever be able to recover it as
they are not above one thousand
strong altogether. In view to the
improbability of this contingency
however, I have deemed it

to dwell thus long on this subject
in order that I may be benefited
by the instructions of Government
as to my future conduct, after the
operations against the Beni Boo
Ali shall have been brought to
a conclusion, as in the event of
such an occurrence, and that it
shall be made apparent, that
this fall of this Fort was occasioned
as occasioned by the late disaster,
it may become a question how
far Government may think
itself bound to Assist in putting
the Imaum in the same situation
in which he was in respect to
his affairs in this part of the
Country before this place reached
us

103

it of that most fortunate event

I have the honor

Lisbon
14th January 1821

(Signed) C.S. Thomson
Lieutenant Colonel

Translation of Letter from
Captain Thomson to
Sultan bin Suggar, &c
dated Bushire 2nd January 182
After Compliments

Our friend Captain Stevens
has arrived with the
Answer to the Letter which
was written to you
by Mr Ashe has at this
period

[redacted] arrived from Bombay
[redacted] I am directed to
notify to you on the
subject of the Imaum
and the disputes which have
taken place between
his people and the Arabs
in the direction of Bramy,
that if any of the Arabs who
have entered into treaties of
peace with the English, attacks
the Imaum or his people, it will
considered

195

considered as done against the English
government, and the consequences will be
a dissolution of the peace and a war
against them and their vessels by sea
and by land, and this is foundson
the principle, that it is impossible for
the British Government to permit any
harm to arise to the Imaum out of
the transactions in which they may
have been engaged together (that is
out of the events in Jahlan. Note by
the translator) and I am directed
to notify this to all the Arabs, who
have entered into treaties of peace with
the English, and particularly to you
who are their head. For the English
Government is well aware that you
are the head of the Arabs and of

act in a friendly manner the friendship of the Government will be extended to you, and if they act in a contrary manner, the Government will consider it as proceeding from yourself, what would be most desirable for all, would be that a solid peace should take place between the Arabs and the Imaum, and if you are inclined to send a person on your part and on the part of the people of Naim, to Muscat, for the purpose of arranging a peace, our assistance will be at your service to effect it on the bases that things shall be restored to the situations in which they were at the period when the English left Ras-ul-Khyma.

I

197

I have further to mention that some Reports have been received by me having been sent to Sohar from Imaum, or other parts of the country. If this should be really the case, it would inevitably form a cause of war, and to notify this is the objection of the foregoing Letter.

Dated from Rustum 28 Rebaul
and 1236 (2nd January 1821)

A true Translation
Sig.d J.P. Thompson
Capt.n 17 Light Dragoons

Resolved Lieutenant Colonel Warren be informed that his proceedings reported in the above recorded despatch have been approved by the Honourable the Governor in Council.

Transcription of previous document

Read the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel Warren to the Chief Secretary dated Kishm 4th Jany with enclosure

Sir

Agreeably to the determination announced in my letter of the 29th ultimo, I sailed that evening and arrived at this place on the 2nd instant, having been fortunate enough to meet the Anne Transport, the day before on her passage to Bombay, with 300 of the 1/2nd Regiment on board. Finding that she had been taken up for the trip only to Deristan, and back again, I was under the necessity of entering into a new engagement, with her, and with the advice of the Commander of the cruizer, I was on board of (the Psyche) I agreed on the part of Government, to hire the vessel for two month certain at Rupees 11,000 per month, commencing on the 1st instant, and to be paid at the same rate for such time as her services might be required afterwards, an arrangement which I trust the Government will approve of. The vessel has since returned here and is now taking on board the remainder of the 1/2nd and 1/11 Regiments, in all 500 men fit for immediate service, sick and drill etc remaining here.

On my arrival here, I found that the removal of the settlement from Deristan had just been completed, with the exception of some materials for the construction of huts sheds, etc, which the Honble Company's boats were still employed in bringing round and a most excellent defensive position has been taken up by the Detachment immediately above the watering place commanding both that and the landing place, about a mile and a quarter from the Town.

Having made every arrangement for the security of the Garrison to be left here, I shall sail again, this afternoon on my return to Muscat, and the Anne will follow in a few days, with the details already mentioned, on board, which I have for the present placed under the orders of Captain Thompson who will join me hereafter as interpreter to the Force and Political Assistant.

The only vessels I found here were the Discovery, the Teignmouth and Mercury. The former I have not thought it necessary to disturb in her business of the survey, the second I have placed at the disposal of the Commissary General Lieutenant Colonel Baker, who has been detained here a long while, owing to the late occurrences, and the latter I have recommended to be left at Kishin for the additional security of the garrison, though I have at present only the Psyche for the purposes of the expedition, I intend on my return to Muscat, to apply to the Imaum to send one of his frigates to relieve her in case H. Highness shall not require her for any other duty - in order that I may have the benefit of her services also in keeping the transports together when they arrive and keeping up my communication between Zoor and Muscat. The Aurora and Ternate are at Bussora and H.M.S. Curlew, I am given to understand, is shortly expected back from Bushire.

In reference to my letter of the 29th ultimo, it does not appear on further enquiry, that the attack upon Brymee was a consequence of the late expedition against Boo Ali. On the contrary, it appears that the people amongst whom that Fort is situated (the Nayeem) have never been reconciled to the Imaum's authority, the great body of these being of the Wahabee persuasion and they have made several attempts to drive the Imaum's Garrison out of the Fort, since H. Highness gained possession of it, which was about twenty months ago. There is no doubt however, that the late disaster has increased the hopes of the malcontents and that some of the Jouassmees did go to their assistance, pleaded by the Shaikh of Aymaun and it was even reported (but this latter wants confirmation) that some of the Joassmees had also gone to join the Boo Ali, Captain Thompson had in consequence as I mentioned in my former letter, deemed it advisable to caution the Shaikhs on the opposite coast that any hostilities against the Imaum, arising out of the late occurrences in Jallan (the country of the Boo Ali) would be considered as a breach of the peace with us, the Imaum's cause and ours being the same on that particular occasion. To this Sultan Bin Sugger in reply admitted that he was aware that there were a few of the Joassmees up in the country of the Nayeem, under the Shaikh of Aymaun over whom, however, it was well known that he (Ben Suggar) had very little

influence and still less power of constraint, but that he would immediately set out for that country, and use his exertions to bring back any of the Joassmees that might be there.

Reports of his return to Sharjeh have been received here, but no communication to that effect has yet arrived from himself. However in consequence of the report respecting the aid furnished the Boo Ali, though by no means confirmed, I have deemed it prudent* to be explicit with this Chief, and to have it intimated to him, that as it would be impossible for us to find out which of the various petty tribes on his coast committed aggressions on us, we must make him responsible for the whole, and as he has many boats out just now (to the number of forty it is said) on various commercial pursuits, there is every reason to suppose that the intimation will have the desired effect, at least, as long as our operations in Jahlaum are likely to last; at all event, his apprehensions for the safety of his own boats will lead him to use his exertions to avert a war with us just now, a result which he has been told will be the consequence of any aid afforded the Boo Ali or any further annoyance to the Imaum resulting from the late affair with that people, and with the view of endeavouring to rid the Imaum of this annoyance in order that his whole means may be disposable for the operations to the southward; Bin Suggur has been invited to essay to bring about a peace between the Nayeem and the Imaum, as will be seen by the accompanying translation of Captain Thompsons letter to him, written by my directions; an event however of which I am not very sanguine, though it would be very desirable; as I am given to understand that the country to the northward of Muscat produces the greatest number of camels and other supplies, which we shall most want, but which we shall find a difficulty in obtaining, if any reverse should occur to the Imaum's arms in that quarter, supplies of that description being furnished by the Chiefs as one condition of their tenure, and not to be procured by us in any other way.
As I mentioned however in my last letter, the Imaum himself has no apprehension for his fort. The building though small is represented as a strong one and he places great dependance on his Garrison. It is to be hoped that his confidence is well formed. The position is a most important one commanding the chief passes from the Sur district and was chosen as his

headquarters by the celebrated Vakeelor Wahabee Chieftain Moortluck Mootiarah some years ago, when the Wahabees had possession of almost all this part of the country. Should the Imaum lose it now, it would open the door to the incursion of the Jowassmees, should the latter being debarred of their former occupation by sea, become formidable by land, but without their aid it is not likely the Nayeem will ever be able to recover it, as they are not above one thousand strong altogether. In view to the possibility of this contingency, however, I have deemed it proper to dwell thus long on this subject in order that I may be benefited by the instructions of Government as to my future conduct, after the operations against the Beni Boo Ali shall have been brought to a conclusion, as in the event of such an occurrence, and that it shall be made apparent, that the fall of this fort was accelerated or occasioned by the late disaster, it may become a question how far Government may think itself bound to assist in putting the Imaum in the same situation in which he was in respect to his affairs in this part of the country before the news reached it of that unfortunate event.

I have the honour to be

(Signed) S. Warren
Lieutenant Colonel

Kishon
4th January 1821

Translation of letter from Captain Thompson to Sultan bin Suggur dated Bushire 2nd January 1821

After Compliments

Our friend (Kataking) has arrived with the answer to the letter which was written to you. A vessel has at this present arrived from Bombay and I am directed to notify to you on the subject of the Imaum and the disputes which have taken place between his people and the Arabs in the direction of Braimy, that if any of the Arabs who have entered into treaties of peace with the English, attack the Imaum or his people.

it will be considered as done against the English Government, and the consequences will be a dissolution of the peace and a war against them and their vessels by sea and by land, and this is founded on the principle, that it is impossible for the British Government to permit any harm to arise to the Imaum out of the transactions in which they may have been engaged together (that is out of the events in Jahlan. Note by the translator) and I am directed to notify this to all the Arabs, who have entered into treaties of peace with the English, and particularly to you who are their head. For the English Government is well aware that you are the head of the Arabs, and if they act in a friendly manner the friendship of the Government will be extended to you, and if they act in a contrary manner, the Government will consider it as proceeding from yourself, what would be most desirable for all, would be that a solid peace should take place between the Arabs and the Imaum, and if you are inclined to send a person on your part and on the part of the people of Naim, to Muscat, for the purpose of arranging a peace, our assistance will be at your service to effect it on the bases that things shall be restored to the situation in which they were at the period when the English left Rus-sil Khyma.

I have further to mention that some reports have been received by me having been sent to Jahlan from Imaum, or other parts of the country. If this should be really the case, it would inevitably form a cause of war, and to notify this is the objection of the present letter.

Dated from Kishm 28 Rebuil awol 1236 (2 January 1821)

A true translation
(Signed) J. P. Thompson
Capt 17 Light Dragoons

Resolved Lieutenant Colonel Warren be informed that his proceedings reported in the above recorded despatch have been approved by the Honourable the Governor in Council.

1.29
The Buraimi forts, December 1824–April 1825




The Resident in
his letter of
Pol. Consult. 1824.
2d June. Fol. 2725.

reports of the reappearance of the Wahabees, of whom a large body had collected in Nejid under a Chief of the name of Toorkey, who was said to have opened a correspondence with Sultan bin Suggur. This fo was said to have gained sufficient strength to undertake an expedit against the Turkish provinces to the Westward, but had been foile by Ahmed Pacha the Governor of Mecca, who had compelled the to retreat with considerable loss. This defeat seemed to have comple exhausted their efforts to regain a ascendancy.—

Pol. Consul. 1824 September Fol. 3980

By this Letter of the 14 [illegible] 11th July the Resident reports the [illegible]

1825

receipt of intelligence from Shargah Aboothabee, that Sultan bin Suggur was still in correspondence with the Wahabee Chief, who was said to have entered into an engagement with him & his adherent Rasheid bin Ahmed to furnish a body of Men for their service whenever they might be requir and it was added the completion of the Towers of Rasul Khyma would be the signal for their advance & for the revival of the former system at the Ports of Shargah, Ejmaun, & their dependancies. The Sheikh of Aboo thabee, who seemed particularly alarmed, had consequently suggested that the works at Rasul Khyma should be immediately destroy

as the only security for the maintenance
of maritime tranquillity and the inde
-pendance of the peaceable Tribes along
the Coast.- Although Lieutenant Colone
Hannes attributed this gloomy fore
-boding in a great degree to the disposi
-tion which Sheikh Tahnoon natu
-rally entertained of his powerful
& Ambitious neighbour, still the
general tenor of the communication
corresponded too closely with the
intelligence, which had reached him
from other Quarters, to admit of a
doubt that the Wahabee Tribe would
gladly take advantage of any opening
that might afford a prospect of their
ultimate reestablishment on the
Coast. By the last accounts the
Wahabe

Wahabee were merely struggling for
existence & unless the Pacha's prepara
-tions for the campaign in Greece had
operated in their favor, it was scarce
-ly to be supposed that they could
entertain any serious thoughts of
distant conquests - Under these
circumstances the Resident abstained
from remonstrating with Sultan
bin Saggur on his clandestine pro
-ceedings, but thought it proper to
let him know that we were acquain
-ted with them - The Sheikh in reply
acknowledged his negotiation with
the Wahabees but attributed it to
the imperious motive of self
preservation -

Pol: Consn: C: 1824.
20 October Fol: 4670

Debaye 15 Sheikh Tahnoon

Bin Seif of Debaye is subordinate to Sheikh Tahnoon of Aboothabie & both tributary to the Imaum of Muscat who possesses a considerable degree of authority over the whole of the Benyas Tribe, of which Sheikh Tahnoon is the Chief. Sheikh Zoy who has since fallen in a conflict arising out of the disputes with Sultan Bin Suggur, was young sensible & animated & seemed to entertain a great respect for the British Government, which the Resident attributed to his connexion with the Imaum of Muscat, who is beloved by all his dependants. His Town was represented to be in a flourishing state and carries on

See Resident's letter 16th March 1824. Vol. 2015

a more extensive Trade than any Port which Colonel Hannas had visited excepting Bahrein. The people there are late largely in pearls & send boats as far as India with the produce of their late fishes & Fisheries.

16 This Chief when visited by the Resident in the early part of the year 1824, complained bitterly of Sultan Bin Suggur, who he said entertained designs of encroachment upon his Territory and insisted in erecting a fortified House in one of his Villages named Khymee in defiance of his remonstrances.

Disputes between the Imaum of Muscat Sultan Bin Suggur and Shaik Saeed Bin Hamood Alkeree

17 We here allude to this circumstance as matter

connected with the jealousies and hatre
which have long existed between Sulta
bin Saggur & the Imaum of Muscat,
& have threatened more than any even
the renewal of hostilities in the Gulph
In these disputes Rashid Bin Ahm
the Sheikh of Ejman, from having
been the declared & inveterate Enemy
of Sultan Bin Saggur has become
his warmest ally, and next to him
may be considered the most danger
character in the Gulph, less however
from any particular weight and
influence which he himself posses
than as a ready Instrument in the
hand of Sultan Bin Saggur who
will be happy to employ him in
the execution of his projects. Sheik
Raschi

574

Raschid's turbulent disposition would
probably attach him to the party of
any powerful and discontented
Chieftain, in times like the present,
when he dares not venture to pro-
-secute his individual schemes of
aggression, but the Chief principle of
Union between him & Sultan bin
Saggur may perhaps be traced to
their mutual hatred of the Beny-
-aas Tribe, which was most inve-
-terate on the part of Raschid Bin
Ahmed, & may account for the im-
-plicit submission of so bold and
independant a spirit to the will
of a superior-

18

The President in

Bl & Consul: 1824.
15 December Fl 7381

his letter of the 3d of November Resp

the receipt of a letter from Sheikh
Sallah Bin Suggur, who was actu
at Sharja in the room of his Brother
Sultan Bin Suggur, at that time ab
at Bryniee, stating that several Boa
for that place had been seized by
Solimian Bin Nasser a person th
residing at Debaye, but who had for
merly been subject with the greate
part of his Tribe to the Sharja
Government. This act which was
represented as one of a Piratical
nature seemed to threaten the
Gulph with general hostilities --
Various representations were given
of the circumstances according to
the side which each party espous
The following however appeared

to be the true state of the case
confirmed the Resident, that
bin Suggur was uniformly the
although the first to represent himself
as aggrieved.—

19 The Tribe of Sulim
of which Sheikh Solimian Bin Nasser
Pol. Consul: 1824 was the Chief, had long been scattered
29. December 1765 over the Coast & distributed in the
Towns of Sharja, Ejmaun Debaye &
Aboothebi; Solimian bin Nasser
residing at Sharja; but having reason
to be dissatisfied with the treatme
he experienced from Sultan bin
Suggur he had removed to Debaye
about 18. Months preceding, leaving
his people at Sharja where they
were detained against their
will

inclination, that during the last
Season of the Pearl fishery they
took an opportunity of effecting
their escape & went over Volun-
-tarily to Sheikh Soleiman, who
by previous agreement proceeded
from Debays to receive & protect them
20 This charge there-
-fore against Soleiman bin Ahmed
appeared only to be a Cloak on the
part of the Sultan bin Suggur to
his aggression, & a letter to Lieutenant
Colonel Stannus from Sheikh
Tannoon of Aboothabee stated
that Sultan Bin Suggur had by
force taken possession of some
Country and Land belonging to His
Highness the Imaum of Muscat

(the

(the same as complained of by Sheikh
Zeyl) who on receiving information
thereof had ordered him to raise an
Army & hold himself in readiness
till he took the Field, and in the
meantime to build a Tower at
Berrah on the Debays Territory.—
24 The Tranquillity
of the Gulph being thus threatened
Lieutenant Colonel Stannus deter-
-mined immediately to proceed to
Muscat, to hold a conference with
the Imaum, who had also about
the same time sent a pressing
Invitation to the Resident to proceed
thither. Lieutenant Colonel Stannus
found His Highness cordially dis-
-posed to cooperate in healing

dif-

dissentions on the Coast & willing
to concur in any measures which
he might propose for the restab
=ment of tranquillity.-

22 The Imaum
assured Lieutenant Colonel Sta
that the present disturbances
had originated with Sooltan
bean Suggur, and Rashed bin
Ahmed, who took advantage o
his late absence at Mecca, wh
he had proceeded on a pilgrima
to rebuild the fortifications of
Shyque, a place situated on he
frontier, which had frequently
changed Masters during the tim
of the Portuguese but had been
[illegible] in the Downfall of

that power, and declared mutually
a solemn agreement between himself
and Sheikh Sooltan.- This unprovoked
aggression had, he acknowledged been
resented by his (the Imaums) absent
under Sheikh Tannoon, who adva
=ced towards Sharja in order to keep
Sheikh Soolan in check and induce
him to withdraw his Troops from
Shyque - With the same view
Salmin bin Nasser had been en=
=couraged in erecting a Fort at Kerah
between Sharja and Debaye, which
he understood had given umbrage
to Zeyd bin Seif, and even occasion
=ed him to waver in his allegiance
After this explanation, His Highness
repeated his wish that the Resident

should undertake the re-establish-
-ment of concord among the Ara-
Tribes, and his determination to
acquiesce in any arrangements
he should make for that purpos
2d The Resident
assured the Imaum that neith
his honor or Interest should
suffer by the mediation of the
British Government, which he
should be happy to exercise in
compliance with his wish, as
well as for the preservation of
tranquillity. Lieutenant Colonel
Stannus conceived that Sheikh
Sooltan might easily be induced
to evacuate the Fort of Brym
and enter into a written engag
-ment

engagement to abstain hereafter from
erecting any fortifications in its
neighbourhood, but that as this
would remove the primary cause
of complaint, Sheikh Sooltan
might perhaps have some right to
stipulate for the demolition of the
Towers at Kerab, the vicinity of
which post was not only calculated
to excite fears for his safety, but
to occasion feelings of peculiar
irritation, from it's being occupied
by a portion of his own revolted
subjects. His Highness immediately
assented to these propositions, and
assured the Resident that Sheikh
Tamoon should be directed to
act in conformity with the

Instructions which he might re-
-ceive from him after his arriva
at Sharja-

21 The Resident in
-forms reporting his conference w
the Imaum, stated, that he wa
by no means satisfied of the
right of the Soudan Tribe to wi
-draw from Sultan Bin Sugg
authority after residing at
Sharja as his acknowledged s
-jects. That there could be no
question of the light in which
similar secession would be view
among European states but the
patriarchal form of Arab Gov
-ernment might perhaps justify
a body of people in transferring
their

their allegiance from their immediate
Sovereign to the Head of their own
Tribe, a privilege which Sultan
Bin Suggur had tacitly admitted
in asserting that the Tribe in question
had not voluntarily placed them-
-selves under the protection of Soli-
-man Bin Nejeem, this assertion
is proved however as stated in a
preceding paragraph of this des-
-patch, to have been erroneous.—
Lieutenant Colonel Stannus judi-
-ciously therefore resolved to decline
using his influence in replacing
them under the Sharja Government
under the principle which we had
laid down for his guidance in the
instance of the Linga People with

Pol.l Consul. 1825.
2d. February No. 6

Sultan bin Suggur had been desir
to remove to his new Town at
Rasul Khyma

25 The Resident
his letter of the 31st December repor
the result of his mediation at
Sharja & his having effected a
reconciliation between Sultan
Suggur & his allies on the one sid
& His Highness the Imaum &
Sheikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot
of Aboothabee on the other.—

26 The agreement
drawn up between the parties
states that the occupation of
the Towers at Brymee by the
followers of Sheikh Soultan ha
expressed that cause of complain

to the Imaum, the former Chief
consents to abandon and demolish
them and to abstain in future from
rebuilding any fortification what
-ever at Brymee, or in the neighbour
-hood of the Imaum's frontier, whe
herewith engages to destroy any Tower
or places of Strength which his
adherents may have built at the
same place or in its neighbourhood.

27 Sheikh Soultan bin
Suggur further agrees to permit the
remainder of the Tribe of Soudan,
or as many of them as may desire
it, to quit Sharja, with their familie
and effects, and remove to any part
of the Coast beyond his Territories
all claims or demands between

and the Inhabitants of Sharga be
liable to adjustment by the Laws
of the Country-

25 Sheikh Saimoon pro-
=mises on behalf of His Highness
the Imaum, that as soon as the
above conditions are complied
with, the Towers lately erected
at Elerah between Sharga and
Debaye shall be destroyed and
a place of refuge afforded to
Salmin Bin Nasser and his
Tribe either in his own Territory
or those of the Imaum, He further
engages to live for the future at
peace with Sheikh Sooltan &
to consider him as his friend &
[illegible] Sheikh Sooltan shall
adhere

adhere strictly to the terms of the pre-
=sent agreement and forbear from
any aggression on the Imaum or his
Adherents.-

29. About this time
We received a letter from Sheikh
Pol. Cons. 16th February 1895 No 498 50 Sultan complaining of the aggres-
=sions of the Chief of Aboothebee &
requesting that we would either
protect him against his Enemies
or allow him to retaliate on them
according to his means.- Having
just received the report of the re-
=conciliation we answered his
letter by congratulations on that
event-

* Further letter has been received from the Sheikh but call for no remark - Vide Pol 1/

30 We regret however
to state that this reconciliation

has been far from proving effectua
and we are still very apprehensiv
that all the efforts of the Residen
to secure tranquillity may prov
unavailing & that the partial
conflicts which have already
taken place between some of the
parties interested in those proce
-ings may terminate in open
hostilities among the principal
Chieftains —

Pol. Consul. 1825.
9 March. N. 57 &
54

31 Lieutenant Colon
Stannus having learned that
steps had been taken to destroy
the Towers of Brymee, accordin
to the agreement, addressed a re
-monstrance to Sultan bin
Saggar on this occasion: The Sheikh

Pol. Consul: 1825.
June N. 39 to
41
& 81/

in reply accuses the Imaum & Sheikh
Tahnoon of impeding the reestablish
-ment of tranquillity and of having
bribed his Servant Mahomed Bin
Salim, who had been placed in charg
of the Towers of Brymee over to his
(the Imaum's) cause. He also states
that Sheikh Tahnoon had advanced
with 300 Camels against the Beny
Kept Tribe, who had formerly been
his subjects & killed a great number
of them, and that Soleiman bin Naj
of the Soudan Tribe, who has been
before mentioned in this despatch
after returning from Aboothebee
went to Aleyah & began to harrass
the people in his neighbourhood
to such a degree as to induce

bin Seif to attack him, when the
latter Chief with two of his people
were killed.—

32 This reply not
appearing satisfactory Lieutenant
Colonel Manners left Bushire &
proceeded to Rishire, where he
found the Imaum who had
already arrived in the Gulph, i
rather a warlike attitude, in
expectation of a general meeting
of his dependant Chieftains.
The nature of his conference wi
the Imaum is reported in the
Resident's letter of the 24th Ap
in which it was resolved that
the Imaum should proceed to
Abooshehr to check the aggr

of Sheikh Tahnoon, whilst the Reside
himself should proceed to Sharja to
obtain the fulfilment of the Treaty on
the part of Sultan Bin Seggur.—

33 On this further letter
from Abusheher dated the 14th May
the Resident mentions the receipt of a
letter from Sultan Bin Seggur which
was deemed by considered as a sufficient
authority for the surrender of the Fort,
and in order to put it to the test it was
agreed that His Highness should send
a Messenger with it, demanding the
surrender of the Towers with a view
to their demolition, & accompanied
by a sufficient body of men to take
forcible possession of them in case
any evasion on the part of Abdulla

Pol. Consul. 1825.
15 June No. 182
Vide 85

Bin Salem, the officer in charge, as Mahomed Bin Sultan had no such authority to do so. The Imam Messenger was to be accompanied by an Agent on the part of the Resid to ascertain by enquiries on the spot to whom the blame would attach in the event of non compliance with the demand.-

34 We have not yet heard the result of this Mission, but the Resident in transmitting his report observes that if Sheikh Sultan should, contrary to his repeated & solemn assurances be found to throw any obstacles directly or indirectly in the way of the measure the Imaum would

then be fully justified in proceeding to any extremities She had assured him that we should approve of his using any means to prevent Sheikh Sultan from again creating dissension among the Arab Tribes.-

35 Throughout the whole of these Proceedings Lieutenant Colonel Hamnes has shown great Zeal & decision & however his mediation may terminate, We must admit that he has followed the most effectual mode that could be adopted for the preservation of peace without running the risk of involving the British Govern-ment in the quarrel.-

Transcription of previous document

The Resident in his letter of the 2nd May communicates reports of the reappearance of the Wahabees, of whom a large body had collected in Nejid under a chieftain of the name of Toorkey, who was said to have opened a correspondence with Sultan bin Suggur. This force was said to have gained sufficient strength to undertake an expedition against the Turkish provinces to the westward, but had been foiled by Ahmed Pacha the Governor of Mecca, who had compelled them to retreat with considerable loss. This defeat seemed to have completely exhausted their efforts to regain an ascendancy.

In his letter of the 10th July the Resident reports the receipt of intelligence from Sharga and Aboothabee, that Sultan bin Suggur was still in correspondence with the Wahabee Chief, who was said to have entered into an engagement with him and his adherent Raschid bin Ahmed to furnish a body of men for their service whenever they might be required, and it was added the completion of the Towers of Rasul Khyma would be the signal for their advance and for the revival of the former system at the Ports of Sharga, Eymaun, and their dependancies. The Sheikh of Aboothabee, who seemed particularly alarmed, had consequently suggested that the works at Rasul Khyma should be immediately destroyed as the only security for the maintenance of maritime tranquillity and the independance of the peaceable tribes along the coast. Although Lieutenant Colonel Stannus attributed this gloomy foreboding in a great degree to the apprehension which Sheikh Tahnoon naturally entertained of his powerful and ambitious neighbour, still the general tenor of the communication corresponded too closely with the intelligence, which had reached him from other Quarters, to admit of a doubt that the Wahabee tribe would gladly take advantage of any opening that might afford a prospect of their ultimate reestablishment on the coast. By the last accounts the Wahabee were merely struggling for existence and unless the Pacha's preparations for the campaign in Greece had operated in their favor, it was scarcely to be supposed that they could entertain any serious thoughts of distant conquests. Under these circumstances the Resident abstained from remonstrating with Sultan bin Suggur on his clandestine proceedings, but thought it proper to let him know that we were acquainted with them. The Sheikh in reply acknowledged his negotiation with the Wahabees but attributed it to the imperious motive of self preservation.

Sheikh Zeyl Ben Seif of Debayr is subordinate to Sheikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee and both tributary to the Imaum of Muscat who possesses a considerable degree of authority over the whole of the Benyass Tribe, of which Sheikh Tahnoon is the Chief. Sheikh Zeyl who has since fallen in a conflict arising out of the disputes with Sultan Bin Suggur, was young sensible and animated and seemed to entertain a great respect for the British Government, which the Resident attributed to his connexion with the Imaum of Muscat, who is beloved by all his dependants. His Town was represented to be in a flourishing state and carries on a more extensive trade than any port which Colonel Stunnus had visited, excepting Bahrein. The people speculate largely in pearls and send boats as far as India with the produce of their date groves and Fisheries.

This Chief when visited by the Resident in the early part of the year 1824, complained sadly of Sultan bin Suggur, who he said entertained designs of encroachment upon his territory and insisted on erecting a fortified house in one of his villages named Brymee in defiance of his remonstrances.

We here allude to this circumstance as materially connected with the jealousies and hatred which have long existed between Sultan bin Suggur and the Imaum of Muscat, and have threatened more than any event the renewal of hostilities in the Gulph. In these disputes Rashid Bin Ahmed the Sheikh of Eymaun, from having been the declared and inveterate enemy of Sultan Bin Suggur has become his warmest ally and next to him may be considered the most dangerous character in the Gulph, less however from any particular weight and influence which he himself possesses than as a ready instrument in the hand of Sultan Bin Suggur who will be happy to employ him in the execution of his projects. Sheikh Raschid's turbulent disposition would probably attach him to the party of any powerful and discontented Chieftain, in times like the present, when he dares not venture to prosecute his individual schemes of aggression, but the chief principle of union between him and Sultan Bin Suggur may perhaps be traced to their mutual hatred of the Benyass Tribe, which was most inveterate on the part of Raschid Bin Ahmed and may account for the implicit submission of so bold and independant a spirit to the will of a superior.

The Resident in his letter of the 3rd November reports the receipt of a letter from Sheikh Sallah Bin Suggur, who was acting at Sharga in the room of his brother Sultan Bin Suggur, at that time absent at Brymee, stating that several boats for that place had been seized by Soliman Bin Nassur a person then residing at Debaye, but who had formerly been subject with the greater part of his Tribe to the Sharga Government. This act which was represented as one of a piratical nature seemed to threaten the Gulph with general hostilities. Various representations were given of the circumstances according to the side which each party represented. The following however appeared to be the true state of the case which confirmed the Resident, that Sultan Bin Suggur was uniformly the aggressor, although the first to represent himself as aggrieved.-

The Tribe of Soudan, of which Sheikh Soliman Bin Nassur was the Chief, had long been scattered over the coast and distributed in the Towns of Sharga, Eymaun, Debaye and Aboothabee, Soliman Bin Nasser residing at Sharga, but having reason to be dissatisfied with the treatment he experienced from Sultan Bin Suggur he had removed to Debaye about 18 months preceding, leaving his people at Sharga where they were detained against their inclination; that during the last season of the pearl fishery they took an opportunity of effecting their escape and went over voluntarily to Sheikh Soliman, who by previous agreement proceeded from Debaye to receive and protect them.

This charge therefore against Soliman Bin Ahmed, appeared only to be a cloak on the part of Sultan Bin Suggur to his aggression, and a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Stannus from Sheikh Tannoon of Aboothabee stated that Sultan Bin Suggur had by force taken possession of some country inland belonging to His Highness the Imaum of Muscat (the same as complained of by Sheikh Zeyl) who on receiving information thereof had ordered him to raise an army and hold himself in readiness till he took the field, and in the meantime to build a tower at Derrah on the Debaye territory.

The tranquillity of the Gulph being thus threatened, Lieutenant Colonel Stannus determined immediately to proceed to Muscat, to hold a conference with the Imaum, who had also about the same time sent a pressing invitation to the Resident to proceed thither. Lieutenant Colonel Stannus found His Highness cordially disposed to cooperate in healing the dissentions on the coast and willing to concur in any measure which he might propose for the reestablishment of tranquillity.

The Imamm assured Lieutenant Colonel Stannus that the present disturbances had originated with Sooltan Bèn Suggur, and Rasheed Bèn Ahmed, who took advantage of his late absence at Mecca, where he had proceeded on a pilgrimage, to rebuild the fortifications of Brymee, a place situated on his frontier, which had frequently changed masters during the time of the Wahabees, but had been abandoned, on the downfall of that power, and declared neutral by a solemn agreement between himself and Sheikh Sooltan. This unprovoked aggression had, he acknowledged been resented by his (the Imaum's) adherents under Sheikh Tannoon, who advanced towards Sharga in order to keep Sheikh Sooltan in check and induce him to withdraw his troops from Brymee. With the same view Salmin Bèn Nasser had been encouraged in erecting a fort at Derah between Sharga and Debaye, which he understood had given umbrage to Zeyl Bèn Seif, and even occasioned him to waver in his allegiance. After this explanation, His Highness repeated his wish that the Resident should undertake the reestablishment of concord among the Arab Tribes, and his determination to acquiesce in any arrangements which he should make for that purpose.

The Resident assured the Imaum that neither his honor or interest should suffer by the mediation of the British Government, which he should be happy to exercise in compliance with his wish, as well as for the preservation of tranquillity. Lieutenant Colonel Stannus conceived that Sheikh Sooltan

might easily be induced to evacuate the Fort of Brymee and enter into a written engagement to abstain hereafter from erecting any fortifications in its neighbourhood, but that as this would remove the primary cause of complaint, Sheikh Sooltan might perhaps have some right to stipulate for the demolition of the Towers at Derah, the vicinity of which post was not only calculated to excite fears for his safety, but to occasion feelings of peculiar irritation, from its being occupied by a portion of his own revolted subjects. His Highness immediately assented to these propositions, and assured the Resident that Sheikh Tannoon should be directed to act in conformity with the instructions which he might receive from him after his arrival at Sharga.

The Resident in thus reporting his conference with the Imaum, stated, that he was by no means satisfied of the right of the Soudan Tribe to withdraw from Sultan Bin Suggur authority after residing at Sharga as his acknowledged subjects. That there could be no question of the light in which similar secession would be viewed among European states but the patriarchal form of Arab Government might perhaps justify a body of people in transferring their allegiance from their immediate sovereign to the Head of their own Tribe, a privilege which Sultan Bin Suggur had tacitly admitted in asserting that the tribe in question had not voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of Soliman Bin Nussur, this assertion is proved however as stated in a preceding paragraph of this despatch, to have been erroneous. Lieutenant Colonel Stannus judiciously therefore resolved to decline using his influence in replacing them under the Sharga Government under the principle which we had laid down for his guidance in the instance of the Linga people whom Sultan Bin Suggur had been desirous to remove to his new town at Rasul Khyma.

The Resident in his letter of the 31st December reports the result of his mediation at Sharga and his having effected a reconciliation between Sultan Bin Suggur and his

allies on the one side and His Highness the Imaum and Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Shakboot of Abothabee on the other.

The agreement drawn up between the parties states that the occupation of the Towers at Brymee by the followers of Sheikh Sooltan having afforded just cause of complaint to the Imaum, the former chieftain consents to abandon and demolish them and to abstain in future from rebuilding any fortification whatever at Brymee, or in the neighbourhood of the Imaum's frontier, who likewise engages to destroy any towers or places of strength which his adherents may have built at the same place or in its neighbourhood.

Sheikh Sooltan Bin Suggur further agrees to permit the remainder of the tribe of Soudan, or as many of them as may desire it, to quit Sharga, with their families and effects, and remove to any part of the coast beyond his territories, all claims or demands between them and the inhabitants of Sharga being liable to adjustment by the Laws of the Country.

Sheikh Tahnoon promises on behalf of His Highness the Imaum, that as soon as the above conditions are complied with, the Towers lately erected at Derah between Sharga and Debaye shall be destroyed and a place of refuge afforded to Salmine-Ben Nasser and his Tribe either in his own territories or those of the Imaum. He further engages to live for the future at peace with Sheikh Sooltan and to consider him as his friend as long as he, Sheikh Sooltan, shall adhere strictly to the terms of the present agreement and forbear from any aggression on the Imaum or his adherents.

About this time we received a letter from Sheikh Sultan complaining of the aggressions of the Chief of Aboothabee and requesting that we would either protect him against his enemies or allow him to retaliate on them according to his means. Having just received the report of the reconciliation we answered his letter by congratulations on that event.

We regret however to state that this reconciliation

has been far from proving effectual and we are still very apprehensive that all the efforts of the Resident to secure tranquillity may prove unavailing and that the partial conflicts which have already taken place between some of the parties interested in those proceedings may terminate in open hostilities among the principal Chieftains.

Lieutenant Colonel Stannus having learned that steps had been taken to destroy the Towers of Brymee, according to the agreement, addressed a remonstrance to Sultan bin Suggur on the occasion. The Sheikh in reply accused the Imaum and Sheikh Tahnoon of impeding the reestablishment of tranquillity and of having bribed his servant Mahomed Bin Salim, who had been placed in charge of the towers of Brymee over to his (the Imaum's) cause. He also states that Sheikh Tahnoon had advanced with 300 camels against the Benny Kept Tribe, who had formerly been his subjects and killed a great number of them, and that Soliman bin Nasser, of the Soudan Tribe, who has been before mentioned in this despatch, after returning from Aboothabee went to Derah and began to harrass the people in his neighbourhood to such a degree as to induce Zeyl bin Seif to attack him, when the latter Chief with two of his people were killed.

This reply not appearing satisfactory Lieutenant Colonel Stannus left Bushire and proceeded to Kishm, where he found the Imaum who had already arrived in the Gulph, in rather a warlike attitude, in expectation of a general meeting of his dependant Chieftains. The nature of his conference with the Imaum is reported in the Residents letter of the 24th April in which it was resolved that the Imaum should proceed to Aboothabee to check the aggression of Sheikh Tahnoon, whilst the Resident himself should proceed to Sharga to obtain the fulfilment of the Treaty on the part of Sultan Bin Suggur.

In his further letter from Bassidore dated the 14th May the Resident mentions the receipt of a letter from

Sultan Bin Suggur which was avowedly considered as a sufficient authority for the surrender of the fort, and in order to put it to the test it was agreed that His Highness should send a messenger with it, demanding the surrender of the Towers with a view to their demolition, and accompanied by a sufficient body of men to take forcible possession of them in case of any evasion on the part of Mahomed Bin Salim, the officer in charge, as Mahomed Bin Sultan had now granted him authority to do so. The Imaum's messenger was to be accompanied by an Agent on the part of the Resident to ascertain by enquiries on the spot to whom the blame would attach in the event of non compliance with the demand.

We have not since heard the result of this mission, but the Resident in transmitting his report observes that if Sheikh Sultan should, contrary to his repeated and solemn assurances be found to throw any obstacles directly or indirectly in the way of the measure, the Imaum would then be fully justified in proceeding to any extremities and he had assured him that we should approve of his using any means to prevent Sheikh Sultan from again creating dissensions among the Arab Tribes.

Throughout the whole of these proceedings Lieutenant Colonel Stannus has shown great zeal and decision and however his mediation may terminate, we must admit that he has followed the most effectual mode that could be adopted for the preservation of peace without running the risk of involving the British Government in the quarrel.

Pol. dept. No 701

To
William Newnham Esqr.
Chief Secretary to Government

Sir

In continuation of my letter No 66. in this department, I now beg leave to forward a summary Report of my proceedings after leaving Muscat and Regret my inability this instant for want of time to offer a more detailed Statement, which I shall be compelled to post from till a future opportunity.

2 On the 8th Instant the Benares sailed from Muscat and arrived on the 16th at Bassidore where we were induced to put in from the probability of meeting with the Nautilus, which we were fortunate enough to find in the Creek. After dispatching the Packet,

Packet to Bushier 109 we again sailed on the 21st and anchored on the 23rd off Sharja, — Saw Visited next morning by Sultan Ben Seggar whom I accompanied on shore & soon had reason to report that during my stay at Sharja I succeeded in effecting a reconciliation between him and Sheikh Saroon the causes of which will be explained by the enclosed Copy of the agreement subscribed by both parties, which I have every Reason to hope will ensure for a considerable period the advantages of amanumity among the Maritime Arabs.

3rd On the 27th I re embarked and found both the Captain and Surgeon, but particularly the latter so much reduced by illness, as to render it desirable that we should return

No 140

return to this place for Medical
assistance we arrived here according
on the 29th Ult Benares being under
orders for Bombay and the Senior
Officer conceiving that it might
be advantageous to dispatch her
with as little delay as possible.
I have removed to the Ternate and
propose sailing for Bushier tomorrow
in hopes that the air of the Northern
part of the Gulf may check the
progress of the fever from which
I have already suffered materially
trusting the circumstance under
which I now write will excuse
the shortness of this communication

I have the honor to remain
Sir
Your most Obd.t Servt

Bushire
31st December 1824.

(Signed) C.G. Stannus
Pol.t in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire 1st Jany 1825

No 111

(56)

In order to terminate the misunderstanding
which at present subsists between His Highness
the Imaum of Muscat and Shaikh Saeed Bin
Shaikh Ahmed of Abothabee on the one side, and
Shaikh Soultan Bin Suggar and his friends
on the other the following articles of agree-
ment have been entered into by the above parties
under the mediation of the British Resident
in the Persian Gulf

1st It appearing that the occupation
of the Towers at Buraimi by the followers
of Shaikh Soultan has afforded just
cause of complaint to the Imaum,
the former Chief has consented to aban-
don and demolish those Towers,
and to abstain in future from building
any fortification whatever at Buraimi
or in the neighbourhood of the Omanee
frontier, who likewise engages
to destroy any Towers or places of
strength which his Adherents may
have

112

have built at the same place or in its neighbourhood.

2nd Shaikh Sooltan bin Suggar further agrees to permit the remainder of the Tribe of Doudan, or as many of them as may desire it, to quit Shanja, with their families and effects and remove to any part of the Coast beyond his Territories; all Claims or demands between them and the inhabitants of Shanja being liable to adjustment by the Laws of the Country.-

3rd Shaikh Tanoon promises on behalf of His Highness the Imam, that as soon as the above conditions are complied with, the Towers lately erected at Dorah between Shanja and Debaye shall be destroyed and a place of Refuge afforded to Salmeina bin Nasser and

113

(57)

and his tribe either in his own Territories or those of the Imaum, He further engages to live for the future at peace with Shaikh Sooltan and to consider him as his friend so long as he, Shaikh Sooltan, shall adhere strictly to the terms of the present agreement and forbear from every aggression on the Imaum or his adherents.

Shanja 26th December 1824.
15th Jummada Ulawal.

The above is an exact copy of the original from which the agreement in Arabick was Translated.—

174

[...]

6, During my stay at Sharja I was visited by most of the Chieftains between Ras-ul-Khaimah and Abothabee each of whom came prepared with his Copy of the treaty to which they refer on all occasions and frequently display erroneous interpretations, I therefore took an opportunity of fully explaining its object and meaning in presence of the whole of the Chieftains and particularly of removing an impression which

175

which Sheikh of Debaye affected to entertain, that the British Government was bound to protect him against his enemies - The tenderness and appearance of Sooltaun Bezee Suggan differed widely as usual from his actions, and could the moderation of Sheikh Tamroon have been depended on, or the adequacy of his resources fully ascertained, it would probably have been our best policy to have Refrained from all interference, and permitted him to carry on his operations to the total subjugation of the Sharja territories, but his success was as doubtful as his moderation to make a proper use of it, and a failure in either of those essential points would only have increased the evil which it was meant to remedy; at present the power of these Petit Chieftains is

176

is so equally balanced and their hatred so irreconcilable that while we can restrain them from open war their mutual jealousies must be advantageous to the cause of general tranquillity. Shaikh Saroor is constantly in the field and his abilities as a leader are held in high estimation by his neighbours, who are at the same time under strong apprehensions of his enterprising spirit. He still appears devoted to the interests of the Imaum from whom he derives all his supplies and military stores, but it is doubtfull how long this subordination might continue, after effecting the downfall of Shaikh Sooltan and obtaining possession of his maritime Resources. The latter Chieftain still exercises an undisputed authority

over

177

(90)

over all the tribes on the coast between Sebuy and Rumps, the former of which has lately wavered in its allegiance to the Imaum of Muscat, and shewn a disposition to place itself under Shaik Sooltans protection. —

7. I desire of this honor to forward a Statement of Expences incurred during my late tour for which I beg to solicit the sanction of the Honorable the Governor in Council. —

I have the honor to be
Sir
Your Most obed.t Servant
C. G. Stavers
Res.t in the P. Gulf

Bushire Residency
18.th March 1825. —

Transcription of previous document

To

Pol. dept. No 70

William Newnham Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government

Sir

In continuation of my letter No 66 in this department, I now beg leave to forward a summary report of my proceedings after leaving Muscat and regret my inability thro indisposition to offer a more detailed statement, which I shall be compelled to postpone till a future opportunity.

2nd On the 8th instant the Benares sailed from Muscat and arrived on the 16th at Bassidore where we were induced to put in from the probability of meeting with the Nautilus, which we were fortunate enough to find in the roads. After dispatching the packet to Bushire we again sailed on the 21st and anchored on the 23rd off Sharga. I was visited next morning by Sooltan ben Suggar whom I accompanied on shore & I am happy to report that during my stay at Sharga I succeeded in effecting a reconciliation between him and Sheikh Tanoon the terms of which will be explained by the enclosed copy of the agreement subscribed by both parties, which I have every reason to hope will ensure for a considerable period the advantages of unanimity among the Maritime Arabs.

3rd On the 27th I reembarked and found both the Captain and surgeon, but particularly the latter so much reduced by illness as to render it desirable that we should return to this place for medical assistance. We arrived here accordingly on the 29th. The Benares being under orders for Bombay and the Senior Officer conceiving that it might be advantageous to dispatch her with as little delay as possible, I have removed to the Ternate and propose sailing for Bushire tomorrow in hopes that the air of the Northern part of the Gulf may check the progress of the fever from which I have already suffered materially. Trusting the circumstances under which I now write will excuse the shortness of this communication.

I have the honor to remain
Sir
Your most obedient servant
(Signed) E. G. Stannus
Rest. in the Persian Gulf

Bassidore
31st December 1824.

Enclosure No 1

In order to terminate the misunderstanding which at present subsists between His Highness the Imam of Muscat and Shaikh Tanoon Bin Shaikboot of Abothabee on the one side, and Shaikh Sooltan ben Suggar and his friends on the other the following articles of agreement have been entered into by the above parties under the mediation of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.

1st It appearing that the occupation of the Towers at Brymee by the followers of Shaikh Sooltan has afforded just cause of complaint to the Imam, the former Chieftain consents to abandon and demolish those Towers and to abstain in future from rebuilding any fortification whatever at Brymee or in the neighbourhood of the Imam's frontier, who likewise engages to destroy any Towers or places of strength which his Adherents may have built at the same place or in its neighbourhood.

2nd Shaikh Sooltan ben Suggar further agrees to permit the remainder of the Tribe of Soudan, or as many of them as may desire it, to quit Sharga, with their families and effects and remove to any part of the coast beyond his territories; all claims or demands between them and the inhabitants of Sharga being liable to adjustment by the Laws of the Country.

3rd Shaikh Tanoon promises on behalf of His Highness the Imam, that as soon as the above conditions are complied with, the Towers lately erected at Derah between Sharga and Debaye shall be destroyed and a place of refuge afforded to Salmine ben Nasser and his Tribe either in his own territories or those of the Imams. He further engages to live for the future at peace with Shaikh Sooltan and to consider him as his friend so long as he, Shaikh Sooltan, shall adhere strictly to the terms of the present agreement and forbear from any aggression on the Imam or his Adherents.

Sharga 26th December 1824
5th Jummada ul awal

The above is an exact copy of the original from which the agreement in Arabic was translated.

6. During my stay at Sharga I was visited by most of the Chieftains between Ramps and Abothabee each of whom came prepared with his copy of the treaty to which they refer on all occasions and frequently assign erroneous interpretations, I therefore took an opportunity of fully explaining its object and meaning in presence of the whole of the Chieftains and particularly of removing an impression which (the) Shaik of Debaye affected to entertain, that the British Government was bound to protect him against his enemies. The sentiments and assurance of Sooltan ben Suggar differed widely as usual from his actions and could the moderation of Shaikh Tannoon have been depended on or the adequacy of his resources fully ascertained, it would probably have been our best policy to have refrained from all interference, and permitted him to carry on his operations to the total subjegation of the Sharga territories, but his success was as doubtful as his inclination to make a proper use of it, and a failure in either of those essential points would only have increased the evil which it was meant to remedy; at present the power of these rival chieftains is so equally balanced and their hatred so inconcileable that while we can restrain them from open war their mutual jealousies must be advantageous to the cause of general tranquillity. Shaik Tannoon is constantly in the field and his abilities as a leader are held in high estimation by his neighbours, who are at the same time under strong apprehensions of his enterprizing spirit. He still appears devoted to the interests of the Imam from whom he derives all his supplies and military stores but it is doubtful how long this subordination might continue, after effecting the downfall of Shaikh Sooltan and obtaining possession of his maritime resources. The latter chieftain still exercises an undisputed authority over all the tribes on the coast between Debaye and Rumps, the former of which has lately wavered in its allegiance to the Imam of Muscat, and shown a disposition to place itself under Shaikh Sooltan's protection.

7. I do myself the honor to forward a Statement of Expenses incurred during my late tour for which I beg to solicit the sanction of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have the honor to be
Sir
Your most obedt Servant
E. G. Stannus
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Bushire Residency
10th March 1825

206.

Political Dept. No 19.

To William Newnham Esqr
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay.

Sir

In my dispatch No 3. on this department, I have already had the honor to report for the information of Government the hesitation manifested by Shaikh Soltan bin Suggar with regard to the destruction of the Towers at Byrimi, and now beg to acquaint you, that having on the 28th ultimo received an unsatisfactory reply to the remonstrance addressed to that Chieftain I resolved to proceed to Khisham where the Imaum was daily expected with the view to obtain his prompt and cordial aid in allaying the existing ferment or at least to render it more difficult for His Highness to take

207

take any active steps in fomenting those hostilities, which I had reason to suspect, might have been the real object of his visit to the Gulf at this period – I felt that the general confidence in the efficacy of our mediation would receive a severe shock were we not to insist on the execution of the treaty concluded at Sharjah, and that consequently every effort should be made to ensure, in the first instance, a strict compliance with its stipulations For these reasons I accompanied without delay for Bafeidore, and was gratified to find, on my arrival there, that the Imaum had already reached Kisham, at which place his dependent Chieftains were expected to attend him –

2 At my first interview with His Highness I communicated to him

205

to him the intelligence which I had received relative to the present state of affairs on the opposite coast, and entreated his assistance in removing the impediments which had hitherto obstructed the execution of the Treaty; observing that altho' those difficulties were probably exaggerated, it was evident that he had it now in his power to obviate all further excuses on the part of Sooltan been dugger and Reduce them to the alternative of either fulfilling his agreement, or incurring the odium of a direct breach of his engagements.—

3rd. His highness in reply expressed himself Ready to afford his hearty cooperation towards so desirable an object, but declared that he could place no confidence whatever in the professions of Shaik Sooltan whose absurd and contradictory statements in his letter to me clearly evinced the duplicity of his conduct—

As

209

(185)

As both himself and Shaik Tamoon however had been indirectly accused in that letter of having impeded the Establishment of Tranquillity, he was willing as the strongest proof of his sincerity, to despatch such orders as I might dictate to the Chiefdoms under his authority.—

This proposal however I thought it right to decline; assuring him that no insinuations of his Enemies could ever excite the slightest doubt in my mind of the Rectitude of his intentions, but that as he must perceive the necessity of depriving Shaik Sooltan of all Shadow of pretence for delaying the demolition of the Towers of Bryme I thought it would be highly desirable that some person in his confidence should be immediately despatched to Shaik Tamoon, with positive injunctions to avoid for the present, all measures or movements which might tend to alarm or give umbrage to the people of Shaiza, and that I should at the same

2/2

Having Reason to believe however that his undisposition was feigned. I. declined accepting of his invitation, and desired Shaikh Sabbah to inform him that the object of my visit was simply to ascertain whether it was his intention to abide by the Treaty, and why its stipulations had not been already carried into effect, I also addressed a short note to Shaikh Soothan noticing the unsatisfactory Reasons which had been assigned for the delay in his former letters, and demanding an explicit avowal of his intentions declaring that as I could not help entertaining doubts of his sincerity, I should feel it incumbent on me to make a Report to Government conformable to those impressions, unless he would at once afford some

2/3

some pledge of his disposition to adhere to his engagements, —

5th I. This note he immediately dispatched a reply which he enclosed is a translation, and which, if the character of the writer were less questionable, would lead to the conclusion that he had in reality become a victim to the intrigues of his Enemies — Nevertheless it is far from improbable that the whole statement may have been fabricated in order to gain time till his hostile preparations were completed, and this conjecture is strengthened by the fact of his having lately made every exertion to collect men and prepare his boats for service, but on the other hand, it would appear to be inconsistent with his usual prudence to hazard the displeasure of the British Government by so gross an imposition

284

expedition, for the sole object of obtaining in his hands the Towers of Bryme — the possession of which would occasion the permanent establishment of his encroachments Eminid at Dirah and produce immediate hostilities with Sheikh Saroor, supported by our sanction and the whole power of the Imaum — It would at all events have been unjust to decide against him without further proof than the unaccountable absence of our agent, who had proceeded to Muscat without my knowledge or permission, precluded me from taking any immediate steps to obtain — I therefore replied that his professions were plausible and that I hoped to find them sincere, That I should take the earliest opportunity of imparting his conciliatory proposals to the Imaum of Muscat and should despatch a

Confidential

285

(108)

Confidential person with his highness's messengers or troops, to report on the actual state of things at Bryme. I concluded by entreating him to continue perfectly quiet and abstain from all measures which might lead to embroil him with any of his neighbours — On the 22nd I arrived at this place and forwarded to the Imaum an extract from Sooltan bin Suggur's letter, recommending him to call upon the Governor of Bryme to obey the orders of his chief, and in case of non compliance, to take forcible possession of it, should such a decided step appear convenient or advisable —

6. The result of these measures will I trust be favorable, but it is evident that a general war cannot long be averted by any means of conciliation short of an entire conformity to the

216

to the treaty, as the vicinity of Dereah to Sharja and Debaye, and the close connexion which has been formed between the two latter places by the recent marriage of Shaick Sooltan with the sister of the present chief Shaick Mohomed bun Hazab, must produce quarrels leading eventually to open hostilities between the principal Chieftains I have written to Shaick Tamroon to restrain the violence of Mohomed bun Nasser and his followers, but the death of Zaid bun Saife who was killed about 2 months ago in a late attack on those people, has been followed by continual skirmishes and it is to be feared that the entire removal of the Soodaun Tribe, can alone ensure permanent tranquillity to that neighbourhood — The Imaum has become enabled in a great degree, to put a stop to those disorders and I have strongly urged him to act without delay, on my suggestion respecting Bymee, not

217 (107)

not only as the most direct mode of attaining his object, but the most effectual means of removing any suspicions which might attach to his good faith, from the insinuations thrown out by Sooltan bun Suggur — These considerations joined to his respect for and habitual deference to the wishes of the British Government, may still I hope induce him to second the efforts which have been made for the re-establishment of the tranquillity and enable me to announce in my next dispatch the amicable close of this long protracted negociation —

7th The absence of Raja Ali from his station at Sharja for more than two months, at a period when his services were particularly required there, has rendered it necessary to remove him from his situation, to which I intend.

28

Sentend to appoint Moola Kuspein, the present Agent at Muyoo. Should the arrangement meet with the approbation of Government. This person has already afforded proofs of his zeal and intelligence in the duties with which he has been entrusted ——

As the Senior Officer has received official intimation of the approach of the Benares. I shall remain here till the 31st in expectation of her arrival, and then proceed in the Fernate, on my Return to the Residency—

I have the honor to be
Sir
Your most Obd. Servant
C. Stannus
Res. in the Persian Gulf

Bassidore
26th April 1825.—

29

(110)

Inclosure in No 19.

Translation of a letter received from Sooltan bin Suggur dated 7th March 1825,

To Lieut. Colonel C. Stannus C.B.
Resident in the Persian Gulf
&c &c

Sometime ago I had the pleasure to write to you, in reply to your letter which I received by the Hooka Company's brig Antelope - and trust that my letter has reached you in safety. I have now to inform you that at the persuasion of the Imams man Abdda my agent Mohomed bin Sallem had disobeyed my orders and rebelled against my authority. On the return of the former person from Abathebee, Mohomed bin Sallem, accompanied him to Muscat, and as soon as this circumstance

220

circumstance came to my knowledge I
wrote to the Imaum acquainting
him with the honor of our agreement
and representing the necessity of dis-
=troying the Towers at Brymee and
Derah for which purpose I requested
that he would send some men with
my people to demolish both Towers,
but before my letter reached Muscat
my Agent and that of Imam returned
to Brymee, and while considering on
the best means of fulfilling my engagement
I received information that Shaik Sanoon
had advanced with 300 Camels against
the Bonny Kebeet tribe, who were formerly
his Subjects and killed a great number
of them, and that Salmine been
Master of whose bad character I
acquainted

221

(10)

acquainted you at Shanga, after leaving
from Abotheber went to Derah, and
began to harrass the people in his
neighbourhood to such a degree that
Zaid bin Saif was obliged to attack
him and was killed in the action
with two of his people, all these cir-
=cumstancies have hitherto prevented
me from taking any further steps,
and now I understand that the Imam
is coming to Abotheber while I have
no friends in this quarter but those
who profess themselves friends but are
worse than Enemies. I have always
been faithful to my engagements
and shall be happy to execute all
your commands, Send therefore
one of your men here, and write
to the Imaum to do so likewise, in
order

222

order that they may proceed with
ammo, to see the Forts destroyed.—

[True Copy]

Rd.

Transcription of previous document

Political Dept No 19

To

William Newnham Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Sir

In my dispatch No 3 in this department, I have already had the honor to report for the information of Government the hesitation manifested by Shaikh Sooltan ben Suggar with regard to the distruction of the Towers at Brymee and now beg to acquaint you, that having on the 21st ultimo received an unsatisfactory reply to the remonstrance addressed to that Chieftain I resolved to proceed to Kishim where the Imam was daily expected with the view to obtain his prompt and cordial aid in allaying the rising ferment or at least to render it more difficult for His Highness to take any activities in fermenting these dessentions which I had reason to suspect, might have been the real object of his visit to the Gulf at this period. I felt that the general confidence in the efficacy of our mediation would receive a severe shock were we not to insist on the execution of the treaty concluded at Sharga, and that consequently every effort should be made to ensure, in the first instance, a strict compliance with its stipulations. For these reasons I embarked without delay for Bassidore, and was gratified to find, on my arrival there, that the Imam had already reached Kishim, at which place his dependent chieftains were expected to attend him.

2. At my first interview with His Highness I communicated to him the intelligence which I had received relative to the present state of affairs on the opposite coast, and entreated his assistance in removing the impediments which had hitherto obstructed the execution of the Treaty, observing that altho those difficulties were probably exaggerated, it was evident that he had it now in his power to obviate all further excuses on the part of Sooltan ben Suggur and reduce him to the alternative of either fulfilling his agreement or incurring the odium of a direct breach of his engagements.

3. His Highness in reply expressed himself ready to afford his hearty cooperation towards so disirable an object, but declared that he could place no confidence whatever in the professions of Shaik Sooltan whose absurd and contradictory statements in his letter to me clearly evinced the duplicity of his conduct. As both himself and Shaik Tannoon however had been indirectly accused in that letter of having impeded the reestablishment of tranquillity, he was willing as the strongest proof of his sincerity, to despatch such orders as I might dictate to the Chieftains under his authority. This proposal however I thought it right to decline, assuring him that no intimations of his enemies could ever excite the slightest doubt in my mind of the realitude of his intentions, but that as he must perceive the necessity of depriving Shaik Sooltan of all shadow of pretence for delaying the demolition of the Towers of Brymee. I thought it would be highly desirable that some person in his confidence should be immediately despatched to Shaik Tannoon, with positive injunctions to avoid for the present, all measures or inconvenients which might tend to alarm or give umbrage to the people of Sharga, and that I should at the same time address a letter to Shaikh Sooltan urging an immediate compliance with his engagements and acquainting him that I should depute an agent to witness the performance of the first article, on the part of the British Government. To this suggestion His Highness assented without hesitation and in my presence gave the necessary instructions to the Shaik of Kishim who was commissioned to convey his orders, on this occasion. The next day, having reflected that my presence at Sharga would probably produce a more decided effect on the mind of Sooltan ben Suggur, I communicated to the Imam my intention of proceeding thither, when he declared that he would also visit Abothabee and communicate to me the result of his endeavours for the restoration of concord.

4. On the 15th instant I arrived off Sharga, and was much disappointed to find that the Imam had passed that place on the preceeding day on his return to Muscat, after leaving a letter to my address with the commander of the Antilope. Sooltan ben Suggur himself was absent at Rassool Kyma but had been sent for and was hourly expected. On the night of our arrival however the violence of the wind obliged us to weigh anchore and take shelter under the Great Tumb and it was not till the 20th that our communication with the shore could be reestablished. On that day Shaikh Shallah ben Suggur came off to the ship with a message from his brother apologising

for his inability to wait on me, owing to severe illness, but requesting me to go on shore and expressing his readiness to do all that would be required of him. Having reason to believe however that his indisposition was feigned I declined accepting of his invitation, desired Shaik (Shallar)to inform him that the object of my visit was simply to ascertain whether it was his intention to abide by the Treaty and why its stipulations had not been already carried into effect. I also addressed a short note to Shaik Sooltan noticing the unsatisfactory reasons which had been assigned for the delay in his former letters, and demanding an explicit avowal of his intentions declaring that as I could not help entertaining doubts of his sincerity, I should feel it encumbent on me to make a report to Government conformable to these impressions, unless he would at once afford some pledge of his disposition to adhere to his engagements.

5. To this note he immediately despatched a reply of which the enclosed is a translation, and which, if the character of the writer were less questionable, would lead to the conclusion that he had in reality become a victim to the intrigues of his enemies. It nevertheless is far from improbable that the whole statement may have been fabricated in order to gain time till his hostile preparations were completed, and this conjecture is strengthened by the fact of his having lately made every exertion to collect men and prepare his boats for service, but on the other hand, it would appear to be inconsistent with his usual prudence to hazard the displeasure of the British Government by so gross an imposition, for the sole object of retaining in his hands the Towers of Brymee, the possession of which would occasion the permanent establishment of his inveterate enemies at Derah and produce immediate hostilities with Shaik Tannoon, supported by our sanction and the whole power of the Imam. It would at all events have been unjust to decide against him without further proof which the unauthorized absence of our Agent who had proceeded to Muscat without my knowledge or permission, precluded me from taking any immediate steps to obtain. I therefore replied that his professions were plausible and that I hoped to find them sincere, that I should take the earliest opportunity of imparting his conciliatory proposals to the Imam of Muscat and should despatch confidential person with His Highness's messenger or troops, to report on the actual state of things at Brymee. I concluded by entreating him to continue perfectly quiet and abstain from all measures which might tend to embroil him with any of his neighbours. On the 22nd I arrived at this place and forwarded to the Imam an extract from Sooltan ben Suggur's letter,

recommending him to call upon the Governor of Brymee to obey the orders of his chief, and in case of non compliance, to take forcible possession of it, should such a decided step appear convenient or adviseable.

6. The result of these measures will I trust be favorable, but it is evident that a general war cannot long be averted by any means of conciliation short of an entire conformity to the treaty, as the vicinity of Derah to Sharga and Debaye, and the close connexion which has been formed between the two latter places by the recent marriage of Shaik Sooltan with the sister of the present chief Shaik Mohamed ben Hazak, must produce quarrels leading eventually to open hostilities between the principal chieftains. I have written to Shaik Tannoon to restrain the violence of Salmin ben Nasser and his followers, but the death of Zaid ben Saife who was killed about 2 months ago in a rash attack on those people, has been followed by continual skirmishes and it is to be feared that the entire removal of the Soodaun Tribe, can alone ensure permanent tranquillity to that neighbourhood. The Imam has become enabled in a great degree, to put a stop to these disorders and I have strongly urged him to act without delay, on my suggestion respecting Brymee, not only as the most direct mode of attaining his object but the most effectual means of removing any suspicions which might attach to his good faith, from the insinuations thrown out by Sooltan ben Suggur. These considerations joined to his respect for and habitual deference to the wishes of the British Government, may still I hope induce him to second the efforts which have been made for the reestablishment of tranquillity and enable me to announce in my next dispatch the amicable close of this long protracted negociation.

7. The unauthorized absence of Ruza Ali from his station at Sharga for more than two months, at a period when his services were particularly required there, has rendered it necessary to remove him from his situation, to which I intend to appoint Moola Hussein the present Agent at Mogoo, should the arrangement meet with the approvation of Government. This person has already afforded proofs of his zeal and intelligence in the duties with which he has been entrusted.

As the Senior Officer has received official intimation of the approach of the Benares, I shall remain here till the 30th in expectation of her arrival, and then proceed in the Ternate on my return to the Residency.

I have the honour to be
Sir
Your Most Obedt Servant
E. G. Stannus
Rest. in the Persian Gulf

Bassidore
24th April 1825

Enclosure in No 19

Translation of a letter received from Sooltan ben Suggur dated 7th March 1825.

To

Lieutenant Colonel E. G. Stannus C.B.
Resident in the Persian Gulf

A.C.

Some time ago I had the pleasure to write to you, in reply to your letter which I received by the Honourable Company's Cruizer Antelope - and trust that my letter has reached you in safety. I have now to inform you that at the persuasion of the Imams man Abdola, my agent Mohomed ben Sallem has disobeyed my orders and rebelled against my authority. On the return of the former person from Abuthabee, Mohomed ben Sallem accompanied him to Muscat, and as soon as this circumstance came to my knowledge I wrote to the Imam acquainting him with the tenor of our agreement and representing the necessity of destroying the Towers at Brymee and Derah for which purpose I requested that he would send some men with my people to demolish both Towers, but before my letter reached Muscat my Agent and that of Imam returned to Brymee, and while considering on the best means of fulfilling my engagement I received information that Shaik Tannoon had advanced with 300 camels against the Benny (Kutub) tribe, who were formerly his subjects and killed a great number of them, and that Salmine ben Nasser of whose bad character I acquainted you at Sharga, after returning from Abothabee went to Derah, and began to harrass the people in his neighbourhood to such a degree that Zaid ben Saife was obliged to attack him and was killed in the action with two of his people, all these circumstances have hitherto prevented me from taking any further steps, and now I understand that the Imam is coming to Abothabee while I have no friends in this quarter but those who profess themselves friends but are worse than enemies. I have always been faithful to my engagements and shall be happy to execute all your commands, send therefore one of your men here, and write to the Imam to do so likewise, in order that they may proceed with mine, to see the Forts destroyed.

(True Copy)
E. G. Stannus
Rest.

1.30
Hostilities at Buraimi and arbitration by Shaikh Tahnun b. Shakhbut, November 1828–May 1829

22

Translation of a Letter from Moollah Hoosein Agunbah
Hargil to Major Wilson dated 16 Novr 1820

&c.. Beg to acquaint you that a Bugarah belonging to Debaye was
wrecked off Batina. but the crew brought some of her Cargo and as dates safe
with a few planks on shore. At this time a Boat belonging to Rashid bin
Humeed's subjects touched at Batina and proceeded to the Debaye Men in a
friendly manner to convey the property recovered to their place for a certain
Rent which was agreed to.. But had however proceeding to Debaye they
landed for Cyhoon and telling the owners that Peace was now between the
Bunyas and Anaeem Tribes at Buymee requested to restore them property
to them - Shaik Rashid bin Humeed in at Buymee from whence he
dispatched Ally bin Humood his Cousin with 150 Bedowins with
orders to forray Shaik Sultan's Territories - Accordingly Ally
bin Humood proceeded to Nukeel Bunyas where the Bunyas were
scattered about to the Westward of abovementioned pasturing their Camels and
apprehending no attack. On his arrival he divided his party into 4 bodies
and plundered Nukeel carrying off 700 Camels and killing 5 or 6 Men
on the 4th Inst. he returned to Buymee and there divided the spoil
among his people. On the 8 Mahomed bin Suef arrived from Shaik

Rashid bin Humeid to Sheik Sultan bin Sagar requesting his mediation to effect a reconciliation between himself and Mahomed bin Yaroof of the Bin Khamis Tribe. Sheik Sultan accordingly wrote off proposing certain terms and conditions to both parties and stating his intention of proceeding to Bey mee in the event of their acceptance. The answer may be returned to Ras el Khymah and Mahomed bin Arif sent off for Bey mee. Sheik Rashid has sent the families of Abed bin Mufrah the Bareemy. Essa bin Khalid the Yasee consisting of about 100 Persons of the Mogarah, Beni Jet, and Bin Yas Tribe into Lanj sent from Sheik Yahroom - They are all in utter distress. On the 13th Inst. Sultan bin Nasir the Chief of Dereah commenced rebuilding the walls which were destroyed by Yahroom on receiving very large presents from the Imam for so doing when H.H. was there in Person. I do not know whether Sultan bin Nasir has commenced this work at the instigation of any one or not - All the Persons connected with Moslim bin Khalid are still in confinement as well as Abdulla bin Sheik Sultan has left Sharjah his brother superintending the erection of the Fortifications round Sharjah which are now nearly completed as well as those round Ras el Khymah.

20th Nov.r 1828. I beg to report the arrival of Cuneyn Abdulla and to acknowledge the receipt of your letter. The communication to the address of Sheik Sultan was written by the Resident to Ras el

Khymah. With respect to the letter for Sheik Yahroom that Chief is at present at Bahrein and his intercourse is kept up from between Abu Dhabi and Sharjah in consequence of the misunderstanding between the people of those two places. I shall proceed to Debaye and deliver the letter into the hands of Yahroom and Khaleefa bin Shakhbut and bring a receipt from him. I shall take that opportunity of acquiring the most correct information possible respecting the state of affairs. The Kowet Batil has been restored to its owners but you know that when one tastes his Brothers property in the morning and restores it in the afternoon it is generally accompanied with a loss of 10 or 8. The owner of the Batil dispatched after us about 8 Leagues and purchasing a small boat returned to Koweit with the remainder of the money. - With respect to the 4 Aspelos Boats plundered on Bin Bunyas one of the people belonging to them complained to Sheik Yahroom on Debaye of this outrage - The Sheik detained his person until his return to Abootabee when he seized the person and plundered the boat and put him into confinement - he then recovered the property from him and restored it to the owners. They say however that some portion of it has been lost. The Aspelos people having got all they could returned to their own Country - I shall pay every attention to your orders respecting sending you copies of all my correspondence with people in this gulf. Sheik Rashid bin Humeid is in Bey mee and fighting desperately with the all Bin Khamis. The neighbourhood presents a scene of Bloodshed and Plunder. Parties of 50 Bedouins are going about who attack and kill each other.

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a Letter from Moollah Houssein, Agent at Sharga to Major Wilson dated 16 Nov 1828

A.C.

I beg to acquaint you that a Bugarah belonging to Debaye was arrested off Batina but the crew brought some of her cargo such as dates together with a few plants on shore. At this time a boat belonging to Rashid Bin Hameed's subjects touched at Batina and proposed to the Debaye men in a friendly manner to convey the property recovered to their place for a certain sum which was agreed to. Instead however of proceeding to Debaye they started for Ajman and telling the owners that there was war between the Beniyas and Anaeem tribes at Brymee refused to restore their property to them. Sheikh Rashid Bin Hameed is at Brymee from whence he dispatched Ally Bin Hamood his cousin with 150 Bedowins with orders to foray Sheikh Tahnoons territories. Accordingly Ally Bin Hamood proceeded to Hulul Beniyas where the Monasirs men scattered about to the westward of Aboothabee pasturing their camels and apprehending no attack. On his arrival he divided his party into 4 bodies and plundered Hulul carrying off 700 camels and killing 5 or 6 men. On the 4 Nov. he returned to Brymee and there divided the spoil among his people. On the 8th Mahomed Bin Seif arrived from Sheikh Rashid Bin Hameed to thank Sooltan Bin Suggur requesting his mediation to effect a reconciliation between himself and Mahomed Bin Suroor of the Boo Shamis Tribe. Sheikh Sooltan accordingly wrote off proposing certain terms and conditions to both parties and stating his intention of proceeding to Brymee in the event of their acceptance. The same day he returned to Rasel Khymah and Mahomed Bin Seif set off for Brymee. Sheikh Rashid has sent the families of Ahmed Bin Miftah the Naeemy and Essa Bin Khalid the Yasee consisting of about 100 people of the Moozarah, Beni Jet and Beniyas Tribes who have fled from Sheikh Tahnoon. They are all to settle in Tet. On the 13 Nov they left Tet and proceeded to Debaye intending to surprize it but failing in their attempt to seize the wells, they plundered some of the houses in the neighbourhood and carried off a quantity of brass and carpets and 20 camels and 20 oxen killing three and wounding four men. The next day they arrived at Sharga with their spoil which they sold and afterwards departed for Brymee. On the 13 Nov Suliman Bin Nasir the Chief of Derah commenced rebuilding the walls which were destroyed by Tahnoon

on receiving very large presents from the Imam for so doing when H.H. was there in person. I do not know whether Suliman Bin Nasir has commenced this work at the instigation of any one or not. All the prisoners connected with Moslim Bin Rashid are still in confinement as well as Udwee. Now that Sooltan has left Shargah his brother superintends the erection of the fortifications round Shargah, which are now nearly completed as well as those around Ras al Khymah.

20th Nov 1828.

I beg to report the arrival of the cruizer Amhurst and to acknowledge the receipt of your letter. The communication to the address of Sheikh Sooltan was taken by the Amhurst to Ras al Khymah. With respect to the other for Sheikh Tahnoon that chief is at present at Bahrain and no intercourse is kept up between Abothabee and Sharga in consequence of a misunderstanding between the people of those two places. I propose however proceeding to Debaye and delivering the letter into the hands of Tahnoons Naib Khaleefa Bin Armuethan and taking a receipt from him. I shall take that opportunity of acquiring the most correct information possible respecting the state of affairs. The Koweit Batul has been restored to its owner but you know that when one takes his brothers property in the morning and restores it in the afternoon it is generally accompanied with a loss of 10 in 8. The owner of the Batul disposed of her in Aboothabee to Saedan the Yasee and purchasing a small boat returned to Koweit with the remainder of the money. With respect to the 4 Asseelo boats plundered in Zir Beniyas one of the people belonging to them complained to Sheikh Tahnoon in Debaye of this outrage. The Sheikh detained this person until his return to Aboothabee when he seized the person who had plundered the boats and put him into confinement. He then recovered the property from him and restored it to the owners, they say however that some portion of it has been lost. The Asseelo people having got all they could returned to their own country. I shall pay every attention to your orders respecting sending you copies of all my correspondence with people in this Gulf. Sheikh Rashid Bin Hameed is in Brymee and fighting desperately with the All Boo Shamis. The neighbourhood presents a scene of bloodstained plunder. Parties of 50 bedowins are going about who attack and kill each other.



Translation of a Letter from Moolla Houssein, Agent at Sharga to Major Wilson 2 Jan 1829.

A.C.

I beg to inform you that Sheikh Tahnoon is at this present in Aboothabee. On the 19th Dec he ordered 150 men of his tribe to prepare their arms and to proceed to ravage the districts of the Anaeems (Rashid Bin Hameed's tribe) under the command of his brother Yasim Bin Shakhboot and Khalifa Bin Khalid. They accordingly left Aboothabee secretly without any person being aware of their departure and travelled solely by night concealing themselves by day. On their arrival in the country of the Anaeem they did not find a single person abroad that tribe having taken the precaution to collect all those connected with them in Zuet to guard against the enemy. Yasoon Bin Shakhboot proceeded therefore to Ulkhilat and Tuhleen about 3 from Ras al Khymah where they seized 50 female camels, 300 sheep and 15 oxen without falling in with a soul and arriving at Aboothabee about 5 days ago sold and divided the proceeds of their spoil. Sheikh Tahnoon will not permit any of his people to leave the place or to hold communication with other countries as he has sent his bateel and bugla to Muscat to get intelligence and to advise with Syed Saed. He is now expecting the return of his answer. Sheikh Sooltan is in Rasel Khymah on the 13th he sent his man Mahmood Bin Ally to Muscat from whence he has not yet returned. The Sheikh has also sent letters respecting the Baniyas to Abdoolla Bin Ahmed and on learning the plunder of the camels and sheep he wrote to Sheikh Tahnoon and sent the letter to his brother Salih who dispatched a boat with Khalifah Bin Suggur to deliver it to the Aboothabee chief. This person has not yet returned. Rashid Bin Hameed is in Brymee and the war between him and the Boo Shamis is as fixed as ever tho both sides content themselves with remaining in their forts instead of meeting each other in the field as formerly. You will I hope excuse the lateness of the arrival of my letters as owing to the season very little communication is kept up from Shargah.

Transcription of previous document



Translation of a Letter from Shaikh Sooltan bin Suggur to Major Wilson dated 23 Jan.y 1829 or 17 Rajul.

A.C. - ~~An affordable~~ Circumstances having occurred necessary to be reported to you. I beg to state at the time Sued Saed proceeded with his forces against Bahrein he requested that I would not annoy those who had joined him in his enterprize until his return, alluding to the Beniyas Tribe belonging to Tahnoon. We therefore trusted to God to restrain all wickedness. At the time however that Sued Saed was off Aboothabee previously to his sailing for Bahrein 300 men of the Beniyas during the time of peace and while we were unprepared made a foray upon our territories ~~and~~ carried off a quantity of property and killed several men. Sued Saed was a witness of this. We sent over to him ~~of~~ information while he was at Aboothabee. After this when Tahnoon was with the Sued's Fleet in person he seized a Bugarah belonging to Oman subjects together with another one the property of Ahmed Bin Yoosuf of Shargah whilst proceeding to Bushire. Sued Saed had not known this and did not approve of it but restored the two Boats without any of their stores. Subsequently they have ravaged my districts repeatedly and Tahnoon has now proceeded inland in person against them intending to produce devastation and ruin. I cannot however contend against him by land, but only on sea and I am desirous of proceeding against their Territories as they have done against mine in order to restrain them for it is not right that I should not retaliate upon them the treatment they have displayed towards me. I therefore hope you will inform the Captain of your vessels that it is necessary that my fleet should proceed against Aboothabee. I trust you will favour me with an answer.

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a Letter from Sheikh Sooltan bin Suggur to Major Wilson dated 23 Jan 1829 or 17 Rajul

A.C.

Circumstances having occurred necessary to be reported to you, I beg to state at the time Sued Saed proceeded with his forces against Bahrein he requested that I would not annoy those who had joined him in his enterprize until his return, alluding to the Beniyas Tribe belonging to Tahnoon. We therefore trusted to God to restrain all wickedness. At the time however that Sued Saed was off Aboothabee previously to his sailing for Bahrein 300 men of the Beniyas during the time of peace and while we were unprepared made a foray upon our territories carried off a quantity of property and killed several men. Sued Saed was a witness of this. We sent over to him information while he was at Aboothabee. After this when Tahnoon was with the Sued's Fleet in person he seized a Bugarah belonging to Oman subjects together with another one the property of Ahmed Bin Yoosuf of Shargah whilst proceeding to Bushire. Sued Saed had not known this and did not approve of it but restored the two boats without any of their stores. Subsequently they have ravaged my districts repeatedly and Tahnoon has now proceeded inland in person against them intending to produce devastation and ruin. I cannot however contend against him by land, but only on sea and I am desirous of proceeding against their territories as they have done against mine in order to restrain them for it is not right that I should not retaliate upon them the treatment they have displayed towards me. I therefore hope you will inform the captain of your vessels that it is necessary that my fleet should proceed against Aboothabee. I trust you will favour me with an answer.

117

Translation of a Letter from Mirdhal Khonjem Agent at Shargah to Major Wilson dated 22 April 1829.

After my former communication I informed you of Sheik Sultan having undertaken prosecution of the whole of the defences of Debaye from the Family of Shaya and of his having appointed people he could depend upon to their charge - after this he took up his residence about 16 Miles inland behind the above place having with him about 1500 of the Beniyas Tribe. During this period the portion of the Manasem Tribe attached to Sheik Sultan viz the Ahel Bou Khamis under Ahmed bin Sorroor joining the War on Baymer slowly continuance and Remainder still keeping their Chief with some attendants at Sheik Sultan on [illegible] Camp they assured on

118

the 12 April and requested him that he would procure their liberation either by Breaking Peace or fighting for them. Accordingly on the 16th Sheik Sultan with a force of 1000 Men and accompanied by Sheikan with 200 of the Beniyas Tribe proceeded to Baymer apparently with the intention of making peace between the divisions of the Manasem Tribe and good Reasons. I intimated in one of my former letters that Sheik Sultan bin Suggur was expecting the arrival of the Sheikh of Bahrein at Ras el Khymah agreeably to the engagement between them. When however the terms agreed upon proved unsatisfactory Sheik Abdulla on King his appearance and getting hard of Sultans departure for Baymer he opened on the duty not to fail to see for the purpose of plundering and putting to death the Beniyas Tribe - Accordingly the following Dispatches were dispatched one Batteel with 70 Men from Ras el Khymah under the command of Sheik Hatim bin Sugger one Batteel from Jezeerat el Hamrah manned by 60 Men - From Ajman one Batteel and three Baggalas - Shargah & Shargah Keyeree joined by a Batteel and seven Boats - the whole fleet then proceeded and spread themselves thro the Islands and along the Beniyas Coast - off Deer Beniyas the Ajman Buggalah fell in with a small Bolt fishing having 4 Men on board - this they took and put the Men to death - on the same Island they found a small Batteel which they took up - and on the 21st returned to Ajman with the Captured Beniyas Boat - the Shargah people on leaving their own ports lay in wait off Debaye and secured a Buggalah which had put to Sea for the purpose of proceeding to Abouthabee - some of the Men were killed as they leaped overboard and gained the Shore - this Boat with her Cargo consisting of Black Cloth and dates was carried to Shargah and the Shargah fleet proceeded to Abouthabee off which they fell in with two Baymah pearl fishing which they captured putting to them of the Beniyas Tribe to death but preserving the lives of 4 Slaves - on the 22nd they brought the 2 Boats and the 4 Slaves to Shargah - the people of which place seeing the mischief that attended those who had proceeded to assist immediately fitted out 10 additional Buggalahs for the accommodation of the Men - Ships generally in attending and watching each other - Sheik Sultan bin Sugger is preparing three Baggalas in Ras el Khymah intending to proceed along the Line his Fleet is to be collected - Sheik Sultan has proceeded to Baymer but no one has yet returned from that place so that I am ignorant of what has happened there - the Batteel and Men of Sheik Khaled bin Humeid have not yet returned from Muscat - this reported that H H the Imam is coming up with 4 Ships in person to Ras el Khymah to make Peace between Sultan and Sultan - but good Reasons for the sole desire of these people is Plunder and Slaughter

123

Translation of a Letter from Moollah Hoosein Agent at Muscat to Major Wilson dated 9 May 1819

R.C. I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your two Letters by the H.C. Cruizer 28 April. Last. In my former communication 22 April. I informed that Sheik Sooltan bin Seggur Fleet on leaving Muscat spread Rumours over the sea and among the Islands. - One detachment of a Battel and 3 Boats under Sheik Hatim bin Yuzeel Proceed off Abothabee without however falling in with any thing from thence they went over to Linged & Clarunk and then returned to Abothabee without meeting one of the Buniyas. They therefore proceeded back to Muscat where they arrived on the 2d Inst. and dispersed to their different homes. Sheik Hatim with the Battel sailing to Ras el Khyma - the second detachment from Muscat consisting of a Battel and 4 Bugarahs meeting with no success off Abothabee sailed for the Islands and found a Buniya boat in Argona sunk 4 People on board by one shot and two Young Men and a Boy. - The Bugarah was seized with the old Man and Boy but the other two concealed themselves in hold and were not found discovered on the 4 Inst. They returned to Muscat without any further success - In my last letter I intimated the intention of Sheik Sultan to proceed to Bymee with about 1000 Men and attended by Nowsham with 200 Men of the Beni Settil Tribe - On his arrival he exerted himself to restore peace between the Ameers big. Ally bin Humood, Mahomed bin Afif together with the Bedowins attended to Rashid bin Humeid and Sooltan bin Seggur on the one side and Humood Bin Sorroor, Bin Raneel, and the Bedowins attended to himself on the other. and sent Sheik Nowsham to reconcile both parties and to finish the quarrelling as directed by - Lasting Peace. - It is reported that the Buniyas Chief made Little objections before him and settled the dispute between the Bin Khamis and Bin Khureiban on the following terms - That with respect to the Loss of Life and property both Tribes should remain in the same situation they were then. and that mutual forgiveness for every thing that has taken place should be declared - This was agreed to by Ally bin Humood and Mahomed bin Afif on the condition they should first advise with Sooltan bin Seggur and Rashid bin Humeid. Having thus established Peace and settled the affairs of the Ameers and Bedowins Sheik Sultan returned from Bymee to Abothabee. Whether he has

arrived there or not I cannot say as no person has lately come from that place - Sheik Sooltan Bin Seggur finding the time agreed upon between him and the Chief of Bahrein elapse without the latter making his appearance at Ras el Khymah and that Sheik Sultan had proceeded to Bymee and settled the dispute between the Ameers, sent on terms to send my a message to Ally bin Humood and Mahomed bin Afif on Bymee to learn upon what terms and conditions they had made peace with Sultan. On the 4th May Sheik Rashid bin Humeid's Battel with his son on board returned to Gymam from Muscat having a present for Rashid of 50 Bags of rice and one hundred Bales of dates and some Money - Some time ago the People of Bahrein sent an armed Boat to Muscat under the Bugla to Bombay with a Cargo generally of valuable belonging to the Merchants. Big Vessels are embarked with Goods, Shot Powder and a body of Soldiers in addition to the Sailors. When the Bugla was ready by the Vessels the Bugla accordingly proceeded to Bombay and having completed her Cargo and sailing waited on her return to Bahrein. on her arrival off Ras el Khud she fell in with three of the Imams Frigates cruizing which attacked her at a distance but were unable to take her being afraid to come up close when for fear of being set on Fire - The Bugla however suffering from the effects of the shot threw a portion of the Cargo overboard and sent away her boat with two men in it. on its falling night she altered her course and I believe safely arrived in Bahrein. The next morning the Ships not seeing the Bugla sent off the boat and returned to Muscat - Three small Craft dispatched a similar letter to this - The whole of Sheik Sooltans Fleet has returned and five boats composing it have proceeded to their respective ports; with the exception of one Bugarah which with a Crew of 20 Men is still at Sea - The whole of the Buniyas is as follows - By the Bugarah detachment 4 Boats taken and 5 men Killed. By the Gymam detachment one Bugarah destroyed one captured and 4 Men Killed - Sheik Sultan in Abothabee and Sheik Sooltan in Ras el Khymah and Sheik Rashid in Gymam - and it is not known whether they are at Peace or War. The former and the Buniyas Tribes are in the greatest misery as their chief support is in the Pearl Fishery and till the season has now passed without it's being commenced Sheik Sooltan they say is going to Muscat and Sheik Sultan to Abbaye and perhaps they may make peace on account of the Pearl Fishery

Transcription of previous document

Translation of a Letter from Moollah Houssein, Agent at Shargah to Major Wilson dated 22 April 1829.

A.C.

In my former communication I informed you of Sheikh Tahnoon having taken possession of the whole of the defences of Debaye from the Family of Huza and of his having appointed people he could depend upon to these charges. After this he took up his residence about 16 miles inland behind the above place having with him about 1100 of the Beniyas Tribe. During this period the portion of the Naeem Tribe attached to Sheikh Tahnoon viz the Hul Boo Shamis under Ahmed Bin Sooroor finding the war on Brymee of long continuance and themselves still sent their chief with some attendants to Sheikh Tahnoon in whose camp they arrived on the 12 April and requested him that he would procure their liberation either by making peace or fighting for them. Accordingly on the 16th Sheikh Tahnoon with a force of 1000 men and accompanied by Haedan with 200 of the Beni Jettil tribe proceeded to Brymee apparently with the intention of making peace between the divisions of the Naeem tribe but God knows I intimated in one of my former letters that Sheikh Sooltan Bin Suggur was expecting the arrival of the Sheikh of Bahrein at Rasel Khymah agreeably to the engagement between them. When however the time agreed upon paper without Sheikh Abdoolla making his appearance and Sultan heard of Tahnoon's departure for Brymee he issued orders to his subjects to put to sea for the purpose of plundering and putting to death the Beniyas Tribe. Accordingly the following vessels were despatched one bateel with 70 men from Ras Al Khymah under the command of Sheik Hatim Bin Suzeel, one bateel from Juzeerat All Humrah manned by 60 men, from Ajman one bateel and two bugarahs. Assembling to Shargah they were joined by a bateel and seven boats. The whole fleet then put to sea and spread themselves thro the islands and along the Baniyas coast. Off Seer Beniyas the Ajman bugarah fell in with a small boat fishing having 4 men on board. This they took and put the men to death. On the same island they found a small bateel which they broke up and on the 21st returned to Ajman with the captured Beniyas boat. The Shargah vessels on leaving their own port lay in wait off Debaye and seized a bugarah which had put to sea for the purpose of proceeding to Aboothabee. None of the men were killed as they leapt overboard and gained the shore. This boat with her cargo consisting of black cloth and dates was carried to Sharjah and the Sharjah fleet proceeded to Aboothabee off which they fell in with two bugarahs pearl fishing which they captured putting 5 men of the Beniyas tribe to death but preserving the lives of 4 slaves. On

the 22nd they brought the 2 boats and the 4 slaves to Shargah, the people of which place seeing the success that attended those who had proceeded to cruize immediately fitted out 10 additional bugarahs for the vocation of these men lies specially in plundering and murdering each other. Sheikh Sooltan Bin Suggur is preparing three buglas in Ras al Khymah intending to proceed to Shargah where his fleet is to be collected. Sheikh Tahnoon has proceeded to Brymee but noone has yet returned from that place so that I am ignorant of what has happened there. The bateel and son of Sheikh Rashid bin Hameed have not yet returned from Muscat. It is reported that H.H. the Imam is coming up with 4 ships in person to Ras al Khymah to seek peace between Tahnoon and Sultan. But God knows for the sole desire of these people is plunder and slaughter.

Translation of a Letter from Moolah Houssein, Agent at Sharga to Major Wilson dated 9 May 1829

A.C.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters by the HCS Euphrates 26 April last. In my former communication 22 April I mentioned that the 5 vessels company Sheikh Sooltan Bin Suggurs fleet on leaving Shargah spread themselves over the sea and among the islands. One detachment of a bateel and 3 boats under Sheikh Hatim Bin Jazeel proceeded off Aboothabee without however falling in with anything from thence and they went on to Lingah and Charrack and then returned to Aboothabee without meeting one of the Beniyas. They therefore proceeded back to Shargah where they arrived on the 2nd inst and dispersed to their different homes. Sheikh Hatim with the bateel sailing to Ras al Khymah. The second detachment from Shargah consisting of a bateel and 4 bugarahs meeting with no prizes off Aboothabee sailed for the islands and found a small Beniyas boat in Arzeena with 4 people on board viz one old and two young men and a boy. The bugarah was seized with the old man and boy but the other two concealed themselves inland and were not discovered. On the 4 inst they returned to Shargah without any further success. In my last letter I intimated that Sheikh Tahnoon had proceeded to Brymee - with about 1000 men and attended by Howidan with 200 men of the Beni Jittel Tribe. On his arrival he exerted himself to restore peace between the Anaeem viz Ally Bin Hamood, Mohamed Bin Syf together with the Bedowins attached to Rashid Bin Hameed and Sooltan Bin Suggur on the one side and Humud Bin Sooroor Ibn Naneel and the Bedowins attached to himself on the other and sent Sheikh Howedin to reconcile both parties and to put a stop to quarrelling and discord by a lasting peace. It

is reported that the Beniyas chief made both sides appear before him and settled the dispute between the Boo Shamis and Boo Khureeban on the following terms, that with respect to the loss of life and property, both tribes should remain in the same situation they were then and that mutual payments for every thing that had taken place should be exchanged. These terms were agreed to by Ally Bin Humood and Mahomed Bin Syf on the condition they should first advise with Sooltan Bin Suggur and Rashid Bin Humeed. Having thus established peace and settled the affairs of the Anaeems and Bedowins Sheik Tahnoon returned from Brymee to Aboothabee. Whether he has arrived there or not I cannot say as no person has lately come from that place. Sheikh Sooltan Bin Suggur finding the time agreed upon between himself and the chief of Bahrein elapse without the latter making his appearance at Ras al Khymah and that Sheikh Tahnoon had proceeded to Brymee and settled the dispute between the Anaeem lost no time in sending a messenger to Ally Bin Hamood and Mahomed Bin Syf in Brymee to learn upon what terms and conditions they had made peace with Tahnoon. On the 4 May Sheikh Rashid bin Hameed's bateel with his son on board returned to Ajman from Muscat bringing a present for Rashid of 50 bags of rice and one hundred ditto of dates and some money. Some time ago the people of Bahrein sent the bugla of Syass to Bombay with a large quantity of valuable pearls belonging to the merchants. They likewise embarked warlike stores guns shot powder and a body of soldiers in addition to the sailors. Knowing the Imam would try to take her the bugla accordingly proceeded to Bombay and having completed her buying and selling sailed on her return to Bahrein. On her arrival off Ras el Hud she fell in with two of the Imam's frigates cruizing which attacked her at a distance but unable to take her being afraid to come up close for fear of being set on fire. The bugla however suffering from the effect of the shot threw a portion of the cargo overboard and cut away her boat with two men in it. On its falling night she altered her course and I believe has safely arrived in Bahrein. The next morning the ships not seeing the bugla picked up the boat and returned to Muscat. Have sent Capt Pepper a similar letter to this. The whole of Sheikh Sooltan's fleet has returned and the boats composing

it have proceeded to their respective ports, with the exception of one Shargah bugarah which with a crew of 20 men is still at sea. The whole of the loss of the Beniyas is as follows.
By the Shargah detachment 4 boats taken and 5 men killed.
By the Ajman detach. one bugarah destroyed one captured and 4 men killed. Sheikh Tahnoon is in Aboothabee and Sheikh Sooltan in Rasel Khymah and Sheikh Rashid in Ajman and it is not known whether they are at peace or war.

The Joasmee and the Beniyas Tribe are in the greatest misery as their chief dependence is in the pearl fishery and half the season has now passed without it's being commenced. Sheikh Sooltan they say is going to Shargah and Sheikh Tahnoon to Debaye and perhaps they may make peace on account of the pearl fishery.

1.31
The second Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi, 1833

Bombay Castle 22d May 1833 Political Consultn

True Translation
(Signed) S Hennell
Asstt to the Resident

True Extract
(Signed) D. A. Blane

From the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 22d April
Gr.

I have the honor to enclose translation of a letter from the Government Agent at Sharja containing intelligence of interest regarding the state of affairs in that quarter.

2d The account which it gives of the progress of the Wahabee force and the increasing power of that sect is supported by information received from other sources. about a year since, as reported in my letter of the 29th May last the situation of Toorkee bin Saood was described in a far different light but the temporary decline of his authority occasioned by the opposition of a Competitor claiming a preferable right by descent and stating himself to have escaped from confinement in Egypt has quickly given way to the superior energy of his character.

3d It is to be feared that the independence of our ally the Imam of Muscat cannot long coexist with an advancement of Wahabee ascending. Already indeed the exaction of the Zukat or Tribute of 5 per Cent would appear by a letter from the Government Agent at Muscat of which I likewise enclose an Extract to be in contemplation. As regards however the interests of Commerce and interference with foreign States Toorkee bin Saood unlike his predecessors states disposed from all but the wishes of the Joasmees and other lawless tribes derive[illegible]

1705 Cont.

Bombay Castle 22nd. May 1833 Political Consult. 19

his sanction for the renewal of Piracy and aggression. —

Bushire Residency
22nd. April 1833. 5

I have the honor to be &c.
(Signed) D. A Blane
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Translation of a Letter from Moollah Hoosein Agent at Shargah to the Resident in the Persian Gulf Dated 20th Shewal or 4th March 1833

I beg to report that all the Joasmee Chiefs are now at Bunymee in the Camp of the Wahabee with whom they have entered into engagements of adherence and submission. The endeavours of Shaik Sultan and Shaik Rashid to induce Omr bin Afeesan to commence hostilities with Shaik Jahnoon have failed owing to the friendly exertions of the Monasser Chiefs to establish a good understanding between these parties an active correspondence is now carrying on with abothabee but the Wahabee leader insists upon the presence and personal submission of the Beniyas Chaik as a necessary condition. It is not likely Jahnoon will go to Bunymee in person but he will send his father Shakbout indeed it is said that that person has already left Dhyd so that every prospect exists that peace will be established the more particularly as Toorky bin Saood is unwilling to commence a War after having extended his power over Nedjd and the whole of Oman without shedding a drop of blood. The Mukuls of the Imam and Hamood bin Azan are in Bunymee the defences of which place are being placed in a state of repair a ditch is likewise being dug. Persons have been sent into every part of Oman threatening summary vengeance upon all who display any hesitation in paying the Zukat and other dues to the Wahabee. It appears that friendly relations have been established between

1705 Cont.

Bombay Castle 22nd. May 1833 Political Consult.

between Shaik Jahnoon and Omr bin Afeesan as the despatch of a Joasmee Fleet of 3 Buglas and a Buteel with 150 men in pursuit of the Buteel and Bugla of the former Chief has been countermanded by Shaik Sultan. a Wahabee Agent is for the future to reside in Abothabee in order to collect the Zukat. Omr bin Afeesan has suggested Abdoollah bin Rashid the Vizl. of Dereiya now in consequence of the misrepresentations of Shaik Sultan and Shaik Rashid. Devissions and disputes between the Arabian Chiefs are fomented and encouraged by the Wahabees as enabling them to obtain arms with comparative ease. The whole of the defences of Bunymee are in the progress of Omr bin Afeesan and all the Chiefs are now in his presence excepting Shaik Jahnoon who remains in his own Capital.

True Translation
(Signed) L. Hennell
Assistant to the Resident

Extract of a Letter from the acting Agent at Muscat to the Resident in the Persian Gulf Dated 28th Shewal or 22nd March 1833.

7 days ago a Messenger arrived here bringing a Mare as a present from Omr bin Afeesan for the Imam. The object of this communication is to keep Mr Hyquist under by professing to have marched into Oman for the purpose of assisting him against his enemies to endeavour to obtain money from him and to confirm the Wahabee power with reference to the Tribes of that province. Shaik Sultan and Shaik Rashid have returned from Bunymee without seeing Omr bin Afeesan as they had been privately informed it was his intention to seize them both. They have however promised obedience in the event of the Wahabee supporting them in hostilities against Jahnoon. The greater part of the Batenah Chiefs have entered into engagements with Omr bin Afeesan and it is believed that Saeed Saood will do likewise. These proceedings form part of a plan of Toorky bin Saood to levy money out of the Imam.

True Translation
(Signed) L. Hennell
Asst to the Resident

True Copies
(Signed) D. A Blane
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Transcription of previous document

Bombay Castle 22nd May 1833 Political Consultn

True Translations

(Signed) S. Hennell
Assistt to the Resident

True Extracts

(Signed) D. A. Blane

From the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 22nd April

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose translation of a letter from the Government Agent at Sharga containing intelligence of interest regarding the state of affairs in that quarter.

2nd The account which it gives of the progress of the Wahabee force and the increasing power of that sect is supported by information received from other sources about a year since, as reported in my letter of the 29th May last the situation of Toorkee Bin Saood was described in a far different light, but the temporary decline of his authority occasioned by the opposition of a competitor claiming a preferable right by descent and stating himself to have escaped from confinement in Egypt has quickly given way to the superior energy of his character.

3rd. It is to be feared that the independence of our ally the Imam of Muscat cannot long coexist with an advancement of Wahabee ascending - Already indeed the exaction of the Zukat or Tribute of 5 per cent would appear by a letter from the Government Agent at Muscat of which I likewise enclose an Extract, to be in contemplation - as regards, however, the interests of commerce and interference with foreign states "Toorkee bin Saood" unlike his predecessors, still opposes himself to the wishes of the Joasmees and other lawless tribes desirous of his sanction for the renewal of piracy and aggression.

I have the honor to be your

(Signed) D. A. Blane

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Bushire Residency
22nd April 1833

Translation of a letter from Moollah Hoossein Agent at Shargah to the Resident in the Persian Gulf Dated 20th Shuwal or 14th March 1833.

I beg to report that all the Joasmee Chiefs are now at Brymee in the Camp of the Wahabee with whom they have entered into engagements of adherence and submission. The endeavours of Shaik Sultan and Shaik Rashid to induce "Omr bin Afeesan" to commence hostilities with Shaik Tahnoon have failed owing to the friendly exertions of the monasir chiefs to establish a good understanding between these parties an active correspondence is now carrying on with Aboothabee but the Wahabee leader insists upon the presence and personal submission of the Benyas Shaik as a necessary condition - It is not likely Tahnoon will go to Brymee in person but he will send his father Shakboot indeed it is said that that person has already set off, so that every prospect exists that peace will be established the more particularly as Toorky bin Saood is unwilling to commence a war after having extended his power over Nedgd and the whole of Oman without shedding a drop of blood. The Wukeels of the Imam and Humood bin Azan are in Brymee the defences of which place are being placed in a state of repair. A ditch is likewise being dug - Persons have been sent into every part of Oman threatening summary vengeance upon all who display any hesitation in paying the Zakat and other dues to the Wahabee - It appears that friendly relations have been established between Sheik Tahnoon and Omr bin Afeesan as the despatch of a Joasmee Fleet of 3 Buglas and a Buteel with 450 men in pursuit of the Buteel and Bugla of the former chief has been countermanded by Shaik Sultan. A Wahabee Agent is for the future to reside in Aboothabee in order to collect the Zukat. Omr bin Afeesan has seized Abdoollah bin Rashid the Chief of Amulgawan in consequence of the misrepresentations of Shaik Sultan and Shaik Rashid. Divisions and disputes between the Arabian Chiefs are fomented and encouraged by the Wahabees as enabling them to attain aims with comparative ease. The whole of the defences of Brymee are in the possession of Omr bin Afeesan and all the chiefs are now in his presence excepting Sheik Tahnoon who remains in his own capital.

True Translation
(Signed) S. Hennell
Assistant to the Resident

Extract of a Letter from the Acting Agent at Muscat to the Resident in the Persian Gulf Dated 28th Shuwal or 22nd March 1833

7 days ago a messenger arrived here bringing a mare as a present from Omr bin Afeesan for the Imam. The object of this communication is to keep H.H. quiet and by professing to have marched into Oman for the purpose of assisting him against his enemies to endeavour to obtain money from him and to confirm the Wahabee power with reference to the Tribes of that province. Shaik Sultan and Shaik Rashid have returned from Brymee without seeing Omr bin Afeesan as they had been privately informed it was his intention to seize them both. They have however promised obedience in the event of the Wahabee supporting them in hostilities against Tahnoon the greater part of the Batinah Chiefs have entered into engagements with Omr bin Afeesan and it is believed that Sued Saood will do so likewise. These proceedings form part of a plan of Toorky bin Saood to squeeze money out of the Imam.

True Translation
(Signed) S. Hennel
Assistant to the Resident

True Copies
(Signed) D. A. Blane
Resident in the Persian Gulf

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